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22 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1997–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of Catrettgreen2 sentences2023However, on a Celotex-type motion, the defendant satisfies its initial burden of production when it “ ‘points out’ the absence of evidence supporting the plaintiff’s position.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325 ; see also Selby v. O’Dea, 2020 IL App (1st) 181951, ¶ 218 (“[I]n a Celotex motion, the defendant puts forth no affirmative evidence; it merely argues that plaintiff has no evidence to prove its case.”). 2022In Williams, a medical malpractice case, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the injured 2 A “Celotex-type motion” references the rule articulated in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). - 40 - No. 1-20-1115 individual’s inability to remember how she came to be injured. | 6 | 12 |
Williams v. Covenant Medical Centergreen2 sentences2022Additionally, the court found that the trial court prematurely granted the motion for summary judgment, where the plaintiffs should have been given adequate time to gather evidence-based on the defendants’ Celotex-type motion Id. at 690- 91. 2014App. 3d at 369 (“A Celotex-type motion is appropriate only when the nonmovant has had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.”); Williams v. Covenant Medical Center, 316 Ill. | 5 | 7 |
Willett v. Cessna Aircraft Co.green2 sentences2020In order to prevail on a Celotex-type motion for summary judgment, “Illinois law requires more than merely pointing out the absence of evidence, without a supporting affidavit or other evidence.” Willett v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 366 Ill. 2020While “[a] Celotex-type motion is appropriate only when the nonmovant has had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery” (Willett, 366 Ill. | 3 | 4 |
Kimbrough v. Jewel Companies, Inc.green2 sentences2000App. 3d at 819 , 416 N.E.2d at 333 (Celotex-type motion). 1997App. 3d at 819 , 416 N.E.2d at 333 (Celotex-type motion). | 3 | 3 |
Hutchcraft v. Independent Mechanical Industries, Inc.green2 sentences2023Jan. 4, 2013) did not apply. -6- ¶ 15 A. Summary Judgment ¶ 16 Section 2-1005(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2022)) governs summary judgments, providing the circuit court must enter judgment where the “pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” A defendant moving for summary judgment has two ways to meet his initial burden of production: (1) by affirmatively showing some element of the case 2001Ed. 2d 265, 275 , 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553-54 (1986), is by “pointing out to the *** court *** that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” While Illinois courts have held that a “[defendant's burden is certainly reduced iii a Celotex-type motion,” the Illinois Appellate Court has suggested that “[t]he Illinois cases may require the defendant to do more than ‘point out’ the absence of evidence.” Hutch-craft, 312 Ill. | 2 | 4 |
Department of Financial & Professional Regulation v. Walgreengreen2 sentences2014See Department of Financial & Professional Regulation v. Walgreen Co., 2012 IL App (2d) 110452, ¶ 22 (Celotex-type motion described as one that argues that the petitioner is unable to prove its case); Pecora v. County of Cook, 323 Ill. 2014See Department of Financial & Professional Regulation v. Walgreen Co., 2012 IL App (2d) 110452 , & 22 (Celotex-type motion described as one that argues that the petitioner is unable to prove its case); Pecora v. County of Cook, 323 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
Pecora v. County of Cookgreen2 sentences2014See Department of Financial & Professional Regulation v. Walgreen Co., 2012 IL App (2d) 110452, ¶ 22 (Celotex-type motion described as one that argues that the petitioner is unable to prove its case); Pecora v. County of Cook, 323 Ill. 2014See Department of Financial & Professional Regulation v. Walgreen Co., 2012 IL App (2d) 110452 , & 22 (Celotex-type motion described as one that argues that the petitioner is unable to prove its case); Pecora v. County of Cook, 323 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Crichton v. Golden Rule Insurancegreen2 sentences2023See Crichton v. Golden Rule Insurance Co., 358 Ill. 2006Crichton, 358 Ill. | 1 | 3 |
Selby v. O'Deagreen1 sentence2023However, on a Celotex-type motion, the defendant satisfies its initial burden of production when it “ ‘points out’ the absence of evidence supporting the plaintiff’s position.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325 ; see also Selby v. O’Dea, 2020 IL App (1st) 181951, ¶ 218 (“[I]n a Celotex motion, the defendant puts forth no affirmative evidence; it merely argues that plaintiff has no evidence to prove its case.”). | 1 | 1 |
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurancegreen1 sentence2020The parties agree that abuse of discretion is the applicable standard of review in evaluating whether the circuit court erred in denying Bradley’s motion to stay (see Jiotis, 2014 IL App (2d) 121293, ¶ 22 ), and they likewise agree that de novo review applies to whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Direct Auto (Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992)). | 1 | 1 |
Hansbrough v. Kosyakgreen1 sentence2012App. 3d at 690 (Celotex-type motion filed only 13 months following filing of complaint was premature); Hansbrough v. Kosyak, 141 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Kleiber v. Freeport Farm and Fleet, Inc.green1 sentence2012See id. ¶ 22 Petitioner argues that it was not required to file a Rule 191(b) affidavit, because respondent filed a Celotex-type motion (see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319 (1986)); a motion that argued that petitioner was unable to prove its case. | 1 | 1 |
Kleiss v. Bozdechgreen1 sentence2006Rather, the defendant must show that the plaintiff cannot acquire sufficient evidence to make its case.” Kleiss v. Bozdech, 349 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Cole Taylor Bank v. Corrigangreen2 sentences1997Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 , 106 S.Ct. at 2552 , 91 L.Ed.2d at 273 ("adequate time for discovery"); Webber v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 235 Ill.App.3d 790, 795 , 175 Ill.Dec. 889, 893 , 601 N.E.2d 286, 290 (1992) ("The discovery may establish that plaintiff does not have evidence of all the necessary elements of his case"); Cole Taylor Bank v. Corrigan, 230 Ill.App.3d 122, 126-27 , 172 Ill.Dec. 114, 117 , 595 N.E.2d 177, 180 (1992) (objective of discovery to insure that judgments rest on the merits and not upon the skillful maneuvering of counsel). 1997Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 , 106 S.Ct. at 2552 , 91 L.Ed.2d at 273 ("adequate time for discovery"); Webber v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 235 Ill.App.3d 790, 795 , 175 Ill.Dec. 889, 893 , 601 N.E.2d 286, 290 (1992) ("The discovery may establish that plaintiff does not have evidence of all the necessary elements of his case"); Cole Taylor Bank v. Corrigan, 230 Ill.App.3d 122, 126-27 , 172 Ill.Dec. 114, 117 , 595 N.E.2d 177, 180 (1992) (objective of discovery to insure that judgments rest on the merits and not upon the skillful maneuvering of counsel). | 1 | 1 |
Webber v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.green2 sentences1997Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 , 106 S.Ct. at 2552 , 91 L.Ed.2d at 273 ("adequate time for discovery"); Webber v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 235 Ill.App.3d 790, 795 , 175 Ill.Dec. 889, 893 , 601 N.E.2d 286, 290 (1992) ("The discovery may establish that plaintiff does not have evidence of all the necessary elements of his case"); Cole Taylor Bank v. Corrigan, 230 Ill.App.3d 122, 126-27 , 172 Ill.Dec. 114, 117 , 595 N.E.2d 177, 180 (1992) (objective of discovery to insure that judgments rest on the merits and not upon the skillful maneuvering of counsel). 1997Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 , 106 S.Ct. at 2552 , 91 L.Ed.2d at 273 ("adequate time for discovery"); Webber v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 235 Ill.App.3d 790, 795 , 175 Ill.Dec. 889, 893 , 601 N.E.2d 286, 290 (1992) ("The discovery may establish that plaintiff does not have evidence of all the necessary elements of his case"); Cole Taylor Bank v. Corrigan, 230 Ill.App.3d 122, 126-27 , 172 Ill.Dec. 114, 117 , 595 N.E.2d 177, 180 (1992) (objective of discovery to insure that judgments rest on the merits and not upon the skillful maneuvering of counsel). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jiotis v. The Burr Ridge Park District
green
2 sentences2021Furthermore, in Jiotis v. Burr Ridge Park District, 2014 IL App (2d) 121293, ¶ 30 , the appellate court excused a plaintiff from strict compliance with Rule 191(b) under the circumstances of the case because the defendants had filed - 48 - No. 1-20-0380 a Celotex-type motion for summary judgment.3 But in that case, the plaintiff did file a Rule 191(b) affidavit, but the affidavit simply was not in strict compliance with the rule. 2016“A Celotex-type motion is appropriate only when the nonmovant has had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.” Id. at 369 . “[S]trict compliance with Rule 191(b)’s affidavit requirement *** is not automatically necessary when a defendant files a Celotex-type motion.” Jiotis v. Burr Ridge Park District, 2014 IL App (2d) 121293, ¶ 26 . | 6 | 2014–2026 |
Berke v. Manilow
green
1 sentence2023As such, it is unclear to this court what evidence Grossinger could obtain to prove Ocampo’s lack of evidence, and we are unaware of any requirement of Grossinger to do so. ¶ 25 Rather, as we have stated, Ocampo is required as the nonmovant to come forward “with some evidence that arguably would entitle recovery at trial.” Berke, 2016 IL App (1st) 150397 , ¶ 3 We note Grossinger’s entreaty to this court to treat his motion for summary judgment like a motion for a directed verdict and cites to Jones v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 2019 IL 123895 , for support. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Jones v. Pneumo Abex LLC
green
1 sentence2023As such, it is unclear to this court what evidence Grossinger could obtain to prove Ocampo’s lack of evidence, and we are unaware of any requirement of Grossinger to do so. ¶ 25 Rather, as we have stated, Ocampo is required as the nonmovant to come forward “with some evidence that arguably would entitle recovery at trial.” Berke, 2016 IL App (1st) 150397 , ¶ 3 We note Grossinger’s entreaty to this court to treat his motion for summary judgment like a motion for a directed verdict and cites to Jones v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 2019 IL 123895 , for support. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Stearns v. Ridge Ambulance Service, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015The introductory section of - 13 - 2015 IL App (2d) 140908 Countryside’s memorandum of law in support of its motion for summary judgment contained the cursory assertion that “[t]here is no evidence or testimony whatsoever in this case to show that *** any action or inaction of Countryside or its staff proximately caused [Marjorie’s] injury.” However, the remainder of Countryside’s memorandum of law focused on whether Countryside owed Marjorie a duty of care. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.