corporation violation in Texas

2015Id.

2015Id.

1919When this is not done, no subsequent act can make the contract effective.’ See, also, McDonald v. New York,, 68 N. Y., 23 , 23 Am.

1911When this is not done, no ■subsequent act can make the contract effective.” See, also, McDonald v. New York, 68 N. Y. 23 , 23 Am.

1917It is said therein: “The laws of this state do not expressly or by necessary implication declare void a note given for commissions on a sale of the stock of a corporation; * * * therefore, under the rule quoted in State Bank of Chicago v. Holland,# the protection of the law is extended to the instrument here sued upon and to the ap-pellee as a purchaser thereof for value before maturity and without notice of any infirmity in its execution.” In Seeligson v. Lewis, 65 Tex. 215 , 57 Am.

1917It is said therein: ‘The laws of this s.tate do not expressly or by necessary implication declare void a note given for commissions on a sale of the stock of a corporation; * * * therefore, under the rule quoted in State Bank of Chicago v. Holland, the protection of the law is extended to the instrument here sued upon and to the appellee as a purchaser thereof for value before maturity and without notice of any infirmity in its execution.’ “In Seeligson v. Lewis, 65 Tex. 215 , 57 Am.

1917App. 263 , 21 S. W. 723 , it was held the holder of a note by indorsement before maturity for value, and without notice of the defense against the original payee, could recover, even though it was given in consideration of intoxicating liquors sold to the maker in violation of the law and the bond executed by the sellers, to the effect that they would not sell to habitual drunkards, nor to persons after having received notice from the wife, mother, etc. In the case of Seheffel v. Smith, 169 S. W. 1131 , it is held a note given for commission on the sale of stock in a corporation in violation o

1917App. 263 , 21 S. W. 723 , it was held the holder of a note by indorsement before maturity for value, and without notice of the defense against the original payee, could recover, even though it was given in consideration of intoxicating liquors sold to the maker in violation of the law and the bond executed by the sellers, to the effect that they would not sell to habitual drunkards, nor to persons after having received notice from the wife, mother, etc. In the case of Scheffel v. Smith, 169 S. W. 1131 , it is held a note given for commission on the sale of stock in a corporation in violation o

1917App. 263 , 21 S. W. 723 , it was held the holder of a note by indorsement before maturity for value, and without notice of the defense against the original payee, could recover, even though it was given in consideration of intoxicating liquors sold to the maker in violation of the law and the bond executed by the sellers, to the effect that they would not sell to habitual drunkards, nor to persons after having received notice from the wife, mother, etc. In the case of Seheffel v. Smith, 169 S. W. 1131 , it is held a note given for commission on the sale of stock in a corporation in violation o

1917App. 263 , 21 S. W. 723 , it was held the holder of a note by indorsement before maturity for value, and without notice of the defense against the original payee, could recover, even though it was given in consideration of intoxicating liquors sold to the maker in violation of the law and the bond executed by the sellers, to the effect that they would not sell to habitual drunkards, nor to persons after having received notice from the wife, mother, etc. In the case of Scheffel v. Smith, 169 S. W. 1131 , it is held a note given for commission on the sale of stock in a corporation in violation o

2018"In Wilson v. United States , supra [ 221 U.S. 361 , 31 S.Ct. 538 , 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) ], the Court held that an officer of a corporation could not claim his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to justify a refusal to produce the corporate books and records in response to a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the corporation.

2018A companion case, Dreier v. United States , 221 U.S. 394 [ 31 S.Ct. 550 , 55 L.Ed. 784 ] (1911), held that the same result followed when the subpoena requiring production of the corporate books was directed to the individual corporate officer." Bellis , 417 U.S. at 89 , 94 S.Ct. 2179 .

2018A companion case, Dreier v. United States , 221 U.S. 394 [ 31 S.Ct. 550 , 55 L.Ed. 784 ] (1911), held that the same result followed when the subpoena requiring production of the corporate books was directed to the individual corporate officer." Bellis , 417 U.S. at 89 , 94 S.Ct. 2179 .

2018A companion case, Dreier v. United States , 221 U.S. 394 [ 31 S.Ct. 550 , 55 L.Ed. 784 ] (1911), held that the same result followed when the subpoena requiring production of the corporate books was directed to the individual corporate officer." Bellis , 417 U.S. at 89 , 94 S.Ct. 2179 .

2018A companion case, Dreier v. United States , 221 U.S. 394 [ 31 S.Ct. 550 , 55 L.Ed. 784 ] (1911), held that the same result followed when the subpoena requiring production of the corporate books was directed to the individual corporate officer." Bellis , 417 U.S. at 89 , 94 S.Ct. 2179 .

2018A companion case, Dreier v. United States , 221 U.S. 394 [ 31 S.Ct. 550 , 55 L.Ed. 784 ] (1911), held that the same result followed when the subpoena requiring production of the corporate books was directed to the individual corporate officer." Bellis , 417 U.S. at 89 , 94 S.Ct. 2179 .

2017Id. at 110 .

1995Second, "[a] party attempting to overcome an adverse fact finding as a matter of law must surmount two hurdles.... [T]he record must be examined for evidence that supports the jury's finding, while ignoring all evidence to the contrary.... [I]f there is no evidence to support the fact finder's answer, then, the entire record must be examined to see if the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law." Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d at 690 .

1995Second, “[a] party attempting to overcome an adverse fact finding as a matter of law must surmount two hurdles_ [T]he record must be examined for evidence that supports the jury’s finding, while ignoring all evidence to the contrary.... [I]f there is no evidence to support the fact finder’s answer, then, the entire record must be examined to see if the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law.” Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d at 690 .

1993This test was first recognized in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F.Supp. 483 (E.D.Pa.), petition for mandamus and prohibition denied sub. nom., General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 , 83 S.Ct. 937 , 9 L.Ed.2d 969 (1963), in which the court held that a corporation could claim the attorney-client privilege only as to statements made by employees “in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney.” Id. at 485.

1993This test was first recognized in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F.Supp. 483 (E.D.Pa.), petition for mandamus and prohibition denied sub. nom., General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 , 83 S.Ct. 937 , 9 L.Ed.2d 969 (1963), in which the court held that a corporation could claim the attorney-client privilege only as to statements made by employees "in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney." Id. at 485.

1993This test was first recognized in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F.Supp. 483 (E.D.Pa.), petition for mandamus and prohibition denied sub. nom., General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 , 83 S.Ct. 937 , 9 L.Ed.2d 969 (1963), in which the court held that a corporation could claim the attorney-client privilege only as to statements made by employees “in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney.” Id. at 485.

1993This test was first recognized in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F.Supp. 483 (E.D.Pa.), petition for mandamus and prohibition denied sub. nom., General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 , 83 S.Ct. 937 , 9 L.Ed.2d 969 (1963), in which the court held that a corporation could claim the attorney-client privilege only as to statements made by employees “in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney.” Id. at 485.

1993This test was first recognized in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F.Supp. 483 (E.D.Pa.), petition for mandamus and prohibition denied sub. nom., General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 , 83 S.Ct. 937 , 9 L.Ed.2d 969 (1963), in which the court held that a corporation could claim the attorney-client privilege only as to statements made by employees “in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney.” Id. at 485.

1993This test was first recognized in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F.Supp. 483 (E.D.Pa.), petition for mandamus and prohibition denied sub. nom., General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 , 83 S.Ct. 937 , 9 L.Ed.2d 969 (1963), in which the court held that a corporation could claim the attorney-client privilege only as to statements made by employees "in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney." Id. at 485.

1993This test was first recognized in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F.Supp. 483 (E.D.Pa.), petition for mandamus and prohibition denied sub. nom., General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 , 83 S.Ct. 937 , 9 L.Ed.2d 969 (1963), in which the court held that a corporation could claim the attorney-client privilege only as to statements made by employees “in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney.” Id. at 485.

1993This test was first recognized in City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F.Supp. 483 (E.D.Pa.), petition for mandamus and prohibition denied sub. nom., General Electric Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 , 83 S.Ct. 937 , 9 L.Ed.2d 969 (1963), in which the court held that a corporation could claim the attorney-client privilege only as to statements made by employees "in a position to control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney." Id. at 485.

1993Butt Co., 812 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991, no writ); Fojtik, 752 S.W.2d at 673 .

1993Butt Co., 812 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991, no writ); Fojtik, 752 S.W.2d at 673 .

1989Arrangements by which a corporation formed by non-physicians employs physicians to render medical services to the corporation's clients consistently have been held to constitute both the unlawful practice of medicine by the corporation and a violation by the employee physician of the prohibitions in section 3.08(12) of the Medical Practice Act, V.T.C.S. article 4495b, on a physician's "permitting or allowing another to use his license or certificate to practice medicine in this state," and in section 3.08(15) on "aiding or abetting, directly or indirectly, the practice of medicine by any perso

1989Arrangements by which a corporation formed by non-physicians employs physicians to render medical services to the corporation's clients consistently have been held to constitute both the unlawful practice of medicine by the corporation and a violation by the employee physician of the prohibitions in section 3.08(12) of the Medical Practice Act, V.T.C.S. article 4495b, on a physician's "permitting or allowing another to use his license or certificate to practice medicine in this state," and in section 3.08(15) on "aiding or abetting, directly or indirectly, the practice of medicine by any perso

1989Arrangements by which a corporation formed by non-physicians employs physicians to render medical services to the corporation's clients consistently have been held to constitute both the unlawful practice of medicine by the corporation and a violation by the employee physician of the prohibitions in section 3.08(12) of the Medical Practice Act, V.T.C.S. article 4495b, on a physician's "permitting or allowing another to use his license or certificate to practice medicine in this state," and in section 3.08(15) on "aiding or abetting, directly or indirectly, the practice of medicine by any perso

1989Rockett, M.D. v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 287 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Attorney General Opinion WW-278 (1957). 2 The Garcia court articulated the policy considerations underlying these restrictions on the "corporate practice of medicine" as follows: Without licensed, professional doctors on Boards of Directors, who and what criteria govern the selection of medical and paramedical staff members?

1989Arrangements by which a corporation formed by non-physicians employs physicians to render medical services to the corporation's clients consistently have been held to constitute both the unlawful practice of medicine by the corporation and a violation by the employee physician of the prohibitions in section 3.08(12) of the Medical Practice Act, V.T.C.S. article 4495b, on a physician's "permitting or allowing another to use his license or certificate to practice medicine in this state," and in section 3.08(15) on "aiding or abetting, directly or indirectly, the practice of medicine by any perso

1989Arrangements by which a corporation formed by non-physicians employs physicians to render medical services to the corporation's clients consistently have been held to constitute both the unlawful practice of medicine by the corporation and a violation by the employee physician of the prohibitions in section 3.08(12) of the Medical Practice Act, V.T.C.S. article 4495b, on a physician's "permitting or allowing another to use his license or certificate to practice medicine in this state," and in section 3.08(15) on "aiding or abetting, directly or indirectly, the practice of medicine by any perso

1987Holloway further states that contracts between a corporation and its officers or directors are not void but they are voidable for unfairness and fraud; that the burden is upon the fiduciary to prove fairness; that transactions in which a corporate fiduciary derives personal profit are subject to the closest examination; id. at 577 ; that a director of a corporation is held to the extreme measure of candor, unselfishness, and good faith; that those principles are rigid, essential, and salutary; and that a director or officer who diverts profits from the corporation in violation of his fiduciary

1987Id.