Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
33 Florida opinions name it 4 courts 1940–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ancel Pratt, Jr. v. Michael C. Weiss, D.O.green2 sentences2024“The purpose of the apportionment requirement in the rule is to allow each offeree to evaluate the terms and the amount of the offer as it pertains to him or her.” Id. at 1272 . 2018In Attorneys’ Title Insurance Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So. 3d 646 (Fla. 2010), the Florida Supreme Court’s strict application of the apportionment requirement of rule 1.442(c)(3)4 resulted in the invalidation of a joint proposal for settlement “where one defendant presented an offer to two plaintiffs that was conditioned upon the acceptance of both plaintiffs.” Pratt, 161 So. 3d at 1272 (stating that “[s]trict application” of the apportionment requirement of rule 1.442 resulted in invalidation of proposal for settlement in Gorka). | 2 | 3 |
Valerie Audiffred v. Thomas B. Arnoldgreen2 sentences2019“The supreme court has recently held that ‘when a single offeror submits a settlement proposal to a single offeree . . . and the offer resolves pending claims by or against additional parties who are neither offerors nor offerees, it constitutes a joint proposal that is subject to the apportionment requirement . . . .” Miley v. Nash, 171 So. 3d 145, 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (emphasis added) (quoting Audiffred v. Arnold, 161 So. 3d 1274, 1280 (Fla. 2015)). 2015The supreme court has recently held that “when a single offeror submits a settlement proposal to a single offeree ... and the offer resolves pending claims by or against additional parties who are neither offerors nor offerees, it constitutes a joint proposal that is subject to the apportionment requirement....” Audiffred v. Arnold, 161 So.3d 1274, 1280 (Fla.2015). | 2 | 2 |
Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc.green2 sentences2015See id. at 278 (quoting Allstate Ins. 2015See id. at 278 (quoting Allstate Ins. | 2 | 2 |
Twiddy v. Guttenplangreen2 sentences2014Co. v. Hingson, 808 So.2d 197, 199 (Fla.2002); see also Twiddy v. Guttenplan, 678 So.2d 488, 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (“[W]e are required to reverse because the joint offer of judgment was not specific enough to enable the trial judge to determine that the ... verdict against [one offeror] was at least twenty-five percent less than the offer made on her behalf.”). 2014Co. v. Hingson, 808 So. 2d 197, 199 (Fla. 2002); see also Twiddy v. Guttenplan, 678 So. 2d 488, 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (“[W]e are required to reverse because the joint offer of judgment was not specific enough to enable the trial judge to determine that the . . . verdict against [one offeror] was at least twenty-five percent less than the offer made on her behalf.”). | 2 | 2 |
Allstate Indem. Co. v. Hingsongreen2 sentences2014Co. v. Hingson, 808 So.2d 197, 199 (Fla.2002); see also Twiddy v. Guttenplan, 678 So.2d 488, 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (“[W]e are required to reverse because the joint offer of judgment was not specific enough to enable the trial judge to determine that the ... verdict against [one offeror] was at least twenty-five percent less than the offer made on her behalf.”). 2014Co. v. Hingson, 808 So. 2d 197, 199 (Fla. 2002); see also Twiddy v. Guttenplan, 678 So. 2d 488, 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (“[W]e are required to reverse because the joint offer of judgment was not specific enough to enable the trial judge to determine that the . . . verdict against [one offeror] was at least twenty-five percent less than the offer made on her behalf.”). | 2 | 2 |
Kidron, Inc. v. Carmonagreen2 sentences2001When Ford appealed, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that "[o]n the facts in this crash-worthiness case, the appellant [Ford] properly raised an apportionment defense." D'Amario, 732 So.2d at 1145 (citing Kidron, Inc. v. Carmona, 665 So.2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)). 1999See Kidron, Inc. v. Carmona, 665 So.2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). | 1 | 2 |
Dama v. Record Bar, Inc.green2 sentences1996Dama v. *170 Record Bar Inc., 512 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). 1992Dama v. Record Bar, Inc., 512 So.2d 206, 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). | 1 | 2 |
Florida Medical Ass'n v. Spiresgreen1 sentence2026Ass'n, v. Spires, 153 So. 2d 756, 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963) (holding that the corporate board of a corporation was not itself an entity subject to suit). 1 Rule 1.442 contains one exception to the apportionment requirement that is inapplicable here. | 1 | 1 |
Miley v. Nashgreen1 sentence2019“The supreme court has recently held that ‘when a single offeror submits a settlement proposal to a single offeree . . . and the offer resolves pending claims by or against additional parties who are neither offerors nor offerees, it constitutes a joint proposal that is subject to the apportionment requirement . . . .” Miley v. Nash, 171 So. 3d 145, 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (emphasis added) (quoting Audiffred v. Arnold, 161 So. 3d 1274, 1280 (Fla. 2015)). | 1 | 1 |
Coho Resources, Inc. v. McCarthygreen2 sentences2018See Young v. Guild, 3 7 So. 3d 251 , 261–62 (Miss. 2009) ("Young's denial in her discovery response was binding on her; she waived her right to an apportionment instruction."); Coho Res., Inc. v. McCarthy, 829 So. 2d 1, 24 (Miss. 2002) (holding that failure to identify other tortfeasors in response to interrogatory requesting identity of any parties defendant believed caused the accident waived right to apportion fault to another tortfeasor); Allstate Indem. 2018Co. v. Camillo, 80 So. 3d 394, 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ("Proof of mailing of 4 7 So. 3d 251 , 261–62 (Miss. 2009) ("Young's denial in her discovery response was binding on her; she waived her right to an apportionment instruction."); Coho Res., Inc. v. McCarthy, 829 So. 2d 1, 24 (Miss. 2002) (holding that failure to identify other tortfeasors in response to interrogatory requesting identity of any parties defendant believed caused the accident waived right to apportion fault to another tortfeasor); Allstate Indem. | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Guildgreen2 sentences2018See Young v. Guild, 3 7 So. 3d 251 , 261–62 (Miss. 2009) ("Young's denial in her discovery response was binding on her; she waived her right to an apportionment instruction."); Coho Res., Inc. v. McCarthy, 829 So. 2d 1, 24 (Miss. 2002) (holding that failure to identify other tortfeasors in response to interrogatory requesting identity of any parties defendant believed caused the accident waived right to apportion fault to another tortfeasor); Allstate Indem. 2018Co. v. Camillo, 80 So. 3d 394, 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ("Proof of mailing of 4 7 So. 3d 251 , 261–62 (Miss. 2009) ("Young's denial in her discovery response was binding on her; she waived her right to an apportionment instruction."); Coho Res., Inc. v. McCarthy, 829 So. 2d 1, 24 (Miss. 2002) (holding that failure to identify other tortfeasors in response to interrogatory requesting identity of any parties defendant believed caused the accident waived right to apportion fault to another tortfeasor); Allstate Indem. | 1 | 1 |
Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Browngreen2 sentences2018Co. v. Brown, 696 N.E.2d 92, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (finding waiver of issue on "consent to sue" clause in insurance contract because insurer's "complaints and its responses to interrogatories gave [plaintiff] no reason to believe that he had failed to comply with the policy terms" (citing Indiana Ins. 2018Co. v. Brown, 696 N.E.2d 92, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (finding waiver of issue on "consent to sue" clause in insurance contract because insurer's "complaints and its responses to interrogatories gave [plaintiff] no reason to believe that he had failed to comply with the policy terms" (citing Indiana Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Progressive Express Insurance v. Camillogreen1 sentence2018Co. v. Camillo, 80 So. 3d 394, 402 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) ("Proof of mailing of 4 7 So. 3d 251 , 261–62 (Miss. 2009) ("Young's denial in her discovery response was binding on her; she waived her right to an apportionment instruction."); Coho Res., Inc. v. McCarthy, 829 So. 2d 1, 24 (Miss. 2002) (holding that failure to identify other tortfeasors in response to interrogatory requesting identity of any parties defendant believed caused the accident waived right to apportion fault to another tortfeasor); Allstate Indem. | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. Goldmangreen2 sentences2015See id. at 278 (quoting Allstate Ins. 2015See id. at 278 (quoting Allstate Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Lamb v. Matetzschkgreen1 sentence2009See Lamb v. Matetzschk, 906 So.2d 1037 (Fla.2005). | 1 | 1 |
Trump Enterprises, Inc. v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.green1 sentence1999See also, Trump Enterprises, Inc. v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 682 So.2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (eminent domain or condemnation proceeding where property is encumbered by leasehold requires determination of value of fee interest and the value of the leasehold interest; thereafter parties proceed to an apportionment hearing where court determines their respective rights in the amount awarded). 10 See, Making Ends Meet, Inc. v. Cusick, 1998 WL 551974 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (tenant not entitled to apportionment of condemnation proceeds where lease contained condemnation clause expressly providing t | 1 | 1 |
| National Advertising Co. v. STATE, DOTgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Goldberg v. Sweet
green
2 sentences2000“In analyzing these contentions, we are mindful that the central purpose behind the apportionment requirement is to ensure that each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction.” Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260-61 , 109 S.Ct. 582 , 102 L.Ed.2d 607 (1989). 2000“In analyzing these contentions, we are mindful that the central purpose behind the apportionment requirement is to ensure that each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction.” Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260-61 , 109 S.Ct. 582 , 102 L.Ed.2d 607 (1989). | 2 | 1991–2000 |
Attorneys' Title Insurance Fund, Inc. v. Gorka
green
2 sentences2018In Attorneys’ Title Insurance Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So. 3d 646 (Fla. 2010), the Florida Supreme Court’s strict application of the apportionment requirement of rule 1.442(c)(3)4 resulted in the invalidation of a joint proposal for settlement “where one defendant presented an offer to two plaintiffs that was conditioned upon the acceptance of both plaintiffs.” Pratt, 161 So. 3d at 1272 (stating that “[s]trict application” of the apportionment requirement of rule 1.442 resulted in invalidation of proposal for settlement in Gorka). 2018In Gorka, the issue before the Court was “whether a joint offer of settlement or judgment that is conditioned on the mutual acceptance of all of the joint offerees is valid and enforceable.” 36 So. 3d at 649 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Reynolds v. Sims
green
2 sentences2012We evaluate this federal principle in conjunction with the newly enacted state constitutional requirement set forth in article III, section 21(b), requiring districts to be “as nearly equal in population as is practicable.” As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that “state legislatures be apportioned in such a way that each person’s vote carries the same weight — that is, each legislator represents the same number of voters.” In re Apportionment Law-1992, 597 So.2d at 278 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , 84 S 2012We evaluate this federal principle in conjunction with the newly enacted state constitutional requirement set forth in article III, section 21(b), requiring districts to be “as nearly equal in population as is practicable.” As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that “state legislatures be apportioned in such a way that each person’s vote carries the same weight — that is, each legislator represents the same number of voters.” In re Apportionment Law-1992, 597 So.2d at 278 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 , 84 S | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Staffmark v. Merrell
green
2 sentences2012In apportioning the benefits, the JCC cited to our opinion in Staffmark v. Merrell, 43 So.3d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), and concluded that the E/C was entitled to avail itself of the apportionment defense provided for in section 440.15(5)(b) because, although Claimant’s prior injuries occurred in an occupational setting, they were never claimed or treated as compen-sable injuries under the workers’ compensation system. 2012In apportioning the benefits, the JCC cited to our opinion in Staffmark v. Merrell, 43 So.3d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), and concluded that the E/C was entitled to avail itself of the apportionment defense provided for in section 440.15(5)(b) because, although Claimant's prior injuries occurred in an occupational setting, they were never claimed or treated as compensable injuries under the workers' compensation system. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Grobman v. Posey
green
2 sentences2008In Grobman v. Posey, 863 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), which also involved a settlement with an HMO in a medical malpractice action, we held that: “setoff turns on whether [the HMO] was a party defendant to which the apportionment requirement of section 768.81(3) applied. 2008If section 768.81(3) did not apply, then ... the failure to include it on the verdict form had no legal effect.” 863 So.2d at 1233 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Ford Motor Co. v. D'AMARIO
green
1 sentence2001When Ford appealed, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that "[o]n the facts in this crash-worthiness case, the appellant [Ford] properly raised an apportionment defense." D'Amario, 732 So.2d at 1145 (citing Kidron, Inc. v. Carmona, 665 So.2d 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Making Ends Meet, Inc. v. Cusick
green
1 sentence1999See also, Trump Enterprises, Inc. v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 682 So.2d 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (eminent domain or condemnation proceeding where property is encumbered by leasehold requires determination of value of fee interest and the value of the leasehold interest; thereafter parties proceed to an apportionment hearing where court determines their respective rights in the amount awarded). 10 See, Making Ends Meet, Inc. v. Cusick, 1998 WL 551974 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (tenant not entitled to apportionment of condemnation proceeds where lease contained condemnation clause expressly providing t | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Angrand v. Key
green
1 sentence1996Finally, we note that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a doctor's testimony on the issue of grief and bereavement in light of the supreme court's recent pronouncement in Angrand v. Key, 657 So.2d 1146 (Fla.1995). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Lee County v. Sager
green
1 sentence1996Bolduc ; State Road Dept. v. Thibaut, 190 So.2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966), cert. denied, 196 So.2d 922 (1967); Lee County v. Sager, 595 So.2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 606 So.2d 1165 (Fla.1992); Division of Admin., State of Fla. v. Allen, 447 So.2d 1383 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
DIV. OF ADMIN., STATE, DEPT OF TRANSP. v. Allen
green
1 sentence1996Bolduc ; State Road Dept. v. Thibaut, 190 So.2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966), cert. denied, 196 So.2d 922 (1967); Lee County v. Sager, 595 So.2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 606 So.2d 1165 (Fla.1992); Division of Admin., State of Fla. v. Allen, 447 So.2d 1383 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State Road Department v. Thibaut
green
1 sentence1996Bolduc ; State Road Dept. v. Thibaut, 190 So.2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966), cert. denied, 196 So.2d 922 (1967); Lee County v. Sager, 595 So.2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 606 So.2d 1165 (Fla.1992); Division of Admin., State of Fla. v. Allen, 447 So.2d 1383 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Stanley
green
1 sentence1996Bolduc ; State Road Dept. v. Thibaut, 190 So.2d 53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966), cert. denied, 196 So.2d 922 (1967); Lee County v. Sager, 595 So.2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 606 So.2d 1165 (Fla.1992); Division of Admin., State of Fla. v. Allen, 447 So.2d 1383 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
FLAGSHIP NAT. BK. OF BROWARD v. Hinkle
green
1 sentence1994Thus, whenever it can be finally determined that one or the other of the carriers is responsible for all or any severable parts of the obligations and duties owed the claimant under the statute, the judge may resolve the controversy and order reimbursement or divide liability "upon appropriate findings of fact." Flagship National Bank of Broward County v. Hinkle, 479 So.2d at 831 . 8 Apportionment of permanent benefits is of course premature until MMI from the subsequent injury... . 564 So.2d at 1198 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Cruise Quality Painting v. Paige
green
1 sentence1994Thus, whenever it can be finally determined that one or the other of the carriers is responsible for all or any severable parts of the obligations and duties owed the claimant under the statute, the judge may resolve the controversy and order reimbursement or divide liability "upon appropriate findings of fact." Flagship National Bank of Broward County v. Hinkle, 479 So.2d at 831 . 8 Apportionment of permanent benefits is of course premature until MMI from the subsequent injury... . 564 So.2d at 1198 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Dionese v. City of West Palm Beach green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| City of Pompano Beach v. Beatty green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| ESCAMBIA CTY. COUNCIL v. Goldsmith green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Escambia County Council v. Goldsmith neutral | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Evans v. Florida Industrial Commission green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Lemus v. Industrial Sites Services green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Pereles v. Magoon neutral | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.