dissolution hearing in Missouri

2010However, “[t]he court’s discretion in awarding temporary maintenance and attorney’s fees pendente lite is broader than at the dissolution hearing.” Fox, *235 866 S.W.2d at 508 ; see also Laubinger, 5 S.W.3d at 171 ; Camden v. Camden, 844 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Mo.App.1992). “ ‘A reviewing court is extremely cautious about altering judgments regarding such allowances because they are temporary and their effects do not extend beyond the final hearing of the case.’ ” Fox, 866 S.W.2d at 508 (quoting Cross v. Cross, 790 S.W.2d 928, 929 (Mo.App.1990)).

1995“The court’s discretion in awarding temporary maintenance and attorney’s fees pendente lite is broader than at the dissolution hearing, and a reviewing court is extremely cautious about altering judgments regarding such allowances because they are temporary and their effects do not extend beyond the final hearing of the case.” Camden v. Camden, 844 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Mo.App.1992) (Internal citation and quotation omitted).

2016See also Davis, 210 S.W.3d at 517 (noting evidence of financial condition eight months after dissolution should have been presented at hearing on mov-ant’s motion for appellate attorney’s fees).

2010See Davis v. Schmidt, 210 S.W.3d 494, 517 (Mo.App.2007) (the hearing on Mother’s motion for appellate attorney fees took place approximately eight months after trial without evidence of Mother’s post-dissolution financial condition).

2010However, “[t]he court’s discretion in awarding temporary maintenance and attorney’s fees pendente lite is broader than at the dissolution hearing.” Fox, *235 866 S.W.2d at 508 ; see also Laubinger, 5 S.W.3d at 171 ; Camden v. Camden, 844 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Mo.App.1992). “ ‘A reviewing court is extremely cautious about altering judgments regarding such allowances because they are temporary and their effects do not extend beyond the final hearing of the case.’ ” Fox, 866 S.W.2d at 508 (quoting Cross v. Cross, 790 S.W.2d 928, 929 (Mo.App.1990)).

1992Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). *78 The court’s discretion in awarding temporary maintenance and attorney’s fees pen-dente lite is broader than at the dissolution hearing, Oesterle v. Oesterle, 796 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Mo.App.1990), and “[a] reviewing court is extremely cautious about altering judgments regarding such allowances because they are temporary and their effects do not extend beyond the final hearing of the case.” Cross v. Cross, 790 S.W.2d 928, 929 (Mo.App.1990).

2017However “the court is to consider the financial resources of the parties since the dissolution, even if the time period between the dissolution hearing and the appellate fee hearing is relatively short.” Potts, 303 S.W.3d at 197 .

2016See Potts v. Potts, 303 S.W.3d at 197 (“[T]he court is to consider the financial resources of the parties since the dissolution, even if the time period between the dissolution' hearing and the appellate Tee hearing is relatively short.”).

2005Wright v. Wright, 1 S.W.3d 52, 62 (Mo.App.

2003Id.

2013Wife was entitled to a specific finding on these issues because “marital property used by a spouse for his living expenses after separation and prior to the dissolution hearing is a legitimate expenditure of marital assets.” Jinks v. Jinks, 120 S.W.3d 301, 308 (Mo.App.2003). “‘Such expenditures have been held to be legitimate expenditures of marital assets, as would be the case if the parties had not separated.’ ” Id. (quoting Conrad v. Conrad, 76 S.W.3d 305, 315 (Mo.App.2002)).

2013Wife was entitled to a specific finding on these issues because “marital property used by a spouse for his living expenses after separation and prior to the dissolution hearing is a legitimate expenditure of marital assets.” Jinks v. Jinks, 120 S.W.3d 301, 308 (Mo.App.2003). “‘Such expenditures have been held to be legitimate expenditures of marital assets, as would be the case if the parties had not separated.’ ” Id. (quoting Conrad v. Conrad, 76 S.W.3d 305, 315 (Mo.App.2002)).

2013Wife was entitled to a specific finding on these issues because “marital property used by a spouse for his living expenses after separation and prior to the dissolution hearing is a legitimate expenditure of marital assets.” Jinks v. Jinks, 120 S.W.3d 301, 308 (Mo.App.2003). “‘Such expenditures have been held to be legitimate expenditures of marital assets, as would be the case if the parties had not separated.’ ” Id. (quoting Conrad v. Conrad, 76 S.W.3d 305, 315 (Mo.App.2002)).

2010However, “[t]he court’s discretion in awarding temporary maintenance and attorney’s fees pendente lite is broader than at the dissolution hearing.” Fox, *235 866 S.W.2d at 508 ; see also Laubinger, 5 S.W.3d at 171 ; Camden v. Camden, 844 S.W.2d 75, 78 (Mo.App.1992). “ ‘A reviewing court is extremely cautious about altering judgments regarding such allowances because they are temporary and their effects do not extend beyond the final hearing of the case.’ ” Fox, 866 S.W.2d at 508 (quoting Cross v. Cross, 790 S.W.2d 928, 929 (Mo.App.1990)).

2009Generally, a decree or judgment for dissolution of marriage distributing marital property is final and not modifiable. § 452.330.5, RSMo 2000 (“The court’s order as it affects distribution of marital property shall be a final order not subject to modification....”); § 452.360.2, RSMo 2000 (“The court’s judgment of dissolution of marriage or legal separation as it affects distribution of marital property shall be a final judgment not subject to modification.”); Ochoa v. Ochoa, 71 S.W.3d 593, 595 (Mo. banc 2002); In re Marriage of Lueken, 267 S.W.3d 800, 802 (Mo.App.

2009Generally, a decree or judgment for dissolution of marriage distributing marital property is final and not modifiable. § 452.330.5, RSMo 2000 (“The court’s order as it affects distribution of marital property shall be a final order not subject to modification....”); § 452.360.2, RSMo 2000 (“The court’s judgment of dissolution of marriage or legal separation as it affects distribution of marital property shall be a final judgment not subject to modification.”); Ochoa v. Ochoa, 71 S.W.3d 593, 595 (Mo. banc 2002); In re Marriage of Lueken, 267 S.W.3d 800, 802 (Mo.App.

2005Crowe v. Clairday, 935 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Mo.App. 1996). 1 Appellant says his reliance on Respondent’s notification of when the dissolution hearing would be held and the hiring of an attorney after learning of the dissolution hearing is proof of his good cause.

2005In Saloma v. Saloma-Orozco, 788 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Mo.App.1990), the appellate court found, in a similar fact pattern, that where the participants in a dissolution were still living together, the relationship of confidence between a wife and husband may justify the latter’s reliance on wife’s representations and that her misleading statements about the dissolution hearing led to extrinsic fraud.

2005Id.

2004Id. at 234-235 (internal citations omitted).

2004There, the parties testified at the dissolution hearing concerning their oral settlement agreement, which the trial court found to be “acceptable.” Id. at 597 .

1999Lawrence v. Lawrence, 938 S.W.2d 333, 338 (Mo.App.1997); Tate v. Tate, 920 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Mo.App.1996); Hoffmann v. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d 817, 828 (Mo. banc 1984).

1999Lawrence v. Lawrence, 938 S.W.2d 333, 338 (Mo.App.1997); Tate v. Tate, 920 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Mo.App.1996); Hoffmann v. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d 817, 828 (Mo. banc 1984).

1999Lawrence v. Lawrence, 938 S.W.2d 333, 338 (Mo.App.1997); Tate v. Tate, 920 S.W.2d 98, 103 (Mo.App.1996); Hoffmann v. Hoffmann, 676 S.W.2d 817, 828 (Mo. banc 1984).

1998Dardick v. Dardick, 661 S.W.2d 538, 543 (Mo.App.1983). 4 Here, while Mr. Graves now alleges that there has been a change in the parties’ financial circumstances since the decree of dissolution, he did not so allege in the trial court in support of his rather cursory suggestions in opposition to Mrs. Graves’ motion for such temporary support.

1994Under .these circumstances, she cannot now contend the agreement, which was incorporated into the decree, is unconscionable. 759 S.W.2d 855, 856 [3] (Mo.App.1988), citing Dow v. Dow, 732 S.W.2d at 908 .