special relationship test in Illinois

2005Poulos , 312 Ill.

2005Poulos, 312 Ill.

2000The special relationship exception was limited by the court in Roehrborn v. Lambert , 277 Ill.

2000The special relationship exception was limited by the court in Roehrborn v. Lambert, 277 Ill.

2018We took the opportunity to reiterate this court's long history of adherence to the no-affirmative-duty rule and the special relationship doctrine before rejecting the plaintiff's argument and reaffirming that the rule and doctrine "stand *1123 as the law of this state." Id. at 101 , 316 Ill.Dec. 211 , 879 N.E.2d 278 . ¶ 38 Additionally, our appellate court has rejected attempts to hold universities liable for harm perpetrated by one student upon another in the absence of a special relationship.

2018We took the opportunity to reiterate this court's long history of adherence to the no-affirmative-duty rule and the special relationship doctrine before rejecting the plaintiff's argument and reaffirming that the rule and doctrine "stand *1123 as the law of this state." Id. at 101 , 316 Ill.Dec. 211 , 879 N.E.2d 278 . ¶ 38 Additionally, our appellate court has rejected attempts to hold universities liable for harm perpetrated by one student upon another in the absence of a special relationship.

2007See, e.g., Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422 (2006); Young v. Bryco Arms, 213 Ill. 2d 433 (2004); Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass’n, 195 Ill. 2d 210 (2000).

2007See, e.g., Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422 (2006); Young v. Bryco Arms, 213 Ill. 2d 433 (2004); Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass’n, 195 Ill. 2d 210 (2000).

2007See, e.g., Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422 (2006); Young v. Bryco Arms, 213 Ill. 2d 433 (2004); Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass’n, 195 Ill. 2d 210 (2000).

2007See, e.g., Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422 (2006); Young v. Bryco Arms, 213 Ill. 2d 433 (2004); Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass’n, 195 Ill. 2d 210 (2000).

2000E.g., Doe, 302 Ill.App.3d at 842-43 , 236 Ill.

2000E.g., Doe, 302 Ill.

2000Johnson , 311 Ill.

2000Johnson, 311 Ill.

1990Dec. 417 , 513 N.E.2d 1026 .) The plaintiffs in that case urged the appellate court to discard the fourth part of the special relationship test on several grounds, most notably that the public policy against drunken driving should create a duty in this situation because the accident was foreseeable.

1990App.3d at 1004-06 , 112 Ill.Dec. 417 , 513 N.E.2d 1026 .) Therefore, Schaffrath refused to discard or modify the "control" requirement of the special relationship test.

1990Anthony, 168 Ill.

1990Anthony, 168 Ill.

1990Plaintiff argues that the first appellate court case to affirmatively state the four-part special relationship test based its phrasing of the fourth prong on a questionable reading of a prior case. ( Bell v. Village of Midlothian (1980), 90 Ill.App.3d 967, 970 , 46 Ill.Dec. 382 , 414 N.E.2d 104 , citing Brooks v. Lundeen (1977), 49 Ill.

1990Plaintiff argues that the first appellate court case to affirmatively state the four-part special relationship test based its phrasing of the fourth prong on a questionable reading of a prior case. ( Bell v. Village of Midlothian (1980), 90 Ill.App.3d 967, 970 , 46 Ill.Dec. 382 , 414 N.E.2d 104 , citing Brooks v. Lundeen (1977), 49 Ill.

2018App. 3d 1 , 14, 270 Ill.Dec. 159 , 782 N.E.2d 718 (2002) ; see People v. Boeckmann , 238 Ill. 2d 1 , 13, 342 Ill.Dec. 537 , 932 N.E.2d 998 (2010) ("it is not appropriate to address the issue in this case where the parties have not raised or argued it"); accord Roberts v. Northland Insurance Co. , 185 Ill. 2d 262 , 270, 235 Ill.Dec. 579 , 705 N.E.2d 762 (1998). ¶ 73 As the majority recognizes, the parties here focused on only the four traditional duty factors and did not raise the so-called "no-affirmative-duty" rule and the special relationship doctrine in either the appellate court or this co

2018App. 3d 1 , 14, 270 Ill.Dec. 159 , 782 N.E.2d 718 (2002) ; see People v. Boeckmann , 238 Ill. 2d 1 , 13, 342 Ill.Dec. 537 , 932 N.E.2d 998 (2010) ("it is not appropriate to address the issue in this case where the parties have not raised or argued it"); accord Roberts v. Northland Insurance Co. , 185 Ill. 2d 262 , 270, 235 Ill.Dec. 579 , 705 N.E.2d 762 (1998). ¶ 73 As the majority recognizes, the parties here focused on only the four traditional duty factors and did not raise the so-called "no-affirmative-duty" rule and the special relationship doctrine in either the appellate court or this co

2013The plaintiff first argues that the special relationship exception applies to impose a duty on McEwen and Rawlings. ¶ 68 In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), the United States Supreme Court set parameters on when the state has a duty to protect individuals from harm by private actors.

1995App. 3d 775 , 641 N.E.2d 845 (examining the special relationship doctrine established in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314(A) (1965).) Plaintiff in the instant case relies on Yamada v. Hilton Hotel Corp. (1977), 60 Ill.

1995App. 3d 101 , 376 N.E.2d 227 , which involves such a situation.

1995App. 3d 775 , 641 N.E.2d 845 (examining the special relationship doctrine established in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314(A) (1965).) Plaintiff in the instant case relies on Yamada v. Hilton Hotel Corp. (1977), 60 Ill.

1995(See Petersen v. U.S. Reduction Co. (1994), 267 Ill.

1993Plaintiffs cite Martin v. Chicago Transit Authority (1984), 128 Ill.

1993(Gordon v. County of Jackson (1992), 231 Ill.

1990(Rowe v. State Bank (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 203 , 531 N.E.2d 1358 .) The court underscored the continued vigor of the special relationship rule, observing that it has “repeatedly held that the simple relationship between a landlord and a tenant, or a landlord and those on the premises with the tenant’s consent, is not a ‘special’ one imposing a duty to protect against the criminal acts of others.” ( 125 Ill. 2d at 216 , 531 N.E.2d at 1364 .) Plaintiffs in Rowe avoided the strictures of the special relationship rule only because they successfully argued that the landlord had negligently performed a

1990(Rowe v. State Bank (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 203 , 531 N.E.2d 1358 .) The court underscored the continued vigor of the special relationship rule, observing that it has “repeatedly held that the simple relationship between a landlord and a tenant, or a landlord and those on the premises with the tenant’s consent, is not a ‘special’ one imposing a duty to protect against the criminal acts of others.” ( 125 Ill. 2d at 216 , 531 N.E.2d at 1364 .) Plaintiffs in Rowe avoided the strictures of the special relationship rule only because they successfully argued that the landlord had negligently performed a

1990(Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 507, 526 , 513 N.E.2d 387, 396 , cert, denied (1988), 485 U.S. 905 , 99 L.

1990(Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 507, 526 , 513 N.E.2d 387, 396 , cert, denied (1988), 485 U.S. 905 , 99 L.

1990(Duncavage v. Allen (1986), 147 Ill.

1990App. 3d at 97-99 , 497 N.E.2d at 438-39 ), although not strictly necessary to the opinion, would seem to depart from the special relationship rule.

1990Plaintiff argues that the first appellate court case to affirmatively state the four-part special relationship test based its phrasing of the fourth prong on a questionable reading of a prior case. ( Bell v. Village of Midlothian (1980), 90 Ill.App.3d 967, 970 , 46 Ill.Dec. 382 , 414 N.E.2d 104 , citing Brooks v. Lundeen (1977), 49 Ill.

1990App.3d 1 , 7 Ill.Dec. 262 , 364 N.E.2d 423 .) Plaintiff argues that Bell's popularly accepted fourth part of the test, which requires that the injury occur while the plaintiff is under the immediate and direct control of an employee or agent of the municipality, does not appear in the Brooks case.

1990(Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 507, 526 , 513 N.E.2d 387, 396 , cert, denied (1988), 485 U.S. 905 , 99 L.