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22 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1941–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Boydgreen2 sentences2013A postconviction court may, under rule 3.050, extend the two-year rule 3.050 deadline “for good cause shown.” State v. Boyd, 846 So.2d 458, 460 (Fla.2003) (quoting Fla. R.Crim. 2013See Petit- Frere v. State, 108 So.3d 681, 683 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ("A postconviction court may, under rule 3.050, extend the two-year rule 3.850 deadline 'for good cause shown.’ ” (quoting State v. Boyd, 846 So.2d 458, 460 (FIa.2003))); see also Manning v. State, 28 So.3d 971, 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ("[W]e hold that when a motion for extension to Hie a postconviction motion is denied, the defendant should not appeal that order, but should instead file the intended motion as soon as possible, alleging the grounds for the motion to the best of the defendant’s ability and further alleging the reas | 2 | 2 |
Bice v. City of Haines Citygreen2 sentences1941See Bice v. City of Haines City, 142 Fla. 371 , 195 So. 919 . 1941See Bice v. City of Haines City, 142 Fla. 371 , 195 So. 919 . | 2 | 2 |
Holloway v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Id. at 151 (quoting Scott v. State, 629 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)) (emphasis added). 2015Holloway v. State, 160 So.3d 149, 151 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). | 1 | 2 |
Scott v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Id. at 151 (quoting Scott v. State, 629 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)) (emphasis added). 2015Id. | 1 | 2 |
Parker v. Stategreen1 sentence2013P. 3.050) (concerning motions for extension of time filed before a deadline under rule 3.050); see also Parker v. State, 907 So.2d 694, 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (allowing motions for enlargement of time to be filed after the rule 3.850 deadline in accordance with rule 3.050, which requires the movant to demonstrate excusable neglect); Suarez v. State, 8 So.3d 1226, 1226 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (same). 2 We therefore reverse and remand for the postconviction court to consider Petit-Frere’s motion filed February 20, 2012, under rule 3.050. | 1 | 1 |
Manning v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Petit- Frere v. State, 108 So.3d 681, 683 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ("A postconviction court may, under rule 3.050, extend the two-year rule 3.850 deadline 'for good cause shown.’ ” (quoting State v. Boyd, 846 So.2d 458, 460 (FIa.2003))); see also Manning v. State, 28 So.3d 971, 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ("[W]e hold that when a motion for extension to Hie a postconviction motion is denied, the defendant should not appeal that order, but should instead file the intended motion as soon as possible, alleging the grounds for the motion to the best of the defendant’s ability and further alleging the reas | 1 | 1 |
Suarez v. Stategreen1 sentence2013P. 3.050) (concerning motions for extension of time filed before a deadline under rule 3.050); see also Parker v. State, 907 So.2d 694, 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (allowing motions for enlargement of time to be filed after the rule 3.850 deadline in accordance with rule 3.050, which requires the movant to demonstrate excusable neglect); Suarez v. State, 8 So.3d 1226, 1226 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (same). 2 We therefore reverse and remand for the postconviction court to consider Petit-Frere’s motion filed February 20, 2012, under rule 3.050. | 1 | 1 |
Petit-Frere v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Petit- Frere v. State, 108 So.3d 681, 683 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ("A postconviction court may, under rule 3.050, extend the two-year rule 3.850 deadline 'for good cause shown.’ ” (quoting State v. Boyd, 846 So.2d 458, 460 (FIa.2003))); see also Manning v. State, 28 So.3d 971, 973 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ("[W]e hold that when a motion for extension to Hie a postconviction motion is denied, the defendant should not appeal that order, but should instead file the intended motion as soon as possible, alleging the grounds for the motion to the best of the defendant’s ability and further alleging the reas | 1 | 1 |
DeMario v. Franklin Mortg. & Inv. Co.green1 sentence2012In that case, the Fourth District specifically held that the initial period during which any such proceeds are held by the Clerk “cannot be interpreted as imposing a ninety day claims bar for persons otherwise entitled to distribution of surplus tax proceeds,” and that “[t]he only statutory limit for making claim to the excess funds is the two-year bar found in section 197.582.” 4 Id. at 213-14 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Bradford v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See Harris v. State, 826 So.2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Beard v. State, 827 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Bradford v. State, 701 So.2d 899, 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See Harris v. State, 826 So.2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Beard v. State, 827 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Bradford v. State, 701 So.2d 899, 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See Rogers v. State, 782 So.2d 373 , 376 n. 7 (Fla.2001) (holding in part that the two-year limitation does not preclude enlargement of issues in a timely filed initial motion for postconviction relief); Brown v. State, 596 So.2d 1026, 1027 (Fla.1992) (holding that the two-year limitation for filing a motion to vacate does not preclude the enlargement of issues raised in a timely filed motion for postconviction relief); Graham v. State, 846 So.2d 617, 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that a timely filed rule 3.850 motion, prior to its disposition, may be amended even after the two-year period f | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See Rogers v. State, 782 So.2d 373 , 376 n. 7 (Fla.2001) (holding in part that the two-year limitation does not preclude enlargement of issues in a timely filed initial motion for postconviction relief); Brown v. State, 596 So.2d 1026, 1027 (Fla.1992) (holding that the two-year limitation for filing a motion to vacate does not preclude the enlargement of issues raised in a timely filed motion for postconviction relief); Graham v. State, 846 So.2d 617, 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that a timely filed rule 3.850 motion, prior to its disposition, may be amended even after the two-year period f | 1 | 1 |
Graham v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See Rogers v. State, 782 So.2d 373 , 376 n. 7 (Fla.2001) (holding in part that the two-year limitation does not preclude enlargement of issues in a timely filed initial motion for postconviction relief); Brown v. State, 596 So.2d 1026, 1027 (Fla.1992) (holding that the two-year limitation for filing a motion to vacate does not preclude the enlargement of issues raised in a timely filed motion for postconviction relief); Graham v. State, 846 So.2d 617, 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that a timely filed rule 3.850 motion, prior to its disposition, may be amended even after the two-year period f | 1 | 1 |
Florida Bar re Amendment to Rules of Criminal Proceduregreen1 sentence1998See id. | 1 | 1 |
Chemstrand Co. v. Enfingergreen1 sentence1995See also, Chemstrand Co. v. Enfinger, 231 So.2d 816 (Fla.1970); Davis v. Kyle, 529 So.2d 1240 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Orleans Parish School Board v. Lexington Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2014Id. at 1219-23 . 2014Id. at 1219 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Timmeny v. Tropical Botanicals Corp.
green
1 sentence2012Id. at 814 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Beard v. State
green
1 sentence2011See Harris v. State, 826 So.2d 340 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Beard v. State, 827 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Bradford v. State, 701 So.2d 899, 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Spera v. State
green
1 sentence2009We note that if O’Neill refiles his motion and is successfully able to assert an exception to the two-year requirement, the postconvietion court should consider his claims in light of Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754 (Fla.2007), of which the postconviction court did not have the benefit at the time it initially denied three of O’Neill’s claims as facially insufficient. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Oehling
green
1 sentence2002State v. Oehling, 750 So.2d 109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Wood v. State
green
1 sentence2001The court did not consider appellant's claim that he qualified for the exception to the two year rule set forth in Wood v. State, 750 So.2d 592 (Fla.1999). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Humana Medical Plan, Inc. v. Estate of Durant
neutral
1 sentence2001Appellant argues that there are exceptions to the two year bar, citing Humana Medical Plan, Inc. v. Estate of Durant, 650 So.2d 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Mengore v. State
neutral
1 sentence2001We must affirm because the motion and supporting memorandum of law contained a defective verification clause that said *402 that the facts were "true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief ." See Mengore v. State, 718 So.2d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Kush v. Lloyd
green
1 sentence1999Under the test announced in Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415 (Fla.1992), section 733.710 constitutes a non-claim statute or a "statute of repose." This is because section 733.702(5) expressly prohibits any court from granting an extension of the time to file a claim against the decedent's estate on any grounds including fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice of the claim beyond two years following the death of the decedent. § 733.710(1), Fla. Stat. In other words, the two-year rule is an absolute bar to the filing of any creditor's claim, whether or not the estate was probated. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Gust v. State
green
1 sentence1997Gust v. State, 535 So.2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (holding that the two-year rule 3.850 filing window runs from the expiration of defendant’s thirty-day appeal period, despite that defendant did not appeal). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Callaway
green
1 sentence1996I respectfully disagree with the majority because neither Davis , nor State v. Callaway, 658 So.2d 983 (Fla.1995), which cites Davis and was decided on the same day, compels or permits the result reached in this case. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Davis v. State
green
1 sentence1996Based upon what is said to be the "plain language" of Davis v. State, 661 So.2d 1193 (Fla.1995), the majority holds that, because the two-year rule 3.850 period has expired, all constitutional challenges to Jefferson's sentence have been lost, and he may only be heard to complain that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for the third degree felonies of which he stands convicted. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Davis v. Kyle
neutral
1 sentence1995See also, Chemstrand Co. v. Enfinger, 231 So.2d 816 (Fla.1970); Davis v. Kyle, 529 So.2d 1240 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Hardee County Plumbing v. Heflin
neutral
1 sentence1995In Hardee County Plumbing v. Heflin, 567 So.2d 995 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), we held that the two-year bar of the statute of limitations applies unless the employer intended, or the employee reasonably believed that the employer intended, to pay wages in lieu of workers’ compensation benefits. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Adams v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.