business records exception in Nebraska

2020Her testimony indicated that she was proficient at retrieving and printing out information stored in the computer system. [The employee’s] situation is analogous to that of the records custodian in [State v.] Estill[, 13 Kan.

2020The State urges this court to consider its ruling in State v. Ford, 1 Neb.

2020State v. Ford, 1 Neb.

2019Cite as 27 Neb.

2017Authentication requires more than saying “‘my opponent gave me a document.’”45 While not a high hurdle, it is still the bur- den of the proponent of the evidence to provide the court with sufficient evidence that the document or writing is what it purports to be.46 On this record, we find no abuse of discretion in excluding the exhibits for lack of authentication. (ii) Hearsay Exception for Business Records [25,26] Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the Nebraska Evidence Rules.47 O’Brien claims the 11 exhibits at issue were admissible under the business records exception to 43 In

2017Authentication requires more than saying “‘my opponent gave me a document.’”45 While not a high hurdle, it is still the bur- den of the proponent of the evidence to provide the court with sufficient evidence that the document or writing is what it purports to be.46 On this record, we find no abuse of discretion in excluding the exhibits for lack of authentication. (ii) Hearsay Exception for Business Records [25,26] Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the Nebraska Evidence Rules.47 O’Brien claims the 11 exhibits at issue were admissible under the business records exception to 43 In

2017Authentication requires more than saying “‘my opponent gave me a document.’”45 While not a high hurdle, it is still the bur- den of the proponent of the evidence to provide the court with sufficient evidence that the document or writing is what it purports to be.46 On this record, we find no abuse of discretion in excluding the exhibits for lack of authentication. (ii) Hearsay Exception for Business Records [25,26] Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the Nebraska Evidence Rules.47 O’Brien claims the 11 exhibits at issue were admissible under the business records exception to 43 In

2017Neb. 2005). 46 State v. Draganescu, 276 Neb. 448 , 755 N.W.2d 57 (2008). 47 Id. - 136 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports O’BRIEN v. CESSNA AIRCRAFT CO.

2017Neb. 2005). 46 State v. Draganescu, 276 Neb. 448 , 755 N.W.2d 57 (2008). 47 Id. - 136 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports O’BRIEN v. CESSNA AIRCRAFT CO.

2016And “taken together, these circumstances, provide sufficient guaranties of trustworthiness to make consideration of the reports fundamentally fair.” In re Interest of Kassara M., 258 Neb. at 95 , 601 N.W.2d at 923 .

2016And “taken together, these circumstances, provide sufficient guaranties of trustworthiness to make consideration of the reports fundamentally fair.” In re Interest of Kassara M., 258 Neb. at 95 , 601 N.W.2d at 923 .

2016Ed. 196 (1933). - 871 - Nebraska A dvance Sheets 292 Nebraska R eports STATE v. HENRY Cite as 292 Neb. 834 ultimate correctness of the trial court’s admission of the evi- dence under any theory supported by the record, so long as both parties had a fair opportunity to develop the record and the circumstances otherwise would make it fair to do so.67 In United States v. Rosenstein,68 the court accordingly affirmed the admission of evidence under the coconspirator exclusion to the hearsay rule, even though the evidence was admitted at trial under the business records exception.

2015State v. Castaneda, 287 Neb. 289 , 842 N.W.2d 740 (2014).

2014We then determined that a Daubert challenge was not pertinent to the cell phone records, because they “contained nothing even resembling ‘expert opinion tes- timony.’” State v. Robinson, 272 Neb. at 619 , 724 N.W.2d at 69 .

2014We then determined that a Daubert challenge was not pertinent to the cell phone records, because they “contained nothing even resembling ‘expert opinion tes- timony.’” State v. Robinson, 272 Neb. at 619 , 724 N.W.2d at 69 .

2006Ed. 2d 69 (1986); *601 (2) overruling the defendant’s objection to the admission into evidence of cellular telephone records, because (a) the records did not fall within the business records exception to the hearsay rule and (b) location data contained in the records required a hearing pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S. Ct. 2786 , 125 L.

2006Ed. 2d 69 (1986); *601 (2) overruling the defendant’s objection to the admission into evidence of cellular telephone records, because (a) the records did not fall within the business records exception to the hearsay rule and (b) location data contained in the records required a hearing pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S. Ct. 2786 , 125 L.

2006Ed. 2d 469 (1993), and Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215 , 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001); (3) overruling the defendant’s objection to the admission into evidence of a coat found in the possession of the defendant’s nephew; (4) failing to grant the defendant’s motions based upon the insufficiency of the evidence (a) to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and (b) specifically to prove that the crime was committed with deliberate and premeditated malice; (5) not finding that the State committed misconduct during opening and closing statements in its arguments with respect to

2006Ed. 2d 469 (1993), and Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215 , 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001); (3) overruling the defendant’s objection to the admission into evidence of a coat found in the possession of the defendant’s nephew; (4) failing to grant the defendant’s motions based upon the insufficiency of the evidence (a) to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and (b) specifically to prove that the crime was committed with deliberate and premeditated malice; (5) not finding that the State committed misconduct during opening and closing statements in its arguments with respect to

2006See, e.g., U.S. v. Fujii, 301 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2002); Hernandez, supra; Briscoe, supra; Sanders, supra. We agree and reaffirm our decision in Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253 , 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965), permitting the *616 admission into evidence of computer-generated records such as those admitted into evidence in this case.

2006See, e.g., Salgado, supra; U.S. v. Chatman, 994 F.2d 1510 (10th Cir. 1993); Briscoe, supra; Miller, supra. Most pertinently, under federal rule 803(6), courts have uniformly rejected arguments such as the defendant’s and have held that when computer-stored records satisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule, preparing printouts for evidentiary purposes does not deprive the printouts of their character as business records.

2006See, e.g., U.S. v. Fujii, 301 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2002); Hernandez, supra; Briscoe, supra; Sanders, supra. We agree and reaffirm our decision in Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253 , 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965), permitting the *616 admission into evidence of computer-generated records such as those admitted into evidence in this case.

2006See, e.g., Salgado, supra; U.S. v. Chatman, 994 F.2d 1510 (10th Cir. 1993); Briscoe, supra; Miller, supra. Most pertinently, under federal rule 803(6), courts have uniformly rejected arguments such as the defendant’s and have held that when computer-stored records satisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule, preparing printouts for evidentiary purposes does not deprive the printouts of their character as business records.

2006Excav. & Equip. v. Ludewig, 247 Neb. 547 , 529 N.W.2d 33 (1995). (c) Analysis (i) Business Records Exception The defendant first argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the cellular telephone records entered into evidence met the foundational requirements of the business records exception to the rule against hearsay.

2006Excav. & Equip. v. Ludewig, 247 Neb. 547 , 529 N.W.2d 33 (1995). (c) Analysis (i) Business Records Exception The defendant first argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the cellular telephone records entered into evidence met the foundational requirements of the business records exception to the rule against hearsay.

2006See, e.g., U.S. v. Fujii, 301 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2002); Hernandez, supra; Briscoe, supra; Sanders, supra. We agree and reaffirm our decision in Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253 , 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965), permitting the *616 admission into evidence of computer-generated records such as those admitted into evidence in this case.

2006See, e.g., U.S. v. Fujii, 301 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2002); Hernandez, supra; Briscoe, supra; Sanders, supra. We agree and reaffirm our decision in Transport Indemnity Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253 , 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965), permitting the *616 admission into evidence of computer-generated records such as those admitted into evidence in this case.

1993State v. Wright, 231 Neb. 410 , 436 N.W.2d 205 (1989); Omaha World-Herald Co. v. Nielsen, 220 Neb. 294 , 369 N.W.2d 631 (1985).

1993State v. Wright, 231 Neb. 410 , 436 N.W.2d 205 (1989); Omaha World-Herald Co. v. Nielsen, 220 Neb. 294 , 369 N.W.2d 631 (1985).

1993App. 3d 836, 455 N.E.2d 829 (1983), for the proposition that one of the foundational *581 requirements for admission of computerized business records is proof that the computer equipment is standard within the industry.

1993State v. Wright, 231 Neb. 410 , 436 N.W.2d 205 (1989); Omaha World-Herald Co. v. Nielsen, 220 Neb. 294 , 369 N.W.2d 631 (1985).

1993State v. Wright, 231 Neb. 410 , 436 N.W.2d 205 (1989); Omaha World-Herald Co. v. Nielsen, 220 Neb. 294 , 369 N.W.2d 631 (1985).