claim of qualified immunity in Florida

2021In a separate concurrence in Keck, Justice Pariente observed that appellate courts had been using extraordinary writs to address 5 In the Keck opinion, the court requested the appellate rules committee to craft an amendment to rule 9.130 to reflect what it had just held, id. at 366 , similar to what it had done when it reviewed the denial of summary judgment on a claim of qualified immunity in Tucker v. Resha, 648 So. 2d 1187, 1190 (Fla. 1994) ("Thus, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and hold that an order denying summary judgment based upon a claim of qualified immunity is

2019For example, in Keck, the Court wrote: -7- [In Tucker v. Resha, 648 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 1994),] [w]e held that an order denying summary judgment based upon a claim of qualified immunity should be subject to interlocutory review to the extent that the order turns on an issue of law. [Id. at 190].

2021In a separate concurrence in Keck, Justice Pariente observed that appellate courts had been using extraordinary writs to address 5 In the Keck opinion, the court requested the appellate rules committee to craft an amendment to rule 9.130 to reflect what it had just held, id. at 366 , similar to what it had done when it reviewed the denial of summary judgment on a claim of qualified immunity in Tucker v. Resha, 648 So. 2d 1187, 1190 (Fla. 1994) ("Thus, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and hold that an order denying summary judgment based upon a claim of qualified immunity is

2018See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530 (holding that the “denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law” is subject to interlocutory review); Tucker, 648 So. 2d at 1190 (“[A]n order denying summary judgment based upon a claim of qualified immunity is subject to interlocutory review to the extent that the order turns on an issue of law.”); Keck, 104 So. 3d at 370 (Pariente, J., concurring) (requesting review for a rule expansion to permit interlocutory review of “the denial of any claim of immunity where the question presented is solely a question of law”).

2018See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530 (holding that the “denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law” is subject to interlocutory review); Tucker, 648 So. 2d at 1190 (“[A]n order denying summary judgment based upon a claim of qualified immunity is subject to interlocutory review to the extent that the order turns on an issue of law.”); Keck, 104 So. 3d at 370 (Pariente, J., concurring) (requesting review for a rule expansion to permit interlocutory review of “the denial of any claim of immunity where the question presented is solely a question of law”).

1995During the pendency of petitioners' motion for rehearing, the Florida Supreme Court issued its opinion in Tucker v. Resha, 648 So.2d 1187 (Fla. 1994), in which it held that "an order denying summary judgment based upon a claim of qualified immunity is subject to interlocutory review to the extent that the order turns on an issue of law." Id. at 1190 ; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) ("[A] district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law is an appealable `final decision' within

2018See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530 (holding that the “denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law” is subject to interlocutory review); Tucker, 648 So. 2d at 1190 (“[A]n order denying summary judgment based upon a claim of qualified immunity is subject to interlocutory review to the extent that the order turns on an issue of law.”); Keck, 104 So. 3d at 370 (Pariente, J., concurring) (requesting review for a rule expansion to permit interlocutory review of “the denial of any claim of immunity where the question presented is solely a question of law”).

2010The supreme court held in that case that “an order denying summary judgment based upon a claim of qualified immunity is subject to interlocutory review to the extent that the order turns on an issue of law.” 648 So.2d at 1190.

2014See also Tucker v. Resha, 648 So. 2d 1187, 1190 (Fla. 1994) (agreeing with the district court’s conclusion that Florida’s appellate rules at the time did not provide for interlocutory review of the nonfinal order and amending the appellate rules immediately to permit interlocutory review of a claim of qualified immunity to the extent that the order turns on an issue of law); Mandico v. Taos Constr., Inc., 605 So. 2d 850, 855 (Fla. 1992) (quashing the decision to the extent that the district court addressed the legal issue through an improper extraordinary writ, but declaring that the rules of

2014See also Tucker v. Resha, 648 So.2d 1187, 1190 (Fla.1994) (agreeing with the district court’s conclusion that Florida’s appellate rules at the time did not provide for interlocutory review of the nonfinal order and amending the appellate rules immediatfely to permit interlocutory review of a claim of qualified immunity to the extent that the order turns on an issue of law); Mandico v. Taos Constr., Inc., 605 So.2d 850, 855 (Fla.1992) (quashing the decision to the extent that the district court addressed the legal issue through an improper extraordinary writ, but declaring that the rules of app

2002Accordingly, the reasoning that underlies the immediate appealability of an order denying ... qualified immunity should be... [applicable];... the district court's decision is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."); see also Tucker v. Resha, 610 So.2d 460, 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), quashed on other grounds 648 So.2d 1187 (Fla.1994) ("Because of the nature and purpose of the claim of qualified immunity, an appeal after final judgment would hardly constitute a full and adequate remedy, for once the protection of immunity is lost and trial ensues, there is no means of reimmuni

1993I would treat the appeal, under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(c), as a petition for certiorari and address the merits as the court did in the case of Tucker v. Resha, 610 So.2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA1992), which also involved a denial by the trial court of a motion for summary judgment based upon a claim of qualified immunity to a civil rights action filed pursuant to Title 42, section 1983.

1996See also Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir.1994) ("the issue of a government official's qualified immunity from suit presents a question of law").

1996See also Johnson v. Jones, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 2156 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (denial of qualified immunity, to the extent it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable final decision).

1996See also Johnson v. Jones, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 2156 , 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 , 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (denial of qualified immunity, to the extent it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable final decision).

1992Tucker asserted a claim of qualified immunity, which shields from civil liability those governmental officials performing discretionary functions, to the extent "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396, 410 (1982); Green v. Brantley, 941 F.2d 1146, 1148 (11th Cir.1991).

1992Tucker asserted a claim of qualified immunity, which shields from civil liability those governmental officials performing discretionary functions, to the extent "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396, 410 (1982); Green v. Brantley, 941 F.2d 1146, 1148 (11th Cir.1991).

1992Tucker asserted a claim of qualified immunity, which shields from civil liability those governmental officials performing discretionary functions, to the extent "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396, 410 (1982); Green v. Brantley, 941 F.2d 1146, 1148 (11th Cir.1991).