plaintiffs second claim in Connecticut

2012Id., 346-47 .

2011The tort of “[conversion occurs when one, without authorization, assumes and exercises ownership over property belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner’s rights.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., 49 Conn. App. 152, 169 , 714 A.2d 21 , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 905 , 720 A.2d 516 (1998).

2011The tort of “[conversion occurs when one, without authorization, assumes and exercises ownership over property belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner’s rights.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., 49 Conn. App. 152, 169 , 714 A.2d 21 , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 905 , 720 A.2d 516 (1998).

2011The tort of “[conversion occurs when one, without authorization, assumes and exercises ownership over property belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner’s rights.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., 49 Conn. App. 152, 169 , 714 A.2d 21 , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 905 , 720 A.2d 516 (1998).

2011The tort of “[conversion occurs when one, without authorization, assumes and exercises ownership over property belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner’s rights.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., 49 Conn. App. 152, 169 , 714 A.2d 21 , cert. denied, 247 Conn. 905 , 720 A.2d 516 (1998).

2004That issue is controlled by Paulus v. LaSala, 56 Conn. App. 139 , 742 A.2d 379 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 , 746 A.2d 789 (2000), which held that “ [t]he date when the wrongful detention terminates is definitively known when judgment is rendered and cannot occur sooner.” Id., 150.

2004That issue is controlled by Paulus v. LaSala, 56 Conn. App. 139 , 742 A.2d 379 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 , 746 A.2d 789 (2000), which held that “ [t]he date when the wrongful detention terminates is definitively known when judgment is rendered and cannot occur sooner.” Id., 150.

2004That issue is controlled by Paulus v. LaSala, 56 Conn. App. 139 , 742 A.2d 379 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 , 746 A.2d 789 (2000), which held that “ [t]he date when the wrongful detention terminates is definitively known when judgment is rendered and cannot occur sooner.” Id., 150.

2004That issue is controlled by Paulus v. LaSala, 56 Conn. App. 139 , 742 A.2d 379 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 928 , 746 A.2d 789 (2000), which held that “ [t]he date when the wrongful detention terminates is definitively known when judgment is rendered and cannot occur sooner.” Id., 150.

1999They were not created by or for an attorney and this does not meet the standard to establish a valid claim of privilege Stanley Works v. New Britain Redevelopment Agency, 155 Conn. 86 , 95 (1967); Carrier Corp. v. Home Insurance Co., 1992 WL 139778 , 5-6 (Conn. Superior Court, June 10, 1992, Schaller, J.) The plaintiffs second claim is that the documents (portions thereof) need not be produced pursuant to Practice Book §§ 13-2 or 13-3.

1999Co., 98 Conn. 591, 597 , 119 A. 897 (1923).

1999Co., 98 Conn. 591, 597 , 119 A. 897 (1923).

1999We consider all three of these claims to be inadequately briefed. “ ‘Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henderson, 47 Conn. App. 542, 558 , 706 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 244 Conn. 908 , 713 A.2d 829 (1998).

1999We consider all three of these claims to be inadequately briefed. “ ‘Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henderson, 47 Conn. App. 542, 558 , 706 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 244 Conn. 908 , 713 A.2d 829 (1998).

1999We consider all three of these claims to be inadequately briefed. “ ‘Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henderson, 47 Conn. App. 542, 558 , 706 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 244 Conn. 908 , 713 A.2d 829 (1998).

1999We consider all three of these claims to be inadequately briefed. “ ‘Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henderson, 47 Conn. App. 542, 558 , 706 A.2d 480 , cert. denied, 244 Conn. 908 , 713 A.2d 829 (1998).

1999A commission member is entitled to rely on his or her own knowledge, Feinson v. Conservation Commission , 180 Conn. 421 , 427 ; this would include knowledge of the site, past applications, conditions in the community, Fuller, Land Use Law and Practice, Connecticut Practice Series, vol. 9, S.21.5 (1993 ed.).

1998II The plaintiffs second claim is that the trial court improperly granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion because a lawyer who performs services for a client is not barred from recovery for services rendered where the attorney has issued a commitment to abide by the dictates of § 52-25lc and rule 1.5 (c) that is not signed. 10 In support of his argument, the plaintiff relies on Schwarzschild v. Martin, 191 Conn. 316, 321-22 , 464 A.2d 774 (1983).

1998II The plaintiffs second claim is that the trial court improperly granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion because a lawyer who performs services for a client is not barred from recovery for services rendered where the attorney has issued a commitment to abide by the dictates of § 52-25lc and rule 1.5 (c) that is not signed. 10 In support of his argument, the plaintiff relies on Schwarzschild v. Martin, 191 Conn. 316, 321-22 , 464 A.2d 774 (1983).

1997Id., 234 .

1996The trial court found the variance to be void ab initio due to the board’s imposition of the condition “for Mrs. Kastner’s life use only.” Because variances are granted only with respect to a particular piece of property, and not with respect to any one person; Garibaldi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 163 Conn. 235, 239 , 303 A.2d 743 (1972); the trial court found the above condition to be unreasonable.

1996The trial court found the variance to be void ab initio due to the board’s imposition of the condition “for Mrs. Kastner’s life use only.” Because variances are granted only with respect to a particular piece of property, and not with respect to any one person; Garibaldi v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 163 Conn. 235, 239 , 303 A.2d 743 (1972); the trial court found the above condition to be unreasonable.

1995Having found that the investigatory file satisfies the first prong of § 1-19 (b) (2), we must next address the plaintiffs second claim, that the commission made its findings before our Supreme Court’s decisions in Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 228 Conn. 158 , and Kureczka v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 228 Conn. 271 , and therefore, used the standard that had previously been articulated in Chairman v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 193 , 585 A.2d 96 (1991), 3 to find that the release of the documents would not constitute an invasion of privacy

1995Having found that the investigatory file satisfies the first prong of § 1-19 (b) (2), we must next address the plaintiffs second claim, that the commission made its findings before our Supreme Court’s decisions in Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 228 Conn. 158 , and Kureczka v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 228 Conn. 271 , and therefore, used the standard that had previously been articulated in Chairman v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 193 , 585 A.2d 96 (1991), 3 to find that the release of the documents would not constitute an invasion of privacy

1995Having found that the investigatory file satisfies the first prong of § 1-19 (b) (2), we must next address the plaintiffs second claim, that the commission made its findings before our Supreme Court’s decisions in Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 228 Conn. 158 , and Kureczka v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 228 Conn. 271 , and therefore, used the standard that had previously been articulated in Chairman v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 193 , 585 A.2d 96 (1991), 3 to find that the release of the documents would not constitute an invasion of privacy

1995Having found that the investigatory file satisfies the first prong of § 1-19 (b) (2), we must next address the plaintiffs second claim, that the commission made its findings before our Supreme Court’s decisions in Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 228 Conn. 158 , and Kureczka v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 228 Conn. 271 , and therefore, used the standard that had previously been articulated in Chairman v. Freedom of Information Commission, 217 Conn. 193 , 585 A.2d 96 (1991), 3 to find that the release of the documents would not constitute an invasion of privacy

1993“The ultimate question . . . is whether the erroneous ruling of the court would have been likely to affect the result.” See Anonymous v. Norton, 168 Conn. 421, 430 , 362 A.2d 532 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 935 , 96 S. Ct. 294 , 46 L.

1993“The ultimate question . . . is whether the erroneous ruling of the court would have been likely to affect the result.” See Anonymous v. Norton, 168 Conn. 421, 430 , 362 A.2d 532 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 935 , 96 S. Ct. 294 , 46 L.

1993“The ultimate question . . . is whether the erroneous ruling of the court would have been likely to affect the result.” See Anonymous v. Norton, 168 Conn. 421, 430 , 362 A.2d 532 , cert. denied, 423 U.S. 935 , 96 S. Ct. 294 , 46 L.