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18 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1983–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Perez, Eduardogreen2 sentences2021For example, “an appellant who is assessed court costs after expiration of the period of time when he could have filed a direct appeal or a challenge under article 103.008 could obtain relief through a petition for mandamus.” Perez v. State, 424 S.W.3d 81, 87 (Tex. 2014) (Alcala, J., concurring). 2015As I noted in my concurring opinion in Perez v. State, mandamus relief pursuant to Daniel “may be available for those defendants who do not obtain a bill of costs until after the time for filing a direct appeal or a challenge through Riles Concurring Op. - 5 article 103.008 has expired.” Perez v. State, 424 S.W.3d 81, 88 (Tex. Crim. | 4 | 4 |
Daniel, Ex Parte Jefferie Anteriesgreen2 sentences2015Id. 2015Id. | 3 | 6 |
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.red2 sentences2024See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011); see also Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). 2024Generally, a direct appeal may challenge only “a final judgment or certain interlocutory orders expressly made appealable by statute.” Sunnyland Dev., Inc. v. Shawn Ibrahim, Inc., 597 S.W.3d 1 , 2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.); see also Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Daisygreen2 sentences2009However, because the trial court has not ruled on Rodriguez’s nunc pro tunc motion, we conclude that Rodriguez’s use of this direct appeal to challenge the trial court’s calculation of his jail time credit is improper. 8 See Ex parte Ybarra, 149 S.W.Sd at 149; Ex parte Deeringer, 210 S.W.3d at 617 -18 & n. 7; see also In re Daisy, 156 S.W.3d at 924 . 2009However, because the trial court has not ruled on Rodriguez's nunc pro tunc motion, we conclude that Rodriguez's use of this direct appeal to challenge the trial court's calculation of his jail time credit is improper. (8) See Ex parte Ybarra , 149 S.W.3d at 149 ; Ex parte Deeringer , 210 S.W.3d at 617 -18 & n.7; see also In re Daisy , 156 S.W.3d at 924 . | 2 | 2 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Jackson v. State , 877 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. Crim. 2001Jackson v. State , 877 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
CMH HOMES v. Perezgreen1 sentence2024See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011); see also Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). | 1 | 1 |
City of Houston v. Clarkgreen1 sentence2022See City of Houston v. Clark, 252 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 14 The City makes clear in its brief that the declaratory-judgment action “is not a direct appeal of a hearing examiner’s award seeking to determine whether a hearing examiner violated Chapter 143.” 22 Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (holding that the district court could not review the merits of the hearing-examiner’s decision on the issue of whether an Acting Fire Chief had authority to suspend members of the fire department but could only review the three non-merits issues); Nuchia v. Woodruff, 956 S.W.2d 612, 616 (Tex. App.—H | 1 | 1 |
Nuchia v. Woodruffgreen1 sentence2022See City of Houston v. Clark, 252 S.W.3d 561, 565 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 14 The City makes clear in its brief that the declaratory-judgment action “is not a direct appeal of a hearing examiner’s award seeking to determine whether a hearing examiner violated Chapter 143.” 22 Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (holding that the district court could not review the merits of the hearing-examiner’s decision on the issue of whether an Acting Fire Chief had authority to suspend members of the fire department but could only review the three non-merits issues); Nuchia v. Woodruff, 956 S.W.2d 612, 616 (Tex. App.—H | 1 | 1 |
Knight, Ex Parte Nancy Gailgreen1 sentence2014See Ex parte Knight, 401 S.W.3d 60, 66 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Reed v. Quartermangreen2 sentences2011See 504 F.3d at 485 . 34 Id. 2011See 504 F.3d at 485 . 34 Id. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte Deeringer
green
2 sentences2009However, because the trial court has not ruled on Rodriguez’s nunc pro tunc motion, we conclude that Rodriguez’s use of this direct appeal to challenge the trial court’s calculation of his jail time credit is improper. 8 See Ex parte Ybarra, 149 S.W.Sd at 149; Ex parte Deeringer, 210 S.W.3d at 617 -18 & n. 7; see also In re Daisy, 156 S.W.3d at 924 . 2009However, because the trial court has not ruled on Rodriguez's nunc pro tunc motion, we conclude that Rodriguez's use of this direct appeal to challenge the trial court's calculation of his jail time credit is improper. (8) See Ex parte Ybarra , 149 S.W.3d at 149 ; Ex parte Deeringer , 210 S.W.3d at 617 -18 & n.7; see also In re Daisy , 156 S.W.3d at 924 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Lanford v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals
green
1 sentence2025The State appears to be essentially invoking the “Calloway rule”—upholding the trial court on appeal if its ruling is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case “even if the trial court did not purport to rely on that theory and the prevailing party did not explicitly raise the theory.”71 The Calloway rule has also been called the “right ruling, wrong reason” rule.72 Even assuming this direct-appeal rule could also apply to a mandamus action in an appropriate case,73 it should not apply here because the administrative presiding judge has not had the opportunity to pass See 847 S.W.2d | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Ex Parte Ybarra
green
1 sentence2009However, because the trial court has not ruled on Rodriguez's nunc pro tunc motion, we conclude that Rodriguez's use of this direct appeal to challenge the trial court's calculation of his jail time credit is improper. (8) See Ex parte Ybarra , 149 S.W.3d at 149 ; Ex parte Deeringer , 210 S.W.3d at 617 -18 & n.7; see also In re Daisy , 156 S.W.3d at 924 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Nelson v. Campbell
green
2 sentences2006NOTES [1] Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649-50 , 124 S.Ct. 2117 , 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (citations omitted). [2] Applicant appropriately notes that this Court recently held that a direct appeal challenge to the lethal injection chemicals used in Texas was not ripe because the defendant's execution was not "imminent." See Doyle v. State, No. 74,960, 2006 WL 1235088 , at *4, 2006 Tex.Crim.App. 2006NOTES [1] Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 649-50 , 124 S.Ct. 2117 , 158 L.Ed.2d 924 (2004) (citations omitted). [2] Applicant appropriately notes that this Court recently held that a direct appeal challenge to the lethal injection chemicals used in Texas was not ripe because the defendant's execution was not "imminent." See Doyle v. State, No. 74,960, 2006 WL 1235088 , at *4, 2006 Tex.Crim.App. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
King v. State
green
2 sentences1983On waiver as provided in this article, the accused shall be charged by information.” King v. State, 473 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), involved a direct appeal where a waiver of indictment was executed under Article 1.141, supra. King held that the state constitutional requirement of an indictment in a felony case was not jurisdictional but was a privilege or right of an accused, which guarantee could be waived in accordance with the statute in a non-capital felony case. 1983On waiver as provided in this article, the accused shall be charged by information." King v. State, 473 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971), involved a direct appeal where a waiver of indictment was executed under Article 1.141, supra. King held that the state constitutional requirement of an indictment in a felony case was not jurisdictional but was a privilege or right of an accused, which guarantee could be waived in accordance with the statute in a non-capital felony case. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.