separate-vote requirement in Oregon

2024Second, drawing on Baum v. Newbry et al., 200 Or 576 , 267 P2d 220 (1954), the court explained that the separate-vote requirement aims to ensure that “voters are able to express their will in one vote as to only one constitutional change.” Armatta, 327 Or at 269 .

2024From that origin, the court recognized that the separate-vote requirement operates to restrict such proposals in scope to making “particular, specific changes to the constitution.” Id.

2024Second, drawing on Baum v. Newbry et al., 200 Or 576 , 267 P2d 220 (1954), the court explained that the separate-vote requirement aims to ensure that “voters are able to express their will in one vote as to only one constitutional change.” Armatta, 327 Or at 269 .

2024Second, drawing on Baum v. Newbry et al., 200 Or 576 , 267 P2d 220 (1954), the court explained that the separate-vote requirement aims to ensure that “voters are able to express their will in one vote as to only one constitutional change.” Armatta, 327 Or at 269 .

2006In Lehman v. Bradbury, 333 Or 231 , 37 P3d 989 (2002), this court concluded that Measure 3, which concerned term limits for various public officials, embodied multiple amendments to the constitution in violation of the separate-vote requirement.

2006In Lehman v. Bradbury, 333 Or 231 , 37 P3d 989 (2002), this court concluded that Measure 3, which concerned term limits for various public officials, embodied multiple amendments to the constitution in violation of the separate-vote requirement.

2006Armatta held, and this court reaffirmed in Meyer , that “a separate-vote analysis must focus on the ‘particular changes made to the constitu tion.’ ” Meyer, 341 Or at 297 (quoting Swett v. Bradbury, 333 Or 597, 609 , 43 P3d 1094 (2002)) (emphasis in original); Armatta, 327 Or at 278 .

2006Armatta held, and this court reaffirmed in Meyer , that “a separate-vote analysis must focus on the ‘particular changes made to the constitu tion.’ ” Meyer, 341 Or at 297 (quoting Swett v. Bradbury, 333 Or 597, 609 , 43 P3d 1094 (2002)) (emphasis in original); Armatta, 327 Or at 278 .

2024See Lincoln Interagency Narcotics Team v. Kitzhaber, 341 Or 496, 503, 513 , 145 P3d 151 (2006) (LINT) (holding that a lengthy measure complied with the separate-vote requirement despite the fact that it had “more in common, both in appearance and in substance, with legislation than with constitutional amendments”).

2024See Lincoln Interagency Narcotics Team v. Kitzhaber, 341 Or 496, 503, 513 , 145 P3d 151 (2006) (LINT) (holding that a lengthy measure complied with the separate-vote requirement despite the fact that it had “more in common, both in appearance and in substance, with legislation than with constitutional amendments”).

2024See Anantha v. Clarno, 302 Or App 196, 200 , 461 P3d 282 (2020) (applying that standard in an analogous context).

2024See Anantha v. Clarno, 302 Or App 196, 200 , 461 P3d 282 (2020) (applying that standard in an analogous context).

2006As the court explained in Meyer v. Bradbury, 341 Or 288, 296 , 142 P3d 1031 (2006), the separate-vote requirement “has a different application and is driven by a decidedly different rationale. * * * [T]he separate-vote requirement serves as a safeguard that is fundamental to the concept of a constitution.” The difference between those two standards is the level of generality at which they operate.

2006As the court explained in Meyer v. Bradbury, 341 Or 288, 296 , 142 P3d 1031 (2006), the separate-vote requirement “has a different application and is driven by a decidedly different rationale. * * * [T]he separate-vote requirement serves as a safeguard that is fundamental to the concept of a constitution.” The difference between those two standards is the level of generality at which they operate.

2021See Geddry, 296 Or App at 147 ; Meyer, 205 Or App at 302-03 (“[A] challenge to a proposed measure on the ground that it violates the separate-vote requirement may be brought before the election.”).

2006In the decision that followed, the Court of Appeals held that (1) under this court’s decision in Foster v. Clark, 309 Or 464 , 790 P2d 1 (1990), initiative challenges based on the separate-vote requirement properly could be brought before an election, Meyer, 205 Or App at 301-03 ; (2) plaintiffs possessed the necessary standing to bring their action, id. at 304 ; and (3) to the extent that plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies before initiating their action, they had done so in this case.

2002However, in the trial court, plaintiffs relied on a decision of the Court of Appeals, Dale v. Kiesling, 167 Or App 394 , 999 P2d 1229 (2000), in which that court characterized the separate-vote inquiry in a different way.

2002However, in the trial court, plaintiffs relied on a decision of the Court of Appeals, Dale v. Kiesling, 167 Or App 394 , 999 P2d 1229 (2000), in which that court characterized the separate-vote inquiry in a different way.

2021See Geddry, 296 Or App at 147 ; Meyer, 205 Or App at 302-03 (“[A] challenge to a proposed measure on the ground that it violates the separate-vote requirement may be brought before the election.”).

2021Specifically, much as in our Geddry decision, we conclude that the fact-bound question of whether the particular initiative at issue here meets the separate-vote requirement of ORS 203.725(2) does not merit an exercise of our discretion to address moot issues. 296 Or App at 148 (declining to exercise discretion to reach the merits of the moot question “whether the language of a now-expired initiative petition was compliant with Oregon constitutional requirements”); see also Eastern Oregon Mining Assoc., 285 Or App at 834 (declining to address a moot issue that “does not present a recurring leg

2021Specifically, much as in our Geddry decision, we conclude that the fact-bound question of whether the particular initiative at issue here meets the separate-vote requirement of ORS 203.725(2) does not merit an exercise of our discretion to address moot issues. 296 Or App at 148 (declining to exercise discretion to reach the merits of the moot question “whether the language of a now-expired initiative petition was compliant with Oregon constitutional requirements”); see also Eastern Oregon Mining Assoc., 285 Or App at 834 (declining to address a moot issue that “does not present a recurring leg

2021See id. (“ ‘It is axiomatic that, among the various interests that the government of this state seeks to protect and promote, the interests represented by the state constitution are paramount to legislative ones.’ ” (Quoting State v. Stoneman, 323 Or 536, 542 , 920 P2d 535 (1996) (emphasis in Meyer).)).

2021See id. (“ ‘It is axiomatic that, among the various interests that the government of this state seeks to protect and promote, the interests represented by the state constitution are paramount to legislative ones.’ ” (Quoting State v. Stoneman, 323 Or 536, 542 , 920 P2d 535 (1996) (emphasis in Meyer).)).

2003Despite its ultimate conclusion that the separate-vote requirement does not focus on the relationship between the policy goals of multiple amendments, it initially suggests that the changes made by Measure 3 are closely related because it was "intended to establish a coherent and comprehensive scheme to address a discrete policy goal." 188 Or.App. at 565 , 72 P.3d at 989 (Armstrong, J., dissenting).

2003Despite its ultimate conclusion that the separate-vote requirement does not focus on the relationship between the policy goals of multiple amendments, it initially suggests that the changes made by Measure 3 are closely related because it was "intended to establish a coherent and comprehensive scheme to address a discrete policy goal." 188 Or.App. at 565 , 72 P.3d at 989 (Armstrong, J., dissenting).

2003Cooney, 293 Mont. 274 , 975 P.2d 325, 328-31 (1999); Cambria v. Soaries, 169 N.J. 1 , 776 A.2d 754, 763-65 (2001); Pennsylvania Prison Society v. Commonwealth, 727 A.2d 632, 634-35 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), rev'd on other grounds, 565 Pa. 526 , 776 A.2d 971 (2001). [5] For example, Article IV of the Oregon Constitution, the subdivision that addresses the legislative branch, did not have to be divided into as many sections as it is. [6] The majority suggests that consideration of constitutional design or structure is of little help in the separate-vote analysis because constitutions include seemingly a

2003Cooney, 293 Mont. 274 , 975 P.2d 325, 328-31 (1999); Cambria v. Soaries, 169 N.J. 1 , 776 A.2d 754, 763-65 (2001); Pennsylvania Prison Society v. Commonwealth, 727 A.2d 632, 634-35 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), rev'd on other grounds, 565 Pa. 526 , 776 A.2d 971 (2001). [5] For example, Article IV of the Oregon Constitution, the subdivision that addresses the legislative branch, did not have to be divided into as many sections as it is. [6] The majority suggests that consideration of constitutional design or structure is of little help in the separate-vote analysis because constitutions include seemingly a

2003Cooney, 293 Mont. 274 , 975 P.2d 325, 328-31 (1999); Cambria v. Soaries, 169 N.J. 1 , 776 A.2d 754, 763-65 (2001); Pennsylvania Prison Society v. Commonwealth, 727 A.2d 632, 634-35 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), rev'd on other grounds, 565 Pa. 526 , 776 A.2d 971 (2001). [5] For example, Article IV of the Oregon Constitution, the subdivision that addresses the legislative branch, did not have to be divided into as many sections as it is. [6] The majority suggests that consideration of constitutional design or structure is of little help in the separate-vote analysis because constitutions include seemingly a

2003Cooney, 293 Mont. 274 , 975 P.2d 325, 328-31 (1999); Cambria v. Soaries, 169 N.J. 1 , 776 A.2d 754, 763-65 (2001); Pennsylvania Prison Society v. Commonwealth, 727 A.2d 632, 634-35 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), rev'd on other grounds, 565 Pa. 526 , 776 A.2d 971 (2001). [5] For example, Article IV of the Oregon Constitution, the subdivision that addresses the legislative branch, did not have to be divided into as many sections as it is. [6] The majority suggests that consideration of constitutional design or structure is of little help in the separate-vote analysis because constitutions include seemingly a

2003Cooney, 293 Mont. 274 , 975 P.2d 325, 328-31 (1999); Cambria v. Soaries, 169 N.J. 1 , 776 A.2d 754, 763-65 (2001); Pennsylvania Prison Society v. Commonwealth, 727 A.2d 632, 634-35 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), rev'd on other grounds, 565 Pa. 526 , 776 A.2d 971 (2001). [5] For example, Article IV of the Oregon Constitution, the subdivision that addresses the legislative branch, did not have to be divided into as many sections as it is. [6] The majority suggests that consideration of constitutional design or structure is of little help in the separate-vote analysis because constitutions include seemingly a

1998Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or. 551, 559 , 871 P.2d 106 (1994). [5] The voters' pamphlet for the 1906 election did not contain any statements by supporters or opponents concerning their understanding of the scope of the amendment to Article XVII, including the application of the separate-vote requirement to initiated amendments.

1998Ecumenical Ministries v. Oregon State Lottery Comm., 318 Or. 551, 559 , 871 P.2d 106 (1994). [5] The voters' pamphlet for the 1906 election did not contain any statements by supporters or opponents concerning their understanding of the scope of the amendment to Article XVII, including the application of the separate-vote requirement to initiated amendments.