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24 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sackett v. Nationwide Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2025See Sackett II, 940 A.2d at 334 . - 16 - time an insured pays to obtain UIM coverage for multiple vehicles, regardless of whether this acquisition occurs when an individual initially applies for insurance, or when she subsequently pays to obtain additional UIM coverage. 2017In Sackett v. Nationwide, 596 Pa. 11 , 940 A.2d 329 (2007) (“Sackett IF), our Supreme Court held that the addition of a vehicle to an existing policy under.an after-acquired vehicle clause that extends coverage on a continuous basis does not constitute the “purchase” of “new” insurance that requires the execution of a new waiver form under Section 1738(c) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”). 1 Sackett II notwithstanding, the Majority concludes that Ap-pellees are entitled to stack across their two policies, since the new vehicle was added by way of amended declaration p | 2 | 3 |
Erie Insurance v. King, J.green2 sentences2021On appeal, this Court initially determined that King’s execution of a stacking waiver is “irrelevant” because King and the niece cannot “‘stack’ benefits they receive from Erie with benefits they received from [the truck’s commercial policy], where [they] are not ‘insureds’ under the [truck’s commercial] policy.” Id. at 339 (citations omitted). 2021On appeal, this Court initially determined that King’s execution of a stacking waiver is “irrelevant” because King and the niece cannot “‘stack’ benefits they receive from Erie with benefits they received from [the truck’s commercial policy], where [they] are not ‘insureds’ under the [truck’s commercial] policy.” Id. at 339 (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Erie Insurance Exchange v. Petrie, J.green2 sentences2021Petrie, 242 A.3d at 922 (internal citation and footnote omitted). 2021Petrie, 242 A.3d at 922 (internal citation and footnote omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Sackett v. Nationwide Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2014Co., 591 Pa. 416 , 919 A.2d 194 (2007) (“Sackett I”), required that Peerless obtain a new stacking waiver from the Bumbargers. 2010Id. “[The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law] makes it clear that an insurer must provide a stacking waiver each time a new vehicle is added to the policy because the amount of coverage that may be stacked increases.” Id. at 202. ¶7 Subsequently, our Supreme Court granted reargument in Sackett v. Nationwide Mut. | 2 | 2 |
Franks, R., Aplts. v. State Farm Mutualgreen2 sentences2026Subsequently, in Franks v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, ___ Pa. ___, 292 A.3d 866 (2023), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court revisited the issue of when a “purchase” occurs under Subsection 1738(c), expanding on the Barnard definition and rejecting the general argument that “purchase” as used in Subsection 1738(c) equates with “change.” See Franks, supra. The Court observed: As we explained in Barnard, the language employed by the Legislature in Section 1738 is not inherently ambiguous nor does it reflect an ambiguity in context with other aspects of the MVFRL. 2026Subsequently, in Franks v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, ___ Pa. ___, 292 A.3d 866 (2023), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court revisited the issue of when a “purchase” occurs under Subsection 1738(c), expanding on the Barnard definition and rejecting the general argument that “purchase” as used in Subsection 1738(c) equates with “change.” See Franks, supra. The Court observed: As we explained in Barnard, the language employed by the Legislature in Section 1738 is not inherently ambiguous nor does it reflect an ambiguity in context with other aspects of the MVFRL. | 1 | 1 |
Stone v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2014Co., 591 Pa. 416 , 919 A.2d 194 (2007) (“Sackett I”), required that Peerless obtain a new stacking waiver from the Bumbargers. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gallagher, B., Aplt. v. Geico Indemnity
green
2 sentences2020Accordingly, because Gallagher found the household exclusion provision inconsistent with Section 1738 of the MVFRL requirement that insureds knowingly waive stacked coverage, and Craley found the present stacking waiver provision was not sufficient for an insured to make a knowing decision to waive stacked coverage, the trial court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court.7 6 The contention that the decision is narrow comes from footnote 8 in the opinion where it states, “[o]ur focus here is narrow.” Gallagher, supra at 138 n.8. 2020Accordingly, because Gallagher found the household exclusion provision inconsistent with Section 1738 of the MVFRL requirement that insureds knowingly waive stacked coverage, and Craley found the present stacking waiver provision was not sufficient for an insured to make a knowing decision to waive stacked coverage, the trial court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court.7 6 The contention that the decision is narrow comes from footnote 8 in the opinion where it states, “[o]ur focus here is narrow.” Gallagher, supra at 138 n.8. | 5 | 2020–2021 |
Craley v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences2020Co., 895 A.2d 530 (Pa. 2006). 2020Co., 895 A.2d 530 (Pa. 2006). | 4 | 2008–2020 |
Timothy Rupert v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
green
2 sentences2023The court agreed “individuals added to a policy as named insureds subsequent to the execution of a stacking waiver, such as [Rupert], will receive adequate notice of the stacking waiver through the first named insured.” Id. 2023The court agreed “individuals added to a policy as named insureds subsequent to the execution of a stacking waiver, such as [Rupert], will receive adequate notice of the stacking waiver through the first named insured.” Id. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Jones v. Unitrin Auto & Home Insurance
green
2 sentences2021This interpretation complies with our stated policy of construing the statute “liberally in favor of the insured”3 so as to “afford[ ] the injured claimant the greatest possible coverage.” See Jones, 40 A.3d at 127 . 2020This interpretation complies with our stated policy of construing the statute “liberally in favor of the insured”6 so as to “afford[ ] the injured claimant the greatest possible coverage.” See Jones, 40 A.3d at 127 . | 2 | 2020–2021 |
Shipp v. Phoenix Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2021The Frankses’ reliance on Shipp, supra, for the proposition that a new stacking waiver is required whenever there is any change in the potential amount of stacked coverage is misplaced. 2020Co., 51 A.3d 219 (Pa. Super. 2012), for the proposition that a new stacking waiver is required whenever there is any change in the potential amount of stacked coverage is misplaced. | 2 | 2020–2021 |
Pergolese v. Standard Fire Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2020Id. at 490-91 . -9- found guidance in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decision in Barnard. 2020Co., 162 A.3d 481 (Pa. Super. 2017), “supports [its] position that deleting a vehicle from a policy does not constitute the purchase of underinsured motorist coverage.” State Farm’s Brief at 18. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Sackett v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence2014Id. at 640-41 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Allwein v. Donegal Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2008After determining that the stacking waiver did not apply, the dissent considered the applicability of the “Other Insurance” clause in the Donegal policy, which provides “gap insurance” rather than “excess insurance.” 12 The dissent observed that an en bane panel of the Superior Court in Allwein v. Donegal Mutual Insurance Co., 448 Pa.Super. 364 , 671 A.2d 744 (1996), appeal denied, 546 Pa. 660 , 685 A.2d 541 (1996), concluded that the MVFRL requires excess UIM coverage because it defines an underinsured motorist using excess rather than gap insurance concepts: an underinsured motor vehicle is 2008After determining that the stacking waiver did not apply, the dissent considered the applicability of the “Other Insurance” clause in the Donegal policy, which provides “gap insurance” rather than “excess insurance.” 12 The dissent observed that an en bane panel of the Superior Court in Allwein v. Donegal Mutual Insurance Co., 448 Pa.Super. 364 , 671 A.2d 744 (1996), appeal denied, 546 Pa. 660 , 685 A.2d 541 (1996), concluded that the MVFRL requires excess UIM coverage because it defines an underinsured motorist using excess rather than gap insurance concepts: an underinsured motor vehicle is | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance v. Colbert
green
2 sentences2008Appellant argues that Donegal, by expanding the definition of “insured” to include guest passengers, has drafted a policy that contra- diets the statutory language in violation of our decision in Colbert, 572 Pa. 82 , 813 A.2d 747 (2002). 2008Appellant argues that Donegal, by expanding the definition of “insured” to include guest passengers, has drafted a policy that contra- diets the statutory language in violation of our decision in Colbert, 572 Pa. 82 , 813 A.2d 747 (2002). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Rizzo
green
2 sentences2005As a matter of stare decisis, I note that our supreme court denied allocatur in both Harris, supra and Rizzo, supra, as well as in Stacking Litigation, supra. I would therefore suggest that the majority’s concern about relying on what it perceives to be dicta in Stacking Litigation is now a moot point. ¶ 3 Turning to the majority’s resolution of this case, I am constrained to disagree because I do not find that the facts of this case implicate “stacking” as our legislature has defined that concept in § 1738 of the MVFRL: rather, a proper analysis of the issue in this case falls squarely within 2005As a matter of stare decisis, I note that our supreme court denied allocatur in both Harris, supra and Rizzo, supra, as well as in Stacking Litigation, supra . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Harris
green
2 sentences2005As a matter of stare decisis, I note that our supreme court denied allocatur in both Harris, supra and Rizzo, supra, as well as in Stacking Litigation, supra. I would therefore suggest that the majority’s concern about relying on what it perceives to be dicta in Stacking Litigation is now a moot point. ¶ 3 Turning to the majority’s resolution of this case, I am constrained to disagree because I do not find that the facts of this case implicate “stacking” as our legislature has defined that concept in § 1738 of the MVFRL: rather, a proper analysis of the issue in this case falls squarely within 2005As a matter of stare decisis, I note that our supreme court denied allocatur in both Harris, supra and Rizzo, supra, as well as in Stacking Litigation, supra . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Rupert v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2005Cappy, three of the justices expressed the view that the General Assembly, through Section 1738, “sought to ensure that policyholders would be given full information regarding availability of stacked coverage before deciding whether or not to reject it,” Rupert, 566 Pa. at 393 , 781 A.2d at 135 , and that allowing a rejection form signed at the inception of a policy to “indefinitely bind[]” all future insureds, including those added after the original first named insured is removed from the policy, fails to “even minimally afford[ ] constructive knowledge of the option to reject stacked covera 2005In an opinion authored by then Chief Justice Stephen A. Zappala, three of the justices took the view that the MVFRL, based on a plain reading of Section 1738, required only the signature of the first named insured on the policy to be effective, that “the signature of the first named insured evidences the insurer’s fulfillment of its obligation of offering and informing the named insured of his or her right to waiver,” Rupert, 566 Pa. at 392 , 781 A.2d at *1247 135, and thus that the validity of the stacking waiver is determined at the inception of the policy. ¶ 11 In an opinion by Chief Justic | 1 | 2005–2005 |
In Re Insurance Stacking Litigation
green
2 sentences2005As a matter of stare decisis, I note that our supreme court denied allocatur in both Harris, supra and Rizzo, supra, as well as in Stacking Litigation, supra. I would therefore suggest that the majority’s concern about relying on what it perceives to be dicta in Stacking Litigation is now a moot point. ¶ 3 Turning to the majority’s resolution of this case, I am constrained to disagree because I do not find that the facts of this case implicate “stacking” as our legislature has defined that concept in § 1738 of the MVFRL: rather, a proper analysis of the issue in this case falls squarely within 2005As a matter of stare decisis, I note that our supreme court denied allocatur in both Harris, supra and Rizzo, supra, as well as in Stacking Litigation, supra . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Winslow-Quattlebaum v. Maryland Casualty Co.
green
1 sentence2004At the time of settlement, the two most important cases to this dispute were Winslow-Quattlebaum, supra, and Lucas v. Progressive Cas. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Geisler v. Motorists Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence1990Id., 382 Pa.Superior Ct. at 628-31, 556 A.2d at 394-96 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.