22 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Weavergreen1 sentence2026Id. ¶ 46; People v. Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d 545, 559-60 (1982). ¶ 81 The second and third factors identified in Weaver are particularly relevant here, and they lead us to conclude that Dziedzic’s testimony did not prejudice defendant. | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Alabamagreen1 sentence2023See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 36 (“This list is taken from and is consistent with Miller’s discussion of a juvenile defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics.”); see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78 . ¶ 36 According to defendant, “the core issue” of this case “is not the judge’s failure to list the sentencing factors but rather the judge’s categorical rejection of at least two of the sentencing factors that applied to this case.” (Emphasis in original.) Specifically, defendant contends that the resentencing court “categorically rejected” the second and third factors, namely “whether t | 1 | 1 |
People v. Buffergreen1 sentence2023See Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 36 (“This list is taken from and is consistent with Miller’s discussion of a juvenile defendant’s youth and its attendant characteristics.”); see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 477-78 . ¶ 36 According to defendant, “the core issue” of this case “is not the judge’s failure to list the sentencing factors but rather the judge’s categorical rejection of at least two of the sentencing factors that applied to this case.” (Emphasis in original.) Specifically, defendant contends that the resentencing court “categorically rejected” the second and third factors, namely “whether t | 1 | 1 |
People v. Knoxgreen1 sentence2023We do not find this argument persuasive. ¶ 37 “[B]ecause a trial court need not explicitly analyze each relevant factor or articulate the basis for the sentence imposed, when mitigating evidence is presented before the trial court, it is presumed that the court considered that evidence in imposing the defendant’s sentence.” People v. 12 No. 1-22-0636 Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349 , ¶ 46. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Waregreen1 sentence2003App. 3d 47, 54 , 751 N.E.2d 81, 88 (2001). •5 Regarding the second and third factors, the detention and asportation of L.E. occurred separately from the offense of sexual assault. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Marriage of Eckert
green
2 sentences2004Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 327 . 2004Eckert, 119 Ill.2d at 327 , 116 Ill.Dec. 220 , 518 N.E.2d 1041 . | 4 | 2003–2004 |
People v. Kite
green
2 sentences2024Failure to prove the existence of a specific and immediate threat obviates the need to conduct an inquiry into the second and third factors.” Kite, 153 Ill. 2d at 45 . 2020A defendant’s “[f]ailure to prove the existence of a specific and immediate threat obviates the need to conduct an inquiry into the second and third factors.” Id. | 2 | 2020–2024 |
People v. Ortega
green
2 sentences2023Id. at 369 . ¶ 48 Here, Ridge began representing the defendant on December 1, 2014. 2013We affirm the decision of the trial court to disqualify counsel based on the second and third factors described in Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d 354 . ¶ 24 CONCLUSION ¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the circuit court of Tazewell County is affirmed. ¶ 26 Affirmed. -6- | 2 | 2013–2023 |
Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.
green
2 sentences2009The second and third factors appear to be a “wash.” Townsend, 227 Ill. 2d at 168-69 . 2009The second and third factors appear to be a "wash." Townsend, 227 Ill.2d at 168-69 , 316 Ill.Dec. 505 , 879 N.E.2d 893 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
People Ex Rel. Braver v. Washington
green
2 sentences2003Washington, 311 Ill. 2003Washington , 311 Ill. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Morgan
green
1 sentence2025People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54 . ¶ 15 On appeal, defendant does not argue the State failed to prove the proof is evident or presumption great he committed an eligible offense but contends the State did not adequately prove the second and third factors. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Locasto v. The City of Chicago
green
1 sentence2025Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Chambers v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences2021As the Illinois Supreme Court has written, “The question to be considered in judging the admissibility of a declaration of this character is whether the declaration was made under circumstances that provide ‘considerable assurance’ of its reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness.” (Emphasis added.) Id. (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300 ). 2021As the Illinois Supreme Court has written, “The question to be considered in judging the admissibility of a declaration of this character is whether the declaration was made under circumstances that provide ‘considerable assurance’ of its reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness.” (Emphasis added.) Id. (quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300 ). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People in Interest of G.B
green
1 sentence2020Regardless of whether available courtroom seating “is a compelling interest, only a substantial interest, or something less” (In re G.B., 2018 COA 77, ¶ 31 ), the trial court’s closure did not satisfy the closely connected second and third Waller factors. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Tackett
green
1 sentence2016Accordingly, the "[f]ailure to prove the existence of a specific and immediate threat obviates the need to conduct an inquiry into the second and third factors." Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Holmes
green
1 sentence2013The court recognized a presumption in favor of defendant’s counsel (Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d 204 ), but applied the Ortega factors to find that the presumption in favor of preferred counsel was outweighed by the risk of a potential conflict. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People Ex Rel. Birkett v. Konetski
green
1 sentence2013Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d at 200 . ¶ 16 Here, we are hard pressed to apply the familiar Mathews factors, and most especially the second and third factors, as defendant does not identify for this court what “additional or substitute procedural safeguards” he is seeking. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
The People v. Poland
green
2 sentences1987(People v. Poland (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 175, 181 , 174 N.E.2d 804 .) The second and third factors are absent here. 1987(People v. Poland (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 175, 181 , 174 N.E.2d 804 .) The second and third factors are absent here. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.