second point error in Texas

2001Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence The appellant’s second point of error is that without Flores’s confession, the evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction. 14 In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); accord Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. *894 Crim.App.1995); Sta

2001Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence The appellant’s second point of error is that without Flores’s confession, the evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction. 14 In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); accord Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. *894 Crim.App.1995); Sta

2001Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence The appellant’s second point of error is that without Flores’s confession, the evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction. 14 In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); accord Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. *894 Crim.App.1995); Sta

2001App. 1995); Staley v. State, 887 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Tex. Crim.

2001Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence The appellant’s second point of error is that without Flores’s confession, the evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction. 14 In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); accord Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. *894 Crim.App.1995); Sta

2001I, §10. 19 Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence The appellant’s second point of error is that without Flores’s confession, the evidence was legally insufficient to support a conviction.14 In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); accord Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim.

2008In assessing the effectiveness of counsel during the guilt-innocence phase of trial, we apply the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington . 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 , 80 L.

2008In assessing the effectiveness of counsel during the guilt-innocence phase of trial, we apply the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington . 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 , 80 L.

2008Dyar v. State, 125 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim.

2008Dyar v. State , 125 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex. Crim.

2008See Rivera, 952 S.W.2d at 36 ; see also Burke v. State, 80 S.W.3d at 82, 95 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).

2008See Rivera , 952 S.W.2d at 36 ; see also Burke v. State , 80 S.W.3d at 82, 95 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).

2008See Rivera, 952 S.W.2d at 36 ; see also Burke v. State, 80 S.W.3d at 82, 95 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).

2008See Rivera , 952 S.W.2d at 36 ; see also Burke v. State , 80 S.W.3d at 82, 95 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).

2002See Williams v. State , 481 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. Crim.

2002See Williams v. State, 481 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. Crim.

2000See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 ; Jackson v. State , 973 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Crim.

2000See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 ; Jackson v. State, 973 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Crim.

2004The exact ground on which we granted review is: Did the Court of Appeals’s resolution of the appellant’s second point of error, regarding the admission of a photograph of an unborn fetus at twenty-eight weeks gestation, during the punishment phase of the mother’s murder trial, violate Rule 403 and Reese v. State? . 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (op. on reh'g). . 840 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). .

2004NOTES [1] See Appendix A. [2] 33 S.W.3d 238 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). [3] This testimony came after the trial court admitted the photograph at issue. [4] The exact ground on which we granted review is: Did the Court of Appeals's resolution of the appellant's second point of error, regarding the admission of a photograph of an unborn fetus at twenty-eight weeks gestation, during the punishment phase of the mother's murder trial, violate Rule 403 and Reese v. State? [5] 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (op. on reh'g). [6] 840 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). [7] See Appendix B. [8] Montgomery, 810 S

1990JURY SELECTION In the second point of error, Davis contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the jury, as empaneled, because the State violated his right to equal protection of the law under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), by exercising peremptory challenges to exclude black veniremen from the jury on the basis of race.

1990JURY SELECTION In the second point of error, Davis contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the jury, as empaneled, because the State violated his right to equal protection of the law under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), by exercising peremptory challenges to exclude black veniremen from the jury on the basis of race.

2007For the reasons stated above, had it been necessary, we would have sustained the second point of error and found the evidence factually insufficient under the standard clarified and enunciated in Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 412-414 (Tex.Crim.App., 2006).

2007For the reasons stated above, had it been necessary, we would have sustained the second point of error and found the evidence factually insufficient under the standard clarified and enunciated in Watson v. State, No. PD-469-05, 2006 Tex. Crim.

1988(Emphasis added.) 705 S.W.2d 181 , 182-83 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985.

1988(Emphasis added.) 705 S.W.2d 181, 182-83 (Tex. APP- - Houston [14th Dist.] 1985.

2025A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law The trial court’s denial of “a motion for a directed verdict [i]s a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence.” Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim.

2016Applicability of exclusionary rule Finally, we address the State’s first point of error, in which it asserts that, “[e]ven if the police had violated O’Brien’s constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule does not apply.” The State focuses its argument almost entirely on the federal exclusionary rule, which is a judicially created remedy that requires the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.39 As the State observes, there are exceptions to the federal rule based on an officer’s good-faith reliance on the law as it existed at the time of the officer’s actions.4

2016Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)). 34 Id. 35 Id. at 799. 36 Id. at 800. 37 Id. 14 This Court and others have repeatedly followed Villarreal and rejected the arguments that the State raises here.38 Consistent with the precedent established in these cases, we overrule the State’s second point of error.

2016Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)). 34 Id. 35 Id. at 799. 36 Id. at 800. 37 Id. 14 This Court and others have repeatedly followed Villarreal and rejected the arguments that the State raises here.38 Consistent with the precedent established in these cases, we overrule the State’s second point of error.

2016Applicability of exclusionary rule Finally, we address the State’s first point of error, in which it asserts that, “[e]ven if the police had violated O’Brien’s constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule does not apply.” The State focuses its argument almost entirely on the federal exclusionary rule, which is a judicially created remedy that requires the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.39 As the State observes, there are exceptions to the federal rule based on an officer’s good-faith reliance on the law as it existed at the time of the officer’s actions.4

2016See State v. Trahan, No. 14-15-00472-CR, 2016 WL 269162 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 21, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that appellate court will uphold trial court’s order granting motion for new trial if any appropriate ground exists to support it) (citing State v. Sanders, 440 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d)).

2016Applicability of exclusionary rule Finally, we address the State’s first point of error, in which it asserts that, “[e]ven if the police had violated O’Brien’s constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule does not apply.” The State focuses its argument almost entirely on the federal exclusionary rule, which is a judicially created remedy that requires the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.39 As the State observes, there are exceptions to the federal rule based on an officer’s good-faith reliance on the law as it existed at the time of the officer’s actions.4

2016Applicability of exclusionary rule Finally, we address the State’s first point of error, in which it asserts that, “[e]ven if the police had violated O’Brien’s constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule does not apply.” The State focuses its argument almost entirely on the federal exclusionary rule, which is a judicially created remedy that requires the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.39 As the State observes, there are exceptions to the federal rule based on an officer’s good-faith reliance on the law as it existed at the time of the officer’s actions.4

2016Applicability of exclusionary rule Finally, we address the State’s first point of error, in which it asserts that, “[e]ven if the police had violated O’Brien’s constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule does not apply.” The State focuses its argument almost entirely on the federal exclusionary rule, which is a judicially created remedy that requires the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.39 As the State observes, there are exceptions to the federal rule based on an officer’s good-faith reliance on the law as it existed at the time of the officer’s actions.4

2016Applicability of exclusionary rule Finally, we address the State’s first point of error, in which it asserts that, “[e]ven if the police had violated O’Brien’s constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule does not apply.” The State focuses its argument almost entirely on the federal exclusionary rule, which is a judicially created remedy that requires the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.39 As the State observes, there are exceptions to the federal rule based on an officer’s good-faith reliance on the law as it existed at the time of the officer’s actions.4

2016Applicability of exclusionary rule Finally, we address the State’s first point of error, in which it asserts that, “[e]ven if the police had violated O’Brien’s constitutional rights, the exclusionary rule does not apply.” The State focuses its argument almost entirely on the federal exclusionary rule, which is a judicially created remedy that requires the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.39 As the State observes, there are exceptions to the federal rule based on an officer’s good-faith reliance on the law as it existed at the time of the officer’s actions.4