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24 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Corfield v. Coryellgreen2 sentences2020These fundamental rights, according to the dissent, were recognized in Corfield v. Coryell as Lockean “natural rights.” 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. 2004Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. | 3 | 3 |
GRANT CTY. FIRE PROT. DIST. v. City of Moses Lakegreen2 sentences2007Id. at 806-10, 83 P.3d 419 . 2006In Grant County II we determined that an independent analysis applies only where the challenged legislation grants a privilege or immunity to a minority class, that is, in the case of a grant of positive favoritism. ¶17 As we explained in Grant County II, the text of the federal constitution shows concern with “majoritarian threats of invidious discrimination against nonmajorities,” while the state provision “protects as well against laws serving the interest of special classes of citizens to the detriment of the interests of all citizens.” Grant County II, 150 Wn.2d at 806-07. | 2 | 3 |
City of Seattle v. Rogers Clothing for Men, Inc.green2 sentences2006See also Andersen v. King County, 158 Wash.2d 1 , 138 P.3d 963 , 2006 Wash. LEXIS 598 , *18 (holding that the same analysis that applies under the federal equal protection clause applies under the state privileges and immunities clause "unless the challenged law is a grant of positive favoritism to a minority class"). ¶ 12 "Legislative bodies have extensive authority to make classifications for purposes of legislation and even broader discretion in making classifications for taxation than it has for regulation." Rogers Clothing, 114 Wash.2d at 234 , 787 P.2d 39 (citing Sonitrol N.W., Inc. v. C 2006See also Andersen v. King County, 158 Wn.2d, 1, 16 , 138 P.3d 963 (2006) (holding that the same analysis that applies under the federal equal protection clause applies under the state privileges and immunities clause “unless the challenged law is a grant of positive favoritism to a minority class”). ¶12 “Legislative bodies have extensive authority to make classifications for purposes of legislation and even broader discretion in making classifications for taxation than it has for regulation.” Rogers Clothing, 114 Wn.2d at 234 (citing Sonitrol Nw., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 84 Wn.2d 588, 590-91 | 2 | 2 |
Andersen v. King Countyyellow2 sentences2006See also Andersen v. King County, 158 Wn.2d, 1, 16 , 138 P.3d 963 (2006) (holding that the same analysis that applies under the federal equal protection clause applies under the state privileges and immunities clause “unless the challenged law is a grant of positive favoritism to a minority class”). ¶12 “Legislative bodies have extensive authority to make classifications for purposes of legislation and even broader discretion in making classifications for taxation than it has for regulation.” Rogers Clothing, 114 Wn.2d at 234 (citing Sonitrol Nw., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 84 Wn.2d 588, 590-91 2006See also Andersen v. King County, 158 Wn.2d, 1, 16 , 138 P.3d 963 (2006) (holding that the same analysis that applies under the federal equal protection clause applies under the state privileges and immunities clause “unless the challenged law is a grant of positive favoritism to a minority class”). ¶12 “Legislative bodies have extensive authority to make classifications for purposes of legislation and even broader discretion in making classifications for taxation than it has for regulation.” Rogers Clothing, 114 Wn.2d at 234 (citing Sonitrol Nw., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 84 Wn.2d 588, 590-91 | 2 | 2 |
Sonitrol Northwest, Inc. v. City of Seattlegreen2 sentences2006See also Andersen v. King County, 158 Wn.2d, 1, 16 , 138 P.3d 963 (2006) (holding that the same analysis that applies under the federal equal protection clause applies under the state privileges and immunities clause “unless the challenged law is a grant of positive favoritism to a minority class”). ¶12 “Legislative bodies have extensive authority to make classifications for purposes of legislation and even broader discretion in making classifications for taxation than it has for regulation.” Rogers Clothing, 114 Wn.2d at 234 (citing Sonitrol Nw., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 84 Wn.2d 588, 590-91 2006See also Andersen v. King County, 158 Wn.2d, 1, 16 , 138 P.3d 963 (2006) (holding that the same analysis that applies under the federal equal protection clause applies under the state privileges and immunities clause “unless the challenged law is a grant of positive favoritism to a minority class”). ¶12 “Legislative bodies have extensive authority to make classifications for purposes of legislation and even broader discretion in making classifications for taxation than it has for regulation.” Rogers Clothing, 114 Wn.2d at 234 (citing Sonitrol Nw., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 84 Wn.2d 588, 590-91 | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gunwallgreen2 sentences1997See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 , 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986). 1997See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54 , 720 P.2d 808 , 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986). | 2 | 2 |
DeYoung v. Providence Medical Centergreen2 sentences2025However, we reiterated that while there are differences in the federal equal protection clause and the state privileges and immunities clause, “these differences do not require an independent state analysis; ʻthis court has repeatedly found these provisions substantially similar and treated them accordingly.ʼ” DeYoung, 136 Wn.2d 136 at 142 (quoting Seeley v. State, 132 Wn.2d 776, 788 , 940 P.2d 604 (1997)). 35 (Mungia, J., dissenting) because “the miniscule number of claims subject to the repose provision renders the relationship of the classification too attenuated to that goal.” Id. at 150. 2000Co., 133 Wash.2d 954, 976 , 948 P.2d 1264 (1997), the court noted that although the textual differences between article 1, section 12 and the federal equal protection clause do not compel an independent state analysis, the differences "suggest we should not foreclose the possibility that there may be a context where the state privileges and immunities clause should be independently examined[.]" Accord DeYoung, 136 Wash.2d at 142 , 960 P.2d 919 . | 1 | 2 |
Plyler v. Doegreen1 sentence1984Moreover, "classifications bearing on nonconstitutional interests — even those involving 'the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings,"' usually will not be subject to heightened treatment "because they are not distinguishable in any relevant way from other regulations in 'the area of economics and social welfare.'" Plyler, 457 U.S. at 232 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 , 25 L. Ed. 2d 491 , 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970) (applying rational relationship test to state regulation imposing a limit upon the amount of aid to dependent children, whi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Seeley v. State
green
2 sentences2025However, we reiterated that while there are differences in the federal equal protection clause and the state privileges and immunities clause, “these differences do not require an independent state analysis; ʻthis court has repeatedly found these provisions substantially similar and treated them accordingly.ʼ” DeYoung, 136 Wn.2d 136 at 142 (quoting Seeley v. State, 132 Wn.2d 776, 788 , 940 P.2d 604 (1997)). 35 (Mungia, J., dissenting) because “the miniscule number of claims subject to the repose provision renders the relationship of the classification too attenuated to that goal.” Id. at 150. 2025However, we reiterated that while there are differences in the federal equal protection clause and the state privileges and immunities clause, “these differences do not require an independent state analysis; ʻthis court has repeatedly found these provisions substantially similar and treated them accordingly.ʼ” DeYoung, 136 Wn.2d 136 at 142 (quoting Seeley v. State, 132 Wn.2d 776, 788 , 940 P.2d 604 (1997)). 35 (Mungia, J., dissenting) because “the miniscule number of claims subject to the repose provision renders the relationship of the classification too attenuated to that goal.” Id. at 150. | 3 | 1998–2025 |
State v. Vance
green
2 sentences2020State v. Vance, 29 Wash. 435, 458 , 70 P. 34 (1902) (interpreting the state privileges and immunities clause consistent with article IV, section 2 of the federal constitution)). 2020State v. Vance, 29 Wash. 435, 458 , 70 P. 34 (1902) (interpreting the state privileges and immunities clause consistent with article IV, section 2 of the federal constitution)). | 2 | 2004–2020 |
Griffin v. Eller
green
2 sentences2014Griffin was resolved solely under an equal protection analysis. 130 Wn.2d at 65 . 2014Griffin was resolved solely under an equal protection analysis. 130 Wn.2d at 65 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Dependency of Grove
green
2 sentences2000This distinction, however, is not at issue here. [61] The rights guaranteed by the federal equal protection clause and the state privileges and immunities clause are substantially identical, In re Dependency of Grove, 127 Wash.2d 221, 239 , 897 P.2d 1252 (1995), and Lakeview does not argue for a broader interpretation of the state provision. [62] We note that an equal protection challenge to the Texas construction statute of repose, where the challenger asserted the statute denied its protections to owners and materialmen, was rejected by the United States Supreme Court as not raising a substa 2000This distinction, however, is not at issue here. [61] The rights guaranteed by the federal equal protection clause and the state privileges and immunities clause are substantially identical, In re Dependency of Grove, 127 Wash.2d 221, 239 , 897 P.2d 1252 (1995), and Lakeview does not argue for a broader interpretation of the state provision. [62] We note that an equal protection challenge to the Texas construction statute of repose, where the challenger asserted the statute denied its protections to owners and materialmen, was rejected by the United States Supreme Court as not raising a substa | 2 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Carey
green
2 sentences1997On this matter, the only history Farmers has addressed is State v. Carey, 4 Wash. 424 , 30 P. 729 (1892), where the court separately addressed the constitutionality of a statute under the state privileges and immunities clause and under article 4, section 2 of the United States Constitution, securing to the citizens of each state the privileges and immunities of the several states, and the Fourteenth Amendment. 1997On this matter, the only history Farmers has addressed is State v. Carey, 4 Wash. 424 , 30 P. 729 (1892), where the court separately addressed the constitutionality of a statute under the state privileges and immunities clause and under article 4, section 2 of the United States Constitution, securing to the citizens of each state the privileges and immunities of the several states, and the Fourteenth Amendment. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
In RE OLSEN v. Delmore
green
2 sentences1982Olsen v. Delmore, 48 Wn.2d 545 , 295 P.2d 324 (1956). 1982Olsen v. Delmore, 48 Wn.2d 545 , 295 P.2d 324 (1956). | 2 | 1980–1982 |
Saenz v. Roe
green
2 sentences2004Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D.Pa.1823) (No. 3230); Vance, 29 Wash. at 458 , 70 P. 34 . "[A]t the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted" (and thus also at the time the Washington Constitution was enacted), the "people understood that `privileges or immunities of citizens' were fundamental rights, rather than every public benefit established by positive law." Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527 , 119 S.Ct. 1518 , 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 2004Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D.Pa.1823) (No. 3230); Vance, 29 Wash. at 458 , 70 P. 34 . "[A]t the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted" (and thus also at the time the Washington Constitution was enacted), the "people understood that `privileges or immunities of citizens' were fundamental rights, rather than every public benefit established by positive law." Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527 , 119 S.Ct. 1518 , 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Gossett v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington
green
2 sentences2000Co., 133 Wash.2d 954, 976 , 948 P.2d 1264 (1997), the court noted that although the textual differences between article 1, section 12 and the federal equal protection clause do not compel an independent state analysis, the differences "suggest we should not foreclose the possibility that there may be a context where the state privileges and immunities clause should be independently examined[.]" Accord DeYoung, 136 Wash.2d at 142 , 960 P.2d 919 . 2000Co., 133 Wash.2d 954, 976 , 948 P.2d 1264 (1997), the court noted that although the textual differences between article 1, section 12 and the federal equal protection clause do not compel an independent state analysis, the differences "suggest we should not foreclose the possibility that there may be a context where the state privileges and immunities clause should be independently examined[.]" Accord DeYoung, 136 Wash.2d at 142 , 960 P.2d 919 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co.
green
2 sentences2000Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co., 459 U.S. 802 , 103 S.Ct. 24 , 74 L.Ed.2d 39 (1982). 2000Ellerbe v. Otis Elevator Co., 459 U.S. 802 , 103 S.Ct. 24 , 74 L.Ed.2d 39 (1982). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Housing Authority v. Saylors
green
2 sentences1999Housing Auth. v. Saylors, 87 Wn.2d 732, 738-39 , 557 P.2d 321 (1976). 1999Housing Auth. v. Saylors, 87 Wn.2d 732, 738-39 , 557 P.2d 321 (1976). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Schaaf
green
1 sentence1992One is the rational relationship test where a law is subjected only to minimal scrutiny and will be declared invalid only if "it rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of a legitimate state objective." Schaaf, 109 Wn.2d at 17 (quoting Phelan , at 512)). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Clark
green
2 sentences1991The court analyzed the defendant's claim *288 under the state privileges and immunities clause before considering the federal analysis. 291 Or. at 236 n. 6. 1991The court analyzed the defendant's claim under the state privileges and immunities clause before considering the federal analysis. 291 Or. at 236 n.6. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Washington State School Directors Ass'n v. Department of Labor & Industries
green
2 sentences1984Directors Ass'n v. Department of Labor & Indus., 82 Wn.2d 367, 376 , 510 P.2d 818 (1973) (quoting State v. Persinger, 62 Wn.2d 362, 368 , 382 P.2d 497 (1963), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 187 (1964)). 1984Directors Ass'n v. Department of Labor & Indus., 82 Wn.2d 367, 376 , 510 P.2d 818 (1973) (quoting State v. Persinger, 62 Wn.2d 362, 368 , 382 P.2d 497 (1963), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 187 (1964)). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Dandridge v. Williams
green
2 sentences1984Moreover, "classifications bearing on nonconstitutional interests — even those involving 'the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings,"' usually will not be subject to heightened treatment "because they are not distinguishable in any relevant way from other regulations in 'the area of economics and social welfare.'" Plyler, 457 U.S. at 232 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 , 25 L. Ed. 2d 491 , 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970) (applying rational relationship test to state regulation imposing a limit upon the amount of aid to dependent children, whi 1984Moreover, "classifications bearing on nonconstitutional interests — even those involving 'the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings,"' usually will not be subject to heightened treatment "because they are not distinguishable in any relevant way from other regulations in 'the area of economics and social welfare.'" Plyler, 457 U.S. at 232 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 , 25 L. Ed. 2d 491 , 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970) (applying rational relationship test to state regulation imposing a limit upon the amount of aid to dependent children, whi | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Persinger v. Washington
neutral
1 sentence1984Directors Ass'n v. Department of Labor & Indus., 82 Wn.2d 367, 376 , 510 P.2d 818 (1973) (quoting State v. Persinger, 62 Wn.2d 362, 368 , 382 P.2d 497 (1963), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 187 (1964)). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. Persinger
green
2 sentences1984Directors Ass'n v. Department of Labor & Indus., 82 Wn.2d 367, 376 , 510 P.2d 818 (1973) (quoting State v. Persinger, 62 Wn.2d 362, 368 , 382 P.2d 497 (1963), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 187 (1964)). 1984Directors Ass'n v. Department of Labor & Indus., 82 Wn.2d 367, 376 , 510 P.2d 818 (1973) (quoting State v. Persinger, 62 Wn.2d 362, 368 , 382 P.2d 497 (1963), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 187 (1964)). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.