constitutional right violation in Mississippi

2022“However, ‘merely asserting a constitutional-right violation is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars.’” Id. (quoting Fluker v. State, 170 So. 3d 471, 475 (¶11) (Miss. 2015)).

2022As the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized in Fluker v. State, 170 So. 3d 471, 475 (¶11) (Miss. 2015), “merely asserting a constitutional-right violation is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars.” “[T]here must at least appear to be some basis 10 for the truth of the claim of a fundamental-constitutional-rights violation.” Nichols v. State, 265 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (¶10) (Miss.

2021However, even if an appellant does claim his fundamental rights were affected, this Court must still assess whether his claim is worthy of examination. “[T]he mere assertion of a constitutional right violation does not trigger the exception.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

2020However, “the mere assertion of a constitutional right violation does not trigger the exception.” Evans v. State, 115 So. 3d 879, 881 (¶3) (Miss.

2017However, merely asserting "a constitutional right violation is not sufficient to overcome the time[-]bar." Stovall v. State , 873 So.2d 1056 , 1058 (¶ 7) (Miss.

2015However, “the mere assertion of a constitutional right violation is not sufficient to overcome the time bar.” Stovall v. State, 873 So.2d 1056, 1058 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2004).

2020Our supreme court has determined, however, that “merely asserting a constitutional-right violation is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars. ‘There must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim before the procedural bar will be waived.’” Means v. State, 43 So. 3d 438, 442 (¶12) (Miss. 2010) (quoting Crosby v. State, 16 So. 3d 74, 79 (¶10) (Miss.

2018The Mississippi Supreme Court has made clear that " 'merely asserting a constitutional-right violation is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars.' " Fluker v. State, 170 So.3d 471 , 475 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2015) (quoting Means v. State , 43 So.3d 438 , 442 (¶ 12) (Miss. 2010) ).

2020There must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim before the limitation period will be waived.” Id. (quoting Stovall v. State, 873 So. 2d 1056, 1058 (¶7) (Miss.

2013See Wicker v. State, 16 So.3d 706, 708 (¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App.2009) (“the mere assertion of a constitutional right violation” is not enough to trigger exception).

2020Our supreme court has determined, however, that “merely asserting a constitutional-right violation is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars. ‘There must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim before the procedural bar will be waived.’” Means v. State, 43 So. 3d 438, 442 (¶12) (Miss. 2010) (quoting Crosby v. State, 16 So. 3d 74, 79 (¶10) (Miss.

2015“There must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim before the [procedural bar] will be waived.” Means, 43 So.3d at 442 (quoting Crosby v. State, 16 So.3d 74, 79 (Miss.Ct.App.2009)).

2012In our consideration of these three claims of constitutional error, we acknowledge that while it is true that the statute of limitations does not apply to “errors affecting fundamental constitutional rights[,] • • • the mere assertion of a constitutional right violation is not sufficient to overcome the time bar.” Chandler, 44 So.3d at 444 (¶ 8).

2012See Chandler v. State, 44 So.3d 442, 444 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (“[T]he mere assertion of a constitutional right violation is not sufficient to overcome the time bar.

2017Under Rowland v. State, 42 So.3d 503, 506 (¶ 9) (Miss. 2010), the Mississippi Supreme Court specifically held that “errors affecting fundamental constitutional rights are excepted from the procedural bars of the UPCCRA.” However, “the mere assertion of a constitutional right violation does not trigger the excep *1244 tion”; rather, the claim must at least appear to have some basis of truth.

2016Baile identifies no statutory exception to the statute of limitations, see id. § 99-39-5(2), nor does he show that his motion implicates any “fundamental constitutional rights.” Rowland v. State, 42 So.3d 503, 506 (¶ 9) (Miss. 2010) (“[E]rrors affecting fundamental constitutional rights are excepted from the procedural bars of the UPCCRA.”); Means v. State, 43 So.3d 438, 442 (¶ 11) (Miss. 2010) (“[Mjerely asserting a constitutional-right violation is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars.

2022As the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized in Fluker v. State, 170 So. 3d 471, 475 (¶11) (Miss. 2015), “merely asserting a constitutional-right violation is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars.” “[T]here must at least appear to be some basis 10 for the truth of the claim of a fundamental-constitutional-rights violation.” Nichols v. State, 265 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (¶10) (Miss.

2020However, “merely asserting a constitutional-right violation is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars[;] . . . there must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim of a fundamental- constitutional-rights violation.” Nichols, 265 So. 3d at 1241 (¶10).

2016“There must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim before the limitation period will be waived.” Id. (quoting Ross v. State, 87 So.3d 1080, 1082 (¶ 8) (Miss.

2015Ross v. State, 87 So.3d 1080, 1082 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.

2021We note that “a mere assertion of a constitutional-right violation does not automatically preclude the application of the procedural bars.” Stokes v. State, 238 So. 3d 631, 634 (¶10) (Miss.

2018However, "a mere assertion of a constitutional-right violation does not automatically preclude the application of the procedural bars." Stokes , 238 So.3d at 634 (¶ 10).

2020Figueroa, as the PCR movant, “bears the burden of demonstrating that he has met an exception.” McComb v. State, 135 So. 3d 928, 932 (¶13) (Miss.

2020Harris, as the PCR movant, “bears the burden of demonstrating that he has met an exception.” McComb, 135 So. 3d at 932 (¶13). ¶19.

2019The Mississippi Supreme Court has held, however, that “neither the common law nor our own constitutional law applies the doctrine of res judicata to constitutional claims.” Smith v. State, 149 So. 3d 1027, 1032 (¶11) (Miss. 2014), overruled on other grounds by Pitchford v State, 240 So. 3d 1061 (Miss. 2017); see also Sims v. State, 227 So. 3d 1167, 1169 (¶7) (Miss.

2018Sims v. State , 227 So.3d 1167 , 1169 (¶ 18) (Miss.

2019The Mississippi Supreme Court has held, however, that “neither the common law nor our own constitutional law applies the doctrine of res judicata to constitutional claims.” Smith v. State, 149 So. 3d 1027, 1032 (¶11) (Miss. 2014), overruled on other grounds by Pitchford v State, 240 So. 3d 1061 (Miss. 2017); see also Sims v. State, 227 So. 3d 1167, 1169 (¶7) (Miss.

2015The majority also cites Smith v. State, 149 So.3d 1027 (Miss.2014), to support their position.

1997The Supreme Court has stated, "[T]his Court has never held that a capital defendant has a constitutional right to an instruction telling the jury to revisit the question of his identity as the murderer as a basis for mitigation." Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 172-73 , 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2327 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988), reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1263 , 109 S.Ct. 25 , 101 L.Ed.2d 976 (1988).

1997The Supreme Court has stated, "[T]his Court has never held that a capital defendant has a constitutional right to an instruction telling the jury to revisit the question of his identity as the murderer as a basis for mitigation." Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 172-73 , 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2327 , 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988), reh'g denied, 487 U.S. 1263 , 109 S.Ct. 25 , 101 L.Ed.2d 976 (1988).

2026Ct. App. 2023) (“[A] guilty plea waives the right to a speedy trial, whether that right is of constitutional or statutory origin.”); Johnson v. State, 39 So. 3d 963, 965-66 (¶9) (Miss.

2022The appellant “has a duty to make more than mere assertions and should set forth reasons for his arguments and cite authorities in their support.” Brown v. State, 211 So. 3d 709, 712 (¶8) (Miss.

2019Fundamental Rights Exception to the UPCCRA’s Procedural Bars5 ¶16. “[E]rrors affecting fundamental rights are [also] excepted from the UPCCRA’s procedural bars.” Gunn, 248 So. 3d at 942 (¶19). “[A] mere assertion of a constitutional- right violation[, however,] does not automatically preclude the application of the procedural 5 We acknowledge that the State has asserted that O’Neal’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

2019Mays v. State, 228 So. 3d 946, 948 (¶5) (Miss.

2018As addressed above, however, Thomas cannot overcome the procedural time-bar by "merely asserting a constitutional-right violation." Fluker , 170 So.3d at 475 (¶ 11) ; see McCoy v. State , 230 So.3d 1090 , 1094 (¶ 9) (Miss.

2017However, “the mere suggestion of a constitutional-right violation is not itself sufficient to surmount the time-bar.” Jones v. State, 203 So.3d 657, 659 (¶ 8) (Miss.

2016Blount v. State, 126 So.3d 927, 930 (¶ 14) (Miss.Ct.App.2013); see also Bailey v. State, 65 So.3d 349, 350 (¶ 5) (Miss.Ct.App. 2011) (“[T]he mere assertion of a constitutional-right violation does not suffice to overcome the three-year time bar.”). ¶ 6.

2016But the “mere assertion of a constitutional right violation does not trigger the. exception.” Ratcliff v. State, 126 So.3d 118, 120 (¶ 7) (Miss.

2016“Merely asserting a constitutional right violation is not sufficient to overcome the time bar.” Cummings, 130 So.3d at 132 (¶ 7).

2016“There must at least appear to be some -basis for the truth of the claim before the procedural bar will be waived.” Id.