nonexhaustive list factors in California

2023Discussing the reliability requirement, the California Supreme Court has “explained: ‘The nonexhaustive list of factors that the United States Supreme Court has cited as relevant to the reliability of hearsay statements made by child witnesses in sexual abuse cases are (1) spontaneity and 7 consistent repetition; (2) the mental state of the declarant; (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of a similar age; and (4) lack of motive to fabricate.’ [Citation.]” (In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1239 , citing Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , 821–822.) A “child’s ability to underst

2023Discussing the reliability requirement, the California Supreme Court has “explained: ‘The nonexhaustive list of factors that the United States Supreme Court has cited as relevant to the reliability of hearsay statements made by child witnesses in sexual abuse cases are (1) spontaneity and 7 consistent repetition; (2) the mental state of the declarant; (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of a similar age; and (4) lack of motive to fabricate.’ [Citation.]” (In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1239 , citing Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , 821–822.) A “child’s ability to underst

2025(In re Cindy L., supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 29–30, citing Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , 821–822, abrogated in part by Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , 60–62.) A trial court’s admission of evidence under Evidence Code section 1360 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

2025(In re Cindy L. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 15 , 29–30, citing Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , 821–822, abrogated in part by Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , 60–62.) C.

2026We thus limit our discussion to these mental states. “ ‘[R]eckless indifference to human life is “implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.” ’ ” (People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867 , 883.) Recklessness includes a subjective element that “ ‘ “[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,” and he or she must consciously disregard “the significant risk of death his or her actions create.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 884.) People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 , 617 set out a non

2026It embraced the view expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 that reckless indifference to human life encompasses a defendant’s willingness to kill, or assist another in killing, to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant did not specifically wish for death to be the outcome of his or her actions. ( Clark, supra, at pp. 616–617.) 9 Clark provided a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to a reckless indifference determination, including awareness of or use of weapons during the crime, the defendant’s presence at the scene and opportunities to

2026(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 706 .) The Clark 12 factors are “ ‘use of or awareness of the presence of a weapon or weapons, physical presence at the scene and opportunity to restrain confederates or aid victims, the duration of the crime, knowledge of any threat the confederates might represent, and efforts taken to minimize risks.’ ” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884.) “ ‘ “[N]o one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 885.) “ ‘Courts of Appeal have recognized that “a defendant’s youth is a[nother] relevant factor in dete

2025(Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 676-677; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-623; Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803 .) The Supreme Court has cautioned that “no one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.” (Banks, at p. 803; accord, People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 706 ; Clark, at p. 618.) Rather, the evaluation of an individual’s culpability for felony murder requires a “fact-intensive, individualized inquiry.” (Scoggins, at 13 p. 683; accord, People v. Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245 , 271.) In Banks, the Supreme Court enumerated th

2026It embraced the view expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 that reckless indifference to human life encompasses a defendant’s willingness to kill, or assist another in killing, to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant did not specifically wish for death to be the outcome of his or her actions. ( Clark, supra, at pp. 616–617.) 9 Clark provided a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to a reckless indifference determination, including awareness of or use of weapons during the crime, the defendant’s presence at the scene and opportunities to

2025(Id. at pp. 617–618.) In Clark, the high court provided the following nonexhaustive list of factors to be considered in determining whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference: (1) knowledge of weapons, and use and number of weapons; (2) physical presence at the crime and opportunities to restrain the crime and/or aid the victim; (3) duration of the felony and period of interaction between the perpetrators and the victims, (4) the 14. defendant’s knowledge of his or her cohort’s likelihood of killing, and (5) the defendant’s efforts to minimize the risk of violence during the felony

2025(In re Cindy L., supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 29–30, citing Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , 821–822, abrogated in part by Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , 60–62.) A trial court’s admission of evidence under Evidence Code section 1360 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

2023Discussing the reliability requirement, the California Supreme Court has “explained: ‘The nonexhaustive list of factors that the United States Supreme Court has cited as relevant to the reliability of hearsay statements made by child witnesses in sexual abuse cases are (1) spontaneity and 7 consistent repetition; (2) the mental state of the declarant; (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of a similar age; and (4) lack of motive to fabricate.’ [Citation.]” (In re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1239 , citing Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805 , 821–822.) A “child’s ability to underst

2026(See, e.g., In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681,686-687 [mother’s “substance abuse had begun more than 17 years earlier and while she had been clean for 372 days, she had previously relapsed twice during the course of this case, once after more than 300 days of sobriety”]; In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423-424 [father’s seven months of sobriety since his last relapse, “while commendable, was nothing new”].) As to whether returning the children to mother’s custody would be in the children’s best interests, the parties address the nonexhaustive list of factors set forth in I

2023A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child.”3 (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 .) (b)(6). (§ 388, subd. (a)(2); see In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194 .) Here, reunification services were ordered for both parents. 3 With respect to whether returning the child to father’s custody would be in the child’s best interest, father directs us to the nonexhaustive list of factors set forth in In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56

2026(See, e.g., In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681,686-687 [mother’s “substance abuse had begun more than 17 years earlier and while she had been clean for 372 days, she had previously relapsed twice during the course of this case, once after more than 300 days of sobriety”]; In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423-424 [father’s seven months of sobriety since his last relapse, “while commendable, was nothing new”].) As to whether returning the children to mother’s custody would be in the children’s best interests, the parties address the nonexhaustive list of factors set forth in I

2026Code, §§ 210 [“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action” (italics added)]; 780 [identifying a nonexhaustive list of factors “the court or jury may consider in determining the credibility of a witness,” including “[t]he existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive”]; People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 337 [“In determining the credibility of a witness, the jury may consid

2026(See, e.g., In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681,686-687 [mother’s “substance abuse had begun more than 17 years earlier and while she had been clean for 372 days, she had previously relapsed twice during the course of this case, once after more than 300 days of sobriety”]; In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423-424 [father’s seven months of sobriety since his last relapse, “while commendable, was nothing new”].) As to whether returning the children to mother’s custody would be in the children’s best interests, the parties address the nonexhaustive list of factors set forth in I

2026Code, §§ 210 [“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action” (italics added)]; 780 [identifying a nonexhaustive list of factors “the court or jury may consider in determining the credibility of a witness,” including “[t]he existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive”]; People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 337 [“In determining the credibility of a witness, the jury may consid

2026(In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527.) The court reasoned that the Kimberly F. factors failed to account for our Supreme Court’s holding that after the termination of reunification services the focus shifts to the dependent child’s need for permanency and stability.

2026(In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 .) The court reasoned that the Kimberly F. factors failed to account for our Supreme Court’s holding that after the termination of reunification services the focus shifts to the dependent child’s need for permanency and stability.

2024We follow In re Sabrina H. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1422 (Sabrina H.) and In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670 , 680–681 (Luke L.), in considering the merits of Father’s argument. 3 Section 361.3, subdivision (a), additionally contains other factors not relevant because both sets of relatives seeking placement satisfied the factors, such as the moral character of the relatives in the home (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(5)); the willingness to provide legal permanency if reunification fails (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(6), (a)(7)(H)(i)); and the ability to provide a proper home and care (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(

2024We follow In re Sabrina H. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1422 (Sabrina H.) and In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670 , 680–681 (Luke L.), in considering the merits of Father’s argument. 3 Section 361.3, subdivision (a), additionally contains other factors not relevant because both sets of relatives seeking placement satisfied the factors, such as the moral character of the relatives in the home (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(5)); the willingness to provide legal permanency if reunification fails (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(6), (a)(7)(H)(i)); and the ability to provide a proper home and care (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(

2024Quillope does not discuss that authority. 16 sentencing hearing is, in general, the proper time for a defendant to assert all available procedural and factual contentions relating to the trial court’s sentencing choices.” (People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 861 .) “Although the court is required to impose sentence in a lawful manner, counsel is charged with understanding, advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at the hearing.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 (Scott).) “[C]omplaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretio

2024(See Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at p. ___ [144 S.Ct. at pp. 1849, 1851]; Ramos, supra, 590 U.S. at pp. 90, 92–93.) Finally, we decline to consider the interplay between section 1170(b)’s jury trial requirement and the current reference in the California Rules of Court to “a nonexhaustive list of factors that may be considered circumstances in aggravation.” (Conc. & dis. opn. of Kruger, J., post, at p. 12; see also ibid. [observing that Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(c) “permit[s] judges broad discretion to find any other factors, as long as they are ‘reasonably relate[d] to the defendant or th

2024(See Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at p. ___ [144 S.Ct. at pp. 1849, 1851]; Ramos, supra, 590 U.S. at pp. 90, 92–93.) Finally, we decline to consider the interplay between section 1170(b)’s jury trial requirement and the current reference in the California Rules of Court to “a nonexhaustive list of factors that may be considered circumstances in aggravation.” (Conc. & dis. opn. of Kruger, J., post, at p. 12; see also ibid. [observing that Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(c) “permit[s] judges broad discretion to find any other factors, as long as they are ‘reasonably relate[d] to the defendant or th

2023(See In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1548 [modification of an exit order “may be sought either in a pending family law action or, if none is pending, a new action based solely on the orders.”].) Accordingly, the exit orders at issue in this case are ongoing in the family law context, and Mother’s challenge to the orders did not necessarily become moot upon the reassumption of emergency dependency jurisdiction by 9 the juvenile court.

2023A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child.”3 (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 .) (b)(6). (§ 388, subd. (a)(2); see In re L.S. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1194 .) Here, reunification services were ordered for both parents. 3 With respect to whether returning the child to father’s custody would be in the child’s best interest, father directs us to the nonexhaustive list of factors set forth in In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56