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23 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2025 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Reynoldsgreen2 sentences2019“Under the doctrine, a defendant who was represented by counsel is barred from raising an issue in a petition for postconviction relief if the defendant raised or could have raised the issue at trial or on direct appeal.” Id., citing Szefcyk, supra, at syllabus and State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 161 (1997). “‘To overcome the res judicata bar, evidence offered dehors the record must demonstrate that the petitioner could not have appealed the constitutional claim based upon the information in the original record.’” Id. at ¶39, quoting State v. Lawson, 103 Ohio App.3d 307, 315 (12th Dist.1 2019“Under the doctrine, a defendant who was represented by counsel is barred from raising an issue in a petition for postconviction relief if the defendant raised or could have raised the issue at trial or on direct appeal.” 5 Id., citing Szefcyk, supra, at syllabus and State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 161 (1997). “‘To overcome the res judicata bar, evidence offered dehors the record must demonstrate that the petitioner could not have appealed the constitutional claim based upon the information in the original record.’” Id. at ¶39, quoting State v. Lawson, 103 Ohio App.3d 307, 315 (12th Dist | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lawsongreen2 sentences2019“Under the doctrine, a defendant who was represented by counsel is barred from raising an issue in a petition for postconviction relief if the defendant raised or could have raised the issue at trial or on direct appeal.” Id., citing Szefcyk, supra, at syllabus and State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 161 (1997). “‘To overcome the res judicata bar, evidence offered dehors the record must demonstrate that the petitioner could not have appealed the constitutional claim based upon the information in the original record.’” Id. at ¶39, quoting State v. Lawson, 103 Ohio App.3d 307, 315 (12th Dist.1 2019“Under the doctrine, a defendant who was represented by counsel is barred from raising an issue in a petition for postconviction relief if the defendant raised or could have raised the issue at trial or on direct appeal.” 5 Id., citing Szefcyk, supra, at syllabus and State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 161 (1997). “‘To overcome the res judicata bar, evidence offered dehors the record must demonstrate that the petitioner could not have appealed the constitutional claim based upon the information in the original record.’” Id. at ¶39, quoting State v. Lawson, 103 Ohio App.3d 307, 315 (12th Dist | 2 | 2 |
State v. Calhoungreen2 sentences2025If the appellate court finds the applicant has satisfied his burden and grants the application to reopen, the matter “proceeds to the second stage, where ‘[t]he case is then treated as if it were an initial direct appeal, with briefs and oral argument.’” State v. Calhoun, 2022-Ohio-4269, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Simpson, 2020-Ohio-6719, ¶ 13 . {¶9} At the second stage, an applicant must establish “the merits of both the direct appeal and the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” Leyh at ¶ 25 . “[T]he prior appellate judgment may not be altered unless the applicant est 2024Summit No. 29604, 2022-Ohio-4269, ¶ 7 , quoting State v. Simpson, 164 Ohio St.3d 102 , 2020-Ohio-6719, ¶ 13 . {¶8} At the second stage, an applicant must establish “the merits of both the direct appeal and the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” Leyh at ¶ 25 . “[T]he prior appellate judgment may not be altered unless the applicant establishes at the second stage that the direct appeal was meritorious and failed because appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance under the two-pronged [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)] standard.” Id. at ¶ 24. “[W]hen an app | 1 | 4 |
State v. Leyh (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2025Group, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-4989, ¶ 15 (“our judicial system relies on the principle of party presentation, and courts should ordinarily decide cases based on issues raised by the parties”); Hawley v. Ritley, 35 Ohio St.3d 157, 159 (1988) (“the court of appeals acted well within its discretion in overruling or disregarding the sixth assignment of error because [of] the lack of briefing on this assigned error” [emphasis added]), citing former App.R. 12(A). 12 January Term, 2025 {¶ 31} Because the appellant who has been granted a reopened appeal is the one who must “establish . . . the merits of bo 2025Analysis {¶ 6} Once an appeal has been reopened, the appellant must establish “ ‘the merits of both the direct appeal and the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.’ ” Diallo II at ¶ 7, quoting State v. Leyh, 2022-Ohio-292, ¶ 25 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Longgreen2 sentences2025See App.R. 26(B)(9).’ ” State v. Long, 2022-Ohio-1601, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), quoting Leyh at ¶ 25 . {¶ 11} Appellant has raised both factual and legal questions in his direct appeal when he raised both sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence arguments. 2023No. 20AP-90, 2022-Ohio-1601, ¶ 26 . | 1 | 2 |
Greenlaw v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020), quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008) (“‘we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present’ ”). {¶ 32} However, while an appellate court must refrain from creating arguments on an appellant’s behalf, the appellate court can adhere to the principles of party presentation (and court neutrality) through supplemental briefing. | 1 | 1 |
Epcon Communities Franchising, L.L.C. v. Wilcox Dev. Group, L.L.C.green1 sentence2025Group, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-4989, ¶ 15 (“our judicial system relies on the principle of party presentation, and courts should ordinarily decide cases based on issues raised by the parties”); Hawley v. Ritley, 35 Ohio St.3d 157, 159 (1988) (“the court of appeals acted well within its discretion in overruling or disregarding the sixth assignment of error because [of] the lack of briefing on this assigned error” [emphasis added]), citing former App.R. 12(A). 12 January Term, 2025 {¶ 31} Because the appellant who has been granted a reopened appeal is the one who must “establish . . . the merits of bo | 1 | 1 |
Hawley v. Ritleygreen1 sentence2025Group, L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-4989, ¶ 15 (“our judicial system relies on the principle of party presentation, and courts should ordinarily decide cases based on issues raised by the parties”); Hawley v. Ritley, 35 Ohio St.3d 157, 159 (1988) (“the court of appeals acted well within its discretion in overruling or disregarding the sixth assignment of error because [of] the lack of briefing on this assigned error” [emphasis added]), citing former App.R. 12(A). 12 January Term, 2025 {¶ 31} Because the appellant who has been granted a reopened appeal is the one who must “establish . . . the merits of bo | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Sineneng-Smithgreen1 sentence2025See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020), quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008) (“‘we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present’ ”). {¶ 32} However, while an appellate court must refrain from creating arguments on an appellant’s behalf, the appellate court can adhere to the principles of party presentation (and court neutrality) through supplemental briefing. | 1 | 1 |
In re T.T.green1 sentence2024No. OT-15-037, 2016-Ohio-5075, ¶ 12 (determining ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed, even where it was undisputed appellant’s trial counsel failed to file a notice of appeal, where the appellant could “only speculate that such [alibi] testimony would have aided him at trial”). {¶ 47} Finally, even if the gas bill covered dates in question, having gas at another address does not establish appellant was never at his mother’s residence during the pertinent timeframe. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Plymalegreen1 sentence2024No. 15CA1, 2016-Ohio-3340, ¶ 39 (stating the appellant could not prevail in a direct appeal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel premised on his trial counsel’s failure to file a notice of alibi where his argument was “based on evidence that is outside the record”); In re T.T., 6th Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Wilkinson v. Austingreen2 sentences2022See, e.g., Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 220 , 125 S.Ct. 2384 , 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (reviewing the Rev.Stat. 1979, 42 U.S.C. 1983 action to determine the constitutional validity of the procedural rules established by ODRC’s statutorily authorized rulemaking authority). 2022See, e.g., Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 220 , 125 S.Ct. 2384 , 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (reviewing the Rev.Stat. 1979, 42 U.S.C. 1983 action to determine the constitutional validity of the procedural rules established by ODRC’s statutorily authorized rulemaking authority). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Henderson (Slip Opinion)green1 sentence2021See State v. Henderson, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-4784, ¶ 44 (a sentencing challenge must be asserted in the direct appeal or such challenge is deemed waived, even where the sentence is later determined to be unlawful). {¶ 20} Without a pending matter, appellant is not entitled to a transcript at state’s expense. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2025If the appellate court finds the applicant has satisfied his burden and grants the application to reopen, the matter “proceeds to the second stage, where ‘[t]he case is then treated as if it were an initial direct appeal, with briefs and oral argument.’” State v. Calhoun, 2022-Ohio-4269, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Simpson, 2020-Ohio-6719, ¶ 13 . {¶9} At the second stage, an applicant must establish “the merits of both the direct appeal and the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” Leyh at ¶ 25 . “[T]he prior appellate judgment may not be altered unless the applicant est 2024Summit No. 29604, 2022-Ohio-4269, ¶ 7 , quoting State v. Simpson, 164 Ohio St.3d 102 , 2020-Ohio-6719, ¶ 13 . {¶8} At the second stage, an applicant must establish “the merits of both the direct appeal and the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” Leyh at ¶ 25 . “[T]he prior appellate judgment may not be altered unless the applicant establishes at the second stage that the direct appeal was meritorious and failed because appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance under the two-pronged [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)] standard.” Id. at ¶ 24. “[W]hen an app | 4 | 2023–2025 |
State v. Simpson (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2025If the appellate court finds the applicant has satisfied his burden and grants the application to reopen, the matter “proceeds to the second stage, where ‘[t]he case is then treated as if it were an initial direct appeal, with briefs and oral argument.’” State v. Calhoun, 2022-Ohio-4269, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Simpson, 2020-Ohio-6719, ¶ 13 . {¶9} At the second stage, an applicant must establish “the merits of both the direct appeal and the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” Leyh at ¶ 25 . “[T]he prior appellate judgment may not be altered unless the applicant est 2024Summit No. 29604, 2022-Ohio-4269, ¶ 7 , quoting State v. Simpson, 164 Ohio St.3d 102 , 2020-Ohio-6719, ¶ 13 . {¶8} At the second stage, an applicant must establish “the merits of both the direct appeal and the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” Leyh at ¶ 25 . “[T]he prior appellate judgment may not be altered unless the applicant establishes at the second stage that the direct appeal was meritorious and failed because appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance under the two-pronged [Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)] standard.” Id. at ¶ 24. “[W]hen an app | 4 | 2023–2025 |
State v. Szefcyk
green
2 sentences2019“Under the doctrine, a defendant who was represented by counsel is barred from raising an issue in a petition for postconviction relief if the defendant raised or could have raised the issue at trial or on direct appeal.” Id., citing Szefcyk, supra, at syllabus and State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 161 (1997). “‘To overcome the res judicata bar, evidence offered dehors the record must demonstrate that the petitioner could not have appealed the constitutional claim based upon the information in the original record.’” Id. at ¶39, quoting State v. Lawson, 103 Ohio App.3d 307, 315 (12th Dist.1 2019“Under the doctrine, a defendant who was represented by counsel is barred from raising an issue in a petition for postconviction relief if the defendant raised or could have raised the issue at trial or on direct appeal.” Id., citing Szefcyk, supra, at syllabus and State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 161 (1997). “‘To overcome the res judicata bar, evidence offered dehors the record must demonstrate that the petitioner could not have appealed the constitutional claim based upon the information in the original record.’” Id. at ¶39, quoting State v. Lawson, 103 Ohio App.3d 307, 315 (12th Dist.1 | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Holdcroft
green
2 sentences2018We will address, however, the legality of the trial court’s resentencing Walker on the firearm specification attendant to Count 2, murder, because Walker was properly resentenced on that count. {¶21} Walker’s argument, like Shabazz’s, is based on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526 , 2013-Ohio-5014 , 1 N.E.3d 382 , wherein the court held that “[a] trial court does not have the authority to resentence a defendant for the purpose of adding a term of postrelease control as a sanction for a particular offense after the defendant has already served the prison 2018We will address, however, the legality of the trial court’s resentencing Walker on the firearm specification attendant to Count 2, murder, because Walker was properly resentenced on that count. {¶21} Walker’s argument, like Shabazz’s, is based on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Holdcroft, 137 Ohio St.3d 526 , 2013-Ohio-5014 , 1 N.E.3d 382 , wherein the court held that “[a] trial court does not have the authority to resentence a defendant for the purpose of adding a term of postrelease control as a sanction for a particular offense after the defendant has already served the prison | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Luna v. Russell
green
2 sentences2021Luna v. Russell, 70 Ohio St.3d 561, 562 , 639 N.E.2d 1168 (1994). 2021Luna v. Russell, 70 Ohio St.3d 561, 562 , 639 N.E.2d 1168 (1994). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2018Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75 , 2014-Ohio-4275 , ¶ 16; HSBC Bank USA, Natl. 2018Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75 , 2014-Ohio-4275 , ¶ 16; HSBC Bank USA, Natl. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Bradley
green
2 sentences2014State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). {¶17} Herein, West has failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the waiver of an evidentiary hearing with regard to a motion to suppress. 2014State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 , 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). {¶17} Herein, West has failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the waiver of an evidentiary hearing with regard to a motion to suppress. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Blasco v. Mislik
green
2 sentences2012Blasco v. Mislik, 69 Ohio St. 2d 684, 686 , 433 N.E. 2d 612 (1982). 2012Blasco v. Mislik, 69 Ohio St. 2d 684, 686 , 433 N.E. 2d 612 (1982). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
National Amusements, Inc. v. City of Springdale
green
2 sentences2012Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale, 53 Ohio St.3d 60, 62 , 558 N.E.2d 1178 (1990). 2012Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale, 53 Ohio St.3d 60, 62 , 558 N.E.2d 1178 (1990). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
In re J.J.
green
2 sentences2012Court of Common Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 111 , 2010-Ohio-2467 , 931 N.E.2d 98, ¶ 36 ; Keith v. Bobby, 117 Ohio St.3d 470 , 2008-Ohio-1443 , 884 N.E.2d 1067, ¶ 14 ; In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205 , 2006-Ohio-5484 , 855 N.E.2d 851, ¶ 10-16 . {¶19} In State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303 , 2011-Ohio-5204 , 958 N.E.2d 142 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a] judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the cle 2012Court of Common Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 111 , 2010-Ohio-2467 , 931 N.E.2d 98, ¶ 36 ; Keith v. Bobby, 117 Ohio St.3d 470 , 2008-Ohio-1443 , 884 N.E.2d 1067, ¶ 14 ; In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205 , 2006-Ohio-5484 , 855 N.E.2d 851, ¶ 10-16 . {¶19} In State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303 , 2011-Ohio-5204 , 958 N.E.2d 142 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a] judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the cle | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Keith v. Bobby
green
2 sentences2012Court of Common Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 111 , 2010-Ohio-2467 , 931 N.E.2d 98, ¶ 36 ; Keith v. Bobby, 117 Ohio St.3d 470 , 2008-Ohio-1443 , 884 N.E.2d 1067, ¶ 14 ; In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205 , 2006-Ohio-5484 , 855 N.E.2d 851, ¶ 10-16 . {¶19} In State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303 , 2011-Ohio-5204 , 958 N.E.2d 142 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a] judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the cle 2012Court of Common Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 111 , 2010-Ohio-2467 , 931 N.E.2d 98, ¶ 36 ; Keith v. Bobby, 117 Ohio St.3d 470 , 2008-Ohio-1443 , 884 N.E.2d 1067, ¶ 14 ; In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205 , 2006-Ohio-5484 , 855 N.E.2d 851, ¶ 10-16 . {¶19} In State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303 , 2011-Ohio-5204 , 958 N.E.2d 142 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a] judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the cle | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Lester
green
2 sentences2012Court of Common Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 111 , 2010-Ohio-2467 , 931 N.E.2d 98, ¶ 36 ; Keith v. Bobby, 117 Ohio St.3d 470 , 2008-Ohio-1443 , 884 N.E.2d 1067, ¶ 14 ; In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205 , 2006-Ohio-5484 , 855 N.E.2d 851, ¶ 10-16 . {¶19} In State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303 , 2011-Ohio-5204 , 958 N.E.2d 142 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a] judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the cle 2012Court of Common Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 111 , 2010-Ohio-2467 , 931 N.E.2d 98, ¶ 36 ; Keith v. Bobby, 117 Ohio St.3d 470 , 2008-Ohio-1443 , 884 N.E.2d 1067, ¶ 14 ; In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205 , 2006-Ohio-5484 , 855 N.E.2d 851, ¶ 10-16 . {¶19} In State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303 , 2011-Ohio-5204 , 958 N.E.2d 142 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a] judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the cle | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State Ex Rel. Hamilton County Board of Commissioners v. Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
green
2 sentences2012Court of Common Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 111 , 2010-Ohio-2467 , 931 N.E.2d 98, ¶ 36 ; Keith v. Bobby, 117 Ohio St.3d 470 , 2008-Ohio-1443 , 884 N.E.2d 1067, ¶ 14 ; In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205 , 2006-Ohio-5484 , 855 N.E.2d 851, ¶ 10-16 . {¶19} In State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303 , 2011-Ohio-5204 , 958 N.E.2d 142 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a] judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the cle 2012Court of Common Pleas, 126 Ohio St.3d 111 , 2010-Ohio-2467 , 931 N.E.2d 98, ¶ 36 ; Keith v. Bobby, 117 Ohio St.3d 470 , 2008-Ohio-1443 , 884 N.E.2d 1067, ¶ 14 ; In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205 , 2006-Ohio-5484 , 855 N.E.2d 851, ¶ 10-16 . {¶19} In State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303 , 2011-Ohio-5204 , 958 N.E.2d 142 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a] judgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth (1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the cle | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Wc Milling, LLC v. Grooms
green
1 sentence2011Having failed to do this, they are now barred from obtaining relief from that judgment.” Id. {¶16} In Watts v. Bancohio National Bank, the Eighth District similarly held that summary judgment was properly granted when: “[t]he [cognovit] judgments in question were unappealed and never vacated” and “[a]ppellants attempted to challenge the judgments by raising defenses they could have raised in Civ.R. 60(B) motions.” Watts v. Bancohio Natl. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Lorain City School District Board of Education v. State Employment Relations Board
green
2 sentences2000To allow courts such latitude would invite many conflicting interpretations of R.C. 4117.08 and other provisions in the Act by various courts throughout Ohio.” Id. at 260 , 533 N.E.2d at 267 . *387 In Hamilton Cty. 2000To allow courts such latitude would invite many conflicting interpretations of R.C. 4117.08 and other provisions in the Act by various courts throughout Ohio.” Id. at 260 , 533 N.E.2d at 267 . *387 In Hamilton Cty. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.