nonexhaustive list factors in Colorado

2019To determine the applicability of this exception, the trial court has to consider "the particular facts of [the] case," mindful of "the overriding concern" under the Due Process Clause that defendants must "have a meaningful opportunity to challenge their convictions." Close , 180 P.3d at 1019 . ¶14 We have identified a nonexhaustive list of factors that are relevant to the justifiable excuse or excusable neglect exception in subsection (2)(d): • whether circumstances or outside influences prevented a timely challenge to a conviction; *848 • the extent to which the defendant, having reason to

2019To determine the applicability of this exception, the trial court has to consider "the particular facts of [the] case," mindful of "the overriding concern" under the Due Process Clause that defendants must "have a meaningful opportunity to challenge their convictions." Close , 180 P.3d at 1019 . ¶15 We have identified a nonexhaustive list of factors that are relevant to the justifiable excuse or excusable neglect exception in subsection (2)(d): • whether circumstances or outside influences prevented a timely challenge to a conviction; • the extent to which the defendant, having reason to quest

2026Id. ¶ 22 To determine whether police behavior was coercive, the court considers the following nonexhaustive list of factors: • whether the defendant was in custody; • whether the defendant was free to leave; • whether the defendant was aware of the situation; • whether the defendant had an opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else prior to or during the interrogation; • whether the statement was made during the interrogation or volunteered later; • the method or style of the interrogation; • the defendant’s mental and physical condition just prior to the interrogation; • the length of

2026Our independent review of the audio- and video-recorded interrogation confirms the trial court's determination that he was not. 29 ¶46 A person is in custody for purposes of Miranda if, under the totality of the circumstances, "a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt that [their] freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest." People v. Eugene, 2024 CO 59, ¶ 15 , 555 P.3d 601, 605 (quoting People v. Garcia, 2017 CO 106, ¶ 20 , 409 P.3d 312,317 ); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). ¶47 We consider a nonexhaustive li

2026Our independent review of the audio- and video-recorded interrogation confirms the trial court's determination that he was not. 29 ¶46 A person is in custody for purposes of Miranda if, under the totality of the circumstances, "a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have felt that [their] freedom of action had been curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest." People v. Eugene, 2024 CO 59, ¶ 15 , 555 P.3d 601, 605 (quoting People v. Garcia, 2017 CO 106, ¶ 20 , 409 P.3d 312,317 ); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). ¶47 We consider a nonexhaustive li

2026Stanley, 170 P.3d at 790 . ¶ 17 In determining whether a statement amounts to a true threat, courts may consider a nonexhaustive list of factors including (1) the statement’s role in a broader exchange; (2) the medium through which the statement was communicated; (3) the manner in which the statement was conveyed; (4) the relationship between the 10 speaker and the recipient; and (5) the subjective reaction of the intended recipient.

2026Id. ¶ 22 To determine whether police behavior was coercive, the court considers the following nonexhaustive list of factors: • whether the defendant was in custody; • whether the defendant was free to leave; • whether the defendant was aware of the situation; • whether the defendant had an opportunity to confer with counsel or anyone else prior to or during the interrogation; • whether the statement was made during the interrogation or volunteered later; • the method or style of the interrogation; • the defendant’s mental and physical condition just prior to the interrogation; • the length of

2024People in Interest of J.R., 2021 COA 81, ¶ 31 . ¶ 33 To determine whether expert testimony has crossed the line, our supreme court has directed us to consider the nonexhaustive list of factors from People v. Rector, 248 P.3d 1196, 1203 (Colo. 2011), including whether (1) the testimony was clarified on cross- examination, (2) the testimony expressed an opinion of the applicable law or legal standards thereby usurping the function of the court, (3) the jury was properly instructed on the law and that it may accept or reject the expert’s opinion, and (4) the expert opined that the defendant commi

2020Id. at 1361 . ¶ 21 Turning to the scope of the stop, courts consider a nonexhaustive list of factors, including the following: (1) the length of the detention; (2) whether the officer diligently pursued the basis for the initial stop; (3) whether the suspect was required to move from one location to another; and (4) whether there were alternative, less intrusive means available.

2020Id.; see also Quintano, 105 P.3d at 591-92 ; Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 219 .

2019Id. at ¶ 121 (citing United States v. Baker , 432 F.3d 1189 , 1223 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated in part by Davis v. Washington , 547 U.S. 813 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) ). ¶19 In applying its new test, the division first noted that "even the most serious error-the improper comment on Howard-Walker's exercise of his right against self-incrimination-was fleeting." Id. at ¶ 123. "[A]nd the less serious errors bore little relation to each other." Id.

2019Id. at ¶ 121 (citing United States v. Baker , 432 F.3d 1189 , 1223 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated in part by Davis v. Washington , 547 U.S. 813 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) ). ¶19 In applying its new test, the division first noted that "even the most serious error-the improper comment on Howard-Walker's exercise of his right against self-incrimination-was fleeting." Id. at ¶ 123. "[A]nd the less serious errors bore little relation to each other." Id.

2019Id. at ¶ 121 (citing United States v. Baker , 432 F.3d 1189 , 1223 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated in part by Davis v. Washington , 547 U.S. 813 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) ). ¶19 In applying its new test, the division first noted that "even the most serious error-the improper comment on Howard-Walker's exercise of his right against self-incrimination-was fleeting." Id. at ¶ 123. "[A]nd the less serious errors bore little relation to each other." Id.

2019Id. at ¶ 121 (citing United States v. Baker , 432 F.3d 1189 , 1223 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated in part by Davis v. Washington , 547 U.S. 813 , 126 S.Ct. 2266 , 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) ). ¶19 In applying its new test, the division first noted that "even the most serious error-the improper comment on Howard-Walker's exercise of his right against self-incrimination-was fleeting." Id. at ¶ 123. "[A]nd the less serious errors bore little relation to each other." Id.

2019People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453 , 465–66 (Colo. 2002) (quoting People v. Trujillo, 938 P.2d 117, 124 (Colo. 1997)). ¶18 We have previously cautioned, however, that “[w]hile the point at which official infringement rises to a degree associated with a formal arrest, and therefore mandates a Miranda warning, remains a matter to be determined” under the totality of these and any 9 other relevant circumstances, custody for Miranda purposes “clearly entails some degree of infringement on an individual’s liberty exceeding a minimally cognizable constitutional seizure.” Figueroa-Ortega, ¶ 7, 283 P.3d a

2019People v. Matheny , 46 P.3d 453 , 465-66 (Colo. 2002) (quoting People v. Trujillo , 938 P.2d 117 , 124 (Colo. 1997) ). ¶18 We have previously cautioned, however, that "[w]hile the point at which official infringement rises to a degree associated with a formal arrest, and therefore mandates a Miranda warning, remains a matter to be determined" under the totality of these and any other relevant circumstances, custody for Miranda purposes "clearly entails some degree of infringement on an individual's liberty exceeding a minimally cognizable constitutional seizure." Figueroa-Ortega , ¶ 7, 283 P.3

2016Nelson, 231 P.3d at 397 . ¶ 19 Section 32-1-207(2)(a) includes a nonexhaustive list of factors specifying when a district’s modification of its service plan is considered material and requires a petition to and approval from the board of county commissioners. [A]pproval of modifications shall be required only with regard to changes of a basic or essential nature, including but not limited to the following: Any addition to the types of services provided by the special district; a decrease in the level of services; a decrease in the financial ability of the district to discharge the existing or