Medina rule in California

2023(Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1024 ; see also Morgan v. Wet Seal, Inc. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1341 (Wet Seal) [the trial court properly considered the merits of the plaintiffs’ causes of action for the limited purpose of assessing whether substantially similar questions regarding liability for Wet Seal’s dress code policy were common to the class and predominated over individual issues].) Second, Medina did not present substantial evidence to show a predominant common question of law or fact existed.

2023Moreover, like Wet Seal, the employee and Medina declarations and deposition testimonies “reinforces the conclusion that [Under Armour]’s liability to putative class members will have to be decided on an individualized basis.” (Wet Seal, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1362 .) Medina’s claim is based on what he was told by a supervisor and on his own interpretation of the policies.

2022(See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [a reviewing court may order the correction of clerical errors in an abstract of judgment at any time]; People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385 [“Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.”].) The record, however, does not support Medina’s claim that he was convicted of violating section 11350, rather than section 11351.

2022(See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [a reviewing court may order the correction of clerical errors in an abstract of judgment at any time]; People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385 [“Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.”].) The record, however, does not support Medina’s claim that he was convicted of violating section 11350, rather than section 11351.

2021Both major and minor disputes are preempted.6 (Hawaiian Airlines, supra, at pp. 252-254.) Although the parties agree that Medina’s claim cannot be considered a major dispute, United contends that it falls within the minor dispute category and must be resolved only through the RLA mechanisms.7 2.

2021Minor Dispute Preemption In determining dispute preemption, the United States Supreme Court has instructed courts to employ the same criteria 6 “In the RLA and [Labor-Management Relations Act section] 301 context, the ‘purpose of Congress’ is to protect the role of grievance and arbitration and of federal labor law in resolving CBA disputes, not to alter or displace state law labor rights.” (Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke (9th Cir. 2018) 898 F.3d 904, 926 (en banc) (Alaska Airlines); see also Melendez v. San Francisco Baseball Associates LLC (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1, 9 (Melendez).) 7 Medina’s openi

2021(Melendez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 9 [“ ‘The primary point of reference . . . [is] the plaintiff’s pleading’ ”]; Alaska Airlines, supra, 898 F.3d at p. 924 [same].) In concluding that the CBA would need to be interpreted in order to adjudicate Medina’s claim, the trial court pointed out that, under the CBA, a mechanic who “does not receive a meal period as required” “is entitled to one of two options” depending on the “ ‘needs of service.’ ” The court found that “[d]etermining compliance with IWC Wage Order [No.] 9-2001 would require the [c]ourt to analyze the CBA’s term of what the appropriate

2021(See Tensor Group v. City of Glendale (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 154, 160 [“‘if two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery’”].) Accordingly, the trial court properly ruled the earlier small claims judgment barred Lee’s action for fraud. given set of facts may give rise to the violation of more than one ‘primary right,’ thus giving a plaintiff the potential of two

2021Minor Dispute Preemption In determining dispute preemption, the United States Supreme Court has instructed courts to employ the same criteria 6 “In the RLA and [Labor-Management Relations Act section] 301 context, the ‘purpose of Congress’ is to protect the role of grievance and arbitration and of federal labor law in resolving CBA disputes, not to alter or displace state law labor rights.” (Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke (9th Cir. 2018) 898 F.3d 904, 926 (en banc) (Alaska Airlines); see also Melendez v. San Francisco Baseball Associates LLC (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1, 9 (Melendez).) 7 Medina’s openi

2021(Melendez, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 9 [“ ‘The primary point of reference . . . [is] the plaintiff’s pleading’ ”]; Alaska Airlines, supra, 898 F.3d at p. 924 [same].) In concluding that the CBA would need to be interpreted in order to adjudicate Medina’s claim, the trial court pointed out that, under the CBA, a mechanic who “does not receive a meal period as required” “is entitled to one of two options” depending on the “ ‘needs of service.’ ” The court found that “[d]etermining compliance with IWC Wage Order [No.] 9-2001 would require the [c]ourt to analyze the CBA’s term of what the appropriate

2015(See People v. Son (2000) 79 Cal. App.4th 224, 241 [where defendant’s stated reasons for falsely confessing to the police were “a matter easily understood by a layperson without expertise[,] . . . expert evidence bearing on other potential reasons for false confessions was unnecessary”].) There was also a risk that an expert might provide testimony on cross-examination that would be unfavorable to Medina’s defense.

2015(Carman v. Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318, 324 [rule that a litigant may not argue theories for the first time on appeal is inapplicable to a pure question of law]; see also People v. Runyan (2012) 54 Cal.4th 849, 859, fn. 3 .) Having entered JNOV on Medina's contract claim, Sarkisian was also entitled to JNOV on Medina's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

2015(Carman v. Alvord (1982) 31 Cal.3d 318, 324 [rule that a litigant may not argue theories for the first time on appeal is inapplicable to a pure question of law]; see also People v. Runyan (2012) 54 Cal.4th 849, 859, fn. 3 .) Having entered JNOV on Medina's contract claim, Sarkisian was also entitled to JNOV on Medina's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

2009This misunderstands the concept of “personal jurisdiction,” which “relates to the power to bind a particular party, and depends on the party’s presence, contacts, or other conduct within the forum state.” (Donaldson v. National Marine, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 503, 512 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 584 , 107 P.3d 254 ].) As explained in the text, Medina’s claim is that the court acted in excess of jurisdiction, rather than without jurisdiction. 7 Perhaps conceding either that (1) Medina did not intend to apply this argument to his current recommitment or (2) he has no valid grounds for arguing against forfei

2009This misunderstands the concept of “personal jurisdiction,” which “relates to the power to bind a particular party, and depends on the party’s presence, contacts, or other conduct within the forum state.” (Donaldson v. National Marine, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 503, 512 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 584 , 107 P.3d 254 ].) As explained in the text, Medina’s claim is that the court acted in excess of jurisdiction, rather than without jurisdiction. 7 Perhaps conceding either that (1) Medina did not intend to apply this argument to his current recommitment or (2) he has no valid grounds for arguing against forfei

2007Co. v. Majorino (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 974, 977 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 719 ] [insurer’s action for declaratory relief did not arise from personal injury lawsuit defendants filed against the insured, but rather arose from the insured’s tender of defense to the insurer and from the terms of an insurance policy issued well before the underlying litigation commenced, so anti-SLAPP statute did not apply].) 9 Medina’s motion to strike, on the other hand, included evidence that the timecard entries were promptly changed, after consultations with upper management, to “approved absence without pay,” and also

2007Co. v. Majorino (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 974, 977 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 719 ] [insurer’s action for declaratory relief did not arise from personal injury lawsuit defendants filed against the insured, but rather arose from the insured’s tender of defense to the insurer and from the terms of an insurance policy issued well before the underlying litigation commenced, so anti-SLAPP statute did not apply].) 9 Medina’s motion to strike, on the other hand, included evidence that the timecard entries were promptly changed, after consultations with upper management, to “approved absence without pay,” and also

2006He remained free to testify as he desired, “without having to subscribe to any particular version of events.” (Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1217.) Although Rojas might have been under some pressure to adhere to his statements that he was not involved in the murder and rape of Medina or in the murder of Sanchez, he nonetheless was required to testify truthfully and completely at trial to avoid breaching the contract.