accomplice testimony instruction in California

2016In fact, the court referred to People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239 , 957 P.2d 928 ], in which it had directed that the standard accomplice testimony instruction should refer only to testimony “that tends to incriminate the defendant” and instruct the jury to view an accomplice’s testimony with “caution” rather than with “distrust.” (See People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 104-105.) In Guiuan , the court explained that “[t]he word ‘caution,’ connoting ‘care and watchfulness,’ signals the need for the jury to pay special heed to incriminating testi

2015In fact, the court referred to People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569 , in which it had directed that the standard accomplice testimony instruction should refer only to testimony “that tends to incriminate the defendant” and instruct the jury to view an accomplice‟s testimony with “caution” rather than with “distrust.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 104-105.) In Guiuan, the court explained that “[t]he word „caution,‟ connoting „care and watchfulness,‟ signals the need for the jury to pay special heed to incriminating testimony because it may be biased, but avoids

2020In Avila, the Supreme Court explained that, “generally, instructions on accomplice testimony must be given on the court’s own motion only when the accomplice witness is called by the prosecution or when a defendant, in testifying, implicates his codefendant while confessing his own guilt.” (Avila, at p. 562.) The Attorney General responds that, under People v. Box (2003) 23 Cal.4th 1153 and People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536 , the trial court was not obligated to instruct the jury concerning Austin’s testimony absent a request from Garcia.

2016Do you have any objection?” Counsel for Johnson, counsel for Thornton, and the deputy district attorney each said “no.” (The trial court was apparently referring to the handwritten page number “20” on the typed set of jury instructions, which were eventually filed and entitled “Jury Instructions Given to the Jury.”) 13 The Attorney General also points to language in People v. Hill, supra, 66 Cal.2d at page 555 , that “[i]t is not error even to forego the giving of accomplice instructions where the giving of them would unfairly prejudice a codefendant in the eyes of the jury,” as further author

2020(People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1192 ; People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1014 .) 23 which the testimony of the accomplice is given.” (Ibid.) Thus, an accomplice encompasses “ ‘[a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether ... they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission ....’ ” (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 564 , quoting § 31.) The requirement that inculpatory accomplice testimony be corroborated reflects a legislative determination that such testimony presents reliability concerns.

2020Garcia argues that People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491 (Avila) and People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362 , overruled on another point in People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312 , 381–382, required the trial court to include Austin in the accomplice testimony instruction (CALCRIM No. 335).

2016Delamora argues alternatively that, even assuming there was sufficient corroborating evidence, reversal is required because the trial court’s failure to give the cautionary instruction regarding accomplice testimony is reversible error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 .

2015(Gonzales, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 304; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) Failure to instruct regarding accomplice testimony is harmless where there are other circumstances that would cause the jury to distrust the accomplice testimony.

2016(See People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 467 , superseded by statute on other grounds [finding ample corroboration connecting defendant with murders in part based on evidence that his girlfriend testified that defendant left their house with alleged accomplice, then later returned with him, on the night of the murders].) Thus, any error in not giving an accomplice testimony instruction was harmless.

2014(People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 467 .) As explained ante, there is sufficient evidence corroborating Boesen’s and Gunn’s testimonies.

2015(People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 369 .) An accomplice for purposes of giving an accomplice testimony instruction means the person was a co-principal or an aider and abettor—one who “actually knows and shares the full extent of the perpetrator’s specific criminal intent, and actively promotes, encourages or assists the perpetrator with the intent and purpose of advancing the perpetrator’s successful commission of the target offense.” (People v. Snyder, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 1220 .) The only evidence connecting Serrano to a crime is his testimony that he put Gonzalez in contact wit

2013(People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 369 .) An accomplice for purposes of giving an accomplice testimony instruction means the person was a co-principal or an aider and abettor—one who “actually knows and shares the full extent of the perpetrator‟s specific criminal intent and actively promotes, encourages or assists the perpetrator with the intent and purpose of advancing the perpetrator‟s successful commission of the target offense.” (People v. Snyder (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1220 (Snyder).) In the context of the natural and probable consequences theory of criminal liability, an aider

2014(People v. Tobias (2001) 25 Cal.4th 327, 331 .) However, error in failing to give an accomplice testimony instruction “is harmless if the record contains ‘sufficient corroborating evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘Corroborating evidence may be slight, entirely circumstantial, and entitled to little consideration when standing alone. [Citations.] It need not be sufficient to establish every element of the charged 10 offense or to establish the precise facts to which the accomplice testified. [Citations.] It is “sufficient if it tends to connect the defendant with the crime in such a way as to satisfy the

2014(People v. Tobias (2001) 25 Cal.4th 327, 331 .) However, error in failing to give an accomplice testimony instruction “is harmless if the record contains ‘sufficient corroborating evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘Corroborating evidence may be slight, entirely circumstantial, and entitled to little consideration when standing alone. [Citations.] It need not be sufficient to establish every element of the charged offense or to establish the precise facts to which the accomplice testified. [Citations.] It is “sufficient if it tends to connect the defendant with the crime in such a way as to satisfy the ju

2021Analysis Thomas relies heavily on People v. Fowler (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 79 (Fowler), a case decided before Alvarez, which held a trial court commits error if it gives the accomplice testimony instruction (to view with “distrust” testimony by a codefendant) when a defendant takes the stand to give self-exculpatory testimony which incriminates a codefendant.

2021As there was nothing in either defendant’s defense of ‘I did not intend to do this’ that could be viewed as incriminating the other defendant, nothing in [the accomplice testimony instruction] directed the jury to view this testimony under anything other than the usual rules for evaluating a witness’s credibility.” ( Johnson, supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1274-1275.) Here, the same reasoning applies with equal force.

2020(People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1192 ; People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1014 .) 23 which the testimony of the accomplice is given.” (Ibid.) Thus, an accomplice encompasses “ ‘[a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether ... they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission ....’ ” (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 564 , quoting § 31.) The requirement that inculpatory accomplice testimony be corroborated reflects a legislative determination that such testimony presents reliability concerns.

2020Garcia argues that People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491 (Avila) and People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362 , overruled on another point in People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312 , 381–382, required the trial court to include Austin in the accomplice testimony instruction (CALCRIM No. 335).

2020The final flaw in Landino’s argument is “section 1111, by its terms, is offense-specific.” (People v. Felton (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 260, 273 .) Accordingly, even if Rosario and Georgina were accomplices to tax evasion as Landino claims, the accomplice testimony instruction would be limited to any testimony they offered relating to that offense.

2020A corollary to the offense-specific rule stated in section 1111 is that “a person who has committed a related but not identical offense need not be corroborated [citation], even though he or she may be trying just as hard as an accomplice would to curry favor or to shift blame.” ( Felton, supra, at p. 273 .) As a result, the trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on accomplice testimony in relation to the charge of embezzlement. 13 Georgina, who was not a party to the partnership agreement, could not have authorized Landino’s diversion of funds, so it is theoretically possible

2020In Avila, the Supreme Court explained that, “generally, instructions on accomplice testimony must be given on the court’s own motion only when the accomplice witness is called by the prosecution or when a defendant, in testifying, implicates his codefendant while confessing his own guilt.” (Avila, at p. 562.) The Attorney General responds that, under People v. Box (2003) 23 Cal.4th 1153 and People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536 , the trial court was not obligated to instruct the jury concerning Austin’s testimony absent a request from Garcia.

2020Garcia argues that People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491 (Avila) and People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362 , overruled on another point in People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312 , 381–382, required the trial court to include Austin in the accomplice testimony instruction (CALCRIM No. 335).

2020In assessing Torres’s claim of instructional error, we apply a de novo standard of review.7 (People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579 .) The standard jury instruction given by the trial court is modeled after section 1111, which states in relevant part as follows: “A conviction can not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense ….” (§ 1111.) An accomplice is “one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause

2020(People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1192 ; People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1014 .) 23 which the testimony of the accomplice is given.” (Ibid.) Thus, an accomplice encompasses “ ‘[a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether ... they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission ....’ ” (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 564 , quoting § 31.) The requirement that inculpatory accomplice testimony be corroborated reflects a legislative determination that such testimony presents reliability concerns.

2016“When the prosecution calls an accomplice as a witness, the trial court must instruct the jury that the witness’s testimony should be viewed with distrust.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 461 .) The cases cited by the Attorney General are inapposite and do not hold that an accomplice instruction is unnecessary when, as here, the sole defendant denies guilt.

2016(People v. Cortez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 123-128.) Accordingly, the trial court had no obligation to give an accomplice testimony instruction telling the jury to view the statements with caution. 3.

2015(See part III.D, ante.) The same analysis applies to Torres’s out-of-court statements, which were not made under “ ‘ “suspect circumstances” ’ ” and thus did not constitute “testimony” (Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 555 ), since they were made to fellow gang members, in informal settings, as opposed to police questioning or similar circumstances.