Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
26 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Liming v. Damosgreen2 sentences2026“A purge hearing is not a new contempt proceeding but a conclusion of the originating contempt hearing, because its purpose is to determine whether the contemnor has satisfied the purge conditions.” Liming v. Damos, 2012-Ohio-4783, ¶ 16 . 2026“The only issue left for the purge hearing is whether the contemnor complied with the purge requirements.” Id. {¶13} At the purge hearing, the contemnor bears the burden to establish compliance with the purge conditions. | 2 | 12 |
S.H.B. v. M.W.L.green1 sentence2026S.H.B., 2019-Ohio-3036, at ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), citing Liming v. Damos, 2012-Ohio-4783, ¶ 16 . | 1 | 1 |
Pitts v. Ohio Department of Transportationgreen1 sentence2022Summit No. 24991, 2010-Ohio-4328 , ¶ 11, quoting Pitts at 379, fn. 1 . {¶24} The trial court’s March 3, 2020, order sustained some of Mr. Choudhry’s objections and returned the matter to the magistrate for a hearing on attorney’s fees and, because the original purge conditions related to payment of those fees, to “set the purge conditions and a purge hearing date in this case as appropriate.” Although M.C. later withdrew her request for 12 attorney’s fees, the March 3, 2020, order contemplated further action by the court with respect to the purge conditions and was, therefore, not a final appe | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. DeWine v. Precourt Sports Ventures L.L.Cgreen1 sentence2020DeWine v. Precourt Sports Ventures LLC, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-342, 2018-Ohio-2414, ¶ 10 ("We do not reach the merits of the trial court's order because we find that the trial court has yet to render a final appealable order in this case and we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction"). {¶ 36} The domestic relations court has not yet been in a position to conduct the purge hearing contemplated by its May 16, 2019 order. | 1 | 1 |
Solove v. Solovegreen1 sentence2013Solove at ¶ 12 (“An order suspending punishment on the condition the [contemnor] comply in the future with the court order does not allow for purging. | 1 | 1 |
Alabama v. Sheltongreen2 sentences2011And the Court concluded that “the only question at issue in the purge hearing-whether Ricardo purged the contempt-was a limited one and presented a low risk of an erroneous decision by the trial court.” Id. {¶25} Like the contemnor in Segovia, Liming had counsel to defend the contempt charge in the first instance and did not appeal from the contempt finding. 2011Therefore, the Segovia Court found that it could afford the finding of contempt “sufficient reliability to support a sentence.” Id., citing Alabama v. Shelton (2002), 535 U.S. 654, 665, 667 , 122 S.Ct. 1764 , 152 L.Ed.2d 888 . | 1 | 1 |
Segovia v. Likensgreen2 sentences2011See Segovia v. Athens App. No. 10CA6 7 Likens, 179 Ohio App.3d 256 , 2008-Ohio-5896 , 901 N.E.2d 310, at ¶39 . 2011See Segovia v. Athens App. No. 10CA6 7 Likens, 179 Ohio App.3d 256 , 2008-Ohio-5896 , 901 N.E.2d 310, at ¶39 . | 1 | 1 |
Gagnon v. Scarpellired2 sentences2011See Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778, 787-790 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (declining to adopt categorical rule that government must provide counsel for indigents in all probation or parole revocation cases and instead adopting a case-by-case approach). 2011See Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778, 787-790 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (declining to adopt categorical rule that government must provide counsel for indigents in all probation or parole revocation cases and instead adopting a case-by-case approach). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
The Docks Venture, L.L.C. v. Dashing Pacific Group, Ltd. (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2024E.g., Liming v. Damos, 133 Ohio St.3d 509 , 2012-Ohio-4783 , 979 N.E.2d 297 , ¶ 12-13 and 24. {¶ 17} A contempt judgment “is a final, appealable order at the time sentence is imposed and the matter is journalized, but * * * a contemnor may have an additional appeal on the limited question of whether or not the purge conditions have been met following execution of the sentence on the failure to purge.” Docks Venture, L.L.C. v. Dashing Pacific Group, Ltd., 141 Ohio St.3d 107 , 2014-Ohio-4254 , 22 N.E.3d 1035, ¶ 2 . “[A]t a purge hearing, ‘the propriety of the contempt finding or the purge condit 2024E.g., Liming v. Damos, 133 Ohio St.3d 509 , 2012-Ohio-4783 , 979 N.E.2d 297 , ¶ 12-13 and 24. {¶ 17} A contempt judgment “is a final, appealable order at the time sentence is imposed and the matter is journalized, but * * * a contemnor may have an additional appeal on the limited question of whether or not the purge conditions have been met following execution of the sentence on the failure to purge.” Docks Venture, L.L.C. v. Dashing Pacific Group, Ltd., 141 Ohio St.3d 107 , 2014-Ohio-4254 , 22 N.E.3d 1035, ¶ 2 . “[A]t a purge hearing, ‘the propriety of the contempt finding or the purge condit | 7 | 2015–2024 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences2012Instead, the appellate court concluded that the purge hearing retained the civil character of the original contempt proceeding, and therefore, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10 did not apply. {¶ 8} The Fourth District then addressed whether Liming had a due process right to counsel and applied the three-factor test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). 2012Instead, the appellate court concluded that the purge hearing retained the civil character of the original contempt proceeding, and therefore, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10 did not apply. {¶ 8} The Fourth District then addressed whether Liming had a due process right to counsel and applied the three-factor test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). | 2 | 2011–2012 |
Edward John Walker v. Ray McLain Sheriff of Lincoln County, Oklahoma
green
2 sentences2007The argument goes that because the civil contempt order contains a purge clause, the contemnor holds `the keys to the jailhouse door · · · · ` The faulty reasoning behind such an argument, as it applies to an indigent, was well explained in Walker v. McLain (C.A.10, 1985) 768 F.2d at 1183 `[i]t is true that defendant's right to appointed counsel diminishes as his interest in personal liberty diminishes. 2004The argument goes that because the civil contempt order contains a purge clause, the contemnor holds "the keys to the jailhouse door. . . ." The faulty reasoning behind such an argument, as it applies to an indigent, was well explained in Walker v. McLain (C.A.10, 1985) 768 F.2d at 1183 "[i]t is true that defendant's right to appointed counsel diminishes as his interest in personal liberty diminishes. | 2 | 2004–2007 |
Tucker v. Tucker
green
1 sentence2025However, “[a] purge hearing is not a new contempt proceeding but a conclusion of the originating contempt hearing, because its purpose is to determine whether the contemnor has satisfied the purge conditions.” Id. at ¶ 16. “[I]f the original contempt sanction is civil, a purge hearing retains the civil nature of that proceeding.” Id. at ¶ 18. {¶15} To the extent Matthew relies on Tucker v. Tucker, 10 Ohio App.3d 251 (10th Dist. 1983), that case is distinguishable. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Rich v. Rich
green
1 sentence2023Rich v. Rich, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2012-T-0089, 2013-Ohio-2840, ¶ 18 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Kilbane
green
2 sentences2023Nichol, supra, citing State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 206-207 , 400 N.E.2d 386 (1980). {¶19} Regarding a purge hearing, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated: A purge hearing is not a new contempt proceeding but a conclusion of the originating contempt hearing, because its purpose is to determine whether the contemnor has satisfied the purge conditions. 2023Nichol, supra, citing State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 206-207 , 400 N.E.2d 386 (1980). {¶19} Regarding a purge hearing, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated: A purge hearing is not a new contempt proceeding but a conclusion of the originating contempt hearing, because its purpose is to determine whether the contemnor has satisfied the purge conditions. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Kolano v. Vega
green
1 sentence2020Liming v. Damos, 133 6 Ohio St.3d 509 , 2012-Ohio-4783 , 979 N.E.2d 297, ¶ 16 (“A purge hearing is * * * a conclusion of the originating contempt hearing because its purpose is to determine whether the contemnor has satisfied the purge conditions.”); Kolano v. Vega, 2016-Ohio- 356, 58 N.E.3d 546 , ¶ 28-29 (5th Dist.) (arguments regarding inability to pay support must be raised at the contempt hearing, not the purge hearing, which is limited to whether the contemnor complied with purge conditions). {¶20} Here, the trial court overruled Regina’s motion because Alfred had already paid in full at | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Cleveland v. Bryce Peters Fin. Corp.
green
1 sentence2019(Emphasis added.) Id. {¶25} Determining whether an individual has satisfied a purge condition of civil contempt is within the sound discretion of the trial court, just as determining whether an individual was originally in contempt of court. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Gibbs
green
2 sentences2018Gibbs , 60 Ohio St.3d at 75 , 573 N.E.2d 62 . 2018Gibbs , 60 Ohio St.3d at 75 , 573 N.E.2d 62 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bostick v. Bostick
green
1 sentence2016Champaign No. 2014-CA-22, 2015-Ohio-455 (stating that the purge hearing was not the proper venue to introduce evidence regarding ability to pay the court-ordered obligation and the only remaining issue was whether the appellant paid to purge the contempt finding). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Frey v. Frey
green
2 sentences2013Frey v. Frey, 197 Ohio App.3d 273 , 2011-Ohio-6012 , 967 N.E.2d 24, ¶ 17 (3rd Dist.) (when the trial court “did not use the word ‘purge,’ or 6 otherwise characterize its decision in terms of an opportunity to purge” and ordered future conduct to be regulated, the court erred in imposing the contempt sanctions, since there was no clear opportunity to purge, and the matter was remanded for the issuance of a proper purge order). 2013Frey v. Frey, 197 Ohio App.3d 273 , 2011-Ohio-6012 , 967 N.E.2d 24, ¶ 17 (3rd Dist.) (when the trial court “did not use the word ‘purge,’ or 6 otherwise characterize its decision in terms of an opportunity to purge” and ordered future conduct to be regulated, the court erred in imposing the contempt sanctions, since there was no clear opportunity to purge, and the matter was remanded for the issuance of a proper purge order). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Liming v. Damos
green
2 sentences2012No. 10CA39, 2011-Ohio-2726 , 2011 WL 2225067 , at ¶ 14. 2012(Nos. 2011-1170 and 2011-1985—Submitted May 23, 2012—Decided October 24, 2012.) APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Athens County, No. 10CA39, 2011-Ohio-2726 . __________________ SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 1. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Pasqua v. Council
green
2 sentences2012Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127,145 , 892 A.2d 663 (2006). {¶ 51} In this case, Liming claimed indigency at the purge hearing and bore the burden of proving the defense of inability to pay. 2012Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127,145 , 892 A.2d 663 (2006). {¶ 51} In this case, Liming claimed indigency at the purge hearing and bore the burden of proving the defense of inability to pay. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Turner v. Rogers
green
2 sentences2012The Supreme Court noted in Turner that “[g]iven the importance of the interest at stake, it is obviously important to assure accurate decision-making in respect to the key ‘ability to pay’ question.” Turner, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. at 2518 , 180 L.Ed.2d 452 . 2012The Supreme Court noted in Turner that “[g]iven the importance of the interest at stake, it is obviously important to assure accurate decision-making in respect to the key ‘ability to pay’ question.” Turner, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. at 2518 , 180 L.Ed.2d 452 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Green v. Green, 2007-P-0092 (6-20-2008)
green
2 sentences2011However, none of these cases address the specific issue of whether a civil contemnor has a constitutional right to appointed counsel at a purge hearing: Schock v. Sheppard (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 45 , 453 N.E.2d 1292 ; Green v. Green, Portage App. No. 2007-P-0092, 2008-Ohio-3064 ; Everly v. Shuster (Apr. 27, 1999), Noble App. No. 237, 1999 WL 260895 ; Duffield v. Duffield (Sept. 12, 2001), Wayne App. No. 01CA0002, 2001 WL 1044077 . {¶21} Therefore, to determine whether an indigent civil contemnor who had counsel at his contempt hearing has a per se right to appointed counsel at a purge hearing, 2011However, none of these cases address the specific issue of whether a civil contemnor has a constitutional right to appointed counsel at a purge hearing: Schock v. Sheppard (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 45 , 453 N.E.2d 1292 ; Green v. Green, Portage App. No. 2007-P-0092, 2008-Ohio-3064 ; Everly v. Shuster (Apr. 27, 1999), Noble App. No. 237, 1999 WL 260895 ; Duffield v. Duffield (Sept. 12, 2001), Wayne App. No. 01CA0002, 2001 WL 1044077 . {¶21} Therefore, to determine whether an indigent civil contemnor who had counsel at his contempt hearing has a per se right to appointed counsel at a purge hearing, | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Schock v. Sheppard
green
2 sentences2011However, none of these cases address the specific issue of whether a civil contemnor has a constitutional right to appointed counsel at a purge hearing: Schock v. Sheppard (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 45 , 453 N.E.2d 1292 ; Green v. Green, Portage App. No. 2007-P-0092, 2008-Ohio-3064 ; Everly v. Shuster (Apr. 27, 1999), Noble App. No. 237, 1999 WL 260895 ; Duffield v. Duffield (Sept. 12, 2001), Wayne App. No. 01CA0002, 2001 WL 1044077 . {¶21} Therefore, to determine whether an indigent civil contemnor who had counsel at his contempt hearing has a per se right to appointed counsel at a purge hearing, 2011However, none of these cases address the specific issue of whether a civil contemnor has a constitutional right to appointed counsel at a purge hearing: Schock v. Sheppard (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 45 , 453 N.E.2d 1292 ; Green v. Green, Portage App. No. 2007-P-0092, 2008-Ohio-3064 ; Everly v. Shuster (Apr. 27, 1999), Noble App. No. 237, 1999 WL 260895 ; Duffield v. Duffield (Sept. 12, 2001), Wayne App. No. 01CA0002, 2001 WL 1044077 . {¶21} Therefore, to determine whether an indigent civil contemnor who had counsel at his contempt hearing has a per se right to appointed counsel at a purge hearing, | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty.
green
2 sentences2011Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services (1981), 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640 . {¶17} Liming claims that he had a due process right to counsel at the purge hearing because he faced the loss of his physical liberty at the hearing. 2011Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services (1981), 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 , 101 S.Ct. 2153 , 68 L.Ed.2d 640 . {¶17} Liming claims that he had a due process right to counsel at the purge hearing because he faced the loss of his physical liberty at the hearing. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Cortland United Methodist Church v. Knowles, 2006-T-0110 (6-29-2007)
green
1 sentence2009No. 2006-T-0110, 2007-Ohio-3383 , at ¶ 33 . {¶ 28} The evidence submitted at trial and during the purge hearing revealed the probate court had, on at least seven separate occasions, formally ordered Adams to file a final distributive accounting relating to the guardianship and turn over all estate documentation to Mr. Meraglio. 2 Furthermore, on at least five separate occasions, Mr. Flaherty was ordered to file a written explanation concerning who, if anyone, was in possession of over $220,000 of unaccounted-for guardianship funds. 3 As a result of appellants' mutual acts or omissions, Attorne | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.