23 New York opinions name it 5 courts 1928–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diegogreen2 sentences2017When evaluated under the Central Hudson test, petitioners’ contention lacks merit (see Metromedia, Inc. v City of San Diego, 453 US 490, 498-499, 510-512 ; Suffolk Outdoor Adv. 2017When evaluated under the Central Hudson test, petitioners’ contention lacks merit (see Metromedia, Inc. v San Diego, 453 US 490, 498-499, 510-512 [1981]; Suffolk Outdoor Adv. | 2 | 3 |
Birnbaum v. New York Racing Ass'ngreen2 sentences2013The Supreme Court also should not have granted that branch of Hudson’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. “ ‘A defendant who moves for summary judgment in a slip-and-fall case has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither created the hazardous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it’ ” (Birnbaum v New York Racing Assn., Inc., 57 AD3d 598, 598 [2008], quoting Yioves v T.J. 2013The Supreme Court also should not have granted that branch of Hudson’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. “ ‘A defendant who moves for summary judgment in a slip-and-fall case has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that it neither created the hazardous condition nor had actual or constructive notice of its existence for a sufficient length of time to discover and remedy it’ ” (Birnbaum v New York Racing Assn., Inc., 57 AD3d 598, 598 [2008], quoting Yioves v T.J. | 2 | 2 |
Alnashmi v. Certified Analytical Group, Inc.green2 sentences2013Here, the Hudson defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the code provisions relied upon by the plaintiff do not constitute statutes imposing liability, that the lease placed the responsibility to repair the floor defect on Kawasaki, and that the Hudson defendants did not, through a course of conduct, assume any duty to repair the alleged defect in the floor (see Alnashmi v Certified Analytical Group, Inc., 89 AD3d at 18 ; see also Grimaldi v 221 Arlington Realty, LLC, 107 AD3d 670, 670 [2013]; Lee v Second Ave. 2013Here, the Hudson defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the code provisions relied upon by the plaintiff do not constitute statutes imposing liability, that the lease placed the responsibility to repair the floor defect on Kawasaki, and that the Hudson defendants did not, through a course of conduct, assume any duty to repair the alleged defect in the floor (see Alnashmi v Certified Analytical Group, Inc., 89 AD3d at 18 ; see also Grimaldi v 221 Arlington Realty, LLC, 107 AD3d 670, 670 [2013]; Lee v Second Ave. | 2 | 2 |
Grimaldi v. 221 Arlington Realty, LLCgreen2 sentences2013Here, the Hudson defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the code provisions relied upon by the plaintiff do not constitute statutes imposing liability, that the lease placed the responsibility to repair the floor defect on Kawasaki, and that the Hudson defendants did not, through a course of conduct, assume any duty to repair the alleged defect in the floor (see Alnashmi v Certified Analytical Group, Inc., 89 AD3d at 18 ; see also Grimaldi v 221 Arlington Realty, LLC, 107 AD3d 670, 670 [2013]; Lee v Second Ave. 2013Here, the Hudson defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the code provisions relied upon by the plaintiff do not constitute statutes imposing liability, that the lease placed the responsibility to repair the floor defect on Kawasaki, and that the Hudson defendants did not, through a course of conduct, assume any duty to repair the alleged defect in the floor (see Alnashmi v Certified Analytical Group, Inc., 89 AD3d at 18 ; see also Grimaldi v 221 Arlington Realty, LLC, 107 AD3d 670, 670 [2013]; Lee v Second Ave. | 2 | 2 |
Yioves v. T.J. Maxx, Inc.green2 sentences2013Maxx, Inc., 29 AD3d 572, 572 [2006]). 2013Maxx, Inc., 29 AD3d 572, 572 [2006]). | 2 | 2 |
Rivera v. Nelson Realty, LLCgreen2 sentences2013An out-of-possession landlord is not liable for injuries caused by dangerous conditions on leased premises in the absence of a statute imposing liability, a contractual provision placing the duty to repair on the landlord, or a course of conduct by the landlord giving rise to a duty (see Rivera v Nelson Realty, LLC, 7 NY3d 530, 534 [2006]; Alnashmi v Certified Analytical Group, Inc., 89 AD3d 10, 18 [2011]). 2013An out-of-possession landlord is not liable for injuries caused by dangerous conditions on leased premises in the absence of a statute imposing liability, a contractual provision placing the duty to repair on the landlord, or a course of conduct by the landlord giving rise to a duty (see Rivera v Nelson Realty, LLC, 7 NY3d 530, 534 [2006]; Alnashmi v Certified Analytical Group, Inc., 89 AD3d 10, 18 [2011]). | 2 | 2 |
Suffolk Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Hulsegreen2 sentences2017Co. v Hulse, 43 NY2d 483, 488-489 ). 2017Co. v Hulse, 43 NY2d 483, 488-489 [1977]). | 1 | 2 |
Profita v. Diazgreen1 sentence2026However, a court may entertain a party’s motion for leave to reargue beyond the 30- day limit when there is a pending appeal and the appeal is unperfected (Kugel v Reynolds, 228 AD3d 743 , 746–47 [2d Dept 2024]; see also Profita v Diaz, 100 AD3d 481, 481 [1st Dept 2012] [holding that the trial court providently exercised its discretion to consider a motion for leave to reargue past the 30-day time limit]). | 1 | 1 |
Valentine Transit, Inc. v. Kernizangreen1 sentence2024NO. 472 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/29/2024 claims is premature (see Valentine Tr. v Kernizan, 191 AD2d 159, 160-161 [1st Dept 1993] [denying summary judgment motion as premature when motion made at same time as motion for leave to amend, which was granted]). | 1 | 1 |
Gibbs v. Port Authoritygreen1 sentence2024The evidence established that Hudson neither owned, occupied, controlled, or made special use of the location where plaintiff was injured ( see Branch v County of Sullivan, 25 NY3d 1079, 1082 [2015]; Gibbs v Port Auth. of N.Y., 17 AD3d 252, 254 [1st Dept 2005]). | 1 | 1 |
SHG Resources, LLC v. SYTR Real Estate Holdings LLCgreen1 sentence2024Legal Analysis and Conclusions A. 395 Hudson’s Motion for Leave to Amend As 395 Hudson’s request for leave to amend its pleadings is unopposed, that branch of 395 Hudson’s motion is granted. 2 B. 395 Hudson’s Motion for Summary Judgment “A motion for summary judgment may not be made before issue is joined and th[at] requirement is strictly adhered to” (City of Rochester v Chiarella, 65 NY2d 92 , 101 [1985] [citations omitted]; see SHG Resources, LLC v SYTR Real Estate Holdings LLC, 201 AD3d 610, 611 [1st Dept 2022]). | 1 | 1 |
Sharen Branch v. County of Sullivangreen1 sentence2024The evidence established that Hudson neither owned, occupied, controlled, or made special use of the location where plaintiff was injured ( see Branch v County of Sullivan, 25 NY3d 1079, 1082 [2015]; Gibbs v Port Auth. of N.Y., 17 AD3d 252, 254 [1st Dept 2005]). | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. Dormitory Authoritygreen1 sentence2023Hudson, whose property manager testified that he conducted daily inspections of the floor where construction was being performed, failed to make out a prima facie case that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the boards' misleveled edges ( see Bayo , 106 AD3d at 648; Rodriguez , 104 AD3d at 530). | 1 | 1 |
Bayo v. 626 Sutter Avenue Associates, LLCgreen1 sentence2023Hudson, whose property manager testified that he conducted daily inspections of the floor where construction was being performed, failed to make out a prima facie case that it did not have actual or constructive notice of the boards' misleveled edges ( see Bayo , 106 AD3d at 648; Rodriguez , 104 AD3d at 530). | 1 | 1 |
Cassese v. Leistergreen1 sentence2015Collins v E-Magine, 291 AD2d 350, 351 [1st Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 605 [2002]. | 1 | 1 |
Zuckerman v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2015Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). | 1 | 1 |
Alvarez v. Prospect Hospitalgreen1 sentence2015Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of their motion (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). | 1 | 1 |
Board of Trustees of State Univ. of NY v. Foxgreen1 sentence2010“What our decisions require is a ‘ “fit” between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends’ — a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable.” (Fox, 492 US at 480 [citation omitted].) 6 C. | 1 | 1 |
People v. . Dixongreen2 sentences2010As early as 1921, we said, in language we have repeatedly echoed since then: "Matters in themselves of seeming indifference or light trifles of the time and place of persons meeting may so harmonize with the accomplice's narrative as to have a tendency to furnish the necessary connection between defendant and the crime" ( Dixon, 231 NY at 116-117 [emphasis added]; see also, e.g., People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; Breland, 83 NY2d at 294 ; People v Besser, 96 NY2d 136, 143 [2001]). 2010As early as 1921, we said, in language we have repeatedly echoed since then: "Matters in themselves of seeming indifference or light trifles of the time and place of persons meeting may so harmonize with the accomplice's narrative as to have a tendency to furnish the necessary connection between defendant and the crime" ( Dixon, 231 NY at 116-117 [emphasis added]; see also, e.g., People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; Breland, 83 NY2d at 294 ; People v Besser, 96 NY2d 136, 143 [2001]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bessergreen2 sentences2010As early as 1921, we said, in language we have repeatedly echoed since then: "Matters in themselves of seeming indifference or light trifles of the time and place of persons meeting may so harmonize with the accomplice's narrative as to have a tendency to furnish the necessary connection between defendant and the crime" ( Dixon, 231 NY at 116-117 [emphasis added]; see also, e.g., People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; Breland, 83 NY2d at 294 ; People v Besser, 96 NY2d 136, 143 [2001]). 2010As early as 1921, we said, in language we have repeatedly echoed since then: "Matters in themselves of seeming indifference or light trifles of the time and place of persons meeting may so harmonize with the accomplice's narrative as to have a tendency to furnish the necessary connection between defendant and the crime" ( Dixon, 231 NY at 116-117 [emphasis added]; see also, e.g., People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; Breland, 83 NY2d at 294 ; People v Besser, 96 NY2d 136, 143 [2001]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Danielsgreen2 sentences2010As early as 1921, we said, in language we have repeatedly echoed since then: "Matters in themselves of seeming indifference or light trifles of the time and place of persons meeting may so harmonize with the accomplice's narrative as to have a tendency to furnish the necessary connection between defendant and the crime" ( Dixon, 231 NY at 116-117 [emphasis added]; see also, e.g., People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; Breland, 83 NY2d at 294 ; People v Besser, 96 NY2d 136, 143 [2001]). 2010As early as 1921, we said, in language we have repeatedly echoed since then: "Matters in themselves of seeming indifference or light trifles of the time and place of persons meeting may so harmonize with the accomplice's narrative as to have a tendency to furnish the necessary connection between defendant and the crime" ( Dixon, 231 NY at 116-117 [emphasis added]; see also, e.g., People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; Breland, 83 NY2d at 294 ; People v Besser, 96 NY2d 136, 143 [2001]). | 1 | 1 |
| Cornier v. Spagnagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
DHE Homes, Ltd. v. Jamnik
green
1 sentence2020Lien Law § 3 provides that a contractor who performs labor or furnishes materials for the improvement of real property with the consent, or at the request of, the owner "shall have a lien for the principal and interest, of the value, or the agreed price, of such labor . . . or materials upon the real property improved or to be improved and upon such improvement, from the time of filing a notice of such lien." "The lienor must establish the amount of the outstanding debt by submitting proof of either the price of its contract or the value of the labor and materials supplied" ( DHE Homes, Ltd. v | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Unique Laundry Corp. v. Hudson Park NY LLC
green
2 sentences2015However, on the prior appeal in this action ( 55 AD3d 382 [1st Dept 2008]), this Court determined that the Hudson defendants lacked standing to argue that the contract between plaintiff and the prior ground lessee violated the ground lease, as there was no evidence that the ground lessors were threatening to terminate the lease with the Hudson defendants on the basis that the Hudson defendants were honoring the contract in violation of the ground lease. 2015However, on the prior appeal in this action ( 55 AD3d 382 [1st Dept 2008]), this Court determined that the Hudson defendants lacked standing to argue that the contract between plaintiff and the prior ground lessee violated the ground lease, as there was no evidence that the ground lessors were threatening to terminate the lease with the Hudson defendants on the basis that the Hudson defendants were honoring the contract in violation of the ground lease. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Muro-Light v. Farley
green
2 sentences2015Therefore, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the Hudson defendants’ motion which was to impose a sanction against the plaintiff and its attorney (see Muro Light v Farley, 95 AD3d 846 [2012]). 2015Therefore, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the Hudson defendants’ motion which was to impose a sanction against the plaintiff and its attorney (see Muro Light v Farley, 95 AD3d 846 [2012]). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In Re the Estate of Hausman
green
1 sentence2015In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to its ownership of the lot and as to the validity of the alleged conveyance to the nonparty by submitting a transcript of the deposition testimony of the plaintiff’s president, who testified that she did not remember ever seeing the unrecorded deed and that the named nonparty grantee was a contemplated corporate entity which had never been formed (see Matter of Hausman, 13 NY3d 408 [2009]; Diallo v Grand Bay Assoc. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
5000, Inc. v. Hudson One, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015They contended, inter alia, that a lot allegedly owned by the plaintiff, which abuts a private street known as Florence Street that is the subject of this dispute (see 5000, Inc. v Hudson One, Inc., 130 AD3d 676 [2015] [decided herewith]), had been conveyed by the plaintiff to a nonparty prior to the commencement of this action. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Breland
green
2 sentences2010As early as 1921, we said, in language we have repeatedly echoed since then: "Matters in themselves of seeming indifference or light trifles of the time and place of persons meeting may so harmonize with the accomplice's narrative as to have a tendency to furnish the necessary connection between defendant and the crime" ( Dixon, 231 NY at 116-117 [emphasis added]; see also, e.g., People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; Breland, 83 NY2d at 294 ; People v Besser, 96 NY2d 136, 143 [2001]). 2010As early as 1921, we said, in language we have repeatedly echoed since then: "Matters in themselves of seeming indifference or light trifles of the time and place of persons meeting may so harmonize with the accomplice's narrative as to have a tendency to furnish the necessary connection between defendant and the crime" ( Dixon, 231 NY at 116-117 [emphasis added]; see also, e.g., People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; Breland, 83 NY2d at 294 ; People v Besser, 96 NY2d 136, 143 [2001]). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Panasia Estates, Inc. v. Hudson Insurance
neutral
2 sentences2008The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that "[a]n insured may recover foreseeable damages, beyond the limits of its policy, for breach of a duty to investigate, bargain for and settle claims in good faith" ( 39 AD3d 343 [2007], citing Acquista v New York Life Ins. 2008The Appellate Division affirmed, stating that “[a]n insured may recover foreseeable damages, beyond the limits of its policy, for breach of a duty to investigate, bargain for and settle claims in good faith” ( 39 AD3d 343 [2007], citing Acquista v New York Life Ins. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
green
1 sentence2004Applying the factors noted in Central Hudson and reaffirmed in its progeny, we find that the TCPA restrictions upon transmission of unsolicited advertisements by facsimile are constitutional since the statute addresses a substantial government interest, materially advances that interest, and is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest (Central Hudson, 447 US at 566 ). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Gagliano v. Vaccaro
green
1 sentence2003In this case, as there is no evidence as to the source of the information in the report, whether that person was under a business duty to make it, or whether some other hearsay exception would render the statement admissible, it should not have been considered by the IAS court in opposition to Hudson’s motion (see Gagliano v Vaccaro, 97 AD2d 430 [since source of information in police accident report was not identifiable except by possible inference, it was error to admit report]; Cornier v Spagna, 101 AD2d 141, 147 [police report signed by officer not present at scene “inexplicably admitted” a | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Noseworthy v. City of New York green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| City of Marietta v. Dills green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Harden v. Hoosier green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Levy v. Exxon Corp. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children & Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Green neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Recovery Consultants, Inc. v. Shih-Hsieh green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| White v. Guarente green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Pate v. Robinson green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Gibson v. United States green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co. green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| New Jersey v. Sargent green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.