8 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Mayesgreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., United States v Mayes, 158 F3d 1215, 1224 (CA 11, 1998) (“We have some flexibility in determining the extent that we choose to utilize the considerations enunciated in Kennedy for purposes of our double jeopardy analysis”), Porter v Coughlin, 421 F3d 141, 147 (CA 2, 2005) (“It is particularly appropriate to apply the factors flexibly in the context of prison discipline cases, which “do not fit neatly into the matrix of double jeopardy doctrine . . . because in the prison context, virtually any form of sanction seems ‘criminal’ and ‘punitive’ as we commonly understand those terms”), 2023See, e.g., United States v Mayes, 158 F3d 1215, 1224 (CA 11, 1998) (“We have some flexibility in determining the extent that we choose to utilize the considerations enunciated in Kennedy for purposes of our double jeopardy analysis”), Porter v Coughlin, 421 F3d 141, 147 (CA 2, 2005) (“It is particularly appropriate to apply the factors flexibly in the context of prison discipline cases, which “do not fit neatly into the matrix of double jeopardy doctrine . . . because in the prison context, virtually any form of sanction seems ‘criminal’ and ‘punitive’ as we commonly understand those terms”), | 1 | 1 |
Haney v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023Haney v United States, 999 A2d 48, 50 (DC App, 2010) (“federal circuits have held that most of the Hudson factors cannot be weighed equally in cases involving inmates because of the special circumstances inherent in a jail setting. 2023Haney v United States, 999 A2d 48, 50 (DC App, 2010) (“federal circuits have held that most of the Hudson factors cannot be weighed equally in cases involving inmates because of the special circumstances inherent in a jail setting. | 1 | 1 |
Porter v. Coughlingreen2 sentences2023See, e.g., United States v Mayes, 158 F3d 1215, 1224 (CA 11, 1998) (“We have some flexibility in determining the extent that we choose to utilize the considerations enunciated in Kennedy for purposes of our double jeopardy analysis”), Porter v Coughlin, 421 F3d 141, 147 (CA 2, 2005) (“It is particularly appropriate to apply the factors flexibly in the context of prison discipline cases, which “do not fit neatly into the matrix of double jeopardy doctrine . . . because in the prison context, virtually any form of sanction seems ‘criminal’ and ‘punitive’ as we commonly understand those terms”), 2023See, e.g., United States v Mayes, 158 F3d 1215, 1224 (CA 11, 1998) (“We have some flexibility in determining the extent that we choose to utilize the considerations enunciated in Kennedy for purposes of our double jeopardy analysis”), Porter v Coughlin, 421 F3d 141, 147 (CA 2, 2005) (“It is particularly appropriate to apply the factors flexibly in the context of prison discipline cases, which “do not fit neatly into the matrix of double jeopardy doctrine . . . because in the prison context, virtually any form of sanction seems ‘criminal’ and ‘punitive’ as we commonly understand those terms”), | 1 | 1 |
Tevis v. AMEX ASSURANCE CO.green2 sentences2019See Tevis v Amex Assurance Co, 283 Mich App 76 , 79- 80; 770 NW2d 16 (2009), in which this Court held that, in a priority dispute between two defendant insurers, the insurer held liable by the trial court to pay PIP benefits had suffered a particularized injury that affected its pecuniary interest, and it therefore was an aggrieved party under MCR 7.203(A) with respect to that ruling. -3- most favorable to the nonmoving party. 2019See Tevis v Amex Assurance Co, 283 Mich App 76 , 79- 80; 770 NW2d 16 (2009), in which this Court held that, in a priority dispute between two defendant insurers, the insurer held liable by the trial court to pay PIP benefits had suffered a particularized injury that affected its pecuniary interest, and it therefore was an aggrieved party under MCR 7.203(A) with respect to that ruling. -3- most favorable to the nonmoving party. | 1 | 1 |
Hudson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2007Moreover, the Hudson factors “ ‘must be considered in relation to the statute on its face,’ and ‘only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent....” Id. at 100 (citations omitted). 2007Moreover, the Hudson factors “ ‘must be considered in relation to the statute on its face,’ and ‘only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent....” Id. at 100 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 7196green1 sentence1998Accord Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-533 , 104 S.Ct. 3194 , 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy due process where a deprivation of property is caused by conduct pursuant to established state [here municipal] procedure, rather than random and unauthorized action), Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 329 (C.A.5, 1984) ( Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 , 101 S.Ct. 1908 , 68 L.Ed.2d 420 [1981], applies only when the nature of the challenged conduct would render provision of predeprivation procedural safeguards impracticable or infeasible), and Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F | 1 | 1 |
Francis Nolan Augustine v. John Doe, Deputy Sheriff, Lafayette Parishgreen1 sentence1998Accord Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-533 , 104 S.Ct. 3194 , 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy due process where a deprivation of property is caused by conduct pursuant to established state [here municipal] procedure, rather than random and unauthorized action), Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 329 (C.A.5, 1984) ( Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 , 101 S.Ct. 1908 , 68 L.Ed.2d 420 [1981], applies only when the nature of the challenged conduct would render provision of predeprivation procedural safeguards impracticable or infeasible), and Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F | 1 | 1 |
Zinermon v. Burchgreen2 sentences1998Zinermon appears to require predeprivation process in virtually all circumstances, see id. at 127-128 , 110 S.Ct. 975 (the Parratt/Hudson doctrine applies only in rare cases), but courts have struggled to apply its analysis consistently. 1998Zinermon appears to require predeprivation process in virtually all circumstances, see id. at 127-128 , 110 S.Ct. 975 (the Parratt/Hudson doctrine applies only in rare cases), but courts have struggled to apply its analysis consistently. | 1 | 1 |
Hudson v. Palmergreen2 sentences1998Accord Hudson v Palmer, 468 US 517, 532-533 ; 104 S Ct 3194 ; 82 L Ed 2d 393 (1984) (postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy due process where a deprivation of property is caused by conduct pursuant to established state [here municipal] procedure, rather than random and unauthorized action), Augustine v Doe, 740 F2d 322, 329 (CA 5, 1984) (Parratt v Taylor, 451 US 527 ; 101 S Ct 1908 ; 68 L Ed 2d 420 [1981], applies only when the nature of. the challenged conduct would render provision of predeprivation procedural safeguards impracticable or infeasible), and Alexander v Ieyoub, 62 F2d 709 (CA 5 1998Accord Hudson v Palmer, 468 US 517, 532-533 ; 104 S Ct 3194 ; 82 L Ed 2d 393 (1984) (postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy due process where a deprivation of property is caused by conduct pursuant to established state [here municipal] procedure, rather than random and unauthorized action), Augustine v Doe, 740 F2d 322, 329 (CA 5, 1984) (Parratt v Taylor, 451 US 527 ; 101 S Ct 1908 ; 68 L Ed 2d 420 [1981], applies only when the nature of. the challenged conduct would render provision of predeprivation procedural safeguards impracticable or infeasible), and Alexander v Ieyoub, 62 F2d 709 (CA 5 | 1 | 1 |
Parratt v. Taylorred2 sentences1998Accord Hudson v Palmer, 468 US 517, 532-533 ; 104 S Ct 3194 ; 82 L Ed 2d 393 (1984) (postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy due process where a deprivation of property is caused by conduct pursuant to established state [here municipal] procedure, rather than random and unauthorized action), Augustine v Doe, 740 F2d 322, 329 (CA 5, 1984) (Parratt v Taylor, 451 US 527 ; 101 S Ct 1908 ; 68 L Ed 2d 420 [1981], applies only when the nature of. the challenged conduct would render provision of predeprivation procedural safeguards impracticable or infeasible), and Alexander v Ieyoub, 62 F2d 709 (CA 5 1998Accord Hudson v Palmer, 468 US 517, 532-533 ; 104 S Ct 3194 ; 82 L Ed 2d 393 (1984) (postdeprivation remedies do not satisfy due process where a deprivation of property is caused by conduct pursuant to established state [here municipal] procedure, rather than random and unauthorized action), Augustine v Doe, 740 F2d 322, 329 (CA 5, 1984) (Parratt v Taylor, 451 US 527 ; 101 S Ct 1908 ; 68 L Ed 2d 420 [1981], applies only when the nature of. the challenged conduct would render provision of predeprivation procedural safeguards impracticable or infeasible), and Alexander v Ieyoub, 62 F2d 709 (CA 5 | 1 | 1 |
Risner v. City of Wyominggreen1 sentence1997See Risner, supra at 434 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Allstate Insurance Co v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co
green
2 sentences2025The trial court observed that, in Allstate Ins Co v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 321 Mich App 543, 561-565 ; 909 NW2d 495 (2017), this Court reasoned that the statute of limitations generally applicable to claims for PIP benefits under MCL 500.3145 did not apply to the potential damages recoverable by an assigned insurer who seeks reimbursement from the highest priority insurer under MCL 500.3175. 2025The trial court observed that, in Allstate Ins Co v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 321 Mich App 543, 561-565 ; 909 NW2d 495 (2017), this Court reasoned that the statute of limitations generally applicable to claims for PIP benefits under MCL 500.3145 did not apply to the potential damages recoverable by an assigned insurer who seeks reimbursement from the highest priority insurer under MCL 500.3175. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Cincinnati v Discovery Network, Inc, 507 US 410, 416 ; 113 S Ct 1505 ; 123 L Ed 2d 99 (1993). 1999Cincinnati v Discovery Network, Inc, 507 US 410, 416 ; 113 S Ct 1505 ; 123 L Ed 2d 99 (1993). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Curtis W. Caine, Jr., M.D. v. Hardy, M.D., Woodie L. Mason
green
1 sentence1998The alleged abuse of the ex parte mechanism in the PRCA amounts to an alleged failure to abide by the statutory safeguards or otherwise provide notice and a predeprivation hearing, see, e.g., MCR 3.310, thus stating a claim under 1983. [18] The Fifth Circuit's panel decision in Caine v. Hardy, 905 F.2d 858 (C.A.5, 1990) ( Caine I ), [19] is also instructive with regard to the debate over the limits of the Parratt/Hudson doctrine. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
James E. Williams v. Keith Langston, Adrienne Johnson, L. Clarizio, and R. Farkas
green
2 sentences1998Zinermon appears to require predeprivation process in virtually all circumstances, see id. at 127-128 , 110 S.Ct. 975 (the Parratt/Hudson doctrine applies only in rare cases), but courts have struggled to apply its analysis consistently. 1998Zinermon appears to require predeprivation process in virtually all circumstances, see id. at 127-128 , 110 S.Ct. 975 (the Parratt/Hudson doctrine applies only in rare cases), but courts have struggled to apply its analysis consistently. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences1998If it could, then the case requires classic Matthews [v Eldridge, 424 US 319 ; 96 S Ct 893 ; 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976)] balancing and has stated a claim for relief. 1998If it could, then the case requires classic Matthews [v Eldridge, 424 US 319 ; 96 S Ct 893 ; 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976)] balancing and has stated a claim for relief. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission
green
1 sentence1997Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.