compounded error in New York

2025To the extent necessary, the rules could have been admitted with a limiting instruction that they may considered only as some evidence of recklessness, along with other factors ( see Foster v Suffolk County Police Dept. , 199 AD3d 658 ).

2019The Family Court therefore erroneously made a new custody determination upon a factual record that was no different from that which this Court previously found to be no longer sufficient ( see Matter of Lopez v Reyes , 154 AD3d at 757 ; see also Matter of New v Sharma , 117 AD3d 1061, 1062-1063 ).

2019The court compounded its error by improvidently declining to conduct new in camera interviews of the children, during which it could have learned facts relevant to both the alleged new developments and their impact on the best interests of the children ( see E.V. v R.V. , 130 AD3d 920, 921 ; Matter of Zubizarreta v Hemminger , 107 AD3d 909, 910 ).

2019The court compounded its error by improvidently declining to conduct new in camera interviews of the children, during which it could have learned facts relevant to both the alleged new developments and their impact on the best interests of the children ( see E.V. v R.V. , 130 AD3d 920, 921 ; Matter of Zubizarreta v Hemminger , 107 AD3d 909, 910 ).

2016Moreover, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the order of reference entered in July 2010 and for a new order of reference (see U.S. Bank N.A. v Ahmed, 137 AD3d 1106 [2016]).

2008Moreover, the trial court compounded defense counsel’s mistakes by erroneously charging the jury on robbery in the second degree as a lesser-included offense of robbery in the first degree without instructing the jury regarding the affirmative defense to robbery in the first degree (see People v Gilliard, 72 NY2d 877, 878 [1988]; People v Bady, 202 AD2d 440 [1994]; People v Lyde, 98 AD2d at 651 ).

2008Moreover, the trial court compounded defense counsel’s mistakes by erroneously charging the jury on robbery in the second degree as a lesser-included offense of robbery in the first degree without instructing the jury regarding the affirmative defense to robbery in the first degree (see People v Gilliard, 72 NY2d 877, 878 [1988]; People v Bady, 202 AD2d 440 [1994]; People v Lyde, 98 AD2d at 651 ).

2007He further argued that the court compounded that error by simply responding “No” to a question by the jury that asked: “If the jury does not come to a unanimous verdict . . . does the penalty become life imprisonment without the possibility of parole?” However, we did not reach the issue in Harris as Matter of Hynes v Tomei ( 92 NY2d 613 [1998], cert denied 527 US 1015 [1999]) required vacating defendant’s death sentence (see People v Harris, 98 NY2d 452, 496 [2002]).

2007He further argued that the court compounded that error by simply responding "No" to a question by the jury that asked: "If the jury does not come to a unanimous verdict ... does the penalty become life imprisonment without the possibility of parole?" However, we did not reach the issue in Harris as Matter of Hynes v Tomei (92 NY2d *145 613 [1998], cert denied 527 US 1015 [1999]) required vacating defendant's death sentence ( see People v Harris, 98 NY2d 452, 496 [2002]).

2007The jury deadlock instruction was again challenged in People v Cahill ( 2 NY3d 14 [2003]), where the defendant argued that the instruction coerced jurors to vote for death because that was more palatable than the possibility that he would be paroled if they could not come to a unanimous agreement and had to leave sentencing in the hands of the judge.

2007The jury deadlock instruction was again challenged in People v Cahill ( 2 NY3d 14 [2003]), where the defendant argued that the instruction coerced jurors to vote for death because that was more palatable than the possibility that he would be paroled if they could not come to a unanimous agreement and had to leave sentencing in the hands of the judge.

2007He further argued that the court compounded that error by simply responding “No” to a question by the jury that asked: “If the jury does not come to a unanimous verdict . . . does the penalty become life imprisonment without the possibility of parole?” However, we did not reach the issue in Harris as Matter of Hynes v Tomei ( 92 NY2d 613 [1998], cert denied 527 US 1015 [1999]) required vacating defendant’s death sentence (see People v Harris, 98 NY2d 452, 496 [2002]).

2000It must also be pointed out that an “essential ingredient in our system of criminal jurisprudence, rooted deeply in our concept of a fair trial within the adversarial context” (People v Felder, 47 NY2d 287, 295 ) is the right to the assistance of counsel, which is guaranteed by both the Federal and New York State Constitutions (US Const 6th, 14th Amends; NY Const, art I, § 6).

1999Inasmuch as the plaintiff was required to make such a showing before the court could grant her motion (see, Gonzalez v Gonzalez, 240 AD2d 630 ; Thomas v Thomas, 221 AD2d 621 ; Marcus v Marcus, 137 AD2d 131 ), we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a hearing to determine whether after the commencement of the plaintiff’s prior 1989 action for divorce, the parties reconciled and received the benefits of the marital relationship.

1999Inasmuch as the plaintiff was required to make such a showing before the court could grant her motion (see, Gonzalez v Gonzalez, 240 AD2d 630 ; Thomas v Thomas, 221 AD2d 621 ; Marcus v Marcus, 137 AD2d 131 ), we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a hearing to determine whether after the commencement of the plaintiff’s prior 1989 action for divorce, the parties reconciled and received the benefits of the marital relationship.

1999Inasmuch as the plaintiff was required to make such a showing before the court could grant her motion (see, Gonzalez v Gonzalez, 240 AD2d 630 ; Thomas v Thomas, 221 AD2d 621 ; Marcus v Marcus, 137 AD2d 131 ), we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a hearing to determine whether after the commencement of the plaintiff’s prior 1989 action for divorce, the parties reconciled and received the benefits of the marital relationship.

1996The court’s review was critically misleading, in that it al lowed the jury to believe that where the theory of prosecution is "unlawful entry”, the intent to commit a crime could be formed during the subsequent time defendant remained in the premises (People v Gaines, supra; People v Randell, 184 AD2d 420, 421 ).

1996The court’s review was critically misleading, in that it al lowed the jury to believe that where the theory of prosecution is "unlawful entry”, the intent to commit a crime could be formed during the subsequent time defendant remained in the premises (People v Gaines, supra; People v Randell, 184 AD2d 420, 421 ).

1994I charge you that the fact that he did not testify is not a factor from which any inference unfavorable to the defendant may be drawn.” However, unlike Jones (supra), immediately following the no adverse inference charge which, inter alia, needlessly drew the jury’s attention to the fact that defendant did not testify, the court compounded its error by singling out defendant as the paradigm of an interested witness in its interested witness charge.

1993Defendant preserved most of his appellate arguments with respect to the prosecutor’s summation since immediately after the prosecutor concluded his summation, defense counsel requested a mistrial or a curative instruction (see, People v Medina, 53 NY2d 951 ).

1990When defendant’s attorney appeared to object, the court compounded the error by permitting the children, whom the mother had removed from the marital residence pursuant to the ex parte order, to remain with the mother as the primary custodial parent, without conducting a hearing (see, Audubon v Audubon, 138 AD2d 658 ; Savas v Savas, 127 AD2d 578 ).

1990When defendant’s attorney appeared to object, the court compounded the error by permitting the children, whom the mother had removed from the marital residence pursuant to the ex parte order, to remain with the mother as the primary custodial parent, without conducting a hearing (see, Audubon v Audubon, 138 AD2d 658 ; Savas v Savas, 127 AD2d 578 ).

1989(People v Finley, 104 AD2d 450, 451 ; accord, People v Deegan, 69 NY2d 976, 979 ; People v Warner-Lambert Co., 51 NY2d 295, 298-299 , cert denied 450 US 1031 .) Additionally, of course, it is usually the defendant who "has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence every fact essential to support [his] motion” to dismiss an indictment.