Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
20 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Simpsongreen2 sentences2000In other cases, this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g., People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 173 2000In other cases, this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g. , Kliner , 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson , 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson , 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g. , People v. Cloutier , 178 Ill. 2d 14 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Cloutiergreen2 sentences2000In other cases, this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g., People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 173 2000In other cases, this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g., People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 173 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Thompkinsgreen2 sentences2000In other cases, this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g., People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 173 2000In other cases, this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g. , Kliner , 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson , 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson , 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g. , People v. Cloutier , 178 Ill. 2d 14 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2000In other cases, this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g., People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 173 2000In other cases, this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g. , Kliner , 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson , 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson , 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g. , People v. Cloutier , 178 Ill. 2d 14 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2000In other cases, this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g., People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 173 2000In other cases, this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g., People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 173 | 2 | 2 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2000In other cases, this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g., People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 173 2000In other cases, this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g. , Kliner , 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson , 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson , 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g. , People v. Cloutier , 178 Ill. 2d 14 | 2 | 2 |
Sackett Enterprises, Inc. v. Starengreen2 sentences1998Under the Illinois constitutional standard, jurisdiction is to be asserted “only when it is fair, just, and reasonable to require a nonresident defendant to defend an action in Illinois, considering the quality and nature of the defendant’s acts which occur in Illinois or which affect interests located in Illinois.” Rollins, 141 Ill. 2d at 275 ; see Sackett Enterprises, Inc. v. Staren, 211 Ill. 1998Under the Illinois constitutional standard, jurisdiction is to be asserted “only when it is fair, just, and reasonable to require a nonresident defendant to defend an action in Illinois, considering the quality and nature of the defendant's acts which occur in Illinois or which affect interests located in Illinois.” Rollins , 141 Ill. 2d at 275 ; see Sackett Enterprises, Inc. v. Staren , 211 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2019On the Illinois constitutional claim, however, the appellate court held defendant’s aggregate sentence was contrary to the “rehabilitation clause” of article I, section 11, providing that penalties must be determined with “ ‘the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.’ ” 2016 IL App (1st) 141744, ¶ 64 (quoting Ill. 2018On the Illinois constitutional claim, however, the appellate court held defendant's aggregate sentence was contrary to the "rehabilitation clause" of article I, section 11, providing that penalties must be determined with " 'the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.' " *838 *905 2016 IL App (1st) 141744 , ¶ 64, 410 Ill.Dec. 591 , 70 N.E.3d 718 (quoting Ill. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Firebaugh v. Traff
green
2 sentences2015However, a rule that permits compelled disclosure of private information without a constitutionally sufficient showing would violate the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution. ¶ 49 We note that in Kunkel the Illinois Supreme Court cited a case that predated our modern rules of discovery—Firebaugh v. Traff, 353 Ill. 82 (1933), where the court applied Illinois constitutional analysis to a discovery order. 2015However, a rule that permits compelled disclosure of private information without a constitutionally sufficient showing would violate the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution. ¶ 49 We note that in Kunkel the Illinois Supreme Court cited a case that predated our modern rules of discovery—Firebaugh v. Traff, 353 Ill. 82 (1933), where the court applied Illinois constitutional analysis to a discovery order. | 4 | 2014–2015 |
The People v. Smith
green
2 sentences1977(People v. Richardson (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 318 , 253 N.E.2d 420 ; People v. Smith (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 95 , 150 N.E.2d 815 ; People v. Gray (1976), 40 Ill. 1977(People v. Richardson (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 318 , 253 N.E.2d 420 ; People v. Smith (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 95 , 150 N.E.2d 815 ; People v. Gray (1976), 40 Ill. | 4 | 1975–1977 |
The PEOPLE v. Richardson
green
2 sentences1977(People v. Richardson (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 318 , 253 N.E.2d 420 ; People v. Smith (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 95 , 150 N.E.2d 815 ; People v. Gray (1976), 40 Ill. 1977(People v. Richardson (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 318 , 253 N.E.2d 420 ; People v. Smith (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 95 , 150 N.E.2d 815 ; People v. Gray (1976), 40 Ill. | 4 | 1975–1977 |
People v. Miller
green
2 sentences2012For the same reasons, the two United States Supreme Court cases of Roper and Graham, dealing with only eighth amendment holdings on punishment imposed, are unhelpful to defendant, who is making a proportionate penalties challenge. ¶ 20 The defendant argues that because the automatic transfer provision exposed him to the possibility of a mandatory consecutive sentence of up to 30 years on each of the two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, even though he received only 7 years per count, this possibility, even though it was never realized, violated the Illinois constitutional requireme 2012For the same reasons, the two United States Supreme Court cases of Roper and Graham, dealing with only eighth amendment holdings on punishment imposed, are unhelpful to defendant, who is making a proportionate penalties challenge. ¶ 20 The defendant argues that because the automatic transfer provision exposed him to the possibility of a mandatory consecutive sentence of up to 30 years on each of the two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, even though he received only 7 years per count, this possibility, even though it was never realized, violated the Illinois constitutional requireme | 2 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Fair
green
2 sentences2000In other cases, this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g., People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 173 2000In other cases, this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g. , Kliner , 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson , 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson , 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g. , People v. Cloutier , 178 Ill. 2d 14 | 2 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Buss
red
2 sentences2000In other cases, this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g., Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson, 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g., People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 173 2000In other cases, this court has considered and rejected the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty statute that defendant raises, including his arguments that the statute is unconstitutional because it (1) places a burden of proof on the defendant that precludes meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence (see, e.g. , Kliner , 185 Ill. 2d at 177-78; People v. Johnson , 182 Ill. 2d 96, 112 (1998); People v. Simpson , 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996)); (2) fails to require the State to prove the absence of mitigating factors (see, e.g. , People v. Cloutier , 178 Ill. 2d 14 | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Rollins v. Ellwood
green
2 sentences1998Under the Illinois constitutional standard, jurisdiction is to be asserted “only when it is fair, just, and reasonable to require a nonresident defendant to defend an action in Illinois, considering the quality and nature of the defendant’s acts which occur in Illinois or which affect interests located in Illinois.” Rollins, 141 Ill. 2d at 275 ; see Sackett Enterprises, Inc. v. Staren, 211 Ill. 1998Under the Illinois constitutional standard, jurisdiction is to be asserted “only when it is fair, just, and reasonable to require a nonresident defendant to defend an action in Illinois, considering the quality and nature of the defendant's acts which occur in Illinois or which affect interests located in Illinois.” Rollins , 141 Ill. 2d at 275 ; see Sackett Enterprises, Inc. v. Staren , 211 Ill. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Gray
green
2 sentences1977App. 3d 52 , 351 N.E.2d 339 , this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Dieringer, held: “The Illinois Supreme Court has consistently held, where it is contended the punishment imposed in a particular case is excessive, though within the limits prescribed by the legislature, Illinois reviewing courts should not disturb the sentence unless it clearly appears the penalty constitutes a great departure from the Illinois constitutional requirement that all penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense. 1977(People v. Richardson (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 318 , 253 N.E.2d 420 ; People v. Smith (1958), 14 Ill. 2d 95 , 150 N.E.2d 815 ; People v. Gray (1976), 40 Ill. | 2 | 1977–1977 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
1 sentence2012In particular, he contends that his claim is meritorious under the United States Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___ , 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Smith
green
2 sentences1994That right stems from the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination.” (Emphasis added.) (Smith, 93 Ill. 2d at 185 .) Smith never cited or discussed the Illinois constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 1994That right stems from the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination." (Emphasis added.) ( Smith, 93 Ill.2d at 185 , 66 Ill.Dec. 412 , 442 N.E.2d 1325 .) Smith never cited or discussed the Illinois constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank
green
1 sentence1985Thus, the conclusion in this case that, "[i]n summary, the General Assembly may enact retroactive legislation which changes the effect of a prior decision of a *39 reviewing court with respect to cases which have not been finally decided" ( 108 Ill.2d at 19 ) must mean that Cohn is sub silentio overruled. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
The People v. Taylor
green
2 sentences1975People v. Taylor, 33 Ill.2d 417 , 211 N.E.2d 673 . 1975People v. Taylor, 33 Ill.2d 417 , 211 N.E.2d 673 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.