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13 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1983–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commissiongreen2 sentences2001The district court, applying the test outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 , 100 S.Ct. 2343 , 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), held: [T]he first prong of the Central Hudson test is satisfied, as the solicitation made by Edelson and Barr was unlawful only because it violated section 817.234(8), and not for any other reason. 2001The district court, applying the test outlined by the United States Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 , 100 S.Ct. 2343 , 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), held: [T]he first prong of the Central Hudson test is satisfied, as the solicitation made by Edelson and Barr was unlawful only because it violated section 817.234(8), and not for any other reason. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. McGeegreen2 sentences2017See Haney v. United States, 999 A.2d 48, 50 (D.C. 2010) (finding the reasoning of Porter and Mayes persuasive and holding “that the administrative discipline imposed in this case was not punitive in effect or purpose”); Rogers v. State, 44 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (finding “that the Hudson test is not appropriate for prison. disciplinary sanctions [as] [i]t is well-established that sanctions assessed by a prison do not preclude the state from prosecuting' a prisoner for the same conduct”); Commonwealth v. McGee, 560 Pa. 324 , 744 A.2d 754, 756-59 (2000) (discussing Hudson and holdi 2017See Haney v. United States, 999 A.2d 48, 50 (D.C. 2010) (finding the reasoning of Porter and Mayes persuasive and holding “that the administrative discipline imposed in this case was not punitive in effect or purpose”); Rogers v. State, 44 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (finding “that the Hudson test is not appropriate for prison. disciplinary sanctions [as] [i]t is well-established that sanctions assessed by a prison do not preclude the state from prosecuting' a prisoner for the same conduct”); Commonwealth v. McGee, 560 Pa. 324 , 744 A.2d 754, 756-59 (2000) (discussing Hudson and holdi | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See Haney v. United States, 999 A.2d 48, 50 (D.C. 2010) (finding the reasoning of Porter and Mayes persuasive and holding “that the administrative discipline imposed in this case was not punitive in effect or purpose”); Rogers v. State, 44 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (finding “that the Hudson test is not appropriate for prison. disciplinary sanctions [as] [i]t is well-established that sanctions assessed by a prison do not preclude the state from prosecuting' a prisoner for the same conduct”); Commonwealth v. McGee, 560 Pa. 324 , 744 A.2d 754, 756-59 (2000) (discussing Hudson and holdi 2017See Haney v. United States, 999 A.2d 48, 50 (D.C. 2010) (finding the reasoning of Porter and Mayes persuasive and holding “that the administrative discipline imposed in this case was not punitive in effect or purpose”); Rogers v. State, 44 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (finding “that the Hudson test is not appropriate for prison. disciplinary sanctions [as] [i]t is well-established that sanctions assessed by a prison do not preclude the state from prosecuting' a prisoner for the same conduct”); Commonwealth v. McGee, 560 Pa. 324 , 744 A.2d 754, 756-59 (2000) (discussing Hudson and holdi | 1 | 1 |
Haney v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017See Haney v. United States, 999 A.2d 48, 50 (D.C. 2010) (finding the reasoning of Porter and Mayes persuasive and holding “that the administrative discipline imposed in this case was not punitive in effect or purpose”); Rogers v. State, 44 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (finding “that the Hudson test is not appropriate for prison. disciplinary sanctions [as] [i]t is well-established that sanctions assessed by a prison do not preclude the state from prosecuting' a prisoner for the same conduct”); Commonwealth v. McGee, 560 Pa. 324 , 744 A.2d 754, 756-59 (2000) (discussing Hudson and holdi 2017See Haney v. United States, 999 A.2d 48, 50 (D.C. 2010) (finding the reasoning of Porter and Mayes persuasive and holding “that the administrative discipline imposed in this case was not punitive in effect or purpose”); Rogers v. State, 44 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (finding “that the Hudson test is not appropriate for prison. disciplinary sanctions [as] [i]t is well-established that sanctions assessed by a prison do not preclude the state from prosecuting' a prisoner for the same conduct”); Commonwealth v. McGee, 560 Pa. 324 , 744 A.2d 754, 756-59 (2000) (discussing Hudson and holdi | 1 | 1 |
DeGregorio v. Balkwillgreen1 sentence2010Section 932.704, Florida Statutes (2007), entitled “Forfeiture proceedings” provides in part: “(4) The seizing agency shall promptly proceed against the contraband article by filing a complaint in the circuit court within the jurisdiction where the seizure or the offense occurred.” Under section 932.701(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2007), the term “Promptly proceed” is defined as follows: “ ‘Promptly proceed’ means to file the complaint within 45 days after seizure.” Furthermore, in DeGregorio v. Balkwill, 853 So.2d 371, 374 (Fla.2003), the Florida Supreme Court said: Because the statute here prov | 1 | 1 |
Newell v. Stategreen1 sentence2004In Newell v. State, 714 So.2d 434, 434-35 (Fla.1998), we granted post-conviction relief under Hudson because in a prior case we had "implicitly acknowledged" that a Hudson issue could be raised in a post-conviction motion. | 1 | 1 |
Silverman v. Walkupgreen1 sentence2001Similarly, in Silverman v. Walkup, 21 F.Supp.2d 775, 780 (E.D.Tenn.1998), a Tennessee federal court held that a statute which proscribed both face-to-face and telephonic solicitation by chiropractors and prohibited chiropractors from "accident" telemarketing violated the chiropractors' First Amendment rights, pursuant to the Central Hudson test. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Croningreen1 sentence2001See id. at 876 . | 1 | 1 |
Barr v. Stategreen2 sentences2000See id. 2000See Barr, 731 So.2d at 129 . | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Stategreen1 sentence1996See Baker v. State, 620 So.2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Gust v. State, 558 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). | 1 | 1 |
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.green2 sentences1983Accordingly, the State, by seeming to separate the vehicular and pedestrian traffic, directly advances this interest. 4) The Court’s entire concern, then, in this consideration of the constitutionality of this statute, boils itself down to the fourth part of the Hudson test: Whether the State activity reaches further than necessary to accomplish the given objective. 3 In making a determination of whether the State activity reaches further than necessary to accomplish the given objective, inquiry includes the examination as to whether the ordinance is a reasonable time, place and manner restric 1983Accordingly, the State, by seeming to separate the vehicular and pedestrian traffic, directly advances this interest. 4) The Court’s entire concern, then, in this consideration of the constitutionality of this statute, boils itself down to the fourth part of the Hudson test: Whether the State activity reaches further than necessary to accomplish the given objective. 3 In making a determination of whether the State activity reaches further than necessary to accomplish the given objective, inquiry includes the examination as to whether the ordinance is a reasonable time, place and manner restric | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Board of Trustees of State Univ. of NY v. Fox
green
2 sentences2000The four prongs of the Central Hudson test, as modified by Board of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 , 109 S.Ct. 3028 , 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989), are: (1) whether the speech at issue is not misleading and concerns lawful activity; (2) whether the government has a substantial interest in restricting that speech; (3) whether the regulation directly advances the asserted governmental interest; and (4) whether the regulation is narrowly tailored, but not necessarily the least restrictive means available, to serve the asserted governmental interest. 2000The four prongs of the Central Hudson test, as modified by Board of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 , 109 S.Ct. 3028 , 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989), are: (1) whether the speech at issue is not misleading and concerns lawful activity; (2) whether the government has a substantial interest in restricting that speech; (3) whether the regulation directly advances the asserted governmental interest; and (4) whether the regulation is narrowly tailored, but not necessarily the least restrictive means available, to serve the asserted governmental interest. | 2 | 1991–2000 |
United States v. Mayes
green
2 sentences2017We turn first to the thoroughly-reasoned opinion of the Eleventh Circuit in Mayes, 158 F.3d 1215 . 2017We turn first to the thoroughly-reasoned opinion of the Eleventh Circuit in Mayes, 158 F.3d 1215 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Converse
green
2 sentences2017Id. at 81 . 2017Id. at 81 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Spencer
green
1 sentence2012Additionally, we caution Hudson that filing future frivolous appeals or petitions involving successive post-conviction or other collateral challenges to his adjudication and/or sentence may result in sanctions from this court as well, including an order barring pro se pleadings or other filings under State v. Spencer, 751 So.2d 47 (Fla.1999), and/or referral to prison officials for consideration of disciplinary procedures which may include loss of gain time. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Baptiste v. State
green
1 sentence2010On appeal, Hudson argues that Baptiste v. State, 995 So.2d 285 (Fla.2008), requires reversal. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Halper
red
2 sentences2008Two overriding principles govern this analysis: first, "no one factor should be considered controlling;" and second, we evaluate the statute on its face, not on "`the character of the actual sanctions imposed.'" Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101 , 118 S.Ct. 488 (quoting and disavowing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 , 109 S.Ct. 1892 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989)). 2008Two overriding principles govern this analysis: first, "no one factor should be considered controlling;" and second, we evaluate the statute on its face, not on "`the character of the actual sanctions imposed.'" Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101 , 118 S.Ct. 488 (quoting and disavowing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 , 109 S.Ct. 1892 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Hudson v. United States
green
2 sentences2008Two overriding principles govern this analysis: first, "no one factor should be considered controlling;" and second, we evaluate the statute on its face, not on "`the character of the actual sanctions imposed.'" Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101 , 118 S.Ct. 488 (quoting and disavowing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 , 109 S.Ct. 1892 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989)). 2008Two overriding principles govern this analysis: first, "no one factor should be considered controlling;" and second, we evaluate the statute on its face, not on "`the character of the actual sanctions imposed.'" Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101 , 118 S.Ct. 488 (quoting and disavowing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447 , 109 S.Ct. 1892 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Lescher v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY
green
2 sentences2008We therefore conclude, as did the Fourth District, that "the amendment eliminating the hardship license, when applied to petitioner, is not unconstitutional as an ex post facto law," Lescher, 946 So.2d at 1142 . 2008We therefore conclude, as did the Fourth District, that "the amendment eliminating the hardship license, when applied to petitioner, is not unconstitutional as an ex post facto law," Lescher, 946 So.2d at 1142 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Edenfield v. Fane
green
1 sentence2001A. Substantial State Interest "Unlike rational basis review, the Central Hudson standard does not permit us to supplant the precise interests put forward by the State with other suppositions." Went for It, 515 U.S. at 624, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at *821 768, 113 S.Ct. 1792 ). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.
green
2 sentences2001Direct and Material Advancement of Substantial Interests The Central Hudson test requires us to next determine whether the statute at issue advances any one of the State's asserted interests in a "direct and material way." Went for It, 515 U.S. at 625 , 115 S.Ct. 2371 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 , 115 S.Ct. 1585 , 131 L.Ed.2d 532 (1995)). 2001Direct and Material Advancement of Substantial Interests The Central Hudson test requires us to next determine whether the statute at issue advances any one of the State's asserted interests in a "direct and material way." Went for It, 515 U.S. at 625 , 115 S.Ct. 2371 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 , 115 S.Ct. 1585 , 131 L.Ed.2d 532 (1995)). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001A. Substantial State Interest "Unlike rational basis review, the Central Hudson standard does not permit us to supplant the precise interests put forward by the State with other suppositions." Went for It, 515 U.S. at 624, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at *821 768, 113 S.Ct. 1792 ). 2001Direct and Material Advancement of Substantial Interests The Central Hudson test requires us to next determine whether the statute at issue advances any one of the State's asserted interests in a "direct and material way." Went for It, 515 U.S. at 625 , 115 S.Ct. 2371 (quoting Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 , 115 S.Ct. 1585 , 131 L.Ed.2d 532 (1995)). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United States
green
2 sentences2001Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 , 119 S.Ct. 1923 , 144 L.Ed.2d 161 (1999)). [9] See supra note 5. [10] See § 627.733, Fla.Stat. (2000). 2001Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 , 119 S.Ct. 1923 , 144 L.Ed.2d 161 (1999)). [9] See supra note 5. [10] See § 627.733, Fla.Stat. (2000). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Amendments Regulating Bar-Advertising
green
1 sentence2001This report addresses "the practice of a small group of lawyers, physicians, osteopaths, chiropractors and hospitals who work together to inflate or outright falsify personal injury claims." 1975 Report at 5. [6] Subsection (9) uses essentially the same language as subsection (8), except that it specifically applies to attorneys. [7] No mention of the 1975 Report is made within the legislative history of these two subsections. [8] Although amicus curiae Randolph Hansbrough suggests that the United States Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to abandon the Central Hudson framework in favor | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Gust v. State
green
1 sentence1996See Baker v. State, 620 So.2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Gust v. State, 558 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio
green
2 sentences1996Indeed, the parties have overlooked “material differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech.” See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650 , 105 S.Ct. 2265, 2281 , 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985). 1996Indeed, the parties have overlooked “material differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech.” See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650 , 105 S.Ct. 2265, 2281 , 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Milligan v. State
green
1 sentence1992The trial court summarily denied the motion, in that Hudson did not allege or show that reversible error occurred at his trial, citing Milligan v. State, 194 So.2d 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967) (allegation of neglect of counsel to file a notice of appeal without a showing of any reversible error occurring at the trial will not entitle an appellant to post-conviction relief). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.