business records exception in District of Columbia

1995We conclude that, because both entries reflected “objective medical data recorded by the hospital officials as part of their regular patient work-up,” Sullivan v. United States, 404 A.2d 153, 158-59 (D.C.1979), rather than “subjective judgment or conjecture,” see Durant, 551 A.2d at 1324 , they were properly admitted under the business records exception.

1986Information from the victim as to his version of the cause of his injuries cannot be admitted under the business records exception, Sullivan, supra, 404 A.2d at 158 , and this portion of the records was excised.

2007See United States v. Smith, 172 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 305 , 521 F.2d 957, 965 (1975) (noting that PD-251 was admissible as a business record but only to impeach the declarant’s trial testimony, not as substantive evidence of the declarant’s statement of the facts recorded in the police report). 21 Even if the first level of hearsay objection could be hurdled under the business records exception, the second and third levels of hearsay — the statements of the interviewees and the conversations that the interviewees reported — would not qualify for the state of mind exception urged by appellant. 22 T

2007See United States v. Smith, 172 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 305 , 521 F.2d 957, 965 (1975) (noting that PD-251 was admissible as a business record but only to impeach the declarant’s trial testimony, not as substantive evidence of the declarant’s statement of the facts recorded in the police report). 21 Even if the first level of hearsay objection could be hurdled under the business records exception, the second and third levels of hearsay — the statements of the interviewees and the conversations that the interviewees reported — would not qualify for the state of mind exception urged by appellant. 22 T

1997Appellants place great emphasis on a sentence in Durant v. United States, 551 A.2d 1318, 1325 (D.C.1988), which reads, “a diagnosis of alcohol intoxication is admissible under the business records exception because it is reliable and a jury’s understanding of the basis and significance of such a diagnosis would not be significantly aided by cross-examination of the physician who rendered the opinion.” The corresponding footnote to this sentence, however, is applicable to appellants’ situation.

1995Clements primarily argues that entries describing Hackney as “alert, oriented X 3,” as well as the entries indicating Hackney’s GSC test results, amounted to medical “opinions” about which competent physicians would differ, see Durant v. United States, 551 A.2d 1318, 1323-24 (D.C.1988), and thus fell outside the scope of the business records exception.

1989See Pryor v. United States, 503 A.2d 678, 681 (D.C.1986).

1986As the recent decision in Pryor v. United States, 503 A.2d 678, 681-82 (D.C.1986) makes clear, if evidence qualifies under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, it is not excludible as a prior consistent statement.

1988Co. v. Taylor, supra, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 66 , 147 F.2d 297 (interpreting a statutory precursor of Super.Ct.Civ.R. 43-1) and its progeny, certain hospital records are admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule because they reflect “medical facts and routinely performed procedures” and are therefore inherently trustworthy.

1988Co. v. Taylor, supra, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 66 , 147 F.2d 297 (interpreting a statutory precursor of Super.Ct.Civ.R. 43-1) and its progeny, certain hospital records are admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule because they reflect “medical facts and routinely performed procedures” and are therefore inherently trustworthy.

1986In re D.M.C., 503 A.2d 1280, 1282 (D.C.1986); Smith v. United States, 337 A.2d 219, 222 (D.C.1975); see Martini Hairdressers, Inc. v. Potomac Beauty Supply Co., 203 A.2d 200, 201 (D.C.1964); Gass v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 15-16 , 416 F.2d 767, 771-772 (1969).

1986As we stated in Pryor v. United States, 503 A.2d 678, 681 (D.C.1986), “[A]” well-known exception to the hearsay rule, the admission of records generally kept in the course of business, has long been recognized in this jurisdic-tion_” See also Super.Ct.R. 43-I(a), made applicable in criminal cases by Super.Crim.R. 57(a); In re D.M.C. 503 A.2d 1280, 1282-83 (D.C.1986); Sullivan v. United States, 404 A.2d 153, 157-58 (D.C.1979).

1986Although it is true that the business records exception does not apply to records that have been prepared with an eye toward litigation, Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 , 63 S.Ct. 477 , 87 L.Ed.2d 645 (1943), we are satisfied that, in this case, the PD 775 qualifies as a business record.

1986Although it is true that the business records exception does not apply to records that have been prepared with an eye toward litigation, Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 , 63 S.Ct. 477 , 87 L.Ed.2d 645 (1943), we are satisfied that, in this case, the PD 775 qualifies as a business record.

2021United States v. Childs, 5 F.3d 1328, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1993) (application for “license plates in the name of [defendant]” were properly admitted “as a business record”); Bynum, 133 A.3d at 985 n.4 (DMV records admissible under “statutory rule of evidence,” see D.C.

2021Grimes further argues the business records exception does not apply to police “conjecture or conclusions” that go beyond mere observations, citing Evans-Reid v. District of Columbia, 930 A.2d 930, 944 (D.C. 2007).

2010Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the results of the scientific analysis of evidence, such as DEA drug testing results, cannot be admitted at trial through the business records exception to the hearsay rule because "the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial.” Melendez-Diaz, supra, 129 S.Ct. at 2538 (internal citation omitted). 5 .

2010Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the results of the scientific analysis of evidence, such as DEA drug testing results, cannot be admitted at trial through the business records exception to the hearsay rule because "the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial.” Melendez-Diaz, supra, 129 S.Ct. at 2538 (internal citation omitted). 5 .

2010It's a report by scientists who will follow a routinized procedure and aren't slanting it in any fashion, and they’re reporting as scientists for an expert to discuss.” This ruling was clearly erroneous because this court explicitly rejected that rationale in Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 13-14 (D.C.2006) ("[W]here a document is created primarily for the government to use it as a substitute for live testimony in a criminal prosecution, the fact that the document might happen to fall within the jurisdiction's business records exception to the hearsay rule does not render the document non

2010See Roberts v. United States, 508 A.2d 110, 112 (D.C.1986) (holding admissible, under the business records exception, a list of ATM transactions compiled from a bank’s com *690 puterized transaction records); Rosenberg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659, 665 (5th Cir.1980) (“computer data compilations ... should be treated as any other record of regularly conducted activity”); Dyno Constr.

2010Co. v. McWane, Inc., 198 F.3d 567, 575 (9th Cir.1999) (admitting “voluminous computerized records” as business records under the exception).

2010While it is true that no evidence showed when the paper documents were created, evidence was presented that the records — consisting of the electronic data stored on Pay By Touch’s computer system — were created at or reasonably close to the time of the transaction. 2 See Roberts, supra, 508 A.2d at 112 .

2010See Roberts v. United States, 508 A.2d 110, 112 (D.C.1986) (holding admissible, under the business records exception, a list of ATM transactions compiled from a bank’s com *690 puterized transaction records); Rosenberg v. Collins, 624 F.2d 659, 665 (5th Cir.1980) (“computer data compilations ... should be treated as any other record of regularly conducted activity”); Dyno Constr.

2007See United States v. Smith, 172 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 305 , 521 F.2d 957, 965 (1975) (noting that PD-251 was admissible as a business record but only to impeach the declarant’s trial testimony, not as substantive evidence of the declarant’s statement of the facts recorded in the police report). 21 Even if the first level of hearsay objection could be hurdled under the business records exception, the second and third levels of hearsay — the statements of the interviewees and the conversations that the interviewees reported — would not qualify for the state of mind exception urged by appellant. 22 T

2007See Montgomery, 517 A.2d at 316 (noting that PD-775 was not kept for such purpose).

2007See United States v. Smith, 172 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 305 , 521 F.2d 957, 965 (1975) (noting that PD-251 was admissible as a business record but only to impeach the declarant’s trial testimony, not as substantive evidence of the declarant’s statement of the facts recorded in the police report). 21 Even if the first level of hearsay objection could be hurdled under the business records exception, the second and third levels of hearsay — the statements of the interviewees and the conversations that the interviewees reported — would not qualify for the state of mind exception urged by appellant. 22 T

2006See, e.g., United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 234 (2d Cir.2006). 14 But where a document is created primarily for the government to use it as a substitute for live testimony in a criminal prosecution, the fact that the document might happen to fall within the jurisdiction’s business records exception to the hearsay rule does not render the document non-testimonial.

1992In addition, any reference to those records by the government in closing remarks — absent a cautionary instruction by the trial court — was harmless error, considering they were not "inherently inadmissible but could have been offered under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.” In re Samuels, 507 A.2d 150, 154 (D.C. 1986). .

1992Probation violation reports have been equated with records admitted pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule; they are “official record[s] kept in the ordinary course of business by the Probation Department.” Patterson v. United States, supra, 570 A.2d at 1199 .

1992Probation violation reports have been equated with records admitted pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule; they are "official record[s] kept in the ordinary course of business by the Probation Department." Patterson v. United States, supra, 570 A.2d at 1199 .

1991He relies on L.C.D., supra, 488 A.2d at 921-22 (HLA test admissible upon proper authentication by laboratory director), and Super.

1991Jones, supra, in turn, simply relied on Howard , stating: Having concluded that the EMIT test results are presumptively reliable and thus properly admissible into evidence, and that the Agency’s record reporting the test result falls within the business records exception to the hearsay rule ... we believe it is immaterial that neither a scientific expert on the EMIT system nor the technician who actually conducted the test was presented at trial.

1991Jones, supra, in turn, simply relied on Howard, stating: Having concluded that the EMIT test results are presumptively reliable and thus properly admissible into evidence, and that the Agency's record reporting the test result falls within the business records exception to the hearsay rule ... we believe it is immaterial that neither a scientific expert on the EMIT system nor the technician who actually conducted the test was presented at trial.

1988Nor can it be presumed that the relationship between a diagnosis of PCP intoxication and impairment of the user’s ability to perceive and recall events several days after the drug is ingested is “within the realm of common knowledge and everyday experience.” Adams v. United States, 502 A.2d 1011, 1021 (D.C.1986) (citations omitted).

1988Nor can it be presumed that the relationship between a diagnosis of PCP intoxication and impairment of the user's ability to perceive and recall events several days after the drug is ingested is "within the realm of common knowledge and everyday experience." Adams v. United States, 502 A.2d 1011, 1021 (D.C.1986) (citations omitted).

1988Adkins v. Morton, 494 A.2d 652, 662 (D.C.1985) (“The test for admissibility is whether the records are composed solely of ‘regularly recorded facts as to the patient’s condition or treatment on which the observations of competent physicians would not differ.’ ”) (citation omitted); see Rotan v. Egan, 537 A.2d 563, 566-67 (D.C.1988).

1988Adkins v. Morton, 494 A.2d 652, 662 (D.C. 1985) ("The test for admissibility is whether the records are composed solely of `regularly recorded facts as to the patient's condition or treatment on which the observations of competent physicians would not differ.'") (citation omitted); see Rotan v. Egan, 537 A.2d 563, 566-67 (D.C.1988).

1988As we stated in Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.1984), [djespite the importance of confrontation and the basic rule against admission of hearsay testimony, it is, of course, well established that certain types of hearsay evidence are inherently reliable and therefore admissible as exceptions to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause....

1988See Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.1984); Super.Ct.Crim.

1988Adkins v. Morton, 494 A.2d 652, 662 (D.C.1985) (“The test for admissibility is whether the records are composed solely of ‘regularly recorded facts as to the patient’s condition or treatment on which the observations of competent physicians would not differ.’ ”) (citation omitted); see Rotan v. Egan, 537 A.2d 563, 566-67 (D.C.1988).

1988Adkins v. Morton, 494 A.2d 652, 662 (D.C. 1985) ("The test for admissibility is whether the records are composed solely of `regularly recorded facts as to the patient's condition or treatment on which the observations of competent physicians would not differ.'") (citation omitted); see Rotan v. Egan, 537 A.2d 563, 566-67 (D.C.1988).