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24 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Southwestern Refining Co., Inc. v. Bernalgreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., Riemer, 392 S.W.3d at 639 ; Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 433, 435 (adopting rigorous analysis requirement from federal decisions). 4 TEX. 2004Fed.R.Civ.P. 23; Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 433, 435-36. | 3 | 3 |
In re Universal Access, Inc.green2 sentences2004In re Universal Access, Inc. , 209 F.R.D. 379, 386 (E.D. 2004In re Universal Access, Inc. , 209 F.R.D. 379, 386 (E.D. | 3 | 3 |
RSR Corp. v. Hayesgreen2 sentences1996RSR Corp. v. Hayes, 673 S.W.2d 928, 931-32 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984, writ dism'd w.o.j.). . 1996RSR Corp. v. Hayes, 673 S.W.2d 928, 931-32 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1984, writ dism'd w.o.j.). [2] These alleged individual issues are: (1) whether the class member received the rate increase notification letter; (2) under the circumstances of each class member, whether the letter constituted a misrepresentation; (3) whether each class member relied on the alleged misrepresentations; (4) what was the class member's understanding of rate increases under the policy; (5) what was the class member's prior experience with rate increases under this policy; (6) how many rate increases has each class member | 2 | 3 |
Smith v. Lewisgreen2 sentences1996Smith v. Lewis, 578 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. 1993See Smith v. Lewis, 578 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 4 .But see Amoco Production Co. v. Hardy, 628 S.W.2d 813, 817 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1981, writ dism’d) (class of royalty interest owners decertified because each claim was under a differing lease, requiring individual findings as to each, thus common questions did not predominate). 5 . | 2 | 2 |
Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernardgreen2 sentences2002In construing a trial court’s powers under the federal class action rule, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “an order limiting communications between parties and potential class members should be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the parties.” Hall, 972 S.W.2d at 795 (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 , 101 S.Ct. 2193 , 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981)). 2002In construing a trial court’s powers under the federal class action rule, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “an order limiting communications between parties and potential class members should be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the parties.” Hall, 972 S.W.2d at 795 (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 , 101 S.Ct. 2193 , 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981)). | 1 | 3 |
Ex Parte Odomgreen2 sentences1979Ex parte Odom, 153 Tex. 537 , 271 S.W.2d 796, 797 (1954); Ford v. Bimbo Corporation, supra, at 796; 1 R. 1979Ex parte Odom, 153 Tex. 537 , 271 S.W.2d 796, 797 (1954); Ford v. Bimbo Corporation, supra, at 796; 1 R. | 1 | 2 |
Jimmy Glen Riemer v. the State of Texas and Jerry Patterson, as Commissioner of the General Land Office of the State of Texasgreen1 sentence2023See, e.g., Riemer, 392 S.W.3d at 639 ; Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 433, 435 (adopting rigorous analysis requirement from federal decisions). 4 TEX. | 1 | 1 |
Kelley v. Sclater (In Re Sclater)green1 sentence2005We conclude that absent express statutory language granting the Attorney General parens patriae authority, the Attorney General cannot maintain a class action without satisfying the class-action prerequisites.13 Article 21.21, which mirrors the federal class-action rule, contains no clear, express grant of authority for the Attorney General to assume parens patriae authority. 13 As supporting authority, appellees cite In re Toys “R” Us Antitrust Litigation, 191 F.R.D. 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), and In re Sclater, 40 B.R. 594, 595 (E.D. | 1 | 1 |
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapraygreen1 sentence2004Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 663-664 (2004); Tex.R. | 1 | 1 |
Walton v. Franklin Collection Agency, Inc.green1 sentence2004In re Universal Access, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 379, 386 (E.D.Tex.2002); Walton v. Franklin Collection Agency, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 404, 410 (N.D.Miss.2000); Kalodner v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 200, 209 (N.D.Tex. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Kalodner v. Michaels Stores, Inc.green1 sentence2004In re Universal Access, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 379, 386 (E.D.Tex.2002); Walton v. Franklin Collection Agency, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 404, 410 (N.D.Miss.2000); Kalodner v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 172 F.R.D. 200, 209 (N.D.Tex. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Shawnee Library Systemgreen2 sentences2001See, e.g., Smith v. Shawnee Library Sys., 60 F.3d 317 , 322 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that “class certification was void because no notice was ever given” before adjudication of the merits); see also Gert v. Elgin Nat’l Indus., Inc., 773 F.2d 154, 159-60 (7th Cir.1985); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 762 (3d Cir.1974) (noting that the federal class action rule provides protection against one-way intervention after an interlocutory merits determination). 2001See, e.g., Smith v. Shawnee Library Sys., 60 F.3d 317 , 322 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that "class certification was void because no notice was ever given" before adjudication of the merits); see also Gert v. Elgin Nat'l Indus., Inc., 773 F.2d 154, 159-60 (7th Cir. 1985); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 762 (3d Cir.1974) (noting that the federal class action rule provides protection against one-way intervention after an interlocutory merits determination). | 1 | 1 |
Celia Gert Individually and on Behalf of the Certified Class v. Elgin National Industries, Inc., a Delaware Corporationgreen2 sentences2001See, e.g., Smith v. Shawnee Library Sys., 60 F.3d 317 , 322 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that “class certification was void because no notice was ever given” before adjudication of the merits); see also Gert v. Elgin Nat’l Indus., Inc., 773 F.2d 154, 159-60 (7th Cir.1985); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 762 (3d Cir.1974) (noting that the federal class action rule provides protection against one-way intervention after an interlocutory merits determination). 2001See, e.g., Smith v. Shawnee Library Sys., 60 F.3d 317 , 322 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that "class certification was void because no notice was ever given" before adjudication of the merits); see also Gert v. Elgin Nat'l Indus., Inc., 773 F.2d 154, 159-60 (7th Cir. 1985); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 762 (3d Cir.1974) (noting that the federal class action rule provides protection against one-way intervention after an interlocutory merits determination). | 1 | 1 |
In Re: Philip Morris Incorporatedgreen2 sentences2001In Philip Morris Inc. v. National Asbestos Workers Medical Fund, 214 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir.2000), which was a mandamus proceeding, the Second Circuit held that a trial court was required to decide whether to certify a class before it proceeded to try the case on the merits. 2001In Philip Morris Inc. v. National Asbestos Workers Medical Fund, 214 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir.2000), which was a mandamus proceeding, the Second Circuit held that a trial court was required to decide whether to certify a class before it proceeded to try the case on the merits. | 1 | 1 |
Reuben J. Katz, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated v. Carte Blanche Corporationgreen2 sentences2001See, e.g., Smith v. Shawnee Library Sys., 60 F.3d 317 , 322 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that “class certification was void because no notice was ever given” before adjudication of the merits); see also Gert v. Elgin Nat’l Indus., Inc., 773 F.2d 154, 159-60 (7th Cir.1985); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 762 (3d Cir.1974) (noting that the federal class action rule provides protection against one-way intervention after an interlocutory merits determination). 2001See, e.g., Smith v. Shawnee Library Sys., 60 F.3d 317 , 322 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that "class certification was void because no notice was ever given" before adjudication of the merits); see also Gert v. Elgin Nat'l Indus., Inc., 773 F.2d 154, 159-60 (7th Cir. 1985); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 762 (3d Cir.1974) (noting that the federal class action rule provides protection against one-way intervention after an interlocutory merits determination). | 1 | 1 |
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Garzagreen1 sentence1999Amerada Hess Corp. v. Garza, 973 S.W.2d 667, 674 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1996, writ dism’d); see Fed. | 1 | 1 |
Employers Casualty Co. v. Texas Ass'n of School Boards Workers' Compensation Self-Insurance Fundgreen2 sentences1998Employers Cas., 886 S.W.2d at 473, n. 4 ; Brister, 722 S.W.2d at 770 . [3] A trial court may base its decision on the pleadings and other materials. 1998Employers Cas., 886 S.W.2d at 473, n. 4 ; Brister, 722 S.W.2d at 770 . . | 1 | 1 |
Morgan v. Deere Credit, Inc.green1 sentence1998Morgan v. Deere Credit, Inc., 889 S.W.2d 360, 365 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994 no writ); Ball v. Farm & Home Sav. | 1 | 1 |
General Motors Corp. v. Bloyedgreen1 sentence1997See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949 , 954 n. 1 (Tex.1996) (“In our analysis of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42, we are guided by analysis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, from which Rule 42 was derived.”); Ball v. Farm & Home Sav. | 1 | 1 |
Amoco Production Co. v. Hardygreen1 sentence1993See Smith v. Lewis, 578 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 4 .But see Amoco Production Co. v. Hardy, 628 S.W.2d 813, 817 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1981, writ dism’d) (class of royalty interest owners decertified because each claim was under a differing lease, requiring individual findings as to each, thus common questions did not predominate). 5 . | 1 | 1 |
Ford v. Bimbo Corporationgreen1 sentence1979Ex parte Odom, 153 Tex. 537 , 271 S.W.2d 796, 797 (1954); Ford v. Bimbo Corporation, supra, at 796; 1 R. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Hall
green
2 sentences2002In construing a trial court’s powers under the federal class action rule, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “an order limiting communications between parties and potential class members should be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the parties.” Hall, 972 S.W.2d at 795 (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 , 101 S.Ct. 2193 , 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981)). 2000In construing a trial court's powers under the federal class action rule, the United States Supreme Court has stated that "an order limiting communications between parties and potential class members should be based on a clear record and specific findings that reflect a weighing of the need for a limitation and the potential interference with the rights of the parties." Hall , 972 S.W.2d at 795 (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard , 452 U.S. 89, 101 (1981)). | 2 | 2000–2002 |
In re Toys \R\" Us Antitrust Litigation"
green
1 sentence2005We conclude that absent express statutory language granting the Attorney General parens patriae authority, the Attorney General cannot maintain a class action without satisfying the class-action prerequisites.13 Article 21.21, which mirrors the federal class-action rule, contains no clear, express grant of authority for the Attorney General to assume parens patriae authority. 13 As supporting authority, appellees cite In re Toys “R” Us Antitrust Litigation, 191 F.R.D. 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), and In re Sclater, 40 B.R. 594, 595 (E.D. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson
green
2 sentences2002Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 433, 435-36 ; Beeson, 22 S.W.3d at 403-405 . 2002Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 433, 435-36 ; Beeson, 22 S.W.3d at 403-405 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Life Insurance Co. of Southwest v. Brister
green
2 sentences1998Employers Cas., 886 S.W.2d at 473, n. 4 ; Brister, 722 S.W.2d at 770 . [3] A trial court may base its decision on the pleadings and other materials. 1998Employers Cas., 886 S.W.2d at 473, n. 4 ; Brister, 722 S.W.2d at 770 . . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Adams v. Reagan
green
1 sentence1998Although rule 42 is patterned after the federal class action rule and FirstCollect’s reference to federal ease law is appropriate, see id. at 288 , federal decisions are merely persuasive in interpreting the Texas rule. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Wente v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.
green
1 sentence1989Wente, 712 S.W.2d at 255 ; see also 1 Newberg on Class Actions § 4.22 (2d ed. 1985) (pointing out the “considerable overlap” in this respect between the two analogous sections of the federal class-action rule). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Zauber v. Murray Savings Ass'n
green
1 sentence1981Zauber v. Murray Savings Association, 591 S.W.2d 932 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1979, writ ref’d n.r. e.); Tex.R.Civ.P. 42, Comment. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.