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13 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1953–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2022See State v. Brown, 480 N.W.2d 761, 764 (S.D. 1992) (holding the erroneous admission of evidence under the business records exception “does not warrant reversal absent a showing that substantial rights of the party were affected”). 2010“The custodian of the records ... ‘need not be in control of or have individual knowledge of the particular ... records ..., but need only be familiar with the [business’s] recordkeeping practices.’ ” Id. (citing United States v. Weinstock, 153 F.3d 272, 276 (6th Cir.1998)). “[A] proper foundation consists of testimony ‘that a document has been prepared and kept in the course of a regularly-conducted business activity.’ ” Id. (citing State v. Brown, 480 N.W.2d 761, 763 (S.D.1992)). | 3 | 3 |
United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Sanford Weinstock, Defendant-Appellant/cross-Appelleegreen2 sentences2004The term “business” as used in this section includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. [¶ 15.] Prior to use of the business records exception, a proper foundation must be made through the “testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness.” Id “The custodian of the records ... ‘need not be in control of or have individual knowledge of the particular ... records ..., but need only be familiar with the [business’s] recordkeeping practices.’ ” United States v. Weinstock, 153 F.3d 272, 276 (6thCir.l998) ( 2004See Wein-stock, 153 F.3d at 276 (noting that the theory behind the business records exception is that a person preparing a record has an incentive to be accurate, therefore “[r]ecords prepared in the course of regularly conducted business activity are particularly reliable... ”). | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Humberto Lechugagreen2 sentences2026See State v. Richmond, 2019 S.D. 62 , ¶ 28 n.9, 935 N.W.2d 792 , 801 n.9 (“Although Richmond does not challenge the admission of his 2015 judgment of conviction, we note that public records, such as a judgment of conviction, are analogous to business records.” (citations omitted)); see, e.g., United States v. Lechuga, 975 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1992) (“When an authorized person certifies facts asserted in public records and reports, such as the fact that defendant was released on bond, or the fact that at arraignment the magistrate judge instructed [defendant] to appear at trial on July 5, those a 2026See State v. Richmond, 2019 S.D. 62 , ¶ 28 n.9, 935 N.W.2d 792 , 801 n.9 (“Although Richmond does not challenge the admission of his 2015 judgment of conviction, we note that public records, such as a judgment of conviction, are analogous to business records.” (citations omitted)); see, e.g., United States v. Lechuga, 975 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1992) (“When an authorized person certifies facts asserted in public records and reports, such as the fact that defendant was released on bond, or the fact that at arraignment the magistrate judge instructed [defendant] to appear at trial on July 5, those a | 2 | 2 |
State v. Richmondgreen2 sentences2026See State v. Richmond, 2019 S.D. 62 , ¶ 28 n.9, 935 N.W.2d 792 , 801 n.9 (“Although Richmond does not challenge the admission of his 2015 judgment of conviction, we note that public records, such as a judgment of conviction, are analogous to business records.” (citations omitted)); see, e.g., United States v. Lechuga, 975 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1992) (“When an authorized person certifies facts asserted in public records and reports, such as the fact that defendant was released on bond, or the fact that at arraignment the magistrate judge instructed [defendant] to appear at trial on July 5, those a 2026See State v. Richmond, 2019 S.D. 62 , ¶ 28 n.9, 935 N.W.2d 792 , 801 n.9 (“Although Richmond does not challenge the admission of his 2015 judgment of conviction, we note that public records, such as a judgment of conviction, are analogous to business records.” (citations omitted)); see, e.g., United States v. Lechuga, 975 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1992) (“When an authorized person certifies facts asserted in public records and reports, such as the fact that defendant was released on bond, or the fact that at arraignment the magistrate judge instructed [defendant] to appear at trial on July 5, those a | 2 | 2 |
Wilson v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Reeves v. King, 534 So.2d 1107, 1114 (Ala.1988); Wilson v. State, 756 P.2d 307, 312 (Alaska App.1988); Wallin v. Ins. 2004Reeves v. King, 534 So2d 1107, 1114 (Ala1988) ; Wilson v. State, 756 P2d 307, 312 (Alaska App1988) ; Wallin v. Ins. | 2 | 2 |
Charles COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. D.J. KIBORT and Educational Therapy Center, Defendants-Appellantsgreen2 sentences2004See United States v. Freidin, 849 F.2d 716, 723 (2dCir.1988) (stating that a memorandum was inadmissible under the business records exception because there was no testimony that it was made in the “regular practice” of business); Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 337 (7thCir.1998) (stating that hospital bills were inadmissible because there was no testimony as to the hospitals regular business practice in maintaining billing records). [¶ 18.] The narrative outline and police report were also foundationally deficient. 2004See United States v. Freidin, 849 F2d 716, 723 (2dCir 1988) (stating that a memorandum was inadmissible under the business records exception because there was no testimony that it was made in the “regular practice†of business); Collins v. Kibort, 143 F3d 331, 337 (7thCir 1998) (stating that hospital bills were inadmissible because there was no testimony as to the hospital’s regular business practice in maintaining billing records). [¶ 18. ] The narrative outline and police report were also foundationally deficient. | 2 | 2 |
Peter H. Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Incorporatedgreen1 sentence2024Hosp., Inc., 386 F.3d 729 , 736 (6th Cir. 2004) (agreeing that the hearsay exception set forth in Rule 803(4) “applies only to statements made by the one actually seeking or receiving medical treatment.”); Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that “Rule 803(4) does not purport to except, nor can it reasonably be interpreted as excepting, statements by the person providing the medical attention to the patient”); Bulthuis v. Rexall Corp., 789 F.2d 1315, 1316 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (holding that “Rule 803(4) applies only to statements made by the | 1 | 1 |
Sawyer v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.green1 sentence2024See 2000 S.D. 144 , ¶ 26, 619 N.W.2d at 651 (finding that records produced by the defendant during discovery could not be admitted by the plaintiff under the business records exception without foundational testimony). | 1 | 1 |
Bulthuis v. Rexall Corporationgreen1 sentence2024Hosp., Inc., 386 F.3d 729 , 736 (6th Cir. 2004) (agreeing that the hearsay exception set forth in Rule 803(4) “applies only to statements made by the one actually seeking or receiving medical treatment.”); Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that “Rule 803(4) does not purport to except, nor can it reasonably be interpreted as excepting, statements by the person providing the medical attention to the patient”); Bulthuis v. Rexall Corp., 789 F.2d 1315, 1316 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (holding that “Rule 803(4) applies only to statements made by the | 1 | 1 |
Pfuhl v. Pfuhlgreen1 sentence2024This Court has noted our “well-entrenched rule” that “[e]ven if the circuit court provided the wrong authority, [its ruling] ‘may still be upheld if it reached the right result for the wrong reason.’” Pfuhl v. Pfuhl, 2014 S.D. 25 , ¶ 7, 846 N.W.2d 778, 780 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Dubray v. South Dakota Department of Social Servicesgreen2 sentences2010“Prior to use of the business records exception, a proper foundation must be made through the ‘testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness.’ ” DuBray, 2004 SD 130 , ¶ 15, 690 N.W.2d at 662 (citation omitted). 2010“Prior to use of the business records exception, a proper foundation must be made through the ‘testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness.’ ” DuBray, 2004 SD 130 , ¶ 15, 690 N.W.2d at 662 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Reeves v. Kinggreen1 sentence2004Reeves v. King, 534 So.2d 1107, 1114 (Ala.1988); Wilson v. State, 756 P.2d 307, 312 (Alaska App.1988); Wallin v. Ins. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Richard G. Freidingreen2 sentences2004See United States v. Freidin, 849 F.2d 716, 723 (2dCir.1988) (stating that a memorandum was inadmissible under the business records exception because there was no testimony that it was made in the “regular practice” of business); Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 337 (7thCir.1998) (stating that hospital bills were inadmissible because there was no testimony as to the hospitals regular business practice in maintaining billing records). [¶ 18.] The narrative outline and police report were also foundationally deficient. 2004See United States v. Freidin, 849 F.2d 716, 723 (2dCir.1988) (stating that a memorandum was inadmissible under the business records exception because there was no testimony that it was made in the “regular practice” of business); Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 337 (7thCir.1998) (stating that hospital bills were inadmissible because there was no testimony as to the hospitals regular business practice in maintaining billing records). [¶ 18.] The narrative outline and police report were also foundationally deficient. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ristaugreen2 sentences1992Accord, State v. Ristau, 290 N.W.2d 487 (S.D.1980). 1992See Ristau, supra. This refers to a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Kenneth Wayne Pagegreen2 sentences1992When admitting evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, a trial court acts under such a, "firmly rooted exception." Id. "`[A] trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of documents such as business records.'" U.S. v. Wigerman, 549 F.2d 1192, 1194 (8th Cir.1977) ( quoting U.S. v. Page, 544 F.2d 982, 987 (8th Cir.1976)). 1992When admitting evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, a trial court acts under such a, “firmly rooted exception.” Id. “ ‘[A] trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of documents such as business records.’ ” U.S. v. Wigerman, 549 F.2d 1192, 1194 (8th Cir.1977) (quoting U.S. v. Page, 544 F.2d 982, 987 (8th Cir.1976)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Joseph Theodore Wigermangreen2 sentences1992When admitting evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, a trial court acts under such a, "firmly rooted exception." Id. "`[A] trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of documents such as business records.'" U.S. v. Wigerman, 549 F.2d 1192, 1194 (8th Cir.1977) ( quoting U.S. v. Page, 544 F.2d 982, 987 (8th Cir.1976)). 1992When admitting evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, a trial court acts under such a, “firmly rooted exception.” Id. “ ‘[A] trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of documents such as business records.’ ” U.S. v. Wigerman, 549 F.2d 1192, 1194 (8th Cir.1977) (quoting U.S. v. Page, 544 F.2d 982, 987 (8th Cir.1976)). | 1 | 1 |
Loper v. Morrisongreen2 sentences1953The section reads in part as follows: “A record of an act, condition, or event, shall in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition, or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of informa *55 tion, method, and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.” The section enlarges the operation of the business records exception to the hearsay rule and, as Wigmore says, brings 1953The section reads in part as follows: “A record of an act, condition, or event, shall in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition, or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of informa *55 tion, method, and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.” The section enlarges the operation of the business records exception to the hearsay rule and, as Wigmore says, brings | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Carter
green
1 sentence2025The circuit court abused its discretion when it received the Milestone photograph into evidence because Detective Gooch could not lay a sufficient foundation to establish its admissibility under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. [¶42.] That being the case, there is not “a reasonable probability that, but for [the error], the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Carter, 2023 S.D. 67, ¶ 26 , 1 N.W.3d at 686 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Tina K. Field v. Trigg County Hospital, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024Hosp., Inc., 386 F.3d 729 , 736 (6th Cir. 2004) (agreeing that the hearsay exception set forth in Rule 803(4) “applies only to statements made by the one actually seeking or receiving medical treatment.”); Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that “Rule 803(4) does not purport to except, nor can it reasonably be interpreted as excepting, statements by the person providing the medical attention to the patient”); Bulthuis v. Rexall Corp., 789 F.2d 1315, 1316 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (holding that “Rule 803(4) applies only to statements made by the | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Stokes
green
1 sentence2024Stokes, 2017 S.D. 21 , ¶ 17, 895 N.W.2d at 356 . [¶30.] When analyzing this issue, we found the State’s reliance on the authentication rules to be misplaced “because it is based on the erroneous premise that authentication of a document satisfies the foundational requirements necessary to qualify for a hearsay exception.” Id. ¶ 18. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences2016We also disagree with Reinhardt’s argument that fingerprint cards present the same Confrontation Clause concerns as the forensic analysis at issue in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011). 2016We also disagree with Reinhardt’s argument that fingerprint cards present the same Confrontation Clause concerns as the forensic analysis at issue in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Bullcoming v. New Mexico
green
2 sentences2016We also disagree with Reinhardt’s argument that fingerprint cards present the same Confrontation Clause concerns as the forensic analysis at issue in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011). 2016We also disagree with Reinhardt’s argument that fingerprint cards present the same Confrontation Clause concerns as the forensic analysis at issue in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation
green
2 sentences1992NOTES [1] SDCL 22-29-1 provides: Any person who, having taken an oath that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any of the cases in which such an oath may by law be administered, intentionally and contrary to such oath, states any material matter which he knows to be false, is guilty of perjury. [2] Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) is identical to SDCL 19-16-10. [3] The two cases relied upon in the special writing, In re Japanese Electronic Products, supra and United States v. Leal, 509 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.1975), appear to be a minority inter 1992The two cases relied upon in the special writing, In re Japanese Electronic Products, supra and United States v. Leal, 509 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.1975), appear to be a minority interpretation which stretch the clear language of the business records exception because of difficulties in obtaining live foundation testimony from witnesses in Japan and Hong Kong. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
cluster 510995
green
2 sentences1992When admitting evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, a trial court acts under such a, "firmly rooted exception." Id. "`[A] trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of documents such as business records.'" U.S. v. Wigerman, 549 F.2d 1192, 1194 (8th Cir.1977) ( quoting U.S. v. Page, 544 F.2d 982, 987 (8th Cir.1976)). 1992When admitting evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, a trial court acts under such a, “firmly rooted exception.” Id. “ ‘[A] trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of documents such as business records.’ ” U.S. v. Wigerman, 549 F.2d 1192, 1194 (8th Cir.1977) (quoting U.S. v. Page, 544 F.2d 982, 987 (8th Cir.1976)). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
United States v. Morris Leal
green
2 sentences1992NOTES [1] SDCL 22-29-1 provides: Any person who, having taken an oath that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any of the cases in which such an oath may by law be administered, intentionally and contrary to such oath, states any material matter which he knows to be false, is guilty of perjury. [2] Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) is identical to SDCL 19-16-10. [3] The two cases relied upon in the special writing, In re Japanese Electronic Products, supra and United States v. Leal, 509 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.1975), appear to be a minority inter 1992The two cases relied upon in the special writing, In re Japanese Electronic Products, supra and United States v. Leal, 509 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.1975), appear to be a minority interpretation which stretch the clear language of the business records exception because of difficulties in obtaining live foundation testimony from witnesses in Japan and Hong Kong. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Clark v. Bergen
green
2 sentences1962“This section may be cited as the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act.” In the case of Clark v. Bergen, 75 S.D. 48 , 59 N.W.2d 250, 253 , this court pointed out that the common law rules relating to books of account and business records became so burdensome relief was sought in this state by the enactment of the Uniform Business Records Act which, in effect, “enlarges the operation of the business records exception to the hearsay rule.” The Business Records Act is based on the premise that entries and memoranda made in the regular course of business contemporaneously with an act, conditio 1962“This section may be cited as the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act.” In the case of Clark v. Bergen, 75 S.D. 48 , 59 N.W.2d 250, 253 , this court pointed out that the common law rules relating to books of account and business records became so burdensome relief was sought in this state by the enactment of the Uniform Business Records Act which, in effect, “enlarges the operation of the business records exception to the hearsay rule.” The Business Records Act is based on the premise that entries and memoranda made in the regular course of business contemporaneously with an act, conditio | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard, Inc. v. Scherpenisse
green
2 sentences1953The section reads in part as follows: “A record of an act, condition, or event, shall in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition, or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of informa *55 tion, method, and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.” The section enlarges the operation of the business records exception to the hearsay rule and, as Wigmore says, brings 1953The section reads in part as follows: “A record of an act, condition, or event, shall in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition, or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of informa *55 tion, method, and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.” The section enlarges the operation of the business records exception to the hearsay rule and, as Wigmore says, brings | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Reinecke v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences1953The section reads in part as follows: “A record of an act, condition, or event, shall in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition, or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of informa *55 tion, method, and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.” The section enlarges the operation of the business records exception to the hearsay rule and, as Wigmore says, brings 1953The section reads in part as follows: “A record of an act, condition, or event, shall in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition, or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of informa *55 tion, method, and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.” The section enlarges the operation of the business records exception to the hearsay rule and, as Wigmore says, brings | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.