10 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rathke v. MacFarlanegreen2 sentences2026Preliminary Injunction ¶18 To grant a party 's motion for a preliminary injunction , the trial court must find that the moving party has demonstrated all six Rathke factors: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) a danger of real, immediate, and irreparable injury which may be prevented by injunctive relief; (3) that there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law; (4) that the granting of a preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest; (5) that the balance of equities favors the injunction; and (6) that the injunction will preserve the status quo pend 2026Preliminary Injunction ¶18 To grant a party's motion for a preliminary injunction, the trial court must find that the moving party has demonstrated all six Rathke factors: 10 (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) a danger of real, immediate, and irreparable injury which may be prevented by injunctive relief; (3) that there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law; (4) that the granting of a preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest; (5) that the balance of equities favors the injunction; and (6) that the injunction will preserve the status quo pen | 1 | 1 |
Springer v. City & County of Denvergreen1 sentence2025See Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 796 (Colo. 2000) (referring to “governmental immunity” as a “defense”); see also Craig v. Rider, 651 P.2d 397, 402 (Colo. 1982) (“[T]he nature of the asserted defense may shed light on the existence and degree of neglect, and possibly on the equitable considerations.”). ¶ 14 To the extent the parties ask us to independently analyze the second and third factors, we decline to do that. | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Longgreen2 sentences2025See Taylor v. HCA-HealthONE LLC, 2018 COA 29, ¶¶ 36, 49-55, 65 (concluding that the district court erred by failing to address the second and third required factors for evaluating a motion to set aside a default judgment and remanding to the district court to consider all three factors together). ¶ 13 Cooper also attempts to salvage the district court’s incomplete analysis by claiming that KMH didn’t develop an argument on the third factor. 2025See Taylor v. HCA-HealthONE LLC, 2018 COA 29, ¶¶ 36, 49-55, 65 (concluding that the district court erred by failing to address the second and third required factors for evaluating a motion to set aside a default judgment and remanding to the district court to consider all three factors together). ¶ 13 Cooper also attempts to salvage the district court’s incomplete analysis by claiming that KMH didn’t develop an argument on the third factor. | 1 | 1 |
Craig v. Ridergreen1 sentence2025See Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 796 (Colo. 2000) (referring to “governmental immunity” as a “defense”); see also Craig v. Rider, 651 P.2d 397, 402 (Colo. 1982) (“[T]he nature of the asserted defense may shed light on the existence and degree of neglect, and possibly on the equitable considerations.”). ¶ 14 To the extent the parties ask us to independently analyze the second and third factors, we decline to do that. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Robertsgreen1 sentence2024See Roberts, 146 P.3d at 593-94 (noting that the prosecutor’s and the court’s burden of complying with the speedy trial statute “includes making a sufficient record that all three elements of section 18-1-405(6)(g)(I), have been met”). | 1 | 1 |
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenzgreen2 sentences2008See Martin Marietta Corp., 823 P.2d at 113 . 2008See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d at 113 ("we cannot conclude with fair assurance that the first element ... for retroactive application has been satisfied, and for that reason we continue with the ... analysis."). | 1 | 1 |
Holter v. Moore and Co.green1 sentence1988See Holter v. Moore and Co., 681 P.2d 962, 964-65 (Colo.App.1983). . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harmelin v. Michigan
green
2 sentences2002Id. at 1004-06 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 . 1992Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, would read prior cases including Solem to hold "that intra- and inter-jurisdictional analyses [the second and third factors in Solem ] are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross dispropor-tionality.” Harmelin, 111 S.Ct. at 2707 . | 2 | 1992–2002 |
Goodman Associates, LLC v. WP Mountain Properties, LLC
green
2 sentences2025Though true, Goodman makes clear that, even if one factor alone is ultimately dispositive, “a court must consider and weigh each” of the three factors “in balance.” 222 P.3d at 320 . 2025After all, whether 5 excusable neglect exists is a “fact-intensive inquiry,” Goodman, 222 P.3d at 319 , and we don’t make factual findings, see Carousel Farms Metro. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Trattler v. Citron
green
1 sentence2009Id. at 228 (noting that the Trattler majority, 182 P.3d at 682 , "emphasized that 'It is unreasonable to deny a party an opportunity to present relevant evidence based on a draconian application of pretrial rules'" and that "'the trial court must strive to afford all parties their day in court and an opportunity to present all relevant evidence at trial "). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Marinez v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF STATE
green
2 sentences1992Marinez, 746 P.2d at 557 . 1992Marinez, 746 P.2d at 557 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People in Interest of CAK
green
2 sentences1989I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the Director of the Division of Labor to hear evidence on the second and third factors for retroactivity set forth in People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603 (Colo.1982). 1989I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the Director of the Division of Labor to hear evidence on the second and third factors for retroactivity set forth in People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603 (Colo.1982). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson
red
2 sentences1989In C.A.K., we adopted the standard for retroactive application of decisions in civil cases set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). 1989In C.A.K., we adopted the standard for retroactive application of decisions in civil cases set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.