Sneed test in Texas

1995Sneed v. State, 670 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); Buentello v. State, 826 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (Sneed test still viable under Tex.R.App.Proc. 30(b)).

1995In Buentello v. State, 826 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), the Court of Criminal Appeals directly confronted the question of whether the adoption of Rule 606(b) changed the law regarding testimony admissible to impeach a jury’s verdict, and whether the five-part test set out in Sneed still applies under Rule 606(b). *724 The court determined that the plain language of Rule 606(b) indicates that jurors are not immune from testifying at a hearing on a motion for new trial and concluded that the Sneed test remains a viable means of determining whether a jury’s discussion of parole law constitutes

2001Sneed v. State, 670 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). 3 The Sneed test was adopted by this Court as a means of examining a defendant’s motion for new trial under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 40.03(7) and 40.03(8). 4 Article 40.03 was later repealed by the adoption of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

2001Sneed v. State, 670 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). 3 The Sneed test was adopted by this Court as a means of examining a defendant’s motion for new trial under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 40.03(7) and 40.03(8). 4 Article 40.03 was later repealed by the adoption of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

2015See Melvin v. State, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 2973 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 21, 2010, pet. refused) (noting “Sneed is no longer viable in light of Rule 606(b)”); Hicks, 15 S.W.3d at 630 (“The 1998 version of Rule 606(b) apparently wipes out Buentello, and all of its progeny”); Hart v. State, 15 S.W.3d 117, 123 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. refused) (stating that because of the 1998 amendment to rule 606(b), Buentello and Sneed are abrogated”).

2001See Hart v. State, 15 S.W.3d 117, 122-124 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000).

1996Rasbury v. State , 832 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd) (applying Sneed test to juror misstatement of self-defense law).

1996Rasbury v. State , 832 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd) (applying Sneed test to juror misstatement of self-defense law).

1992Sneed at 265 ; see Ready at 758-759 (even though juror believed statements about parole to be factual because of the specificity of the assertions, none of the jurors professed to know the law); Stanton v. State, lil S.W.2d 914, 924 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, pet. ref'd) (no new trial even though juror related during deliberations that he had *619 friend who received a long sentence and served only a short time); Gilliam v. State, 746 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1988, no pet.) (discussion of parole which failed to meet Sneed test); McGlothlin v. State, 705 S.W.2d 851, 861-862 (Tex.App.— Fort Wor

1992Sneed at 265 ; see Ready at 758-759 (even though juror believed statements about parole to be factual because of the specificity of the assertions, none of the jurors professed to know the law); Stanton v. State, lil S.W.2d 914, 924 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, pet. ref'd) (no new trial even though juror related during deliberations that he had *619 friend who received a long sentence and served only a short time); Gilliam v. State, 746 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1988, no pet.) (discussion of parole which failed to meet Sneed test); McGlothlin v. State, 705 S.W.2d 851, 861-862 (Tex.App.— Fort Wor

2018"We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, but simply determine whether the trial court's Sneed analysis was arbitrary or unreasonable." Id.

2018"We do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, but simply determine whether the trial court's Sneed analysis was arbitrary or unreasonable." Id.

2015Hicks, 15 S.W.3d at 630 (explaining that while amended rule 606(b) makes proving jury misconduct more difficult it does not preclude proof of jury misconduct by other means 4 The exception allowed a juror to testify “as to any matter relevant to the validity of the verdict or indictment.” McQuarrie, 380 S.W.3d at 158 (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (noting the exception “swallowed the rule” limiting juror testimony). 5 In Salazar, decided after rule 606(b) was amended, the court relied on appellate rule 21.3(f) and (g) to apply the Sneed factors.

2015Hicks, 15 S.W.3d at 630 (explaining that while amended rule 606(b) makes proving jury misconduct more difficult it does not preclude proof of jury misconduct by other means 4 The exception allowed a juror to testify “as to any matter relevant to the validity of the verdict or indictment.” McQuarrie, 380 S.W.3d at 158 (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (noting the exception “swallowed the rule” limiting juror testimony). 5 In Salazar, decided after rule 606(b) was amended, the court relied on appellate rule 21.3(f) and (g) to apply the Sneed factors.

2015Hicks, 15 S.W.3d at 630 (explaining that while amended rule 606(b) makes proving jury misconduct more difficult it does not preclude proof of jury misconduct by other means 4 The exception allowed a juror to testify “as to any matter relevant to the validity of the verdict or indictment.” McQuarrie, 380 S.W.3d at 158 (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (noting the exception “swallowed the rule” limiting juror testimony). 5 In Salazar, decided after rule 606(b) was amended, the court relied on appellate rule 21.3(f) and (g) to apply the Sneed factors.

2015Hicks, 15 S.W.3d at 630 (explaining that while amended rule 606(b) makes proving jury misconduct more difficult it does not preclude proof of jury misconduct by other means 4 The exception allowed a juror to testify “as to any matter relevant to the validity of the verdict or indictment.” McQuarrie, 380 S.W.3d at 158 (Keller, P.J., dissenting) (noting the exception “swallowed the rule” limiting juror testimony). 5 In Salazar, decided after rule 606(b) was amended, the court relied on appellate rule 21.3(f) and (g) to apply the Sneed factors.

2014App. 1984)); see also Short v. State, 995 S.W.2d 948, 954 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d) (applying Sneed test).

2006See Rocha , 69 S.W.3d at 319 (noting that party seeking additional time for discovery must state with particularity the diligence used to obtain the information being sought).

2001Hines v. State, 3 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex.App. — Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d)(concluding that the 1998 amendment to Rule 606(b) overrides the holding in Sneed). * Jurors Davis and Patterson were challenged for cause for not considering probation, the trial court overruled the objection, and Brantley did not use a peremptory strike against them.

2001See Sneed, 670 S.W.2d at 267 and Lewis v. State, 911 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App.1995).

2001See Sneed, 670 S.W.2d at 267 and Lewis v. State, 911 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App.1995).

1998See id. at 614; see also Tex. R.

1998See id. at 614; see also Tex. R.

1996App. 1984)); Bass v. State , 830 S.W.2d 142, 148 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd) (applying Sneed test to jury's discussion of parole).

1995Id. at 921.

1995Id. at 921.

1992Sneed at 265; see Ready at 758-759 (even though juror believed statements about parole to be factual because of the specificity of the assertions, none of the jurors professed to know the law); Stanton v. State, 747 S.W.2d 914, 924 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, pet. ref’d) (no new trial even though juror related during deliberations that he had friend who received a long sentence and served only a short time); Gilliam v. State, 746 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1988, no pet.) (discussion of parole which failed to meet Sneed test); McGlothlin v. State, 705 S.W.2d 851, 861-862 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986

1992Sneed at 265; see Ready at 758-759 (even though juror believed statements about parole to be factual because of the specificity of the assertions, none of the jurors professed to know the law); Stanton v. State, 747 S.W.2d 914, 924 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, pet. ref’d) (no new trial even though juror related during deliberations that he had friend who received a long sentence and served only a short time); Gilliam v. State, 746 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1988, no pet.) (discussion of parole which failed to meet Sneed test); McGlothlin v. State, 705 S.W.2d 851, 861-862 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986

1992Sneed at 265; see Ready at 758-759 (even though juror believed statements about parole to be factual because of the specificity of the assertions, none of the jurors professed to know the law); Stanton v. State, 747 S.W.2d 914, 924 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, pet. ref’d) (no new trial even though juror related during deliberations that he had friend who received a long sentence and served only a short time); Gilliam v. State, 746 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1988, no pet.) (discussion of parole which failed to meet Sneed test); McGlothlin v. State, 705 S.W.2d 851, 861-862 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986

1992Sneed at 265 ; see Ready at 758-759 (even though juror believed statements about parole to be factual because of the specificity of the assertions, none of the jurors professed to know the law); Stanton v. State, lil S.W.2d 914, 924 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, pet. ref'd) (no new trial even though juror related during deliberations that he had *619 friend who received a long sentence and served only a short time); Gilliam v. State, 746 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1988, no pet.) (discussion of parole which failed to meet Sneed test); McGlothlin v. State, 705 S.W.2d 851, 861-862 (Tex.App.— Fort Wor

1992Sneed at 265; see Ready at 758-759 (even though juror believed statements about parole to be factual because of the specificity of the assertions, none of the jurors professed to know the law); Stanton v. State, 747 S.W.2d 914, 924 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, pet. ref’d) (no new trial even though juror related during deliberations that he had friend who received a long sentence and served only a short time); Gilliam v. State, 746 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1988, no pet.) (discussion of parole which failed to meet Sneed test); McGlothlin v. State, 705 S.W.2d 851, 861-862 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986

1992Sneed at 265 ; see Ready at 758-759 (even though juror believed statements about parole to be factual because of the specificity of the assertions, none of the jurors professed to know the law); Stanton v. State, lil S.W.2d 914, 924 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, pet. ref'd) (no new trial even though juror related during deliberations that he had *619 friend who received a long sentence and served only a short time); Gilliam v. State, 746 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1988, no pet.) (discussion of parole which failed to meet Sneed test); McGlothlin v. State, 705 S.W.2d 851, 861-862 (Tex.App.— Fort Wor

1992Sneed at 265; see Ready at 758-759 (even though juror believed statements about parole to be factual because of the specificity of the assertions, none of the jurors professed to know the law); Stanton v. State, 747 S.W.2d 914, 924 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, pet. ref’d) (no new trial even though juror related during deliberations that he had friend who received a long sentence and served only a short time); Gilliam v. State, 746 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1988, no pet.) (discussion of parole which failed to meet Sneed test); McGlothlin v. State, 705 S.W.2d 851, 861-862 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986

1992Sneed at 265 ; see Ready at 758-759 (even though juror believed statements about parole to be factual because of the specificity of the assertions, none of the jurors professed to know the law); Stanton v. State, lil S.W.2d 914, 924 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1988, pet. ref'd) (no new trial even though juror related during deliberations that he had *619 friend who received a long sentence and served only a short time); Gilliam v. State, 746 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1988, no pet.) (discussion of parole which failed to meet Sneed test); McGlothlin v. State, 705 S.W.2d 851, 861-862 (Tex.App.— Fort Wor

1989McCartney v. State, 542 S.W.2d 156, 162 (Tex.Crim.App.1976).

1989McCartney v. State, 542 S.W.2d 156, 162 (Tex.Crim.App.1976).