third-stage hearing in Illinois

2026The standard for actual innocence claims is “extraordinarily difficult to meet.” Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 94 . ¶ 43 Robinson challenges the court’s decision that Mamon, Shaw, and Hunt-Bey’s new testimony lacked credibility, claiming it was sufficient to probably change the result on retrial. - 11 - No. 1-24-0200 However, after reviewing the record and giving deference to the circuit court’s findings on facts and credibility from the third-stage hearing, we conclude that the result would not change and that there was no manifest error. ¶ 44 In reaching its decision, the court made fact-findin

2025Where the third-stage hearing involves fact-finding and credibility determinations, the circuit court’s decision will not be reversed unless manifestly erroneous (English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 23 ), meaning that the opposite conclusion is clearly evident (Coleman, 2013 IL 113307 , ¶ 98) or that the finding was arbitrary, unreasonable or not based on the evidence presented.

2025Where the third-stage hearing involves fact-finding and credibility determinations, the circuit court’s decision will not be reversed unless manifestly erroneous (English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 23 ), meaning that the opposite conclusion is clearly evident (Coleman, 2013 IL 113307 , ¶ 98) or that the finding was arbitrary, unreasonable or not based on the evidence presented.

2024At a third-stage hearing, “the circuit court serves as the fact finder, and, therefore, it is the court’s function to determine witness credibility, decide the weight to be given testimony and evidence, and resolve any evidentiary conflicts.” Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 34 (citing People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 23 ).

2021As our supreme court has said, we are not to presume how the trial court would have ruled on a petition at the second stage “if counsel had adequately performed his duties under Rule 651(c),” because “[i]t is the duty of the trial court *** to determine on the basis of a complete record whether the [postconviction] claims require an evidentiary hearing.” People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 246 (1993). ¶ 72 However, given the extraordinary delays that have already occurred in this case, all the parties and the court on remand are urged to expedite this case, resolve the merit of Mr. Landa’s - 2

2020See People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 240 (1993) (“A post-conviction petition which is not supported by affidavits or other supporting documents is generally dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.”) As defendant’s claim of failure to properly investigate was advanced to a third-stage hearing, it follows that an affidavit from Bybee was not, in fact, required. ¶ 74 We next consider whether postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance in declining to call either Bybee or Hargrave to testify at the third-stage hearing.

2024People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 23 . “[A] decision is manifestly erroneous when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 98 (quoting People v Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 155 (2004).

2022“Manifest error is ‘clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.’ [Citation.] Thus, a decision is manifestly erroneous when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 98 , 996 N.E.2d 617 (quoting People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 155 , 817 N.E.2d 524, 528 (2004)).

2019App 3d 554, 565 (2003) (hearsay affidavits are generally insufficient to support postconviction claims); People v. Salgado, 2016 IL App (1st) 133102, ¶ 47 (affidavits containing only hearsay are generally insufficient to warrant a third-stage hearing); People v. Gray, 2011 IL App (1st) 091689 , ¶ 16 - 26 - No. 1-15-2994 (noting that the content of an affidavit was “no more than hearsay, which, as a genral rule, is insufficient to support a claim” under the Act); People v. Wallace, 2015 IL App (3d) 130489, ¶¶ 25, 28 (The affidavit providing that a fellow inmate confessed to shooting the victim

2018App 3d 554, 565 (2003) (hearsay affidavits are generally insufficient to support postconviction claims); People v. Salgado, 2016 IL App (1st) 133102, ¶ 47 (affidavits containing only hearsay are generally insufficient to warrant a third-stage hearing); People v. Gray, 2011 IL App (1st) 091689, ¶ 16 (noting that the content of an affidavit was “no more than hearsay, which, as a genral rule, is - 26 ­ No. 1-15-2994 insufficient to support a claim” under the Act); People v. Wallace, 2015 IL App (3d) 130489, ¶¶ 25-28 (The affidavit providing that a fellow inmate confessed to shooting the victim wh

2025Id. ¶ 24 Petitioner’s argument (postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance at the third-stage hearing) was not addressed by the trial court, and therefore, it made no findings or determinations regarding this issue.

2025Rule 651(c) does not govern postconviction counsel’s performance during the third-stage hearing; rather, “that performance is measured by the overarching reasonableness standard generally applicable to a postconviction proceeding.” Pabello, 2019 IL App (2d) 170867, ¶ 35 . ¶ 70 The defendant first contends that his postconviction attorney did not adequately present his claims at the second stage because she did not amend the pro se petition and/or supplement the petition with affidavits—failed to shape his claims into proper legal form.

2025Where, as in this case, fact- finding and credibility determinations are involved, “[w]e will not reverse the trial court’s - 16 - 1-24-0712 decision after a third-stage hearing unless it is manifestly erroneous.” Mendoza, 2024 IL App (1st) 231588, ¶ 31 (citing People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006)).

2021Id. at 473 . ¶ 46 At a third-stage hearing, “the trial court acts as a fact-finder, making credibility determinations and weighing the evidence. [Citation.] Accordingly, we review the court’s decision to deny relief for manifest error.” People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 51 .

2021See Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 58 (“a petitioner who requests leave to file a successive petition need not satisfy even the substantial showing burden to advance to the third stage—let alone the evidentiary burden to obtain a new trial after a third-stage hearing”).

2021See Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 58 (“a petitioner who requests leave to file a successive petition need not satisfy even the substantial showing burden to advance to the third stage—let alone the evidentiary burden to obtain a new trial after a third-stage hearing”).

2025“A manifest error is one that is ‘clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.’ [Citation.]” Mendoza, 2024 IL App (1st) 231588, ¶ 31 (citing People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319, 333 (2009)).

2024Nothing about the trial court’s ruling on this matter was error, let alone error that was “clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 333 . ¶ 60 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s petition following a third- stage hearing. ¶ 61 B.

2021“Manifest error is ‘clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.’ [People v. Morgan, 212 Ill. 2d 148, 155 , 817 N.E.2d 524, 528 (2004).] Thus, a decision is manifestly erroneous when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” People v. Coleman, 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 98 , 996 N.E.2d 617 . ¶ 48 Reviewing courts apply the manifestly erroneous standard in recognition of “the understanding that the postconviction trial judge is able to observe and hear the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing and, therefore, occupies a position of advantage in a search for the truth which is infinitely superior to that

2020Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473 (“all well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the trial record are to be taken as true” at the second stage); Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 385 (same). -7- With this in mind, we find that the showing that Mr. Willingham has made in this case is substantial enough to warrant a third-stage hearing. ¶ 35 The affidavit of Jacobi Adams, while not detailed, says that he was right there—in the car with Jermaine Fleming—and that Jermaine Fleming was armed on the afternoon of June 20, 1995.

2024The third-stage hearing “ ‘is a new and independent investigation, with the hearing court authorized and required to use any proper procedure necessary and appropriate in order to discharge its duty of determining the existence or nonexistence of facts which would constitute a denial of a claimed constitutional right.’ ” People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 383 (1997) (quoting People v. Wakat, 415 Ill. 2d 610 , 616-17 (1953)).

2020The parties agree that our review should thus proceed under the manifestly erroneous standard, under which we would only disturb the circuit court’s ruling if we find “error which is clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 384-85 (1997).

2021Section 122-1(b) of the Act requires a postconviction petition be “verified by affidavit” (725 ILCS 5/122-1(b) (West 2016)) so as to “confirm[ ] that the allegations are brought truthfully and in good faith” (People v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 67 (2002)).

2020Section 122-1(b) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122- 1(b) (West 2016)) requires a postconviction petition be “verified by affidavit” so as to “confirm[ ] that the allegations are brought truthfully and in good faith.” People v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 67 (2002).

2019App 3d 554, 565 (2003) (hearsay affidavits are generally insufficient to support postconviction claims); People v. Salgado, 2016 IL App (1st) 133102, ¶ 47 (affidavits containing only hearsay are generally insufficient to warrant a third-stage hearing); People v. Gray, 2011 IL App (1st) 091689 , ¶ 16 - 26 - No. 1-15-2994 (noting that the content of an affidavit was “no more than hearsay, which, as a genral rule, is insufficient to support a claim” under the Act); People v. Wallace, 2015 IL App (3d) 130489, ¶¶ 25, 28 (The affidavit providing that a fellow inmate confessed to shooting the victim

2018App 3d 554, 565 (2003) (hearsay affidavits are generally insufficient to support postconviction claims); People v. Salgado, 2016 IL App (1st) 133102, ¶ 47 (affidavits containing only hearsay are generally insufficient to warrant a third-stage hearing); People v. Gray, 2011 IL App (1st) 091689, ¶ 16 (noting that the content of an affidavit was “no more than hearsay, which, as a genral rule, is - 26 ­ No. 1-15-2994 insufficient to support a claim” under the Act); People v. Wallace, 2015 IL App (3d) 130489, ¶¶ 25-28 (The affidavit providing that a fellow inmate confessed to shooting the victim wh

2008People v. Mays, 254 Ill.

2008People v. Mays, 254 Ill.

2025At the third-stage hearing, “the circuit court serves as the fact finder, and, therefore, it is the court’s function to determine witness credibility, decide the weight to be given testimony and evidence, and resolve any evidentiary conflicts.” People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 34 . ¶ 46 On review, the trial court’s third-stage factual findings and credibility determinations are entitled to significant deference on review.

2025“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must - 11 - demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 . “[A] defendant must show that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 . ¶ 37 At the third-stage

2025We do not see how she thereby rendered unreasonable assistance. ¶ 73 Third, because the circuit court, in its final decision, failed to mention Katrina and erroneously applied the standard for a second-stage claim of actual innocence (see People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 46 ) instead of a third-stage claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (see People v. Marcus, 2023 IL App (2d) 220096, ¶ 61 ), defendant argues that Ranos should have filed “a post-decision motion” pointing out those mistakes. ¶ 74 We are unconvinced.

2021In determining whether to grant a third-stage hearing, the circuit court takes all well-pleaded facts in the petition and in any accompanying affidavits as true, unless they are positively rebutted by the record (People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1999)) and does not make findings of fact or credibility determinations (People v. Childress, 191 Ill. 2d 168, 174 (2000)). -8- No. 1-19-0122 We review the dismissal of a postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing de novo (People v. Sanders, 2016 IL 118123, ¶ 31 ) and may affirm on any basis supported by the record (People v. Jones, 399

2026See People v. House, 2023 IL App (4th) 220891, ¶ 94 (“[T]he primary purpose of a third- stage hearing is to test the reliability, credibility, or veracity of the new evidence and determine whether the new evidence is compelling enough to place the trial evidence in a new light and undermine confidence in the finding of guilt.”). ¶ 44 We find that defendant has forfeited any argument on appeal that he made a substantial showing of an actual innocence claim at the third stage based on Baker’s affidavit.

2025“This deferential - 12 - standard of review reflects the understanding that the trial court is in the best position to observe and weigh the credibility of the witnesses.” People v. House, 2023 IL App (4th) 220891, ¶ 78 . ¶ 47 Our supreme court has also stated that where no fact-finding and credibility determinations are necessary at a third-stage hearing and the issues presented involve only questions of law, a de novo standard of review may be applied.

2026See People v. Watson, 2022 IL App (5th) 190427, ¶ 46 (because the circuit court advanced the petition and supplement to a third-stage hearing, it appears that the supplement was sufficient to shape defendant’s claims into an appropriate legal form). ¶ 69 C.

2023See People v. Watson, 2022 IL App (5th) 190427, ¶ 47 (“Rule 651(c) only applies to counsel at the second stage of postconviction proceedings.”); People v. Pabello, 2019 IL App (2d) 170867, ¶ 28 (“It would be illogical to measure counsel’s performance at the third stage by a standard applicable to the distinctly different second stage.”); People v. Zareski, 2017 IL App (1st) 150836, ¶ 59 (same); see also People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 38 (“[T]his court has not prescribed by rule specific duties that counsel must perform at the third stage.”). ¶ 30 Underlying this appeal is the fundamental

2019App 3d 554, 565 (2003) (hearsay affidavits are generally insufficient to support postconviction claims); People v. Salgado, 2016 IL App (1st) 133102, ¶ 47 (affidavits containing only hearsay are generally insufficient to warrant a third-stage hearing); People v. Gray, 2011 IL App (1st) 091689 , ¶ 16 - 26 - No. 1-15-2994 (noting that the content of an affidavit was “no more than hearsay, which, as a genral rule, is insufficient to support a claim” under the Act); People v. Wallace, 2015 IL App (3d) 130489, ¶¶ 25, 28 (The affidavit providing that a fellow inmate confessed to shooting the victim

2018App 3d 554, 565 (2003) (hearsay affidavits are generally insufficient to support postconviction claims); People v. Salgado, 2016 IL App (1st) 133102, ¶ 47 (affidavits containing only hearsay are generally insufficient to warrant a third-stage hearing); People v. Gray, 2011 IL App (1st) 091689, ¶ 16 (noting that the content of an affidavit was “no more than hearsay, which, as a genral rule, is - 26 ­ No. 1-15-2994 insufficient to support a claim” under the Act); People v. Wallace, 2015 IL App (3d) 130489, ¶¶ 25-28 (The affidavit providing that a fellow inmate confessed to shooting the victim wh

2026See, e.g., People v. Pabello, 2019 IL App (2d) 170867, ¶¶ 26-37 (also noting that, if postconviction counsel’s performance would not be ineffective under the higher Strickland test, it would not be deficient under the postconviction standard); see also People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 38 (“this court has not prescribed by rule specific duties that counsel must perform at the third stage”). ¶ 63 Here, defendant does not appear to dispute that postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance overall; rather, and despite acknowledging that postconviction counsel raised the Rule 431(b) cl

2023See People v. Watson, 2022 IL App (5th) 190427, ¶ 47 (“Rule 651(c) only applies to counsel at the second stage of postconviction proceedings.”); People v. Pabello, 2019 IL App (2d) 170867, ¶ 28 (“It would be illogical to measure counsel’s performance at the third stage by a standard applicable to the distinctly different second stage.”); People v. Zareski, 2017 IL App (1st) 150836, ¶ 59 (same); see also People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 38 (“[T]his court has not prescribed by rule specific duties that counsel must perform at the third stage.”). ¶ 30 Underlying this appeal is the fundamental

2024Rather, at a third-stage hearing, the “trial court acts as a factfinder, making credibility determinations and weighing the evidence.” People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 51 (citing People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 23 ); accord Velasco, 2018 IL App (1st) 161683, ¶ 118 .

2023Relevant here, at a third-stage hearing, “the trial court acts as a - 17 - factfinder, making credibility determinations and weighing the evidence. *** Accordingly, we review the court’s decision to deny relief for manifest error.” People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 51 , 182 N.E.3d 64 .

2026Velasco, 2018 IL App (1st) 161683, ¶ 137 .

2024Rather, at a third-stage hearing, the “trial court acts as a factfinder, making credibility determinations and weighing the evidence.” People v. Reed, 2020 IL 124940, ¶ 51 (citing People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 23 ); accord Velasco, 2018 IL App (1st) 161683, ¶ 118 .

2016Third Stage Proceedings 9 ¶ 32 Ignoring defendant's failure to establish cause and prejudice, we reject defendant's substantive contention that the circuit court's findings at the third-stage hearing were against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 33 To state a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the plea bargaining context, defendant must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 .

2015It would be implausible to interpret English as prescribing, across the board, a purely deferential standard of review for claims of ineffective assistance whenever the judge who presided over the third-stage hearing was the same judge who had presided over the trial, because that interpretation would clash with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)–and in English, the supreme court reiterated its adoption of Strickland (English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 33 ). ¶ 66 In Strickland, the Supreme Court held that “[i]neffectiveness [was] not a question of basic, primary, or historical fact” but, ra

2025See Pabello, 2019 IL App (2d) 170867, ¶ 28 ; Marshall, 375 Ill.

2024Illinois courts have “expressly held that Rule 651(c) does not apply once a postconviction petition has been advanced to the third stage.” Id. ¶ 27 (citing People v. Marshall, 375 Ill.