10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
CRISTER v. McFaddengreen2 sentences2009“A jury charge should correctly state the law applicable to the issues in the case. [Cit.]” Critser v. McFadden, 277 Ga. 653, 654 ( 593 SE2d 330 ) (2004). 2009“A jury charge should correctly state the law applicable to the issues in the case. [Cit.]” Critser v. McFadden, 277 Ga. 653, 654 ( 593 SE2d 330 ) (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See, e.g., Martin v. State, 268 Ga. 682 (2) ( 492 SE2d 225 ) (1997). 3. 2008See, e.g., Martin v. State, 268 Ga. 682 (2) ( 492 SE2d 225 ) (1997). 3. | 1 | 1 |
Sweet v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See Sweet v. State, 278 Ga. 320 (3) ( 602 SE2d 603 ) (2004) (no ineffective assistance shown where trial counsel failed to call witness at trial that gave unhelpful testimony at motion for new trial hearing). 2008See Sweet v. State, 278 Ga. 320 (3) ( 602 SE2d 603 ) (2004) (no ineffective assistance shown where trial counsel failed to call witness at trial that gave unhelpful testimony at motion for new trial hearing). | 1 | 1 |
Freeman v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See Freeman v. State, 278 Ga. 349 (2) (a) ( 603 SE2d 214 ) (2004). *599 Because evidence supports the conclusion that trial counsel was not ineffective, Hudson’s claim to the contrary is without merit. 2008See Freeman v. State, 278 Ga. 349 (2) (a) ( 603 SE2d 214 ) (2004). *599 Because evidence supports the conclusion that trial counsel was not ineffective, Hudson’s claim to the contrary is without merit. | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. Stategreen2 sentences2008In reviewing the trial court’s decision, “ ‘[w]e accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibil *598 ity determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.’ [Cit.]” Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 ( 586 SE2d 313 ) (2003). (a) Hudson argues that trial counsel was ineffective because she did not timely locate two potential witnesses, Alton Turner and Gail Garnigan, each of whom would have testified regarding Hudson’s husband’s general reputation for violence in support of Hudson’s claim of self-defense. 2008In reviewing the trial court’s decision, “ ‘[w]e accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibil *598 ity determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.’ [Cit.]” Robinson v. State, 277 Ga. 75, 76 ( 586 SE2d 313 ) (2003). (a) Hudson argues that trial counsel was ineffective because she did not timely locate two potential witnesses, Alton Turner and Gail Garnigan, each of whom would have testified regarding Hudson’s husband’s general reputation for violence in support of Hudson’s claim of self-defense. | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Stategreen2 sentences2000See Harris v. State, 259 Ga. 511, 512 (1), 384 S.E.2d 647 (1989). 2000See Harris v. State, 259 Ga. 511, 512 (1), 384 S.E.2d 647 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Hooper v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2000Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that Hudson’s motion for dismissal on this ground was correct. 5 Restatement 2d (1958), Agency, § 217 (b) (ii), comment (b). 6 Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 754 (7) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994). 7 See Hooper v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 651, 652 (1) ( 512 SE2d 312 ) (1999). 8 OCGA § 9-11-52 (a). 9 Cooper v. Rosser, 232 Ga. 597 (1) ( 207 SE2d 513 ) (1974). 10 Kingston Dev. 2000Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that Hudson’s motion for dismissal on this ground was correct. 5 Restatement 2d (1958), Agency, § 217 (b) (ii), comment (b). 6 Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 754 (7) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994). 7 See Hooper v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 651, 652 (1) ( 512 SE2d 312 ) (1999). 8 OCGA § 9-11-52 (a). 9 Cooper v. Rosser, 232 Ga. 597 (1) ( 207 SE2d 513 ) (1974). 10 Kingston Dev. | 1 | 1 |
Gilbert v. Richardsongreen2 sentences2000Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that Hudson’s motion for dismissal on this ground was correct. 5 Restatement 2d (1958), Agency, § 217 (b) (ii), comment (b). 6 Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 754 (7) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994). 7 See Hooper v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 651, 652 (1) ( 512 SE2d 312 ) (1999). 8 OCGA § 9-11-52 (a). 9 Cooper v. Rosser, 232 Ga. 597 (1) ( 207 SE2d 513 ) (1974). 10 Kingston Dev. 2000Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that Hudson’s motion for dismissal on this ground was correct. 5 Restatement 2d (1958), Agency, § 217 (b) (ii), comment (b). 6 Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 754 (7) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994). 7 See Hooper v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 651, 652 (1) ( 512 SE2d 312 ) (1999). 8 OCGA § 9-11-52 (a). 9 Cooper v. Rosser, 232 Ga. 597 (1) ( 207 SE2d 513 ) (1974). 10 Kingston Dev. | 1 | 1 |
Kingston Development Co. v. Kenerlygreen2 sentences2000Co. v. Kenerly, 132 Ga. App. 346, 348-349 (1) ( 208 SE2d 118 ) (1974), applying L. 2000Co. v. Kenerly, 132 Ga. App. 346, 348-349 (1) ( 208 SE2d 118 ) (1974), applying L. | 1 | 1 |
Valley Coaches, Inc. v. Streettgreen2 sentences1994See Valley Coaches v. Streett, 160 Ga. App. 25 ( 286 SE2d 313 ) (1981). 1994See Valley Coaches v. Streett, 160 Ga. App. 25 ( 286 SE2d 313 ) (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Reeb v. Daniels Lincoln-Mercury Co.green2 sentences1994“If there is any evidence creating a material issue of fact, a motion for a directed verdict cannot be granted.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Reeb v. Daniels Lincoln-Mercury Co., 193 Ga. App. 817, 819 (1) (a) ( 389 SE2d 367 ) (1989); OCGA § 9-11-50 (a). 1994“If there is any evidence creating a material issue of fact, a motion for a directed verdict cannot be granted.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Reeb v. Daniels Lincoln-Mercury Co., 193 Ga. App. 817, 819 (1) (a) ( 389 SE2d 367 ) (1989); OCGA § 9-11-50 (a). | 1 | 1 |
Woods v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.green2 sentences1979The threshold question is whether Hudson’s claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as asserted by Mrs. Hood. "[Wjhile res judicata applies only as between the same parties and upon the same cause of action to matters which were actually in issue or which under the rules of law could have been put in issue, estoppel by judgment applies as between the same parties upon any cause of action to matters which were directly decided in the former suit.” Brown v. Brown, 212 Ga. 202, 204 ( 91 SE2d 495 ) (1956); Woods v. Delta Air Lines, 237 Ga. 332, 333 ( 227 SE2d 376 ) (1976); Code §§ 110-501, 1979The threshold question is whether Hudson’s claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as asserted by Mrs. Hood. "[Wjhile res judicata applies only as between the same parties and upon the same cause of action to matters which were actually in issue or which under the rules of law could have been put in issue, estoppel by judgment applies as between the same parties upon any cause of action to matters which were directly decided in the former suit.” Brown v. Brown, 212 Ga. 202, 204 ( 91 SE2d 495 ) (1956); Woods v. Delta Air Lines, 237 Ga. 332, 333 ( 227 SE2d 376 ) (1976); Code §§ 110-501, | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Browngreen2 sentences1979The threshold question is whether Hudson’s claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as asserted by Mrs. Hood. "[Wjhile res judicata applies only as between the same parties and upon the same cause of action to matters which were actually in issue or which under the rules of law could have been put in issue, estoppel by judgment applies as between the same parties upon any cause of action to matters which were directly decided in the former suit.” Brown v. Brown, 212 Ga. 202, 204 ( 91 SE2d 495 ) (1956); Woods v. Delta Air Lines, 237 Ga. 332, 333 ( 227 SE2d 376 ) (1976); Code §§ 110-501, 1979The threshold question is whether Hudson’s claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as asserted by Mrs. Hood. "[Wjhile res judicata applies only as between the same parties and upon the same cause of action to matters which were actually in issue or which under the rules of law could have been put in issue, estoppel by judgment applies as between the same parties upon any cause of action to matters which were directly decided in the former suit.” Brown v. Brown, 212 Ga. 202, 204 ( 91 SE2d 495 ) (1956); Woods v. Delta Air Lines, 237 Ga. 332, 333 ( 227 SE2d 376 ) (1976); Code §§ 110-501, | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. T. M. H.
green
1 sentence2018Indeed, there is no transcript of the status conference at which this issue was considered, 1 and the State failed to raise this issue in either of its two briefs opposing Hudson's motion for resentencing. 2 While the Court of Appeals addressed this argument in passing, State v. T.M.H. , 339 Ga. App 628 , 634, n. 13, 794 S.E.2d 201 (2016), this Court did not grant certiorari on that holding nor does the State challenge this holding in its appellate brief; in fact, this Court has received zero briefing on the issue. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences2015Williams v. State, 331 Ga. App. 46 (1) ( 769 SE2d 760 ) (2015). 2015Williams v. State, 331 Ga. App. 46 (1) ( 769 SE2d 760 ) (2015). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Hudson v. United States
green
2 sentences2009Thus, "[e]ven in those cases where the legislature `has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect,' [cit.], as to `transfor(m) what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.' [Cit.]" Hudson, supra. In order to determine whether the in personam RICO forfeiture proceeding is civil, as OCGA § 16-14-7(a) states, or criminal in nature, we utilize the factors set forth in Hudson v. United States, supra, 522 U.S. at 99-100 , 118 S.Ct. 488 . [4] We need not address all sev 2009Thus, "[e]ven in those cases where the legislature `has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect,' [cit.], as to `transfor(m) what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.' [Cit.]" Hudson, supra. In order to determine whether the in personam RICO forfeiture proceeding is civil, as OCGA § 16-14-7(a) states, or criminal in nature, we utilize the factors set forth in Hudson v. United States, supra, 522 U.S. at 99-100 , 118 S.Ct. 488 . [4] We need not address all sev | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Gilley v. Hudson
green
1 sentence2009It is not substantively different from the evidence we considered before on summary judgment in Gilley v. Hudson, 283 Ga. App. at 880 , in which we held that a jury question *310 existed “as to whether Dr. Hudson provided Gilley with emergency care upon circumstances requiring immediate action.” The trial court properly charged the jury regarding the defense, and did not err in denying Hudson’s motion for a directed verdict or post-trial motions on his Good Samaritan defense. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Cooper v. Rosser
green
2 sentences2000Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that Hudson’s motion for dismissal on this ground was correct. 5 Restatement 2d (1958), Agency, § 217 (b) (ii), comment (b). 6 Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 754 (7) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994). 7 See Hooper v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 651, 652 (1) ( 512 SE2d 312 ) (1999). 8 OCGA § 9-11-52 (a). 9 Cooper v. Rosser, 232 Ga. 597 (1) ( 207 SE2d 513 ) (1974). 10 Kingston Dev. 2000Plaintiff’s counsel conceded that Hudson’s motion for dismissal on this ground was correct. 5 Restatement 2d (1958), Agency, § 217 (b) (ii), comment (b). 6 Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 754 (7) ( 452 SE2d 476 ) (1994). 7 See Hooper v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 651, 652 (1) ( 512 SE2d 312 ) (1999). 8 OCGA § 9-11-52 (a). 9 Cooper v. Rosser, 232 Ga. 597 (1) ( 207 SE2d 513 ) (1974). 10 Kingston Dev. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
White v. State
neutral
2 sentences1980White v. State, 151 Ga. App. 559 ( 260 SE2d 554 ) (1979). 2. 1980White v. State, 151 Ga. App. 559 ( 260 SE2d 554 ) (1979). 2. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.