constitutional right violation in Tennessee

2018Because the defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation was violated, see Black, 815 S.W.2d at 177 , the burden rested upon the State “‘to prove that the constitutional right violation [was] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,’” Sayles, 49 S.W.3d at 280 (quoting Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 167 (Tenn. 2000)).

2015See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 444 S,W.3d 554, 591 n. 50 (Tenn,2014) (referring to State’s "burden of proving unconstitutional prosecutorial comment or argument harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Nagele, 353 S.W.3d 112, 117 (Tenn.2011) (referring to State's “burden of proving harmless error”); Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 476 (Tenn.2010) (“Where, as here, the trial court has committed constitutional error ..., the judgment of conviction must be set aside unless tire State proves that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 167 ("Once a constitutional

2004A violation of the right to confrontation may be deemed harmless “if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Sayles, 49 S.W.3d at 280 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681 ) (citing State v. Reid, 882 S.W.2d 423, 429 (Tenn. Crim.

2001The United States Supreme Court stated in Delaware v. Van Arsdall that a violation of the right to confrontation may be deemed harmless “if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 475 U.S. at 681 , 106 S.Ct. at 1436 ; see also State v. Reid, 882 S.W.2d 423, 429 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).

2001“Once a constitutional error has been established, as in this case, the burden is upon the State to prove that the constitutional right violation is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 167 (Tenn.2000) (citing State v. Harris, 989 S.W.2d 307, 314 (Tenn.1999)).

2000“Once a constitutional error has been established, as in this case, the burden is upon the State to prove that the constitutional right violation is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 167 (Tenn. 2000) (citing State v. Harris, 989 S.W.2d 307, 314 (Tenn. 1999)).

2015State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554 , 591 n. 50 (Tenn. 2014) (referring to State’s "burden of proving unconstitutional prosecutorial comment or argument harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Nagele, 353 S.W.3d 112, 117 (Tenn. 2011) (referring to State’s "burden of proving harmless error”); Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 476 (Tenn. 2010) ("Where, as here, the trial court has committed constitutional error ..., the judgment of conviction must be set aside unless the State proves that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 167 (“Once a constitutional error h

2015See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 444 S,W.3d 554, 591 n. 50 (Tenn,2014) (referring to State’s "burden of proving unconstitutional prosecutorial comment or argument harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Nagele, 353 S.W.3d 112, 117 (Tenn.2011) (referring to State's “burden of proving harmless error”); Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 476 (Tenn.2010) (“Where, as here, the trial court has committed constitutional error ..., the judgment of conviction must be set aside unless tire State proves that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 167 ("Once a constitutional

2015State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554 , 591 n. 50 (Tenn. 2014) (referring to State’s "burden of proving unconstitutional prosecutorial comment or argument harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Nagele, 353 S.W.3d 112, 117 (Tenn. 2011) (referring to State’s "burden of proving harmless error”); Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 476 (Tenn. 2010) ("Where, as here, the trial court has committed constitutional error ..., the judgment of conviction must be set aside unless the State proves that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 167 (“Once a constitutional error h

2015See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 444 S,W.3d 554, 591 n. 50 (Tenn,2014) (referring to State’s "burden of proving unconstitutional prosecutorial comment or argument harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Nagele, 353 S.W.3d 112, 117 (Tenn.2011) (referring to State's “burden of proving harmless error”); Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 476 (Tenn.2010) (“Where, as here, the trial court has committed constitutional error ..., the judgment of conviction must be set aside unless tire State proves that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 167 ("Once a constitutional

2008See Luttrell v. State, 644 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tenn. Crim.

2005See Luttrell v. State, 644 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tenn. Crim.

2007See State v. Williamson, 919 S.W.2d 69, 80 (Tenn. Crim.

2006See State v. Williamson, 919 S.W.2d 69, 80 (Tenn. Crim.

2026We note that “neither the United States Constitution nor the Tennessee Constitution provides a criminal defendant with a constitutional right to error coram nobis relief.” Nunley, 552 S.W.3d at 817 (quoting Frazier v. State, 495 S.W.3d 246, 248 (Tenn. 2016)).

2016See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506 (1954) (recognizing that a federal court‘s power to grant coram nobis relief arises from the ―all-writs section of the Judicial Code‖ and making no reference to the federal constitution); State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 666-68 (Tenn. 1999) (tracing the historical common-law and statutory origins of error coram nobis and its availability in Tennessee).

2016See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506 , 74 S.Ct. 247 , 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954) (recognizing that a federal court’s power to grant coram nobis relief arises from the “all-writs section of the Judicial Code” and making no reference to the federal constitution); State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 666-68 (Tenn.1999) (tracing the historical common-law and statutory origins of error coram nobis and its availability in Tennessee).

2016See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506 (1954) (recognizing that a federal court‘s power to grant coram nobis relief arises from the ―all-writs section of the Judicial Code‖ and making no reference to the federal constitution); State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 666-68 (Tenn. 1999) (tracing the historical common-law and statutory origins of error coram nobis and its availability in Tennessee).

2016See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506 , 74 S.Ct. 247 , 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954) (recognizing that a federal court’s power to grant coram nobis relief arises from the “all-writs section of the Judicial Code” and making no reference to the federal constitution); State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 666-68 (Tenn.1999) (tracing the historical common-law and statutory origins of error coram nobis and its availability in Tennessee).

2015State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554 , 591 n. 50 (Tenn. 2014) (referring to State’s "burden of proving unconstitutional prosecutorial comment or argument harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Nagele, 353 S.W.3d 112, 117 (Tenn. 2011) (referring to State’s "burden of proving harmless error”); Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 476 (Tenn. 2010) ("Where, as here, the trial court has committed constitutional error ..., the judgment of conviction must be set aside unless the State proves that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 167 (“Once a constitutional error h

2015See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554 , 591 n.50 (Tenn. 2014) (referring to State‟s “burden of proving unconstitutional prosecutorial comment or argument harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Nagele, 353 S.W.3d 112, 117 (Tenn. 2011) (referring to State‟s “burden of proving harmless error”); Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 476 (Tenn. 2010) (“Where, as here, the trial court has committed constitutional error . . . , the judgment of conviction must be set aside unless the State proves that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 167 (“Once a constitut

2010Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-377 , 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780-1781 (1964); McCravey v. State, 426 S.W.2d 174, 175-176 (Tenn. 1968); Smith v. State, 535 S.W.2d 162, 164-165 (Tenn. Crim.

2010Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-377 , 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780-1781 (1964); McCravey v. State, 426 S.W.2d 174, 175-176 (Tenn. 1968); Smith v. State, 535 S.W.2d 162, 164-165 (Tenn. Crim.

2010Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-377 , 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780-1781 (1964); McCravey v. State, 426 S.W.2d 174, 175-176 (Tenn. 1968); Smith v. State, 535 S.W.2d 162, 164-165 (Tenn. Crim.

2010Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-377 , 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780-1781 (1964); McCravey v. State, 426 S.W.2d 174, 175-176 (Tenn. 1968); Smith v. State, 535 S.W.2d 162, 164-165 (Tenn. Crim.

2010See Campbell v. State, 469 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Tenn. Crim.

2006In determining whether the constitutional right to present a defense has been violated by the exclusion of evidence, the analysis should consider whether: “1) the excluded evidence is critical to the defense; 2) the evidence bears sufficient indicia of reliability; and 3) the interest supporting exclusion of the evidence is substantially important.” Id. at 433-34 (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298-301 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 ); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 315 , 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (the exclusion of evidence violates the constitutional right to a defense when it

2006In determining whether the constitutional right to present a defense has been violated by the exclusion of evidence, the analysis should consider whether: “1) the excluded evidence is critical to the defense; 2) the evidence bears sufficient indicia of reliability; and 3) the interest supporting exclusion of the evidence is substantially important.” Id. at 433-34 (citing Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298-301 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 ); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 315 , 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (the exclusion of evidence violates the constitutional right to a defense when it

2001The United States Supreme Court stated in Delaware v. Van Arsdall that a violation of the right to confrontation may be deemed harmless “if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 475 U.S. at 681 , 106 S.Ct. at 1436 ; see also State v. Reid, 882 S.W.2d 423, 429 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).

2001The United States Supreme Court stated in Delaware v. Van Arsdall that a violation of the right to confrontation may be deemed harmless “if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 475 U.S. at 681 , 106 S.Ct. at 1436 ; see also State v. Reid, 882 S.W.2d 423, 429 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)).