vindication of a legal claim in Texas

2025In Harper, the supreme court stated that the TCPA’s “legal action” definition “appears to encompass any ‘procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim.’” 562 S.W.3d at 8 (quoting Paulsen, 537 S.W.3d at 233 ) (emphasis added).

2025In holding that the TCPA did not authorize a countermotion to dismiss as a substitute for filing an opposing response, the court observed, “For these purposes the enumeration of ‘lawsuit,’ ‘cause of action,’ ‘petition,’ ‘complaint,’ ‘cross-claim,’ and ‘counterclaim,’ is best characterized by the observation that each element of this class is a procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim, in a sense that is not true for a motion to dismiss.” Paulsen, 537 S.W.3d at 233–34 (emphasis added).

2025In Harper, the supreme court stated that the TCPA’s “legal action” definition “appears to encompass any ‘procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim.’” 562 S.W.3d at 8 (quoting Paulsen, 537 S.W.3d at 233 ) (emphasis added).

2019Code § 27.001(6), and under the supreme court’s interpretation of that phrase as “appear[ing] to encompass any procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim,” see Harper, 562 S.W.3d at 8, 12 (also noting that “it would be difficult to write a more capacious definition”).

2018This undeniably “broad” definition appears to encompass any “procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim.” Paulsen v. Yarrell, 537 S.W.3d 224, 233 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (noting, however, that a TCPA dismissal motion is not itself a TCPA “legal action”); see also In re Elliott, 504 S.W.3d 455, 465 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, orig. proceeding) (holding that the TCPA’s “broad definition” encompasses a petition under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202); Better Bus.

2018This undeniably "broad" definition appears to encompass any "procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim." Paulsen v. Yarrell , 537 S.W.3d 224 , 233 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (noting, however, that a TCPA dismissal motion is not itself a TCPA "legal action"); see also In re Elliott , 504 S.W.3d 455 , 465 (Tex. App.-Austin 2016, orig. proceeding) (holding that the TCPA's "broad definition" encompasses a petition under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202); Better Bus.

2021Because the motion to compel was ancillary to Suzann’s substantive claims, it was not a “procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim” that 12 would constitute a “legal action” under the catch-all provision of the 2011 statutory definition.6 See Misko, 575 S.W.3d at 877 ; see also In re Guardianship of Fairley, 604 S.W.3d 450 , 459 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, pet. filed) (motion to transfer did not seek an adjudication of the merits of the plaintiff’s substantive claims and, therefore, was not a “legal action” subject to the TCPA); Caliber Oil & Gas, LLC v. Midland Visions 2000, 59

2020This “catch-all provision” included within the statutory definition of “legal action” “appears to encompass any procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim.” Misko, 575 S.W.3d at 876 (citations omitted).

2021Based on the doctrine of ejusdem generis, we held in Deepwell Energy that, in order to fall within this catch-all provision, a filing must be a “procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim” similar to a “lawsuit,” “cause of action,” “petition,” “complaint,” “cross-claim,” or “counterclaim.” Deepwell Energy, 574 S.W.3d at 929 ; see also Roach v. Ingram, 557 S.W.3d 203, 217 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); Paulsen, 537 S.W.3d at 233 .

2019We hold that a TCPA motion to dismiss is not included as a “legal action” under the phrase “or any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal or equitable relief” because it is not a procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim like a “lawsuit,” “cause of action,” “petition,” “complaint,” “cross-claim,” or “counterclaim.” Id. (quoting Section 27.001(6)); see 6 Roach, 557 S.W.3d at 217–18.

2021Based on the doctrine of ejusdem generis, we held in Deepwell Energy that, in order to fall within this catch-all provision, a filing must be a “procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim” similar to a “lawsuit,” “cause of action,” “petition,” “complaint,” “cross-claim,” or “counterclaim.” Deepwell Energy, 574 S.W.3d at 929 ; see also Roach v. Ingram, 557 S.W.3d 203, 217 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied); Paulsen, 537 S.W.3d at 233 .

2019We held that a TCPA motion to dismiss does not fall under this “catch-all” 12 provision of the statutory definition because it “is not a procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim.” 574 S.W.3d at 929 .

2020Thus, we cannot equate a request for sanctions under Chapter 10 or Rule 13, whether filed as a counterclaim or a motion, with a “procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim.” Dow Jones, 564 S.W.3d at 858 .

2020In fact, however, it “‘functions primarily as a safeguard against creative re- pleading of what are substantively lawsuits, causes of action, petitions, complaints, counterclaims, or cross-claims so as to avoid the TCPA dismissal mechanisms’ and, when viewed in light of the purpose of the TCPA, must be given a ‘somewhat restrictive application.’” Id. at 876-77 (quoting Dow Jones & Co. v. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P., 564 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet. denied)).

2019Id.

2019Id.

2019The nonsuit of claims challenged in a TCPA motion to dismiss does not “entirely moot” the TCPA motion because the movant may “continue to pursue their requests for attorney’s fees incurred in defending those claims prior to their voluntary dismissal, as well as for the sanctions the Act would prescribe.” Craig v. Tejas Promotions, LLC, 550 S.W.3d 287, 293 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet. denied); see McDonald Oilfield Operations, LLC v. 3B Inspection, LLC, 582 S.W.3d 732 , 752 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (quoting CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n, 390 S.W.3d 29

2019See Van Der Linden v. Khan, 535 S.W.3d 179 , 201–03 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. denied) (rejecting idea that each form of recovery is separate legal action); see also Paulsen v. Yarrell, 537 S.W.3d 224, 233 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (applying doctrine of ejusdem generis to conclude Section 27.001(6)’s “legal action” definition refers to “procedural vehicle[s] for the vindication of a legal claim” and cannot sweep within its terms that which is ancillary to both “the underlying lawsuit and [the] substantive claims that are the Act’s core focus”); Deepwell Energy Se

2019This 6 As explained fully later, the “economic loss rule generally precludes recovery in tort for economic losses resulting from a party’s failure to perform under a contract when harm consists only of the economic loss of a contractual expectancy.” Chapman Custom Homes, Inc. v. Dallas Plumbing Co., 445 S.W.3d 716, 718 (Tex. 2014). -7- 04-18-00438-CV “broad definition appears to encompass any procedural vehicle for the vindication of a legal claim.” State ex rel.

2019The nonsuit of claims challenged in a TCPA motion to dismiss does not “entirely moot” the TCPA motion because the movant may “continue to pursue their requests for attorney’s fees incurred in defending those claims prior to their voluntary dismissal, as well as for the sanctions the Act would prescribe.” Craig v. Tejas Promotions, LLC, 550 S.W.3d 287, 293 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet. denied); see McDonald Oilfield Operations, LLC v. 3B Inspection, LLC, 582 S.W.3d 732 , 752 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (quoting CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n, 390 S.W.3d 29

2019The nonsuit of claims challenged in a TCPA motion to dismiss does not “entirely moot” the TCPA motion because the movant may “continue to pursue their requests for attorney’s fees incurred in defending those claims prior to their voluntary dismissal, as well as for the sanctions the Act would prescribe.” Craig v. Tejas Promotions, LLC, 550 S.W.3d 287, 293 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet. denied); see McDonald Oilfield Operations, LLC v. 3B Inspection, LLC, 582 S.W.3d 732 , 752 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (quoting CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n, 390 S.W.3d 29