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10 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1911–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2005In addition, “[i]t is well established that Rhode Island does not recognize the plain-error rule. ‘Indeed, in promulgating rules of criminal procedure, Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which deals with plain error, was specifically deleted to conform to Rhode Island case law.’ ” State v. Rupert, 649 A.2d 1013, 1015-16 (R.I.1994) (quoting State v. Williams, 432 A.2d 667, 670 (R.I. 1981)). 1982Recently, in State v. Williams, R.I., 432 A.2d 667 (1981), in responding to the identical argument, we stated: “We note that Rhode Island had not theretofore recognized the plain-error rule. | 4 | 5 |
State v. Rupertgreen2 sentences2005In addition, “[i]t is well established that Rhode Island does not recognize the plain-error rule. ‘Indeed, in promulgating rules of criminal procedure, Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which deals with plain error, was specifically deleted to conform to Rhode Island case law.’ ” State v. Rupert, 649 A.2d 1013, 1015-16 (R.I.1994) (quoting State v. Williams, 432 A.2d 667, 670 (R.I. 1981)). 2001Compare State v. Rupert, 649 A.2d 1013, 1015 (R.I.1994) (stating that "[i]t is well established that Rhode Island does not recognize the plain-error rule”), with Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, 145 F.3d 5 , 9 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that the court will review for plain error even when a party fails to object and that "[p]lain error applies only where the error results in a clear miscarriage of justice or seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceedings”). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Castlegreen2 sentences2013We considered a similar argument in State v. Perry, 770 A.2d 882, 886 (R.I.2001), where a defendant argued that an instruction that the jury should acquit if it found that there was “‘a real possibility’ that he was not guilty.” This Court said that “[d]efining for a jury when doubt is reasonable, while an inexact science, does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant when no part of the definition contradicts the court’s plain instruction that the burden is entirely the [s]tate’s.” Id. at 886 (quoting State v. Castle, 86 Wash.App. 48 , 935 P.2d 656, 661 (1997)). 2013We considered a similar argument in State v. Perry, 770 A.2d 882, 886 (R.I.2001), where a defendant argued that an instruction that the jury should acquit if it found that there was “‘a real possibility’ that he was not guilty.” This Court said that “[d]efining for a jury when doubt is reasonable, while an inexact science, does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant when no part of the definition contradicts the court’s plain instruction that the burden is entirely the [s]tate’s.” Id. at 886 (quoting State v. Castle, 86 Wash.App. 48 , 935 P.2d 656, 661 (1997)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Perrygreen2 sentences2013We considered a similar argument in State v. Perry, 770 A.2d 882, 886 (R.I.2001), where a defendant argued that an instruction that the jury should acquit if it found that there was “‘a real possibility’ that he was not guilty.” This Court said that “[d]efining for a jury when doubt is reasonable, while an inexact science, does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant when no part of the definition contradicts the court’s plain instruction that the burden is entirely the [s]tate’s.” Id. at 886 (quoting State v. Castle, 86 Wash.App. 48 , 935 P.2d 656, 661 (1997)). 2013We considered a similar argument in State v. Perry, 770 A.2d 882, 886 (R.I.2001), where a defendant argued that an instruction that the jury should acquit if it found that there was “‘a real possibility’ that he was not guilty.” This Court said that “[d]efining for a jury when doubt is reasonable, while an inexact science, does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant when no part of the definition contradicts the court’s plain instruction that the burden is entirely the [s]tate’s.” Id. at 886 (quoting State v. Castle, 86 Wash.App. 48 , 935 P.2d 656, 661 (1997)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hallenbeckgreen2 sentences2012See State v. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d 992, 1018 (R.I.2005). 2012See Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d at 1018 ; State v. Rupert, 649 A.2d 1013, 1015 (R.I.1994); State v. Williams, 432 A.2d 667, 670 (R.I.1981). | 1 | 1 |
Kaveny v. Town of Cumberland Zoning Board of Reviewgreen1 sentence2011See Kaveny , 875 A.2d at 10 . | 1 | 1 |
cluster 754633green1 sentence2001Compare State v. Rupert, 649 A.2d 1013, 1015 (R.I.1994) (stating that "[i]t is well established that Rhode Island does not recognize the plain-error rule”), with Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, 145 F.3d 5 , 9 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that the court will review for plain error even when a party fails to object and that "[p]lain error applies only where the error results in a clear miscarriage of justice or seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceedings”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Quattrocchigreen2 sentences1986As we noted in State v. Williams, 432 A.2d 667, 670 (R.I.1981) “Indeed, in promulgating rules of criminal procedure, Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which deals with plain error, was specifically deleted to conform to Rhode Island case law.” See State v. Quattrocchi, 103 R.I. 115, 124 , 235 A.2d 99, 104 (1967). 1986As we noted in State v. Williams, 432 A.2d 667, 670 (R.I.1981) “Indeed, in promulgating rules of criminal procedure, Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which deals with plain error, was specifically deleted to conform to Rhode Island case law.” See State v. Quattrocchi, 103 R.I. 115, 124 , 235 A.2d 99, 104 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. SALUTER.
green
1 sentence2001Thus, “[a]l-though we think that the [‘real possibility of innocence’ language] might possibly engender some confusion as to the burden of proof if it stood by itself,” Saluter, 715 A.2d at 1257 (quoting Gibson 726 F.2d at 874 ), when the trial justice instructs the jury that the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt rests upon, and never shifts from, the state throughout the trial, the overall charge is “sufficient to dispel any possible confusion or misunderstanding arising from the reasonable doubt definition.” Id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
United States v. Paul W. Gibson
green
2 sentences2001Thus, “[a]l-though we think that the [‘real possibility of innocence’ language] might possibly engender some confusion as to the burden of proof if it stood by itself,” Saluter, 715 A.2d at 1257 (quoting Gibson 726 F.2d at 874 ), when the trial justice instructs the jury that the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt rests upon, and never shifts from, the state throughout the trial, the overall charge is “sufficient to dispel any possible confusion or misunderstanding arising from the reasonable doubt definition.” Id. 2001Thus, “[a]l-though we think that the [‘real possibility of innocence’ language] might possibly engender some confusion as to the burden of proof if it stood by itself,” Saluter, 715 A.2d at 1257 (quoting Gibson 726 F.2d at 874 ), when the trial justice instructs the jury that the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt rests upon, and never shifts from, the state throughout the trial, the overall charge is “sufficient to dispel any possible confusion or misunderstanding arising from the reasonable doubt definition.” Id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Walke v. McGehee
neutral
2 sentences1911Again, in the case of Walke v. McGehee, 11 Ala. 273 , it was said by the judge delivering the opinion (although the point was not expressly decided), that `our statutes when they speak of indebtedness to the defendant in attachment or judgment, refer to such indebtedness as would enable the debtor himself to maintain debt or indebitatus assumpsit.' Indeed, if we ever depart from the plain rule, that the attachment and garnishment can operate only on the legal rights of the defendant, there will be no stopping point, and we must go the full length, that the equitable rights of the defendant may 1911Again, in the case of Walke v. McGehee, 11 Ala. 273 , it was said by the judge delivering the opinion (although the point was not expressly decided), that 'our statutes when they speak of indebtedness to the defendant in attachment or judgment, refer to such indebtedness as would enable the debtor himself to maintain debt or indebitatus assumpsit.’ Indeed, if we ever depart from the plain rule, that the attachment and garnishment can operate only on the legal rights of the defendant, there will be no stopping point, and we must go the full length, that the equitable rights of the defendant may | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.