apportionment instruction in Kentucky

2001In Stratton v. Parker, Ky., 793 S.W.2d 817 (1990), we voiced our continued approval of Floyd v. Carlisle Const. Co., Inc ., and after setting forth the recently enacted legislation codifying the principles of comparative fault, now KRS 411.182, we stated: The law has now developed to the point that in tort actions involving the fault of more than one party, including third-party defendants and persons who have settled the claim against them, an apportionment instruction, if requested, must be given whereby the jury will determine the amount of the plaintiff's damage and the degree of fault to

2001In Stratton v. Parker, Ky., 793 S.W.2d 817 (1990), we voiced our continued approval of Floyd v. Carlisle Const. Co., Inc., and after setting forth the recently enacted legislation codifying the principles of comparative fault, now KRS 411.182, we stated: The law has now developed to the point that in tort actions involving the fault of more than one party, including third-party defendants and persons who have settled the claim against them, an apportionment instruction, if requested, must be given whereby the jury will determine the amount of the plaintiff’s damage and the degree of fault to b

2012Davis v. Lucas, 432 S.W.2d 411 (Ky.1968).

2009Davis v. Lucas, 432 S.W.2d 411 (Ky.1968).

1997Liability is now subject to an apportionment instruction since Hilen v. Hays, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 713 (1984).

1997Liability is now subject to an apportionment instruction since Hilen v. Hays, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 713 (1984).

1990We also noted in a footnote that: "1 Because of the rule established in Hilen v. Hays, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 713 (1984) a majority of this court would now hold that apportionment is required even as to joint tortfeasors brought in as defendants in a third-party complaint and would overrule Nix v. Jordan, Ky., 532 S.W.2d 762 (1975) to the extent that it holds otherwise." In Stratton v. Parker, Ky., 793 S.W.2d 817 (1990), we held: "The law has now developed to the point that in tort actions involving the *29 fault of more than one party, including third-party defendants and persons who have settled th

1988Literally, the statute permits apportionment only against ‘defendants,’ which necessarily means joint defendants.” 532 S.W.2d at 763 .

1990Orr v. Coleman, supra, is a clear expression that damages assessed severally under an apportionment instruction cannot be enforced jointly against joint tort-feasors.

1990Orr v. Coleman, supra , is a clear expression that damages assessed severally under an apportionment instruction cannot be enforced jointly against joint tort-feasors.

2026Because [Plaintiff] failed to meet its burden of establishing by expert testimony the standard of care imposed upon [medical defendant] in a surgery such as this, and that he breached that standard of care by his specific actions or failure to act, the trial court properly denied [plaintiff]'s request for an apportionment instruction.” (emphasis added)); Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676 , 680–81 (Ky. 2005) (“As the standard of care is not within the scope of common experience of 19 jurors, requiring expert testimony as to the standard of care of a phlebotomist was a prop

2016In Degener v. Hall Contracting Corp., 27 S.W.3d 775 (Ky.2000), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that contribution and indemnity continue to be viable even after the adoption of comparativé fault and apportionment.

2016Insight suggests that the decision in CertainTeed Corp. v. Dexter, 330 S.W.3d 64 (Ky.2010), stands for the proposition that a complaint filed against a non-party is sufficient to submit an apportionment instruction that includes that non-party party.

2015Further, Appellees contend that Wemyss v. Coleman, 729 S.W.2d 174 (Ky.1987), and its progeny have established that comparative negligence principles apply to any antecedent or subsequent negligence that enhances the plaintiffs injury.

2007"Inherent in the Kentucky law of apportionment, KRS 411.182, is that the interests of codefendants may be considered antagonistic." Sommerkamp, 114 S.W.3d at 816 .

2007“Inherent in the Kentucky law of apportionment, KRS 411.182, is that the interests of codefendants may be considered antagonistic.” Sommerkamp, 114 S.W.3d at 816 .

2005In Baker v. Webb, 883 S.W.2d 898 (Ky.App.1994) this court interpreted KRS 411.182 in addressing the precise issue raised in this case, i.e., whether a non-settling non-party could be included in the apportionment instruction, and concluded as follows: [T]he thrust of KRS ill. 182, considered in its entirety, limits allocation of fault to those who actively assert claims, offensively or defensively, as parties in the litigation or who have settled by release or agreement.

2005Id.; see also Floyd v. Carlisle Construction Company, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 430 (Ky.1988); Bass v. Williams, 839 S.W.2d 559 (Ky.App.1992); Copass v. Monroe County Medical Foundation, Inc., 900 S.W.2d 617 (Ky.App.1995).

2005Id.; see also Floyd v. Carlisle Construction Company, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 430 (Ky.1988); Bass v. Williams, 839 S.W.2d 559 (Ky.App.1992); Copass v. Monroe County Medical Foundation, Inc., 900 S.W.2d 617 (Ky.App.1995).

1988In Corbin Motor Lodge v. Combs, Ky., 740 S.W.2d 944 (1987), a decision written so recently that the ink is hardly dry, by the same author as the present Opinion, we stated “the law in this area,” common law tort doctrine, should not be changed unless it “reaches an absurd result” or because “change in the present law is compelled in order to avoid grave injustices.” 740 S.W. 2d at 946 .

1988In Corbin Motor Lodge v. Combs, Ky., 740 S.W.2d 944 (1987), a decision written so recently that the ink is hardly dry, by the same author as the present Opinion, we stated “the law in this area,” common law tort doctrine, should not be changed unless it “reaches an absurd result” or because “change in the present law is compelled in order to avoid grave injustices.” 740 S.W. 2d at 946 .