corporation claim in Illinois

2019Pielet, 2012 IL 112064, ¶¶ 32-33 . ¶ 41 Defendants claim Pielet applies to all actions to enforce the rights of a since-dissolved corporation even when the corporation transferred away its right by assignment or operation of law.

2018Pielet , 2012 IL 112064 , ¶¶ 32-33, 365 Ill.Dec. 497 , 978 N.E.2d 1000 . ¶ 41 Defendants claim Pielet applies to all actions to enforce the rights of a since-dissolved corporation even when the corporation transferred away its right by assignment or operation of law.

2000We find that the language of the policy in the case at bar unambiguously permits the inclusion of “family members” as “insureds” under the policy only when the “insured” is designated to be an “individual” and not a “corporation,” and, moreover, regardless of Hansen, Illinois law does not permit Hillcrest as a corporation to have or claim automobile insurance coverage for any purported “family members.” American States, 177 Ill. 2d at 479 , 687 N.E.2d at 75 ; Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 108 , 607 N.E.2d at 1212 ; Economy, 246 Ill.

2000We find that the language of the policy in the case at bar unambiguously permits the inclusion of “family members” as “insureds” under the policy only when the “insured” is designated to be an “individual” and not a “corporation,” and, moreover, regardless of Hansen, Illinois law does not permit Hillcrest as a corporation to have or claim automobile insurance coverage for any purported “family members.” American States, 177 Ill. 2d at 479 , 687 N.E.2d at 75 ; Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 108 , 607 N.E.2d at 1212 ; Economy, 246 Ill.

2000We find that the language of the policy in the case at bar unambiguously permits the inclusion of “family members” as “insureds” under the policy only when the “insured” is designated to be an “individual” and not a “corporation,” and, moreover, regardless of Hansen, Illinois law does not permit Hillcrest as a corporation to have or claim automobile insurance coverage for any purported “family members.” American States, 177 Ill. 2d at 479 , 687 N.E.2d at 75 ; Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 108 , 607 N.E.2d at 1212 ; Economy, 246 Ill.

2000We find that the language of the policy in the case at bar unambiguously permits the inclusion of “family members” as “insureds” under the policy only when the “insured” is designated to be an “individual” and not a “corporation,” and, moreover, regardless of Hansen, Illinois law does not permit Hillcrest as a corporation to have or claim automobile insurance coverage for any purported “family members.” American States, 177 Ill. 2d at 479 , 687 N.E.2d at 75 ; Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 108 , 607 N.E.2d at 1212 ; Economy, 246 Ill.

2000We find that the language of the policy in the case at bar unambiguously permits the inclusion of “family members” as “insureds” under the policy only when the “insured” is designated to be an “individual” and not a “corporation,” and, moreover, regardless of Hansen, Illinois law does not permit Hillcrest as a corporation to have or claim automobile insurance coverage for any purported “family members.” American States, 177 Ill. 2d at 479 , 687 N.E.2d at 75 ; Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 108 , 607 N.E.2d at 1212 ; Economy, 246 Ill.

2000App. 3d at 392 , 615 N.E.2d at 1294 .

1994App. 3d 51 , 547 N.E.2d 496 ), plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment in favor of their claim for the dissolution of the parties’ corporation and their claim for the dissolution of the parties’ partnership and the appointment of a receiver to sell property owned by the partnership.

1991Felsenthal Co. v. North Assurance Co. (1918), 284 Ill. 343 , 120 N.E. 268 .) In Felsenthal, where Mr. Fox owned nearly all of a corporation’s stock and was the assignee.of all stock he did not own, the court stated: “It is true, as contended by appellant, that the general rule of law is that the willful burning of property by a stockholder in a corporation is not a defense against the collection of the insurance by the corporation, and that the corporation cannot be prevented from collecting the insurance because its agents willfully set fire to the property without the participation or author

1991Felsenthal Co. v. North Assurance Co. (1918), 284 Ill. 343 , 120 N.E. 268 .) In Felsenthal, where Mr. Fox owned nearly all of a corporation’s stock and was the assignee.of all stock he did not own, the court stated: “It is true, as contended by appellant, that the general rule of law is that the willful burning of property by a stockholder in a corporation is not a defense against the collection of the insurance by the corporation, and that the corporation cannot be prevented from collecting the insurance because its agents willfully set fire to the property without the participation or author

1989(Holland, 127 Ill.

1982Ed. 2d 433 , 91 S. Ct. 479 , adopted a broader approach for determining when a corporation could claim the attorney-chent privilege.

1975(Brodsky v. Frank (1930) 342 Ill. 110 , 173 N.E. 775 .) There is an exception to this general rule when the stockholder shows that the specific wrong complained of is not only a wrong against the corporation but also a violation of a duty owing to the stockholder personally.

1975(Brodsky v. Frank (1930) 342 Ill. 110 , 173 N.E. 775 .) There is an exception to this general rule when the stockholder shows that the specific wrong complained of is not only a wrong against the corporation but also a violation of a duty owing to the stockholder personally.

1975(Schaffer v. Universal Rundle Corp. (5th Cir. 1968), 397 F.2d 893 ; Cullum v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (Tex. Civ.

1951Woodruff v. American Baseball Co. 290 Penn. 136 , 138 Atl. 497 , the writ was issued to oust the corporation from the privilege of Sunday baseball, because it violated the Sunday laws of that State.

1951Woodruff v. American Baseball Co. 290 Penn. 136 , 138 Atl. 497 , the writ was issued to oust the corporation from the privilege of Sunday baseball, because it violated the Sunday laws of that State.

1943Co. v. Boggiano, 202 Ill. 312 , decrees were reversed in minority stockholders ’ suits for decreeing payment direct to the minority stockholders for their proportionate share of the recovery in place of decreeing the payment direct to the corporation and this principle was also affirmed in the previous appeal in the ease at bar.

1939In People v. Mackey, 255 Ill. 144 , leave was asked to bring a suit in quo warranto against a corporation to test the question of whether failure to record the certificate within two years, as required by section 4 of the Act of 1872, then applicable, was fatal to the existence of the corporation.

1929“Money voluntarily paid to a corporation under a claim of right, without fraud or imposition, for an illegal tax, license, or fine, cannot without statutory aid — there being no coercion, no ignorance or mistake of facts, but only ignorance or pure mistake of the law — be recovered back from the corporation, either at law or in equity, even though such tax, license fee, or fine could not have been legally demanded and enforced.” In a comprehensive note to the section last quoted it is said: “The doctrine of non-liability has been applied to the case of money paid under an unconstitutional act

1929“Money voluntarily paid to a corporation under a claim of right, without fraud or imposition, for an illegal tax, license, or fine, cannot without statutory aid — there being no coercion, no ignorance or mistake of facts, but only ignorance or pure mistake of the law — be recovered back from the corporation, either at law or in equity, even though such tax, license fee, or fine could not have been legally demanded and enforced.” In a comprehensive note to the section last quoted it is said: “The doctrine of non-liability has been applied to the case of money paid under an unconstitutional act

1927Co. of Canada, 142 U. S. 217 ; State v. Clement Nat.

1927Co. v. Carr, 302 Ill. 172,179 .) A franchise tax is not a tax on the property of the corporation but, properly speaking, is imposed on the corporation for the privilege of carrying on its business and exercising the corporate franchise granted by the State (37 Cyc. 817; Beale on Foreign Corporations, p. 663; Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry.

1908What the legislature had in view in enacting this section of the Criminal Code manifestly was to prevent persons from obtaining a fictitious credit by advertising themselves as being a corporation when they were not incorporated.” In People v. Rose, 219 Ill. 46 , where the effect of the same section of the criminal statute was under consideration, it is said: “It is furthermore to be observed that this criminal statute does not make contracts made by persons guilty of the offense prohibited, invalid, but merely provides that such persons shall be liable to pay a certain fine.

1904Co., 129 Mass. 351 , it was held that a passenger who receives an injury by falling from the front platform of a street car while in motion, upon which he occupies a sitting position against the rules of the corporation and the warning of the driver of the car, and without any reasonable excuse therefor, is notin the exercise of such care as will entitle him to maintain an action against the corporation.

1903The mere assumption of a name appropriate for a corporation would be no violation of the statute; nor would the putting forth of a sign or advertisement in which a corporate name is assumed, if not done for the purpose of soliciting business, constitute such violation.” Edgerton v. Preston, 15 Ill.

1902Where the party would recover back taxes which he is under no legal obligation to pay, the payment must be compulsory.” ■In Elston v. City of Chicago, supra, we said (p. 518): “No case can be found, where money has obeen voluntarily paid with a full knowledge of the facts and circumstances under which it was demanded, which holds that it can be recovered back, upon the ground that the payment was made under a misapprehension of the legal rights and obligations of the party paying.” If an illegal tax is, however, paid under duress or compulsion it may be recovered back.

1897(Louk v. Woods, 15 Ill. 256 .) The ninth clause of section 1, chapter 131, of the Revised Statutes, provides: “Words purporting to give a joint authority to three or more public officers or other persons shall be construed as giving such authority to a majority of such officers or persons.” In the case of public officers who constitute a corporation the rule goes further, and all need not be present if there is a quorum or majority for the transaction of business.

1897(Dennis v. Maynard, 15 Ill. 477 ; Trustees of Schools v. Allen, 21 id. 120; Schofield v. Watkins, 22 id. 66; Commissioners of Highways v. Baumgarten, 41 id. 254.) A committee appointed to make an estimate has none of the qualities of such a corporation, and hence does not come under the latter rule; but when all are present and consulting, a majority may determine upon the estimate which shall be reported as that of the committee.