23 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1936–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2006The Thomas court further stated that "This court has not created or recognized a plain error rule of general application." Id. at 435 . 2005The Thomas court further stated that "This court has not created or recognized a plain error rule of general application." Id. at 435 . | 1 | 7 |
State v. Arviegreen2 sentences2014In State v. Arvie, 505 So.2d 44, 47 (La.1987), the Supreme Court once again cautioned that Williamson did not create a plain error rule for blanket application; however, it reaffirmed Williamson noting: [O]ne could hardly imagine an error which more seriously affects the fairness of a judicial proceeding or which is more prejudicial to the fundamental rights of an accused than a jury instruction which incorrectly defines the crime with which the accused is charged. 1993In the case of State v. Arvie, 505 So.2d 44 (La.1987), the supreme court once more cautioned that Williamson did not create or recognize a plain error rule of general application. | 1 | 5 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Williamson
green
2 sentences2016State v. Williamson, supra; State v. Green, supra. The exception to the contemporaneous objection rule is not a plain error rule of general application. 2011Despite the contemporaneous objection rule, defense argues that this error is also permissible under Williamson, supra. As determined previously in this assignment, the limited exception of the plain error rule does not apply in this instance either. | 4 | 2004–2016 |
Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U. S. Philips Corp.
green
2 sentences2003Commenting on this rule in Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27 , 114 S.Ct. 425 , 126 L.Ed.2d 396 (1993), the Court stated: Even before the first version of Rule 14.1(a) was adopted, we indicated our unwillingness to decide issues not presented in petitions for certiorari. 2003Commenting on this rule in Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27 , 114 S.Ct. 425 , 126 L.Ed.2d 396 (1993), the Court stated: Even before the first version of Rule 14.1(a) was adopted, we indicated our unwillingness to decide issues not presented in petitions for certiorari. | 2 | 2002–2003 |
State v. Latiolais
green
2 sentences1994This court has not created or recognized a plain error rule of general application." *464 We too declined to apply the Williamson exception in State v. Latiolais, 453 So.2d 1266 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984), writ denied, 458 So.2d 125 citing State v. Belgard and Chief Justice Calogero's concurring opinion in which he mentioned Williamson and noted: "This case is distinguishable from Williamson . 1993This circuit faced this issue in State v. Latiolais, 453 So.2d 1266 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied, 458 So.2d 125 (La.1984). | 2 | 1993–1994 |
State v. Latiolais
green
2 sentences1994This court has not created or recognized a plain error rule of general application." *464 We too declined to apply the Williamson exception in State v. Latiolais, 453 So.2d 1266 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984), writ denied, 458 So.2d 125 citing State v. Belgard and Chief Justice Calogero's concurring opinion in which he mentioned Williamson and noted: "This case is distinguishable from Williamson . 1993This circuit faced this issue in State v. Latiolais, 453 So.2d 1266 (La.App. 3rd Cir.), writ denied, 458 So.2d 125 (La.1984). | 2 | 1993–1994 |
State v. Joseph
green
2 sentences1964State v. Joseph, 143 La. 428 , 78 So. 663 , L.R.A. 1918E, 1062 . 1964State v. Joseph, 143 La. 428 , 78 So. 663 , L.R.A. 1918E, 1062 . | 2 | 1962–1964 |
Feitel v. Feitel
green
2 sentences1961We must next consider the question of whether or not this interlocutory order may have caused “irreparable injury.” In the case of Feitel v. Feitel, 169 La. 384 , 125 So. 280 , the Supreme Court provided the following test: “The character of the injury caused by an interlocutory judgment, even when it is signed by the Judge, must be tested under the following plain rule: ‘If the decree of the appellate court can restore the parties, without the loss of any right under the pleadings, to the identical position which they respectively occupied before the rendering of the interlocutory decree or o 1961We must next consider the question of whether or not this interlocutory order may have caused “irreparable injury.” In the case of Feitel v. Feitel, 169 La. 384 , 125 So. 280 , the Supreme Court provided the following test: “The character of the injury caused by an interlocutory judgment, even when it is signed by the Judge, must be tested under the following plain rule: ‘If the decree of the appellate court can restore the parties, without the loss of any right under the pleadings, to the identical position which they respectively occupied before the rendering of the interlocutory decree or o | 2 | 1945–1961 |
Fields v. Gagné
neutral
2 sentences1945In denying the writ the court said: “The character of the injury caused by an interlocutory judgment, even when it is signed by the Judge, must be tested under the following plain rule: ‘If the decree of the appellate court can restore the parties, without the loss of any right under the pleadings, to the identical position which they respectively occupied before the rendering of the interlocutory decree or order complained of, the injury to either party is clearly not irreparable, and therefore the right to appeal does not exist.’ Fields v. Gagné, 33 La.Ann. 339 .” In Feitel v. Feitel, 169 La 1945In denying the writ the court said: "The character of the injury caused by an interlocutory judgment, even when it is signed by the Judge, must be tested under the following plain rule: `If the decree of the appellate court can restore the parties, without the loss of any right under the pleadings, to the identical position which they respectively occupied before the rendering of the interlocutory decree or order complained of, the injury to either party is *Page 634 clearly not irreparable, and therefore the right to appeal does not exist.' Fields v. Gagne, 33 La.Ann. 339 ." In Feitel v. Feit | 2 | 1945–1961 |
State v. Green
green
1 sentence2016State v. Williamson, supra; State v. Green, supra. The exception to the contemporaneous objection rule is not a plain error rule of general application. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Trackling
green
1 sentence2009Id., 598 So.2d at 617-18 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Divine
green
1 sentence2009Id., 598 So.2d at 617-18 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Chisolm
neutral
1 sentence1999Citing State v. Thomas, 427 So.2d 428 (La.1982), this court in State v. Chisolm, 95-2028 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/12/97) , 691 So.2d 251 , writ denied, 97-0938 (La.10/3/97), 701 So.2d 195 , refused to apply the plain error rule where the trial judge incorrectly instructed the jury that specific intent to inflict great bodily harm was an element of attempted second degree murder. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Chisolm
green
1 sentence1999Citing State v. Thomas, 427 So.2d 428 (La.1982), this court in State v. Chisolm, 95-2028 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/12/97) , 691 So.2d 251 , writ denied, 97-0938 (La.10/3/97), 701 So.2d 195 , refused to apply the plain error rule where the trial judge incorrectly instructed the jury that specific intent to inflict great bodily harm was an element of attempted second degree murder. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Dobson
green
1 sentence1991State v. Dobson, 578 So.2d 533 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1991). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
United States v. Milton L. McCaskill
green
1 sentence1987United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995 (4th Cir.1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1018 , 103 S.Ct. 381 , 74 L.Ed.2d 513 . [4] Describing the problem in terms of the possible facial unconstitutionality of the statute avoided a direct confrontation with the contemporaneous objection rule. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Kleinbart v. Superior Court for the District of Columbia
green
1 sentence1987United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995 (4th Cir.1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1018 , 103 S.Ct. 381 , 74 L.Ed.2d 513 . [4] Describing the problem in terms of the possible facial unconstitutionality of the statute avoided a direct confrontation with the contemporaneous objection rule. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Dean v. United States
green
1 sentence1987United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995 (4th Cir.1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1018 , 103 S.Ct. 381 , 74 L.Ed.2d 513 . [4] Describing the problem in terms of the possible facial unconstitutionality of the statute avoided a direct confrontation with the contemporaneous objection rule. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
McCoy v. Bordenkircher
green
1 sentence1987United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995 (4th Cir.1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1018 , 103 S.Ct. 381 , 74 L.Ed.2d 513 . [4] Describing the problem in terms of the possible facial unconstitutionality of the statute avoided a direct confrontation with the contemporaneous objection rule. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Meyers v. Flournoy
green
2 sentences1964Meyers v. Flournoy, 209 La. 812 , 25 So.2d 601 ; State ex rel. 1964Meyers v. Flournoy, 209 La. 812 , 25 So.2d 601 ; State ex rel. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
In re Coon
green
1 sentence1964In this respect our jurisprudence was well epitomized in the case of In re Coon, La.App., 141 So.2d 112 , and the authorities therein cited, in the following language: “In the interpretation of a constitutional article the courts are not bound by a literal interpretation where to do so would lead to an absurd conclusion or to a plain violation of the spirit and purpose of the enactment. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
State ex rel. Pflug v. Judge of Division E
neutral
1 sentence1961Pflug v. Judge, 35 La.Ann. 765 , and Fields v. Gagne, 33 La.Ann. 339, 340 . | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Bossier's Heirs v. Hollingsworth & Jackson
green
2 sentences1937Ann. [339] 340.” In the case of Bossier’s Heirs v. Hollingsworth & Jackson, 117 La. 221 , 41 So. 553, 555 , the court, after quoting the articles of the Code of Practice, said: “We therefore usually understand by the term ‘final judgment’ that judgment which, disposing of all the issues not- previously disposed of by interlocutory judgments, is the last judgment which the court renders. 1937Ann. [339] 340.” In the case of Bossier’s Heirs v. Hollingsworth & Jackson, 117 La. 221 , 41 So. 553, 555 , the court, after quoting the articles of the Code of Practice, said: “We therefore usually understand by the term ‘final judgment’ that judgment which, disposing of all the issues not- previously disposed of by interlocutory judgments, is the last judgment which the court renders. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
State ex rel. Ikerd v. Judge of the Eighth District Court
neutral
1 sentence1936Ikerd v. Judge of Eighth District Court, 35 La.Ann. 212 , is cited and approved in State ex rel. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.