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23 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co.
green
2 sentences2022The Ohio Supreme Court held that “the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable and binding to oral employment-at-will agreements when a promise which the employer should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part 4 of the employee does induce such action or forbearance, if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Id. at 106 . 2014In Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 19 Ohio St.3d 100 (1985), paragraph one of the syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held: "Unless otherwise agreed, either party to an oral employment-at-will employment agreement may terminate the employment relationship for any reason which is not contrary to law." The Mers court also held the following at 105: We therefore hold that where appropriate, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable and binding to oral employment-at-will agreements when a promise which the employer should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the | 17 | 1986–2022 |
Kelly v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.
green
2 sentences1994The test in such cases is whether the employer should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the employee.” When determining whether promissory estoppel is applicable to an employment>at-wiIl relationship, the test to apply is “whether the employer should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the employee.” Kelly v. Georgia-Pac 1994The test in such cases is whether the employer should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the employee.” When determining whether promissory estoppel is applicable to an employment>at-wiIl relationship, the test to apply is “whether the employer should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the employee.” Kelly v. Georgia-Pac | 2 | 1990–1994 |
Kiel v. Circuit Design Technology, Inc.
green
1 sentence2005The test in such cases is whether the employer should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the employee." Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 17} The representation made by the employer must amount to a specific promise of job security or continued employment. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Helle v. Landmark, Inc.
green
1 sentence1993The test in such cases is whether the employer should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the employee.” Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd.
green
2 sentences1993The test in such cases is whether the employer should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the employee.” *364 In addition, “a promise of future benefits or opportunities without a specific promise of continued employment does not support a promissory estoppel exception to the well-established doctrine of employment at will.” Wing, 59 Ohio St.3d at 110-111 , 570 N.E.2d at 1099 . 1993The test in such cases is whether the employer should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the employee.” *364 In addition, “a promise of future benefits or opportunities without a specific promise of continued employment does not support a promissory estoppel exception to the well-established doctrine of employment at will.” Wing, 59 Ohio St.3d at 110-111 , 570 N.E.2d at 1099 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Cohen & Co. v. Messina
green
2 sentences1991The test in such cases is whether the employer should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the employee.” In Cohen v. Messina (1985), 24 Ohio App.3d 22, 26 , 24 OBR 44, 48, 492 N.E.2d 867, 872 , the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals set forth the prima facie elements necessary for the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel: “[1] There must be a promise, clear and unambiguous in its terms, [2] reliance by the party to whom the promise is made, [3] t 1991The test in such cases is whether the employer should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the employee.” In Cohen v. Messina (1985), 24 Ohio App.3d 22, 26 , 24 OBR 44, 48, 492 N.E.2d 867, 872 , the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals set forth the prima facie elements necessary for the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel: “[1] There must be a promise, clear and unambiguous in its terms, [2] reliance by the party to whom the promise is made, [3] t | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Helmick v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc.
green
1 sentence1990Mers, supra, at 105 ; Helmich v. Cincinnati Word Processing, Inc. (1989), 45 Ohio St. 3d 131 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |