viable constitutional claim in Texas

2022Even so, however, “this limited waiver of immunity exists only to the extent the plaintiff has pleaded a viable constitutional claim.” Downstream [Env’t], 444 S.W.3d at 38 ; City of Hous[.] v. Johnson, 353 S.W.3d 499, 504 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).

2021Even so, however, “this limited waiver of immunity exists only to the extent the plaintiff has pleaded a viable constitutional claim.” Downstream Envtl., 444 S.W.3d at 38 ; City of Houston v. Johnson, 353 S.W.3d 499, 504 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).

2025The City’s Immunity Is Waived for Oncor’s Viable Constitutional Claim As explained above, the Texas Constitution authorizes suits for equitable or injunctive relief for violations of the Texas Bill of Rights, see Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d at 148-49 , but 23 to invoke this limited waiver of immunity, the plaintiff must plead a viable constitutional claim, City of Houston v. Downstream Env’t, L.L.C., 444 S.W.3d 24, 38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied); see also Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2011) (citing, e.g., City of Elsa, 226 S.W.3d at 392 ; Bouillion, 896 S.W

2022Id.; Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2011).

2025The City’s Immunity Is Waived for Oncor’s Viable Constitutional Claim As explained above, the Texas Constitution authorizes suits for equitable or injunctive relief for violations of the Texas Bill of Rights, see Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d at 148-49 , but 23 to invoke this limited waiver of immunity, the plaintiff must plead a viable constitutional claim, City of Houston v. Downstream Env’t, L.L.C., 444 S.W.3d 24, 38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied); see also Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2011) (citing, e.g., City of Elsa, 226 S.W.3d at 392 ; Bouillion, 896 S.W

2022Even so, however, “this limited waiver of immunity exists only to the extent the plaintiff has pleaded a viable constitutional claim.” Downstream [Env’t], 444 S.W.3d at 38 ; City of Hous[.] v. Johnson, 353 S.W.3d 499, 504 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).

2025Constitution expressly contemplates the very 1, § 3, a plaintiff must show that he was "treated action that forms the basis of his complaint. differently from others similarly situated." Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 13 .

2019See Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 13 (stating that “[w]hile it is true that sovereign immunity does not bar a suit to vindicate constitutional rights . . . 9 immunity from suit is not waived if the constitutional claims are facially invalid”); Rose, 2017 WL 4697889 , at *10 (stating that “[i]n the absence of a viable constitutional claim, [the governmental entity] did not waive its immunity, and the trial court properly granted the plea as to [the plaintiff’s] constitutional claim”).

2025The City’s Immunity Is Waived for Oncor’s Viable Constitutional Claim As explained above, the Texas Constitution authorizes suits for equitable or injunctive relief for violations of the Texas Bill of Rights, see Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d at 148-49 , but 23 to invoke this limited waiver of immunity, the plaintiff must plead a viable constitutional claim, City of Houston v. Downstream Env’t, L.L.C., 444 S.W.3d 24, 38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied); see also Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2011) (citing, e.g., City of Elsa, 226 S.W.3d at 392 ; Bouillion, 896 S.W

2025According to Williams, the Department “should be called to task to explain why the alternative of harvest is not considered, even for deer that test positive for or are exposed to CWD.” Sovereign immunity does not bar a suit for equitable relief based upon an alleged violation of the Texas Constitution, City of Elsa v. M.A.L., 226 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. 2007), but immunity is waived only insofar as the plaintiff pleads a viable constitutional claim.

2025Oncor further contends that it has presented a viable constitutional claim that the City’s threatened taking would be void because no appropriate procedure exists to ascertain and compensate it for the value of the Streetlight System as a “going concern,” see id. at 803-05, and thus, the City’s immunity is waived.

2025And under Lone Star, which remains binding precedent, because the general Texas condemnation statutes provide no mechanism for the awarding of going-concern value, we conclude that Oncor has stated a viable constitutional claim for which the City’s immunity is waived. 98 S.W.2d at 805 (concluding injunction was proper remedy for preventing City of Fort Worth’s attempt to take Lone Star’s business and properties “in the absence of adequate and appropriate machinery for ascertaining the constitutional compensation which plaintiff would be entitled to receive”).

2023See City of Paris v. Abbott, 360 S.W.3d 567 , 583 & n.13 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, pet. denied); City of Houston v. Johnson, 353 S.W.3d 499, 505 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). 8

2021See Sanchez v. Brown, 2020 WL 2615931 , at *18 (“This Court also questions the appropriateness of using its power to turn what are now CDC recommendations into orders that must be complied with under threat of contempt.”); see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 543 n.27. –31– The conduct alleged here does not, as a matter of law, state a viable constitutional claim.

2019Where, as here, “[the] plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts,” and those facts implicate the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, “we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties” to the extent “necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised.” Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004) (citing Bland Indep.

2018See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 , 541–42, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (providing that “the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights—life, liberty, and 23 property—cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures,” and that such a deprivation must therefore “be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case”); Hamilton v. City of Wake Vill., 593 F. Supp. 1294, 1296 (E.D.

2018See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 , 541–42, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (providing that “the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights—life, liberty, and 23 property—cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures,” and that such a deprivation must therefore “be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case”); Hamilton v. City of Wake Vill., 593 F. Supp. 1294, 1296 (E.D.

2018See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 , 541–42, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (providing that “the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights—life, liberty, and 23 property—cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures,” and that such a deprivation must therefore “be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case”); Hamilton v. City of Wake Vill., 593 F. Supp. 1294, 1296 (E.D.

2018P. 47.1; Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 87 (Tex. 2015). –16– Accordingly, Hinga has failed to plead a viable constitutional claim under article I, section 19 of the Texas Constitution waiving the City’s governmental immunity.

2018But, as stated above, “this limited waiver of immunity exists only to the extent the plaintiff has pled a viable constitutional claim.” Downstream Envtl., 444 S.W.3d at 38 . “[C]itizens do not surrender their First Amendment rights by accepting public employment.” Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2374 (2014).

2018To the contrary, “speech by public employees on subject matter related to their employment holds special value precisely because those employees gain knowledge of matters of public concern through their employment.” Id. at 2379 .

2015See Barth, 403 S.W.3d at 853 ; Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2011); Montrose Management Dist. v. 1620 Hawthorne, Ltd., 435 S.W.3d 393, 408 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. filed). 2 Neither before nor after the trial court’s dismissal order, did Ward ask the trial court for an opportunity to amend her petition.

2015See Barth, 403 S.W.3d at 853 ; Andrade v. NAACP of Austin, 345 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. 2011); Montrose Management Dist. v. 1620 Hawthorne, Ltd., 435 S.W.3d 393, 408 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. filed). 2 Neither before nor after the trial court’s dismissal order, did Ward ask the trial court for an opportunity to amend her petition.