23 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Matter of Wlpgreen2 sentences2024See id. at 669 (concluding that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to juvenile dependency proceedings after “[w]eighing the substantial social cost of ignoring children’s safety against the minimal additional deterrence”). 2024See id. at 669 (concluding that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to juvenile dependency proceedings after “[w]eighing the substantial social cost of ignoring children’s safety against the minimal additional deterrence”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hummonsgreen2 sentences2014See Hummons, 253 P3d at 278 (“If the purpose of an illegal stop or seizure is to discover a warrant—in essence, to discover an intervening circumstance—the fact that a warrant is actually discovered cannot validate admission of the evidence that is the fruit of the illegality.”). 2014See Hummons, 253 P3d at 278 (“If the purpose of an illegal stop or seizure is to discover a warrant — in essence, to discover an intervening circumstance — the fact that a warrant is actually discovered cannot validate admission of the evidence that is the fruit of the illegality.”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Moralezred2 sentences2014See Moralez, 300 P3d at 1103 (“Regardless of whether a suspicionless deten- tion to identify a citizen and check that citizen for outstand- ing arrest warrants is characterized as a standard practice, a field interview, a pedestrian check, or a ‘fishing expedi- tion,’ such a detention can, and often will, demonstrate at least some level of flagrant police conduct.”).15 For purposes of the federal exclusionary rule, the effect of that factor, when considered along with the tem- poral proximity between the unlawful detention and the discovery of the challenged evidence, outweighs any value that 2014See Moralez, 300 P3d at 1103 (“Regardless of whether a suspicionless detention to identify a citizen and check that citizen for outstanding arrest warrants is characterized as a standard practice, a field interview, a pedestrian check, or a ‘fishing expedition,’ such a detention can, and often will, demonstrate at least some level of flagrant police conduct.”). 15 For purposes of the federal exclusionary rule, the effect of that factor, when considered along with the temporal proximity between the unlawful detention and the discovery of the challenged evidence, outweighs any value that otherwi | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Calandragreen2 sentences2014The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the people to . be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The federal exclusionary rule is “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.” United States v. Calandra, 414 US 338, 348 , 94 S 2014The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the people to . be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The federal exclusionary rule is “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.” United States v. Calandra, 414 US 338, 348 , 94 S | 1 | 5 |
Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2011See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 484-88, 491-92 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963) (applying *659 “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine under the federal exclusionary rule to evidence obtained following violations of the United States Constitution); State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 21-36 , 115 P3d 908 (2005) (applying similar “exploitation analysis” under the Oregon exclusionary rule to evidence obtained after violations of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution); cf. State v. Vondehn, 348 Or 462, 475-76 , 236 P3d 691 (2010) (applying a “derives from” test to evidence obtained a 2011See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 484-88, 491-92 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963) (applying *659 “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine under the federal exclusionary rule to evidence obtained following violations of the United States Constitution); State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 21-36 , 115 P3d 908 (2005) (applying similar “exploitation analysis” under the Oregon exclusionary rule to evidence obtained after violations of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution); cf. State v. Vondehn, 348 Or 462, 475-76 , 236 P3d 691 (2010) (applying a “derives from” test to evidence obtained a | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Peltiergreen1 sentence2022See Peltier, 422 US at 538-39 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Baileygreen2 sentences2018See State v. Bailey , 356 Or. 486 , 508, 338 P.3d 702 (2014) (state has "burden to establish attenuation" for purposes of the federal exclusionary rule). 2018See State v. Bailey , 356 Or. 486 , 508, 338 P.3d 702 (2014) (state has "burden to establish attenuation" for purposes of the federal exclusionary rule). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Isomgreen1 sentence2015The author of those “strong words” later disavowed them, opining that Mills had “raised the chance to impeach a defendant during trial above the proscriptions of our Constitution.” Isom, 306 Or at 598 (Gillette, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
Herring v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013That factor weighs very heavily in the analysis because it goes to the heart of the federal exclusionary rule’s purpose, which is to “deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it ***.” Elkins, 364 US at 217 ; see Herring v. United States, 555 US 135, 144 , 129 S Ct 695 , 172 L Ed 2d 296 (2009) (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it.”). 2013That factor weighs very heavily in the analysis because it goes to the heart of the federal exclusionary rule’s purpose, which is to “deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it ***.” Elkins, 364 US at 217 ; see Herring v. United States, 555 US 135, 144 , 129 S Ct 695 , 172 L Ed 2d 296 (2009) (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it.”). | 1 | 1 |
Elkins v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 US 206, 217 , 80 S Ct 1437 , 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960). 2013That factor weighs very heavily in the analysis because it goes to the heart of the federal exclusionary rule’s purpose, which is to “deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it ***.” Elkins, 364 US at 217 ; see Herring v. United States, 555 US 135, 144 , 129 S Ct 695 , 172 L Ed 2d 296 (2009) (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it.”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Janisgreen2 sentences1992See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 US 433 , 96 S Ct 3021 , 49 L Ed 2d 1046 (1976) (deterrence function is not served by excluding illegally seized evidence in federal civil proceedings); United States v. Calandra, supra, 414 US at 354-55 (deterrence function is not sufficiently served by excluding illegally seized evidence in a federal grand jury proceeding). 1992See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 US 433 , 96 S Ct 3021 , 49 L Ed 2d 1046 (1976) (deterrence function is not served by excluding illegally seized evidence in federal civil proceedings); United States v. Calandra, supra, 414 US at 354-55 (deterrence function is not sufficiently served by excluding illegally seized evidence in a federal grand jury proceeding). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences1989See State v. Jones, 248 Or. 428, 423 , 435 P.2d 317 (1967). 1989See State v. Jones, 248 Or. 428, 423 , 435 P.2d 317 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Hall
green
2 sentences2011See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 484-88, 491-92 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963) (applying *659 “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine under the federal exclusionary rule to evidence obtained following violations of the United States Constitution); State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 21-36 , 115 P3d 908 (2005) (applying similar “exploitation analysis” under the Oregon exclusionary rule to evidence obtained after violations of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution); cf. State v. Vondehn, 348 Or 462, 475-76 , 236 P3d 691 (2010) (applying a “derives from” test to evidence obtained a 2011See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 484-88, 491-92 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963) (applying *659 “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine under the federal exclusionary rule to evidence obtained following violations of the United States Constitution); State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 21-36 , 115 P3d 908 (2005) (applying similar “exploitation analysis” under the Oregon exclusionary rule to evidence obtained after violations of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution); cf. State v. Vondehn, 348 Or 462, 475-76 , 236 P3d 691 (2010) (applying a “derives from” test to evidence obtained a | 4 | 2011–2014 |
State v. Dempster
green
2 sentences2013Because I do not agree, however, that the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Dempster, 248 Or 404 , 434 P2d 746 (1967) controls with respect to the analysis of the federal exclusionary rule, I respectfully dissent. 2013Because I do not agree, however, that the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Dempster, 248 Or 404 , 434 P2d 746 (1967) controls with respect to the analysis of the federal exclusionary rule, I respectfully dissent. | 2 | 2013–2014 |
Weeks v. United States
red
2 sentences1987Again, the majority opinion in Davis starts out with an attempt to trace the purposes for the federal exclusionary rule as expressed in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), claiming that the purpose for the exclusionary rule as expressed in Weeks was to protect some personal right and that our early case of State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443 , 204 P. 958 , 206 P. 290 (1922), adopted the exclusionary rule for the same reasons as expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Weeks . 1987Again, the majority opinion in Davis starts out with an attempt to trace the purposes for the federal exclusionary rule as expressed in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), claiming that the purpose for the exclusionary rule as expressed in Weeks was to protect some personal right and that our early case of State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443 , 204 P. 958 , 206 P. 290 (1922), adopted the exclusionary rule for the same reasons as expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Weeks . | 2 | 1981–1987 |
State v. Unger
green
2 sentences2021State v. Unger, 356 Or 59, 67 , 333 P3d 1009 (2014). 2021State v. Unger, 356 Or 59, 67 , 333 P3d 1009 (2014). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Brown v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2013While it is true that the United States Supreme Court has developed attenuation analysis more extensively since Dempster was decided, see Brown v. Illinois, 422 US 590 , 95 S Ct 2254 , 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975), it has never directly addressed whether the discovery of evidence as a result of an arrest pursuant to a warrant is attenuated from a preceding unlawful seizure. 2013While it is true that the United States Supreme Court has developed attenuation analysis more extensively since Dempster was decided, see Brown v. Illinois, 422 US 590 , 95 S Ct 2254 , 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975), it has never directly addressed whether the discovery of evidence as a result of an arrest pursuant to a warrant is attenuated from a preceding unlawful seizure. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Vondehn
green
2 sentences2011See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 484-88, 491-92 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963) (applying *659 “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine under the federal exclusionary rule to evidence obtained following violations of the United States Constitution); State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 21-36 , 115 P3d 908 (2005) (applying similar “exploitation analysis” under the Oregon exclusionary rule to evidence obtained after violations of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution); cf. State v. Vondehn, 348 Or 462, 475-76 , 236 P3d 691 (2010) (applying a “derives from” test to evidence obtained a 2011See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 484-88, 491-92 , 83 S Ct 407 , 9 L Ed 2d 441 (1963) (applying *659 “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine under the federal exclusionary rule to evidence obtained following violations of the United States Constitution); State v. Hall, 339 Or 7, 21-36 , 115 P3d 908 (2005) (applying similar “exploitation analysis” under the Oregon exclusionary rule to evidence obtained after violations of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution); cf. State v. Vondehn, 348 Or 462, 475-76 , 236 P3d 691 (2010) (applying a “derives from” test to evidence obtained a | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. McMurphy
green
1 sentence1993ORS 138.550(1) provides: “The failure of petitioner * * * to have raised matters alleged in the petition at the trial of the petitioner, shall not affect the availability of relief under [The Post-Conviction Hearing Actl.” In State v. McMurphy, supra, 291 Or at 785 , the court explained: ‘Tin contrast to the federal exclusionary rule,! the deterrent effect on future fpolice misconduct], though a desired consequence, is not the constitutional basis for respecting the rights of a defendant against whom the state proposes to use evidence already seized. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Laundy
green
2 sentences1987Again, the majority opinion in Davis starts out with an attempt to trace the purposes for the federal exclusionary rule as expressed in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), claiming that the purpose for the exclusionary rule as expressed in Weeks was to protect some personal right and that our early case of State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443 , 204 P. 958 , 206 P. 290 (1922), adopted the exclusionary rule for the same reasons as expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Weeks . 1987Again, the majority opinion in Davis starts out with an attempt to trace the purposes for the federal exclusionary rule as expressed in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), claiming that the purpose for the exclusionary rule as expressed in Weeks was to protect some personal right and that our early case of State v. Laundy, 103 Or. 443 , 204 P. 958 , 206 P. 290 (1922), adopted the exclusionary rule for the same reasons as expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Weeks . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1985The court in Brewton attempted to decide the case consistently with the then recent case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and its own decision in State v. Neely, 239 Or. 487 , 395 P.2d 557 , 398 P.2d 482 (1965), the latter a case in which the court adopted the federal exclusionary rule analysis as "a necessary procedural device to implement the substantive rights written into the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments." State v. Brewton, supra, 247 Or. at 244-45 , 422 P.2d 581 . 1985The court in Brewton attempted to decide the case consistently with the then recent case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and its own decision in State v. Neely, 239 Or. 487 , 395 P.2d 557 , 398 P.2d 482 (1965), the latter a case in which the court adopted the federal exclusionary rule analysis as "a necessary procedural device to implement the substantive rights written into the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments." State v. Brewton, supra, 247 Or. at 244-45 , 422 P.2d 581 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Nettles
green
2 sentences1985In State v. Nettles, 287 Or 131 , 597 P2d 1243 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the federal exclusionary rule, which is binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not apply to probation revocation hearings. 1985In State v. Nettles, 287 Or 131 , 597 P2d 1243 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the federal exclusionary rule, which is binding on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not apply to probation revocation hearings. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Brewton
green
2 sentences1985The court in Brewton attempted to decide the case consistently with the then recent case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and its own decision in State v. Neely, 239 Or. 487 , 395 P.2d 557 , 398 P.2d 482 (1965), the latter a case in which the court adopted the federal exclusionary rule analysis as "a necessary procedural device to implement the substantive rights written into the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments." State v. Brewton, supra, 247 Or. at 244-45 , 422 P.2d 581 . 1985The court in Brewton attempted to decide the case consistently with the then recent case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and its own decision in State v. Neely, 239 Or. 487 , 395 P.2d 557 , 398 P.2d 482 (1965), the latter a case in which the court adopted the federal exclusionary rule analysis as "a necessary procedural device to implement the substantive rights written into the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments." State v. Brewton, supra, 247 Or. at 244-45 , 422 P.2d 581 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Neely
green
2 sentences1985The court in Brewton attempted to decide the case consistently with the then recent case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and its own decision in State v. Neely, 239 Or. 487 , 395 P.2d 557 , 398 P.2d 482 (1965), the latter a case in which the court adopted the federal exclusionary rule analysis as "a necessary procedural device to implement the substantive rights written into the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments." State v. Brewton, supra, 247 Or. at 244-45 , 422 P.2d 581 . 1985The court in Brewton attempted to decide the case consistently with the then recent case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and its own decision in State v. Neely, 239 Or. 487 , 395 P.2d 557 , 398 P.2d 482 (1965), the latter a case in which the court adopted the federal exclusionary rule analysis as "a necessary procedural device to implement the substantive rights written into the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments." State v. Brewton, supra, 247 Or. at 244-45 , 422 P.2d 581 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Chinn
green
2 sentences1984Only after Mapp v. Ohio, supra , which applied the federal exclusionary rule to the states, did the Oregon court, in State v. Chinn, 231 Or. 259 , 373 P.2d 392 (1962), unequivocably state that unconstitutionally obtained evidence should be suppressed, and not until State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279 , 442 P.2d 250 (1966), did it ever find a search improper and reverse a conviction for failure to suppress. 1984Only after Mapp v. Ohio, supra , which applied the federal exclusionary rule to the states, did the Oregon court, in State v. Chinn, 231 Or. 259 , 373 P.2d 392 (1962), unequivocably state that unconstitutionally obtained evidence should be suppressed, and not until State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279 , 442 P.2d 250 (1966), did it ever find a search improper and reverse a conviction for failure to suppress. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers v. Delaney
green
2 sentences1984Only after Mapp v. Ohio, supra , which applied the federal exclusionary rule to the states, did the Oregon court, in State v. Chinn, 231 Or. 259 , 373 P.2d 392 (1962), unequivocably state that unconstitutionally obtained evidence should be suppressed, and not until State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279 , 442 P.2d 250 (1966), did it ever find a search improper and reverse a conviction for failure to suppress. 1984Only after Mapp v. Ohio, supra, which applied the federal exclusionary rule to the states, did the Oregon court, in State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962), unequivocably state that unconstitutionally obtained evidence should be suppressed, and not until State v. Elkins, 245 Or 279 , 442 P2d 250 (1966), did it ever find a search improper and reverse a conviction for failure to suppress. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. Elkins
green
2 sentences1984Only after Mapp v. Ohio, supra , which applied the federal exclusionary rule to the states, did the Oregon court, in State v. Chinn, 231 Or. 259 , 373 P.2d 392 (1962), unequivocably state that unconstitutionally obtained evidence should be suppressed, and not until State v. Elkins, 245 Or. 279 , 442 P.2d 250 (1966), did it ever find a search improper and reverse a conviction for failure to suppress. 1984Only after Mapp v. Ohio, supra, which applied the federal exclusionary rule to the states, did the Oregon court, in State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259 , 373 P2d 392 (1962), unequivocably state that unconstitutionally obtained evidence should be suppressed, and not until State v. Elkins, 245 Or 279 , 442 P2d 250 (1966), did it ever find a search improper and reverse a conviction for failure to suppress. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Mapp v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1981By the time of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the underlying theory of exclusion had changed somewhat. 1981By the time of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the underlying theory of exclusion had changed somewhat. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.