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29 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1916–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Claim of Krebs v. Town of Ithacagreen2 sentences2013Matter of Nye v IBM Corp., 2 AD3d 1164, 1164 [2003]; Matter of Krebs v Town of Ithaca, 293 AD2d 883, 883-884 [2002], lv denied 100 NY2d 501 [2003]), he could nevertheless succeed on his motion for summary judgment by demonstrating that his negligence was not a proximate cause of any actual and ascertainable damages to plaintiff (see Geraci v Munnelly, 85 AD3d 1361, 1362 [2011]; Bixby v Somerville, 62 AD3d 1137, 1139 [2009]; Tabner v Drake, 9 AD3d 606, 609 [2004]). 2013Matter of Nye v IBM Corp., 2 AD3d 1164, 1164 [2003]; Matter of Krebs v Town of Ithaca, 293 AD2d 883, 883-884 [2002], lv denied 100 NY2d 501 [2003]), he could nevertheless succeed on his motion for summary judgment by demonstrating that his negligence was not a proximate cause of any actual and ascertainable damages to plaintiff (see Geraci v Munnelly, 85 AD3d 1361, 1362 [2011]; Bixby v Somerville, 62 AD3d 1137, 1139 [2009]; Tabner v Drake, 9 AD3d 606, 609 [2004]). | 2 | 2 |
Bixby v. Somervillegreen2 sentences2013Matter of Nye v IBM Corp., 2 AD3d 1164, 1164 [2003]; Matter of Krebs v Town of Ithaca, 293 AD2d 883, 883-884 [2002], lv denied 100 NY2d 501 [2003]), he could nevertheless succeed on his motion for summary judgment by demonstrating that his negligence was not a proximate cause of any actual and ascertainable damages to plaintiff (see Geraci v Munnelly, 85 AD3d 1361, 1362 [2011]; Bixby v Somerville, 62 AD3d 1137, 1139 [2009]; Tabner v Drake, 9 AD3d 606, 609 [2004]). 2013Matter of Nye v IBM Corp., 2 AD3d 1164, 1164 [2003]; Matter of Krebs v Town of Ithaca, 293 AD2d 883, 883-884 [2002], lv denied 100 NY2d 501 [2003]), he could nevertheless succeed on his motion for summary judgment by demonstrating that his negligence was not a proximate cause of any actual and ascertainable damages to plaintiff (see Geraci v Munnelly, 85 AD3d 1361, 1362 [2011]; Bixby v Somerville, 62 AD3d 1137, 1139 [2009]; Tabner v Drake, 9 AD3d 606, 609 [2004]). | 2 | 2 |
Geraci v. Munnellygreen2 sentences2013Matter of Nye v IBM Corp., 2 AD3d 1164, 1164 [2003]; Matter of Krebs v Town of Ithaca, 293 AD2d 883, 883-884 [2002], lv denied 100 NY2d 501 [2003]), he could nevertheless succeed on his motion for summary judgment by demonstrating that his negligence was not a proximate cause of any actual and ascertainable damages to plaintiff (see Geraci v Munnelly, 85 AD3d 1361, 1362 [2011]; Bixby v Somerville, 62 AD3d 1137, 1139 [2009]; Tabner v Drake, 9 AD3d 606, 609 [2004]). 2013Matter of Nye v IBM Corp., 2 AD3d 1164, 1164 [2003]; Matter of Krebs v Town of Ithaca, 293 AD2d 883, 883-884 [2002], lv denied 100 NY2d 501 [2003]), he could nevertheless succeed on his motion for summary judgment by demonstrating that his negligence was not a proximate cause of any actual and ascertainable damages to plaintiff (see Geraci v Munnelly, 85 AD3d 1361, 1362 [2011]; Bixby v Somerville, 62 AD3d 1137, 1139 [2009]; Tabner v Drake, 9 AD3d 606, 609 [2004]). | 2 | 2 |
Nye v. IBM Corp.green2 sentences2013Matter of Nye v IBM Corp., 2 AD3d 1164, 1164 [2003]; Matter of Krebs v Town of Ithaca, 293 AD2d 883, 883-884 [2002], lv denied 100 NY2d 501 [2003]), he could nevertheless succeed on his motion for summary judgment by demonstrating that his negligence was not a proximate cause of any actual and ascertainable damages to plaintiff (see Geraci v Munnelly, 85 AD3d 1361, 1362 [2011]; Bixby v Somerville, 62 AD3d 1137, 1139 [2009]; Tabner v Drake, 9 AD3d 606, 609 [2004]). 2013Matter of Nye v IBM Corp., 2 AD3d 1164, 1164 [2003]; Matter of Krebs v Town of Ithaca, 293 AD2d 883, 883-884 [2002], lv denied 100 NY2d 501 [2003]), he could nevertheless succeed on his motion for summary judgment by demonstrating that his negligence was not a proximate cause of any actual and ascertainable damages to plaintiff (see Geraci v Munnelly, 85 AD3d 1361, 1362 [2011]; Bixby v Somerville, 62 AD3d 1137, 1139 [2009]; Tabner v Drake, 9 AD3d 606, 609 [2004]). | 2 | 2 |
Tabner v. Drakegreen2 sentences2013Matter of Nye v IBM Corp., 2 AD3d 1164, 1164 [2003]; Matter of Krebs v Town of Ithaca, 293 AD2d 883, 883-884 [2002], lv denied 100 NY2d 501 [2003]), he could nevertheless succeed on his motion for summary judgment by demonstrating that his negligence was not a proximate cause of any actual and ascertainable damages to plaintiff (see Geraci v Munnelly, 85 AD3d 1361, 1362 [2011]; Bixby v Somerville, 62 AD3d 1137, 1139 [2009]; Tabner v Drake, 9 AD3d 606, 609 [2004]). 2013Matter of Nye v IBM Corp., 2 AD3d 1164, 1164 [2003]; Matter of Krebs v Town of Ithaca, 293 AD2d 883, 883-884 [2002], lv denied 100 NY2d 501 [2003]), he could nevertheless succeed on his motion for summary judgment by demonstrating that his negligence was not a proximate cause of any actual and ascertainable damages to plaintiff (see Geraci v Munnelly, 85 AD3d 1361, 1362 [2011]; Bixby v Somerville, 62 AD3d 1137, 1139 [2009]; Tabner v Drake, 9 AD3d 606, 609 [2004]). | 2 | 2 |
Claim of Woodruff v. Goulds Pumps/ITT Industries, Inc.green2 sentences2012As Arcelor concededly failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements for such a claim, Bethlehem is liable only if it had actual knowledge of claimant’s hearing loss (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 49-ee [2]; Matter of Woodruff v Goulds Pumps/ITT Indus., Inc., 18 AD3d 1063, 1063-1064 [2005]). 2012As Arcelor concededly failed to comply with the statutory notice requirements for such a claim, Bethlehem is liable only if it had actual knowledge of claimant’s hearing loss (see Workers’ Compensation Law § 49-ee [2]; Matter of Woodruff v Goulds Pumps/ITT Indus., Inc., 18 AD3d 1063, 1063-1064 [2005]). | 2 | 2 |
D'Ambrosio v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences1986Thus, where one is held liable solely on account of the negligence of another, indemnification, not contribution, principles apply to shift the entire liability to the one who was negligent (see, also, Logan v Esterly, 34 NY2d 648 )” (D'Ambrosio v City of New York, supra, at pp 460-462). 1985In short, the apportionment rule applies to those who in fact share responsibility for causing the accident or harm, and does not extend further to those who are only vicariously liable * * * as here, the owner of a building who contracts with an independent contractor exclusively responsible for maintenance of the building or parts of it.” (Rogers v Dorchester Assoc., 32 NY2d 553, 565-566 .) As the Court of Appeals stated in D'Ambrosio v City of New York ( 55 NY2d 454, 462 ), “where one is held liable solely on account of the negligence of another, indemnification, not contribution, principle | 1 | 2 |
Huckaby v. New York State Division of Tax Appealsgreen2 sentences2026"The central purpose behind the apportionment requirement is to ensure that each [s]tate taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction" ( Matter of Huckaby v New York State Div. of Tax Appeals , Tax Appeals Trib. , 4 NY3d at 436 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]). " 'External consistency is essentially a practical inquiry for determining whether the State has taxed only that portion of the revenues from the interstate activity which reasonably reflects the in-state component of the activity being taxed' " ( Matter of International Bus. 2026"The central purpose behind the apportionment requirement is to ensure that each [s]tate taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction" ( Matter of Huckaby v New York State Div. of Tax Appeals , Tax Appeals Trib. , 4 NY3d at 436 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]). " 'External consistency is essentially a practical inquiry for determining whether the State has taxed only that portion of the revenues from the interstate activity which reasonably reflects the in-state component of the activity being taxed' " ( Matter of International Bus. | 1 | 1 |
Morales v. County of Nassaugreen2 sentences2017The majority points out that the statute "was the product of a painstaking balance of interests . . . includ[ing] among others, the burden to be imposed on innocent plaintiffs" (majority op, at 13, 16, quoting from Morales v County of Nassau, 94 NY2d 218, 224-224 [1999]). 2017The majority points out that the statute “was the product of a painstaking balance of interests . . . including], among many others, the burdens to be imposed on innocent plaintiffs” (majority op at 750, 752, quoting Morales v County of Nassau, 94 NY2d 218, 224-225 [1999]). | 1 | 1 |
Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co.green1 sentence2007While it held that apportionment was not proper “[i]n light of [the employee’s] repeated disloyalty throughout his tenure,” it involved a fiduciary’s aggravated conduct in repeatedly making unsubstantiated payments to himself, and in fact cited in support of its holding the federal case, Phansalkar v Andersen Weinroth & Co., L.P. ( 344 F3d 184, 205 [2003], supra), which refined the apportionment standard. | 1 | 1 |
In re Blumenthalgreen1 sentence2007(See Matter of Blumenthal, 32 AD3d at 768.) . | 1 | 1 |
Goldberg v. Sweetgreen2 sentences2005The Commerce Clause's requirement of fair apportionment has been said to be a "principle of fair share . . . which is threatened whenever one State's act of overreaching combines with the possibility that another State will claim its fair share of the value taxed" ( Oklahoma Tax Commn. v Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 US 175, 184 [1995] [holding superseded by statute]). "[T]he central purpose behind the apportionment requirement is to ensure that each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction" ( Goldberg v Sweet, 488 US 252, 260-261 [1989]). [5] Shaffer v Carter ( 252 US 37 [192 2005The Commerce Clause’s requirement of fair apportionment has been said to be a “principle of fair share . . . which is threatened whenever one State’s act of overreaching combines with the possibility that another State will claim its fair share of the value taxed” (Oklahoma Tax Commn. v Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 US 175, 184 [1995] [holding superseded by statute]). “[T]he central purpose behind the apportionment requirement is to ensure that each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction” (Goldberg v Sweet, 488 US 252, 260-261 [1989]). 5 Shaffer v Carter ( 252 US 37 [1920]) | 1 | 1 |
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.red2 sentences2005The Commerce Clause's requirement of fair apportionment has been said to be a "principle of fair share . . . which is threatened whenever one State's act of overreaching combines with the possibility that another State will claim its fair share of the value taxed" ( Oklahoma Tax Commn. v Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 US 175, 184 [1995] [holding superseded by statute]). "[T]he central purpose behind the apportionment requirement is to ensure that each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction" ( Goldberg v Sweet, 488 US 252, 260-261 [1989]). [5] Shaffer v Carter ( 252 US 37 [192 2005The Commerce Clause’s requirement of fair apportionment has been said to be a “principle of fair share . . . which is threatened whenever one State’s act of overreaching combines with the possibility that another State will claim its fair share of the value taxed” (Oklahoma Tax Commn. v Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 US 175, 184 [1995] [holding superseded by statute]). “[T]he central purpose behind the apportionment requirement is to ensure that each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction” (Goldberg v Sweet, 488 US 252, 260-261 [1989]). 5 Shaffer v Carter ( 252 US 37 [1920]) | 1 | 1 |
| In Re the Accounting of the Rochester Trust & Safe Deposit Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Logan v. Esterly
neutral
2 sentences1986Thus, where one is held liable solely on account of the negligence of another, indemnification, not contribution, principles apply to shift the entire liability to the one who was negligent (see, also, Logan v Esterly, 34 NY2d 648 )” (D'Ambrosio v City of New York, supra, at pp 460-462). 1985In short, the apportionment rule applies to those who in fact share responsibility for causing the accident or harm, and does not extend further to those who are only vicariously liable * * * as here, the owner of a building who contracts with an independent contractor exclusively responsible for maintenance of the building or parts of it.” (Rogers v Dorchester Assoc., 32 NY2d 553, 565-566 .) As the Court of Appeals stated in D'Ambrosio v City of New York ( 55 NY2d 454, 462 ), “where one is held liable solely on account of the negligence of another, indemnification, not contribution, principle | 4 | 1979–1986 |
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.
green
2 sentences1985In short, the apportionment rule applies to those who in fact share responsibility for causing the accident or harm, and does not extend further to those who are only vicariously liable * * * as here, the owner of a building who contracts with an independent contractor exclusively responsible for maintenance of the building or parts of it.” (Rogers v Dorchester Assoc., 32 NY2d 553, 565-566 .) As the Court of Appeals stated in D'Ambrosio v City of New York ( 55 NY2d 454, 462 ), “where one is held liable solely on account of the negligence of another, indemnification, not contribution, principle 1975Co. ( 30 NY2d 143 ) the apportionment rule has made it possible for two or more defendants to be met with varying claims as to the degree of their liability, and the case against them may be presented in different, but nonetheless sufficient, ways to allow the jury to find negligence in some proportion. | 4 | 1975–1985 |
Rogers v. Dorchester Associates
red
2 sentences1985In short, the apportionment rule applies to those who in fact share responsibility for causing the accident or harm, and does not extend further to those who are only vicariously liable * * * as here, the owner of a building who contracts with an independent contractor exclusively responsible for maintenance of the building or parts of it.” (Rogers v Dorchester Assoc., 32 NY2d 553, 565-566 .) As the Court of Appeals stated in D'Ambrosio v City of New York ( 55 NY2d 454, 462 ), “where one is held liable solely on account of the negligence of another, indemnification, not contribution, principle 1981In short, the apportionment rule applies to those who in fact share responsibility for causing the accident or harm, and does not extend further to those who are only vicariously liable, as the employer of a negligent employee, the owner of a motor vehicle operated by a negligent driver, or, as here, the owner of a building who contracts with an independent contractor exclusively responsible for maintenance of the building or parts of it.” H & H cites Rogers (supra) arguing that it is only vicariously liable, and is therefore entitled to full indemnity. | 4 | 1978–1985 |
In re the Accounting of Dulles
green
2 sentences1989The executors, for example, stress that the decedent’s apportionment clause lacks a direction that the taxes are to be paid as an "administration expense” which many cases hold to be a sufficient direction against statutory apportionment (see, Matter of Bellinger, 27 NY2d 873 ; Matter of Dewar, 62 AD2d 352 ; Matter of Cromwell, 199 Misc 143 , affd 278 App Div 649 , affd 303 NY 681 ). 1966An additional argument for respondent sister is that the exoneration clause explicitly assimilates the estate taxes as an administration expense, which therefore are deductible from the gross estate (see Matter of Cromwell, 199 Misc. 143 , affd. 278 App. Div. 649 , affd. 303 N. Y. 681 ). | 2 | 1966–1989 |
In re the Accounting of Dulles
green
2 sentences1989The executors, for example, stress that the decedent’s apportionment clause lacks a direction that the taxes are to be paid as an "administration expense” which many cases hold to be a sufficient direction against statutory apportionment (see, Matter of Bellinger, 27 NY2d 873 ; Matter of Dewar, 62 AD2d 352 ; Matter of Cromwell, 199 Misc 143 , affd 278 App Div 649 , affd 303 NY 681 ). 1966An additional argument for respondent sister is that the exoneration clause explicitly assimilates the estate taxes as an administration expense, which therefore are deductible from the gross estate (see Matter of Cromwell, 199 Misc. 143 , affd. 278 App. Div. 649 , affd. 303 N. Y. 681 ). | 2 | 1966–1989 |
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Foster Wheeler Corp.
green
2 sentences2011In that case, Foster Wheeler Corporation sought a declaratory judgment for an apportionment of the defense and indemnity costs associated with various asbestos-related personal injury claims from its insurers (Foster Wheeler, 36 AD3d at 19 ). “[T]he insurance policies in question cover[ed] risks that [were] spread through multiple states” (id. at 22) and the parties disputed whether New York or New Jersey law should apply when interpreting those policies (see id. at 21 ). 2011In that case, Foster Wheeler Corporation sought a declaratory judgment for an apportionment of the defense and indemnity costs associated with various asbestos-related personal injury claims from its insurers (Foster Wheeler, 36 AD3d at 19 ). “[T]he insurance policies in question cover[ed] risks that [were] spread through multiple states” (id. at 22) and the parties disputed whether New York or New Jersey law should apply when interpreting those policies (see id. at 21 ). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Rangolan v. County of Nassau
green
1 sentence2010There, the Court of Appeals held, “CPLR 1602 (2) (iv) is not an exception to apportionment under CPLR article 16, but a savings provision that preserves the principles of vicarious liability.” (Rangolan, 96 NY2d at 45 .) “To construe CPLR 1602 (2) (iv) as creating a blanket non-delegable duty exception would render CPLR 1602 (8) meaningless and redundant.” (Id. at 48.) Because CPLR 1602 (2) (iv) is not construed as an “exception” to the apportionment rule, but rather as a “savings provision,” plaintiffs may not cite CPLR 1602 (2) (iv) for the proposition that they fall under an exception to th | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Bink v. F.C. Queens Place Associates, LLC
green
1 sentence2009Queens Place Assoc., LLC, 27 AD3d at 409 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Cole v. Mandell Food Stores, Inc.
green
1 sentence2008As discussed, the Court of Appeals recognized in Cole that, “in keeping with the liberal rules of CPLR 3025, courts have generally permitted plaintiffs to amend the pleadings at various points throughout an action in order to comply with CPLR 1603” (Cole, 93 NY2d at 39 , citing Detrinca v De Fillippo, 165 AD2d 505 [1991]). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Detrinca v. De Fillippo
green
1 sentence2008As discussed, the Court of Appeals recognized in Cole that, “in keeping with the liberal rules of CPLR 3025, courts have generally permitted plaintiffs to amend the pleadings at various points throughout an action in order to comply with CPLR 1603” (Cole, 93 NY2d at 39 , citing Detrinca v De Fillippo, 165 AD2d 505 [1991]). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Whalen v. Kawasaki Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence2007(Whalen v Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 242 AD2d 919 [4th Dept 1997], affd in relevant part 92 NY2d 288 [1998].) Here, the court providently used its discretion in affording Steinberg the benefit of asserting a setoff from the $985,000 already provided to Launders, but declining to permit him to assert the apportionment defense, pursuant to CPLR article 16. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Whalen v. Kawasaki Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence2007(Whalen v Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 242 AD2d 919 [4th Dept 1997], affd in relevant part 92 NY2d 288 [1998].) Here, the court providently used its discretion in affording Steinberg the benefit of asserting a setoff from the $985,000 already provided to Launders, but declining to permit him to assert the apportionment defense, pursuant to CPLR article 16. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Shaffer v. Carter
green
2 sentences2005The Commerce Clause's requirement of fair apportionment has been said to be a "principle of fair share . . . which is threatened whenever one State's act of overreaching combines with the possibility that another State will claim its fair share of the value taxed" ( Oklahoma Tax Commn. v Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 US 175, 184 [1995] [holding superseded by statute]). "[T]he central purpose behind the apportionment requirement is to ensure that each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction" ( Goldberg v Sweet, 488 US 252, 260-261 [1989]). [5] Shaffer v Carter ( 252 US 37 [192 2005The Commerce Clause’s requirement of fair apportionment has been said to be a “principle of fair share . . . which is threatened whenever one State’s act of overreaching combines with the possibility that another State will claim its fair share of the value taxed” (Oklahoma Tax Commn. v Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 US 175, 184 [1995] [holding superseded by statute]). “[T]he central purpose behind the apportionment requirement is to ensure that each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction” (Goldberg v Sweet, 488 US 252, 260-261 [1989]). 5 Shaffer v Carter ( 252 US 37 [1920]) | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Monell v. City of New York
green
1 sentence1992"In light of the apportionment rule among joint tort-feasors (CPLR 1401-1404) and the adoption of a rule of comparative negligence (CPLR 1411), the responsibilities of defendants to the plaintiff as well as to themselves are best determined by the same jury at one time.” (Monell v City of New York, 84 AD2d 717, 718 .) (Appeals from Judgment of Supreme Court, Monroe County, Affronti, J. — Negligence.) Present — Callahan, J. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
In re the Estate of Dewar
green
1 sentence1989The executors, for example, stress that the decedent’s apportionment clause lacks a direction that the taxes are to be paid as an "administration expense” which many cases hold to be a sufficient direction against statutory apportionment (see, Matter of Bellinger, 27 NY2d 873 ; Matter of Dewar, 62 AD2d 352 ; Matter of Cromwell, 199 Misc 143 , affd 278 App Div 649 , affd 303 NY 681 ). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| In re McKinney green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
In re the Estate of Miller
green
1 sentence1989The charities add that "it is unclear what the phrase 'without apportionment among the beneficiaries of my estate’ modifies or to which beneficiaries the decedent is referring.” Beyond these assertions, the charities have alleged that the decedent’s will, when read as a whole, evinces a "primary charitable intent” on the decedent’s part, suggesting that the charities’ bequests should be preserved at a maximum level, undiminished by any estate taxes (see, Matter of McKinney, 117 Misc 2d 173 , affd 101 AD2d 477 ; Matter of Miller, 76 Misc 2d 1092 ). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
In re the Estate of McKinney
green
1 sentence1989The charities add that "it is unclear what the phrase 'without apportionment among the beneficiaries of my estate’ modifies or to which beneficiaries the decedent is referring.” Beyond these assertions, the charities have alleged that the decedent’s will, when read as a whole, evinces a "primary charitable intent” on the decedent’s part, suggesting that the charities’ bequests should be preserved at a maximum level, undiminished by any estate taxes (see, Matter of McKinney, 117 Misc 2d 173 , affd 101 AD2d 477 ; Matter of Miller, 76 Misc 2d 1092 ). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Matter of Bellinger neutral | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Insurance Co. of North America v. Dayton Tool & Die Works, Inc. green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Pratt v. Robinson green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Suetterlein v. Northern Insurance neutral | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| In re the Estate of Peters green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Ogden v. . East River Insurance Co. neutral | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.