special relationship doctrine in California

2024(E.D.Cal. 2014) 997 F.Supp.2d 1071 , 1085–1086 (Walsh).) “In cases involving suicide, courts have been extremely reluctant to impose liability based on the special relationship exception.” (Adams v. City of Fremont (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 243, 277 [police have no duty to prevent a threatened suicide].) 11 A special relationship exists between schools and students, though that relationship, “ ‘by itself, does not create liability.’ ” (Mosley v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1263 .) The relationship places “an affirmative duty on the school district to take

2021(Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377 , 401–402, 410–411 [finding duty under Rowland, but concluding in the alternative that the plaintiff satisfied the special relationship test]; see Adams v. City of Fremont (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 243 , 267–276, 282–288 (Adams) [noting that Rowland factors and the special relationship test are sometimes in conflict and finding no duty to protect under either test, while concluding that this court has generally favored applying Rowland’s multifactor test over the special relationship test]; cf. University of Southern California v. Su

2023(See Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 114–115 [discussing negligent undertaking theory].) We therefore do not address it. 26 conduct in question remains relevant to the existence and scope of a proprietor’s duty under the special relationship doctrine.” (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 248 ; see also id. at p. 249 [“Merely because a supermarket or other similar enterprise ‘chooses to have a security program’ that includes provision of a roving security guard does not signify that the proprietor has assumed a duty to protect invitees from third party violence.”]) To hold otherwise migh

2019Delgado involved an assault in the parking lot of a bar which employed two guards-one stationed inside and one outside. ( Delgado , supra , 36 Cal.4th at pp. 229-230, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 , 113 P.3d 1159 .) The plaintiff left the bar at the suggestion of the inside guard; but the outside guard was not at his station, and the plaintiff was assaulted by a gang of men in the parking lot. ( Id. at pp. 231-232, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 , 113 P.3d 1159 .) We note that while the court ultimately found a legal duty on the part of the bar's proprietor, it rested that determination not on the foreseeability of

2022(See Brown v. USA Taekwondo, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 216 [examples of special relationships creating an affirmative duty to protect include the relationship between employers and employees]; accord, Regents of University of California v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 620 .) According to Dominguez, Colonial was therefore required to undertake measures to protect its working- at-home employees from third party criminal harm. 9 (See Rest.3d Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (2012) § 40, subds. (a) & (b)(4) [special relationships include “an employer with its employees who,

2018The Supreme Court, however, concluded that because the university owed a duty to protect its students based on the special-relationship doctrine, it need not address any possible alternative source of duty. ( Regents , supra , 4 Cal.5th at p. 634, fn. 8, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415 , 413 P.3d 656 .) As discussed in more detail below, the majority additionally held that Civil Code section 43.92 precluded liability against defendant Nicole Green, a university therapist who had treated Thompson, because there was no evidence Thompson had ever communicated a serious threat of physical violence against an

2014(See Hansra v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 630, 646 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 216 ] [“to say that a ‘special relationship’ exists [or does not exist] *462 is to say nothing other than the [Rowland] factors favoring imposition of a duty of care in particular circumstances outweigh [or do not outweigh] the countervailing factors . . .”]; Adams v. City of Fremont (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 243, 285 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 196 ] [“the question of duty must not ignore matters of policy regardless of whether the duty purportedly arises under the special relationship doctrine . . .”].) 3.

2014(See Hansra v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 630, 646 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 216 ] [“to say that a ‘special relationship’ exists [or does not exist] *462 is to say nothing other than the [Rowland] factors favoring imposition of a duty of care in particular circumstances outweigh [or do not outweigh] the countervailing factors . . .”]; Adams v. City of Fremont (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 243, 285 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 196 ] [“the question of duty must not ignore matters of policy regardless of whether the duty purportedly arises under the special relationship doctrine . . .”].) 3.

2015To expansively construe the special relationship doctrine to encompass such incremental increases in a preexisting risk would eviscerate our Supreme Court’s adoption in Williams, supra, 34 Cal.3d at page 23 , of the public duty rule, which protects police officers from the burden of assuming greater obligations to others by virtue of their employment.” ( Adams, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 284-285.) This case is very different from Lugtu, supra, 26 Cal.4th 703 , on which appellant relies.

1999(See, e.g., Williams, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 24 ; Davidson, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 206 ; M.B., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 704-705.) Despite this broad dictum, not one of the cases in which courts have imposed a duty on police officers based on the special relationship exception relied solely on affirmative police conduct that increased a preexisting risk of harm.

2025Thus, the following describes the part of the special relationship doctrine relevant to this appeal: “When the avoidance of foreseeable harm to a third person requires a defendant to control the conduct of a person with whom the defendant has a special relationship (such as physician and patient) or to warn the person of the risks involved in certain conduct, the defendant’s duty extends to a third person with whom the defendant does not have a special relationship.” (Reisner v. Regents of Univ. of California (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-1199 , italics added (Reisner); see Tarasoff, supra,

2025Thus, the following describes the part of the special relationship doctrine relevant to this appeal: “When the avoidance of foreseeable harm to a third person requires a defendant to control the conduct of a person with whom the defendant has a special relationship (such as physician and patient) or to warn the person of the risks involved in certain conduct, the defendant’s duty extends to a third person with whom the defendant does not have a special relationship.” (Reisner v. Regents of Univ. of California (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1198-1199 , italics added (Reisner); see Tarasoff, supra,

2017(Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 99 , 162 P.3d 610 ].) These factors include: “ ‘ “[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future *1129 harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalenc

2017(Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 99 , 162 P.3d 610 ].) These factors include: “ ‘ “[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future *1129 harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalenc

2024(E.D.Cal. 2014) 997 F.Supp.2d 1071 , 1085–1086 (Walsh).) “In cases involving suicide, courts have been extremely reluctant to impose liability based on the special relationship exception.” (Adams v. City of Fremont (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 243, 277 [police have no duty to prevent a threatened suicide].) 11 A special relationship exists between schools and students, though that relationship, “ ‘by itself, does not create liability.’ ” (Mosley v. San Bernardino City Unified School Dist. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1263 .) The relationship places “an affirmative duty on the school district to take

2010W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508, 517 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 673 ]; accord, Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 56, p. 383 [under special relationship doctrine, school's duty to take reasonable precautions for safety of students includes obligation to exercise control over conduct of third persons].) The foregoing principles have been applied in four significant Supreme Court cases.

2021(Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377 , 401–402, 410–411 [finding duty under Rowland, but concluding in the alternative that the plaintiff satisfied the special relationship test]; see Adams v. City of Fremont (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 243 , 267–276, 282–288 (Adams) [noting that Rowland factors and the special relationship test are sometimes in conflict and finding no duty to protect under either test, while concluding that this court has generally favored applying Rowland’s multifactor test over the special relationship test]; cf. University of Southern California v. Su

2019(See, e.g., USC , at p. 448, 241 Cal.Rptr.3d 616 ; Sullivan , at p. 1213 ; Sparks , at p. 245 .) In support of her position, appellant cites Grenier , in which the Supreme Court of Connecticut concluded a genuine dispute existed whether the fraternity owed a duty to control its local chapter. ( Grenier, supra , 51 A.3d at p. 389.) As respondent notes, the national fraternity in Grenier , unlike respondent, owned the local chapter's house and paid for improvements to the house. ( Ibid. ) Beyond this obvious distinction, however, we believe the court's analysis was inconsistent with the legal pr

2018(Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 620 [citing Rest.3d Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, § 40, subd. (b) (Rest.3d) [identifying “a school with its students” as a form of “special relationship[] that may support a duty to protect against foreseeable risks”]].) The Court emphasized, however, that the comments to the Restatement further observe that “reasonable care varies in different school environments, with substantially different supervision being appropriate in elementary schools as opposed to colleges.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 620 [citing Rest.3d, § 40, com. l, p. 45

2018(Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 620 [citing Rest.3d Torts, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, § 40, subd. (b) (Rest.3d) [identifying “a school with its students” as a form of “special relationship[] that may support a duty to protect against foreseeable risks”]].) The Court emphasized, however, that the comments to the Restatement further observe that “reasonable care varies in different school environments, with substantially different supervision being appropriate in elementary schools as opposed to colleges.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 620 [citing Rest.3d, § 40, com. l, p. 45

2005Special relationship analysis Turning to the application of the special relationship doctrine in the case before us, it is undisputed that defendant, a bar proprietor, stood in a special relationship with plaintiff, its patron and invitee, and hence owed a duty to undertake "reasonable steps to secure common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties that [were] likely to occur in the absence of such precautionary measures" ( Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th 666, 674 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137 , 863 P.2d 207 ) and to take such "appropriate action as is reasonable under the circumstances to pro

2005Special relationship analysis Turning to the application of the special relationship doctrine in the case before us, it is undisputed that defendant, a bar proprietor, stood in a special relationship with plaintiff, its patron and invitee, and hence owed a duty to undertake "reasonable steps to secure common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties that [were] likely to occur in the absence of such precautionary measures" ( Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th 666, 674 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137 , 863 P.2d 207 ) and to take such "appropriate action as is reasonable under the circumstances to pro

2008The special relationship doctrine is most commonly invoked “in cases involving the relationship between business proprietors such as shopping centers, restaurants, and bars, and their tenants, patrons, or invitees.” (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 , 113 P.3d 1159 ] (Delgado).) A business owner may have an affirmative duty to “control the wrongful acts of third persons which threaten invitees where the [owner] has reasonable cause to anticipate such acts and the probability of injury resulting therefrom.” (Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc. (1966) 65 Ca

2008The special relationship doctrine is most commonly invoked “in cases involving the relationship between business proprietors such as shopping centers, restaurants, and bars, and their tenants, patrons, or invitees.” (Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill (2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 145 , 113 P.3d 1159 ] (Delgado).) A business owner may have an affirmative duty to “control the wrongful acts of third persons which threaten invitees where the [owner] has reasonable cause to anticipate such acts and the probability of injury resulting therefrom.” (Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc. (1966) 65 Ca

2006(Adams v. City of Fremont (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 243, 279 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 196 ]; M.B. v. City of San Diego (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 699, 704-705 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 555 ].) The rule is not triggered “simply because police officers responded to a call for assistance and took some action at the scene.” (Adams v. City of Fremont, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 279 ; see Von Batsch v. American Dist.

1999(See, e.g., Williams, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 24 , 192 Cal.Rptr. 233 , 664 P.2d 137 ; Davidson, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 206 , 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 ; M.B., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 704-705, 284 Cal.Rptr. 555 .) Despite this broad dictum, not one of the cases in which courts have imposed a duty on police officers based on the special relationship exception relied solely on affirmative police conduct that increased a preexisting risk of harm.

2026(Conti, at pp. 1218–1219.) Applying the special relationship doctrine and the factors set forth in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland), the court concluded the church defendants had a legal duty to exercise reasonable due care to restrict and supervise the offending church member during field service to prevent him from molesting children in the community and in the congregation during church-sponsored field service.

2023We also outline the special relationship doctrine, which can impose a duty on an individual to protect another from harm caused by a third party, and the policy considerations set forth in Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland) that may potentially limit any such duty.

2024(Vasilenko, at p. 1083.) “As a general rule, a person who has not created a peril has no duty to come to the aid of another ‘no matter how great the danger in which the other is placed, or how easily he could be rescued, unless there is some relationship between them which gives rise to a duty to act. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] This rule applies to police officers as well as to other citizens: The police owe duties of care only to the public at large and, except where they enter into a ‘special relationship,’ have no duty to offer affirmative assistance to anyone in particular.” (Benavidez v. S

1999The notion that the special relationship exception may be expansively interpreted to impose a duty of care whenever a law enforcement officer’s affirmative conduct increases a preexisting risk of harm is derived from McCorkle, supra, 70 Cal.2d 252 and Mann, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 773 .

2024(N.D.Cal. 2019) 399 F.Supp.3d 986 , 1001, italics added; Walsh, supra, 997 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1085–1086 [school employees are generally not trained to treat mental illness and are not held to a higher standard of care than medical professionals who diagnose mental illness].) The requirement of custody and control is consistent with the rule that “the special relationship doctrine can impose no greater duty of protection on school districts for off-school- grounds hazards than the Legislature has authorized by statute.” (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 804 ; Guerre

2010Either a total lack of supervision ... or ineffective supervision ... may constitute a lack of ordinary care on the part of those responsible for student supervision...." ...'" ( Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist., supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 933-934, citations omitted.) "The special relationship doctrine may serve as the basis for establishing negligence and liability on the part of a school district for breach of the long-established duty of schools to supervise students in their charge and protect them against harm from others on school premises during the school day." ( Searcy v. Hemet Un

2000Special Relationship Creating Responsibility for Third Party Criminal Acts Alternatively, we note that liability for negligence “is not imposed for the failure to assist or protect another, absent some legal or special relationship between the parties giving rise to a duty to act. [Citations.]” (People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 200 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236 , 886 P.2d 1229 ]; Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 203 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 ]; see also Eric J. v. Betty M. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 715, 727 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 549 ]; Hernandez v. City of Pomona (1996) 49

2000Special Relationship Creating Responsibility for Third Party Criminal Acts Alternatively, we note that liability for negligence “is not imposed for the failure to assist or protect another, absent some legal or special relationship between the parties giving rise to a duty to act. [Citations.]” (People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 200 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236 , 886 P.2d 1229 ]; Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 203 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 ]; see also Eric J. v. Betty M. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 715, 727 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 549 ]; Hernandez v. City of Pomona (1996) 49

2021(See Bastian v. County of San Luis Obispo (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 520, 529 ; see, e.g., Carpenter v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 923, 931-932 [police created special relationship with witness to crime by assuring him that he was in no danger and by failing to warn him of threats against him].) This follows from the fact that a special relationship is an exception to the public duty rule; hence, it gives rise to a duty to protect.

1999Similarly, the remaining cases in which a duty was imposed under the special relationship exception based on the impact of a defendant’s conduct on the plaintiff’s risk of harm have all involved instances where law enforcement officers placed the plaintiff in a position of peril. ( Carpenter, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d 923 ; Wallace, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th 1385 ; see also Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782 [ 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352 ] [probation officer placed juvenile in foster parents’ home without warning foster parents of child’s homicidal tendencies].) Neither are we per

2017Conversely, nonfeasance is found when the defendant has failed to aid plaintiff through beneficial intervention.” (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 49 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 539 P.2d 36 ].) “[A]bsent misfeasance, ‘as a general matter, there is no duty to act to protect others from the conduct of third parties.’ [Citation.] [¶] Even in the case of nonfeasance, there are ‘recognized exceptions to the general no-duty-to-protect rule,’ one of which is the special relationship doctrine. [Citations.] ‘A defendant may owe an affirmative duty to protect another from the conduct of third

2017Conversely, nonfeasance is found when the defendant has failed to aid plaintiff through beneficial intervention.” (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 49 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 539 P.2d 36 ].) “[A]bsent misfeasance, ‘as a general matter, there is no duty to act to protect others from the conduct of third parties.’ [Citation.] [¶] Even in the case of nonfeasance, there are ‘recognized exceptions to the general no-duty-to-protect rule,’ one of which is the special relationship doctrine. [Citations.] ‘A defendant may owe an affirmative duty to protect another from the conduct of third

2017Conversely, nonfeasance is found when the defendant has failed to aid plaintiff through beneficial intervention.” (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 49 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 539 P.2d 36 ].) “[A]bsent misfeasance, ‘as a general matter, there is no duty to act to protect others from the conduct of third parties.’ [Citation.] [¶] Even in the case of nonfeasance, there are ‘recognized exceptions to the general no-duty-to-protect rule,’ one of which is the special relationship doctrine. [Citations.] ‘A defendant may owe an affirmative duty to protect another from the conduct of third

2017Conversely, nonfeasance is found when the defendant has failed to aid plaintiff through beneficial intervention.” (Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 49 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 468 , 539 P.2d 36 ].) “[A]bsent misfeasance, ‘as a general matter, there is no duty to act to protect others from the conduct of third parties.’ [Citation.] [¶] Even in the case of nonfeasance, there are ‘recognized exceptions to the general no-duty-to-protect rule,’ one of which is the special relationship doctrine. [Citations.] ‘A defendant may owe an affirmative duty to protect another from the conduct of third

2015(Seo v. All-Makes Overhead Doors (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1203 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 160 ], quoting Eric J. v. Betty M., supra, 76 Cal.App.4th 715, 729-730 ; see Suarez v. Pacific Northstar Mechanical, Inc. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 430, 438 [ 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 168 ]; but see Natty v. Grace Community Church, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 293 [applying both the special relationship doctrine and the Rowland factors in analyzing whether church pastors had a duty to prevent a foreseeable suicide].) However, even if we were required to consider the Rowland factors, we would not conclude that the elders had a du

2000Special Relationship Creating Responsibility for Third Party Criminal Acts Alternatively, we note that liability for negligence “is not imposed for the failure to assist or protect another, absent some legal or special relationship between the parties giving rise to a duty to act. [Citations.]” (People v. Heitzman (1994) 9 Cal.4th 189, 200 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 236 , 886 P.2d 1229 ]; Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 203 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 , 649 P.2d 894 ]; see also Eric J. v. Betty M. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 715, 727 [ 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 549 ]; Hernandez v. City of Pomona (1996) 49

2005Special relationship analysis Turning to the application of the special relationship doctrine in the case before us, it is undisputed that defendant, a bar proprietor, stood in a special relationship with plaintiff, its patron and invitee, and hence owed a duty to undertake "reasonable steps to secure common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties that [were] likely to occur in the absence of such precautionary measures" ( Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th 666, 674 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137 , 863 P.2d 207 ) and to take such "appropriate action as is reasonable under the circumstances to pro

2005Special relationship analysis Turning to the application of the special relationship doctrine in the case before us, it is undisputed that defendant, a bar proprietor, stood in a special relationship with plaintiff, its patron and invitee, and hence owed a duty to undertake "reasonable steps to secure common areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties that [were] likely to occur in the absence of such precautionary measures" ( Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th 666, 674 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137 , 863 P.2d 207 ) and to take such "appropriate action as is reasonable under the circumstances to pro