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23 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Reinaldo Fuentes (070729)green2 sentences2019The court's finding of aggravating factors and lack of mitigating factors was "based upon competent and credible evidence in the record." Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70 (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)). 2018The court's finding of aggravating factors two and twelve did not constitute improper double-counting in its sentencing on the other charges for which defendants were convicted because S.S.'s mental defect or incapacity is not an element of any of those offenses. 51 A-1137-15T1 We therefore are constrained to vacate defendants' respective sentences on the first-degree aggravated sexual assault charges under N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(7), and remand for resentencing on those charges only.7 See Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70 (finding "[a]n appellate court may . . . remand for resentencing if the trial court c | 3 | 5 |
State v. O'DONNELLgreen2 sentences2020See O'Donnell, 117 N.J. at 215 . 2019See State v. O'Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 216 (1989) ("[A]n appellate court should not second- guess a trial court's finding of sufficient facts to support an aggravating or mitigating factor if that finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record."). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Rothgreen2 sentences2021Therefore, this court: [M]ust affirm the sentence unless (1) the sentencing guidelines were violated; (2) the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the sentencing court were not based upon competent and credible evidence in the record; or (3) "the application of the guidelines to the facts of [the] case makes the sentence clearly unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience." [Ibid. (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).] We are convinced that the record supports the judge's finding of aggravating factors and his determination that no mitigating factors applied. 2019The court's finding of aggravating factors and lack of mitigating factors was "based upon competent and credible evidence in the record." Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70 (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)). | 3 | 3 |
State v. McDuffiegreen2 sentences2025Because the extended-term sentence is integral to the overall sentence, we need not address defendant's remaining sentencing arguments other than to point out that in State v. Tillery, our Supreme Court held that there was "no error in the trial court's reliance on defendant's criminal record both to determine defendant's 'persistent offender' status under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), and to support the court's finding of aggravating factors three, six, and nine." 238 N.J. 293, 327 (2019); see also State v. McDuffie, 450 N.J. Super. 554, 576 (App. Div. 2017) (rejecting "as lacking merit" the defendant 2021Likewise, in State v. McDuffie, 450 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Kareem T. Tillery (079832) (Essex County and Statewide)green2 sentences2025Because the extended-term sentence is integral to the overall sentence, we need not address defendant's remaining sentencing arguments other than to point out that in State v. Tillery, our Supreme Court held that there was "no error in the trial court's reliance on defendant's criminal record both to determine defendant's 'persistent offender' status under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), and to support the court's finding of aggravating factors three, six, and nine." 238 N.J. 293, 327 (2019); see also State v. McDuffie, 450 N.J. Super. 554, 576 (App. Div. 2017) (rejecting "as lacking merit" the defendant 2021However, in State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 327 (2019), our Supreme Court found "no error in the trial court's reliance on defendant's criminal record both to determine defendant's 'persistent offender' status under N.J.S.A. 2C:44 -3(a) and to support the court's finding of aggravating factors three, six, and nine." Indeed, the Tillery Court confirmed that "the defendant's criminal record may be relevant in both stages of the sentencing determination" as "defendant's prior record is central to aggravating factor six, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6), and may be relevant to other aggravating and mitigati | 2 | 2 |
State v. Piercegreen2 sentences2021Indeed, in our decision in [State v. Pierce, 188 N.J. 155, 168 (2006)], we envisioned that the defendant's criminal record may be relevant in both stages of the sentencing determination. 2019Indeed, as we recently noted in a sentencing appeal involving judicial factfinding to set a period of parole ineligibility, “[r]equiring the finding of aggravating factors to justify a sentence within the prescribed range does not transform those factors into the substantial equivalent of elements of an offense to be decided by a jury.” State v. Kiriakakis, 235 N.J. 420, 437 (2018). 34 “[O]nce the court finds that [the] statutory eligibility requirements are met, . . . the range of sentences, available for imposition, starts at the minimum of the ordinary-term range and ends at the maximum of | 1 | 2 |
State v. Natalegreen2 sentences2018See Natale , 184 N.J. at 486 -87 , 878 A.2d 724 . 2005Contrary to the Appellate Division’s understanding, a sentence above the presumptive term premised on a judge’s finding of aggravating factors, other than the fact of a prior criminal conviction, is “incompatible with the holdings in Apprendi supra, Blakely, supra, and Booker, supra.” Id. at 484, 878 A.2d at 739 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2022Our "review of a sentencing court's imposition of sentence is guided by an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Jones, 232 N.J. 308, 318 (2018). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jarbathgreen1 sentence2022He argues the trial court misinterpreted the holding in State v. Jarbath, 114 N.J. 394, 414-15 (1989), stating mitigating factor eight only applies when the defendant has no prior record, and the death was accidental. | 1 | 1 |
State v. William A. Case, Jr. (072688)green1 sentence2021We review sentences "in accordance with a deferential standard," State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014), and acknowledge "that appellate courts should not 'substitute their judgment for those of our sentencing courts.'" State v. Cuff, 239 N.J. 321 , 347 (2019) (quoting State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ricegreen1 sentence2020"Adult arrests that do not result in convictions may be 'relevant to the character of the sentence . . . imposed.'" State v. Rice, 425 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen1 sentence2019As we noted in Pierce, [w]here, within that range of sentences, the court chooses to sentence a defendant remains in the sound judgment of the court -- subject to reasonableness and the existence of credible evidence in the record to support the court’s finding of aggravating and mitigating factors and the court’s weighing and balancing of those factors found. [Ibid.] When a court weighs aggravating and mitigating factors, the judge exercises “a far-ranging discretion as to the sources and types of evidence used to assist him or her in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be impose | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kiriakakisgreen2 sentences2019Indeed, as we recently noted in a sentencing appeal involving judicial factfinding to set a period of parole ineligibility, "[r]equiring the finding of aggravating factors to justify a sentence within the prescribed range does not transform those factors into the substantial equivalent of elements of an offense to be decided by a jury." State v. Kiriakakis , 235 N.J. 420 , 437, 196 A.3d 563 (2018). 2019Indeed, as we recently noted in a sentencing appeal involving judicial factfinding to set a period of parole ineligibility, "[r]equiring the finding of aggravating factors to justify a sentence within the prescribed range does not transform those factors into the substantial equivalent of elements of an offense to be decided by a jury." State v. Kiriakakis , 235 N.J. 420 , 437, 196 A.3d 563 (2018). | 1 | 1 |
Ring v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2004Since our decision in Martini I, the United States Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona declared unconstitutional Arizona’s capital sentencing law that delegated to the judge rather than the jury the determination whether to impose the death penalty based on the finding of aggravating factors. 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 , 122 S.Ct. 2428, 2432 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556, 564 (2002). 2004Since our decision in Martini I, the United States Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona declared unconstitutional Arizona’s capital sentencing law that delegated to the judge rather than the jury the determination whether to impose the death penalty based on the finding of aggravating factors. 536 U.S. 584, 588-89 , 122 S.Ct. 2428, 2432 , 153 L.Ed.2d 556, 564 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Carlos Bolvito (071493)
green
1 sentence2018See Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 70 ; Bolvito, 217 N.J. at 228 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Lawless
green
2 sentences2015It is well-established that appellate courts review the trial court’s “sentencing determination under a deferential standard of review.” State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 606 , 70 A.3d 647 (2013) (citing State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 180 , 966 A.2d 473 (2009); State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 , 564 A.2d 1202 (1989)). 2015It is well-established that appellate courts review the trial court’s “sentencing determination under a deferential standard of review.” State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 606 , 70 A.3d 647 (2013) (citing State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 180 , 966 A.2d 473 (2009); State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 , 564 A.2d 1202 (1989)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Cassady
green
2 sentences2015It is well-established that appellate courts review the trial court’s “sentencing determination under a deferential standard of review.” State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 606 , 70 A.3d 647 (2013) (citing State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 180 , 966 A.2d 473 (2009); State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 , 564 A.2d 1202 (1989)). 2015It is well-established that appellate courts review the trial court’s “sentencing determination under a deferential standard of review.” State v. Lawless, 214 N.J. 594, 606 , 70 A.3d 647 (2013) (citing State v. Cassady, 198 N.J. 165, 180 , 966 A.2d 473 (2009); State v. O’Donnell, 117 N.J. 210, 215 , 564 A.2d 1202 (1989)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Natale
green
1 sentence2005Ibid. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2004The Court in Ring held that “[bjecause Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the junctional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.” Id. at 609 , 122 S.Ct. at 2443 , 153 L.Ed.2d at 577 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 2365 n. 19, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 , 457 n. 19 (2000)) (emphasis added). 2004The Court in Ring held that “[bjecause Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the junctional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.” Id. at 609 , 122 S.Ct. at 2443 , 153 L.Ed.2d at 577 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 2365 n. 19, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 , 457 n. 19 (2000)) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Ramseur
green
2 sentences1991I continue to disagree with the Court's position on constitutional grounds. "[A]s a matter of its basic definition of murder the statute effectively telescopes the definitional narrowing of the class of death-eligible murderers with the jury's finding of aggravating factors at sentencing." Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 403, 524 A. 2d 188 (Handler, J., dissenting). *241 The shortcoming in the statute in failing to narrow sufficiently the class of capital-murder defendants eligible to receive the death sentence before the penalty trial commences is particularly significant in this case. 1991I continue to disagree with the Court’s position on constitutional grounds. “[A]s a matter of its basic definition of murder the statute effectively telescopes the definitional narrowing of the class of death-eligible murderers with the jury’s finding of aggravating factors at sentencing.” Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 403, 524 A.2d 188 (Handler, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
People v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1987The fact ... to be found in regard to the special circumstance is no less crucial to the potential for deprivation of liberty ... then are the elements of the underlying crime.... [ Id. ] Although the structure of the New Jersey statute differs, as a matter of its basic definition of murder the statute effectively telescopes the definitional narrowing of the class of death-eligible murderers with the jury's finding of aggravating factors at sentencing. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.