sequential conviction requirement in Florida

2005While the Court in Barnes agreed that "the underlying philosophy of a habitual offender statute may be better served by a sequential conviction requirement," it held that "[u]nder these circumstances, this Court has no authority to change the plain meaning of a statute where the legislature has unambiguously expressed its intent." Barnes, 595 So.2d at 24 .

1993Justice Overton, writing for the majority, observed that "the underlying philosophy of a habitual offender statute may be better served by a sequential conviction requirement," but agreed that the "clear and unambiguous" wording of the 1988 statute contained no such requirement. 595 So.2d at 24 .

1992The sequential conviction requirement was first adopted by this Court as a necessary prerequisite for the imposition of a habitual offender sentence under our decision in Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 806 , 30 So.2d 304 (1947).

1992The sequential conviction requirement was first adopted by this Court as a necessary prerequisite for the imposition of a habitual offender sentence under our decision in Joyner v. State, 158 Fla. 806 , 30 So.2d 304 (1947).

2011Nevertheless, even under the HVFO provision, the predicate offense must be separate from the one for which the sentence is being imposed. *75 In Ponton , the Third District rejected the defendant’s claim that he should not have been sentenced as an HVFO because the sentence was based on predicate convictions that occurred on the same day, holding, “There is no sequential conviction requirement for an adjudication as an HVFO.” Ponton, 16 So.3d at 918 .

2011See Wilson v. State, 25 So.3d 704, 705 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that the sequential conviction requirement did not apply to the defendant’s sentencing because his crimes were committed prior to effective date of that provision); Bunch v. State, 976 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (addressing how section 775.084(5) applies to an HFO sentence); Walker v. State, 842 So.2d 969, 970 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (addressing how the sequential conviction requirement applies to an HFO sentence); Gordon v. Moore, 832 So.2d 880, 881 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (addressing how the sequential conviction requirement appli

2005See State v. Richardson, 915 So.2d 86 (Fla.2005); State v. Del Castillo, 890 So.2d 376, 378 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); McCall v. State, 862 So.2d 807 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

2004See Bover v. State, 797 So.2d 1246, 1251 (Fla.2001) (holding "that because [defendant] did not object to the habitual offender sentence on the basis that he lacked the requisite prior sequential convictions at the time his habitual offender sentence was imposed, the State should have the opportunity on remand to present record evidence that other prior convictions existed that would satisfy the sequential conviction requirement"); Lloyd v. State, 844 So.2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Davis v. State, 588 So.2d 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). [3] For reasons that are not clear, the decision of the panel in

2004See Bover v. State, 797 So.2d 1246, 1251 (Fla.2001) (holding "that because [defendant] did not object to the habitual offender sentence on the basis that he lacked the requisite prior sequential convictions at the time his habitual offender sentence was imposed, the State should have the opportunity on remand to present record evidence that other prior convictions existed that would satisfy the sequential conviction requirement"); Lloyd v. State, 844 So.2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Davis v. State, 588 So.2d 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). [3] For reasons that are not clear, the decision of the panel in

2004See Bover v. State, 797 So.2d 1246, 1251 (Fla.2001) (holding "that because [defendant] did not object to the habitual offender sentence on the basis that he lacked the requisite prior sequential convictions at the time his habitual offender sentence was imposed, the State should have the opportunity on remand to present record evidence that other prior convictions existed that would satisfy the sequential conviction requirement"); Lloyd v. State, 844 So.2d 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Davis v. State, 588 So.2d 289 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). [3] For reasons that are not clear, the decision of the panel in

2004The Fourth District reasoned that where defendant was convicted and, as a result of the conviction, the court found the defendant violated his probation, the sentence for the violation case and the case which forms the basis for the violation are entered on the same day and violate the sequential conviction requirement of section 775.084, Florida Statutes, which provides: "In order to be counted as a prior felony for purposes of sentencing under this section, the felony must have resulted in a conviction sentenced separately prior to the current offense and sentenced separately from any other

1992However, in Stevens v. State, 540 So.2d 232 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989), this court affirmed appellant’s prior conviction for trafficking in stolen property, and merely remanded for proper guidelines scoring.

1991Although appellee notes that the supreme court has not addressed the requirement since the demise of the two-tiered scheme, various district courts, including the Third District in Shead, supra, have continued to require sequential convictions on the authority of Joyner .

1991This was true when the requirement had a basis in the language of the habitual offender provision, see Joyner, supra, and continued to be true long after the old two-tiered provision was discarded, see Shead, supra .

1991Joyner, 30 So.2d at 306 . [2] In Wilken v. State, 531 So.2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), the Fourth District applied the sequential conviction requirement to the habitual misdemeanant provision in section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1987).

1991Thus, appellant notes, the sequential conviction requirement has been applied throughout the years to all versions of the statute, including the 1988 version at issue in Taylor v. State, 558 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), and in Walker v. State, 567 So.2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). *760 Appellee argues that reliance upon Joyner and its progeny is misplaced because, stated simply, the 1988 habitual offender statute is worded differently than all of its predecessors.

1991Thus, appellant notes, the sequential conviction requirement has been applied throughout the years to all versions of the statute, including the 1988 version at issue in Taylor v. State, 558 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), and in Walker v. State, 567 So.2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). *760 Appellee argues that reliance upon Joyner and its progeny is misplaced because, stated simply, the 1988 habitual offender statute is worded differently than all of its predecessors.