dissolution hearing in Florida

2004Gibbs v. Gibbs, 686 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) ("The analysis in a modification proceeding is substantially different from when the initial child custody decision is made in the dissolution because the presumption in favor of the custodial parent in the modification proceeding can only be overcome by satisfying an extraordinary burden.").

2003In Gibbs , Judge Altenbernd explained: "[T]he analysis in a modification proceeding *647 is substantially different from when the initial child custody decision is made in the dissolution because the presumption in favor of the custodial parent in the modification proceeding can only be overcome by satisfying an extraordinary burden." Gibbs, 686 So.2d at 641 .

2026See Smith v. Smith, 39 So. 3d 458, 459 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).

2011It is well-established that “[a] spouse may not deplete marital assets prior to a dissolution hearing unless he or she can show the withdrawals were minimally necessary to meet reasonable living expenses.” Steedman v. Chenoweth, 27 So.3d 78, 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).

2009Johnson-Gainer v. Gainer, 921 So.2d 798, 798-99 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); Mobley v. Mobley, 920 So.2d 97, 102 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

2009Johnson-Gainer v. Gainer, 921 So.2d 798, 798-99 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); Mobley v. Mobley, 920 So.2d 97, 102 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

2008Cf. Alfonso v. Alfonso, 823 So.2d 261, 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding that an incarcerated husband who evidently did not apprise the trial court of his desire to be heard at, and who failed to request to be present at a final dissolution hearing, either in person or telephonically, waived his right to argue on appeal that the trial court denied him the right to be present, at least where he apparently received all relief he requested).

2008Cf. Alfonso v. Alfonso, 823 So.2d 261, 262 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding that an incarcerated husband who evidently did not apprise the trial court of his desire to be heard at, and who failed to request to be present at a final dissolution hearing, either in person or telephonically, waived his right to argue on appeal that the trial court denied him the right to be present, at least where he apparently received all relief he requested).

2008As Judge Warner observed, in her special concurrence in Rogers v. Rogers, 977 So.2d 687, 687 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008): Unlike the state’s obligation in criminal cases to ensure the defendant’s presence at critical stages of proceedings, in civil court no corresponding duty is imposed on the state.

2008See Moss v. Moss, 939 So.2d 159, 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (holding that the husband's failure to argue his entitlement to attorney's fees under a prenuptial agreement at a hearing held on the issue of entitlement to attorney's fees constituted an abandonment of that claim). *593 Second, based on the evidence that was presented in support of the other issues, the trial court made specific findings concerning the factors included in section 61.80 and denied alimony based on those findings.

2008His multiple pro se pleadings, which are to be construed liberally, see Chancey v. Chancey, 880 So.2d 1281, 1282 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), evince an unequivocal desire to appear at the final dissolution hearing.

2006Italiano v. Italiano, 873 So.2d 558, 560 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); see also LaSala v. LaSala, 806 So.2d 602, 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

2006Italiano v. Italiano, 873 So.2d 558, 560 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); see also LaSala v. LaSala, 806 So.2d 602, 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

2004It is well settled that "once this Court has jurisdiction of a cause, it has jurisdiction to consider all issues appropriately raised in the appellate process." Savoie v. State, 422 So.2d 308, 312 (Fla. 1982); see also Caufield v. Cantele, 837 So.2d 371 , 377 n. 5 (Fla.2002). [10] I must highlight here what I consider to be a most egregious, entirely inappropriate argument that was made on the first day of the dissolution hearing and again in the brief to this Court by the respondent.

2004It is well settled that "once this Court has jurisdiction of a cause, it has jurisdiction to consider all issues appropriately raised in the appellate process." Savoie v. State, 422 So.2d 308, 312 (Fla. 1982); see also Caufield v. Cantele, 837 So.2d 371 , 377 n. 5 (Fla.2002). [10] I must highlight here what I consider to be a most egregious, entirely inappropriate argument that was made on the first day of the dissolution hearing and again in the brief to this Court by the respondent.

2004See id.

2001See also Wescott v. Wescott, 444 So.2d 495 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (former husband's alleged perjury at the dissolution hearing regarding his income and assets found to be classic example of intrinsic fraud).

2000Generally, "[t]he test of residency is physical presence in Florida and the concurrent intent to be a permanent resident." Cruickshank v. Cruickshank, 420 So.2d 914, 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

1999See Sugrim v. Sugrim, 649 So.2d 936 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).

1997The court specifically stated, “I’m not awarding alimony at this point because Mr. and Mrs. Gardner, Sr. seem to be taking care of that, very amply I might add....” This court has held that as a general rule, “[g]ifts which have not yet been received are purely speculative in nature, mere expectancies, and as such are not properly included in the calculation of income for purposes of determining the need for, or the ability to provide, support.” Shiveley v. Shiveley, 635 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Bedell v. Bedell, 583 So.2d 1005, 1008 (Fla.1991) (“For the purpose of demons

1997The court specifically stated, “I’m not awarding alimony at this point because Mr. and Mrs. Gardner, Sr. seem to be taking care of that, very amply I might add....” This court has held that as a general rule, “[g]ifts which have not yet been received are purely speculative in nature, mere expectancies, and as such are not properly included in the calculation of income for purposes of determining the need for, or the ability to provide, support.” Shiveley v. Shiveley, 635 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see also Bedell v. Bedell, 583 So.2d 1005, 1008 (Fla.1991) (“For the purpose of demons

1992See, e.g., Perlmutter v. Perlmutter, 523 So.2d 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), rev. denied, 531 So.2d 1354 (Fla. 1988) (while the determination of the valuation date is for the trial court on a case by case basis depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, the trial court erred in choosing the filing date of the petition as the appropriate date for valuation where the property had increased in value between the filing and trial date by over $2,000,000); Moore v. Moore, 543 So.2d 252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (while the date of the dissolution hearing is the most common date selected for valuing

1988See Finn v. Finn, 312 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1975); Fagan v. Fagan, 381 So.2d 278 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); George v. George, 360 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Cyr v. Cyr, 354 So.2d 140 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Baldi v. Baldi, 323 So.2d 592 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975).