planning requirement in New York

2015A parent’s incarceration does not excuse the planning requirement, and under the circumstances of this case, the father did not offer a viable plan (see Matter of Gregory B., 74 NY2d 77, 90 [1989]).

2012I accept that “an incarcerated parent may not satisfy the planning requirement of the statute where the only plan offered is long-term foster care lasting potentially for the child’s entire minority” (Matter of Gregory B., 74 NY2d 77, 90 [1989]).

2015“However, the standards to evaluate whether a parent has met the requirement to substantially plan should not be set unrealistically high, lest the planning requirement become simply a device to permit termination in nearly all cases where the other statutory conditions are met” (Matter of Tatianna K. [Claude U.], 79 AD3d 1184, 1186 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Orlando F., 40 NY2d 103, 111 [1976]).

2010However, the standards to evaluate whether a parent has met the requirement to “substantially plan” should not be set “unrealistically high,” lest the planning requirement “become simply a device to permit termination in nearly all cases where the other statutory conditions are met” (Matter of Orlando F., 40 NY2d 103, 111 [1976]).

2013Further, the father’s incarceration did not excuse him from the planning requirement of the statute (see Matter of Hailey ZZ. [Ricky ZZ.], 19 NY3d 422, 430-431 [2012]; Matter of Sharon H., 163 AD2d 312 [1990]).

2013Further, the father’s incarceration did not excuse him from the planning requirement of the statute (see Matter of Hailey ZZ. [Ricky ZZ.], 19 NY3d 422, 430-431 [2012]; Matter of Sharon H., 163 AD2d 312 [1990]).

2009Rather, his only viable plan for his son was long-term foster care. “[A]n incarcerated parent may not satisfy the planning requirement of the statute where the only plan offered is long-term foster care” (Matter of Gregory B., 74 NY2d 77, 90 [1989]; see Matter of “Female” V., 21 AD3d 1118, 1119 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 708 [2006]; Matter of Shawn O., 19 AD3d 238 [2005]; cf. Matter of Latasha F., 251 AD2d 1005 [1998]).

2007There is case law in the TPR arena however with a clear directive that not only must an incarcerated parent plan for the future of his child but that the Department must exercise diligent efforts in helping the incarcerated parent so plan. “[A]n incarcerated parent may not satisfy the planning requirement of the statute where the only plan offered is long-term foster care lasting potentially for the child’s entire minority” (Matter of “Female” V., 21 AD3d 1118, 1119 [2d Dept 2005] [the department established diligent efforts by, inter alia, facilitating visitation, keeping respondent advised o

2016It also contemplates that the parent will "formulate, and act to accomplish, a feasible and realistic plan" ( Matter of Orlando F., 40 NY2d 103, 110 [internal quotation marks omitted]), and "take such steps as are necessary to provide a home that is adequate and stable, under the financial circumstances existing, within a reasonable period of time" ( Matter of Star Leslie W., 63 NY2d at 143 ).

2006The planning requirement contemplates that the parent take such steps as are necessary to provide an adequate and stable home within a reasonable period of time (see Social Services Law § 384-b [7] [a], [b], [c]; Matter of Star Leslie W., supra at 142-143).

2016Although the case planner testified at the fact-finding hearing that the father visited with the children until at least shortly before his arrest, the planning requirement "presupposes, at a minimum, that the parents take steps to correct the conditions that led to the removal of the child from their home" ( Matter of Leon RR, 48 NY2d 117, 125 ).

2016Although the case planner testified at the fact-finding hearing that the father visited with the children until at least shortly before his arrest, the planning requirement “presupposes, at a minimum, that the parents take steps to correct the conditions that led to the removal of the child from their home” (Matter of Leon RR, 48 NY2d 117, 125 [1979]).

2015“However, the standards to evaluate whether a parent has met the requirement to substantially plan should not be set unrealistically high, lest the planning requirement become simply a device to permit termination in nearly all cases where the other statutory conditions are met” (Matter of Tatianna K. [Claude U.], 79 AD3d 1184, 1186 [2010] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Orlando F., 40 NY2d 103, 111 [1976]).

2010“Whether or not the planning requirement will be deemed satisfied will . . . vary depending on the facts and circumstances” (Matter of Gregory B., 74 NY2d 77, 87 [1989]), and the unique challenges presented by a child with special needs is a germane consideration (see Matter of George U., 195 AD2d 718, 719-720 [1993]).

2007An incarcerated parent must have a “realistic and feasible” alternative to having his child remain in foster care until his release from prison (Matter of Love Russell J., 7 AD3d 799, 800 [2d Dept 2004] [department exercised diligent efforts by, inter alia, facilitating visitation, keeping the respondent advised of his children’s welfare and repeatedly reminding him of the need to find a resource]).

2005Children, 253 AD2d 554, 555 [1998]). “[A]n incarcerated parent may not satisfy the planning requirement of the statute where the only plan offered is long-term foster care lasting potentially for the child’s entire minority” (Matter of Gregory B., 74 NY2d 77, 90 [1989]).

2004Despite a warning from the agency of the consequences of failing to plan, the father did not suggest any other potential resources (see Matter of Marcel F., 212 AD2d 705, 706 [1995]). “[A]n incarcerated parent may not satisfy the planning requirement of the statute where the only plan offered is long-term foster care lasting potentially for the child’s entire minority” (Matter of Gregory B., 74 NY2d 77, 90 [1989]).

2003The finding that it was in the children’s best interest to be adopted by their foster parents, with whom they have lived and thrived for most of their lives, is supported by a preponderance of the evidence (see Matter of Tenisha Tishonda T., 302 AD2d 534, 535 [2003]; Matter of Luno Scott A., 292 AD2d 602, 603 [2002] ; Matter of Sarah Jean R., 290 AD2d 511, 512 [2002]).

2003The finding that it was in the children’s best interest to be adopted by their foster parents, with whom they have lived and thrived for most of their lives, is supported by a preponderance of the evidence (see Matter of Tenisha Tishonda T., 302 AD2d 534, 535 [2003]; Matter of Luno Scott A., 292 AD2d 602, 603 [2002] ; Matter of Sarah Jean R., 290 AD2d 511, 512 [2002]).

2003The finding that it was in the children’s best interest to be adopted by their foster parents, with whom they have lived and thrived for most of their lives, is supported by a preponderance of the evidence (see Matter of Tenisha Tishonda T., 302 AD2d 534, 535 [2003]; Matter of Luno Scott A., 292 AD2d 602, 603 [2002] ; Matter of Sarah Jean R., 290 AD2d 511, 512 [2002]).

1976Courts will have to act with sensitivity and care in determining whether the parent’s plans are sufficiently credible and sound to satisfy the statutory requirement.” (Gordon, Terminal Placements of Children and Permanent Termination of Parental Rights: The New York Permanent Neglect Statute, 46 St John’s L Rev 215, 236-237; see, also, Matter of Jones, 59 Misc 2d 69 ; Matter of Clear, 58 Misc 2d 699 .) We need not formulate, under the instant facts, an exact standard which must be met in order to comply with the statutory mandate in light of respondent’s utter failure to exert even a minimal a