six-month rule in New Mexico

2025Thus, the Court held that “when charges are 18 dismissed in the courts of limited jurisdiction, . . . and later refiled in district court, 19 the triggering event for six-month rule purposes is the triggering event that occurred 1 in the court of limited jurisdiction, and the six-month time period is not automatically 2 reset upon the refiling.” Id. 3 {16} In reaching its holding, the Savedra Court was clearly concerned with a literal 4 application of Rule 5-604(B) because it would violate the spirit and purpose of the 5 six-month rule by permitting the state to cause delay in bringing a defen

2025Thus, the Court held that “when charges are 18 dismissed in the courts of limited jurisdiction, . . . and later refiled in district court, 19 the triggering event for six-month rule purposes is the triggering event that occurred 1 in the court of limited jurisdiction, and the six-month time period is not automatically 2 reset upon the refiling.” Id. 3 {16} In reaching its holding, the Savedra Court was clearly concerned with a literal 4 application of Rule 5-604(B) because it would violate the spirit and purpose of the 5 six-month rule by permitting the state to cause delay in bringing a defen

2010Delgado v. Stanley, 83 N.M. 626, 627 , 495 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1972) (holding that the state must demonstrate a bona fide reason for refiling charges after dismissing those charges by filing a nolle prosequi if the defendant asserts that it was done to circumvent the six-month rule).

2010Delgado v. Stanley, 83 N.M. 626, 627 , 495 P.2d 1073, 1074 (1972) (holding that the state must demonstrate a bona fide reason for refiling charges after dismissing those charges by filing a nolle prosequi if the defendant asserts that it was done to circumvent the six-month rule).

2022We, therefore, affirm Defendant’s conviction without reaching the State’s argument about the sufficiency of the record and without reaching the merits of Defendant’s argument on appeal. {16} The purpose of the six-month rule is to “assure the prompt trial and disposition of criminal cases, not to effect dismissals by . . . a technical application.” State v. Flores, 1982-NMSC-132 , ¶ 6, 99 N.M. 44 , 653 P.2d 875 .

2022We, therefore, affirm Defendant’s conviction without reaching the State’s argument about the sufficiency of the record and without reaching the merits of Defendant’s argument on appeal. {16} The purpose of the six-month rule is to “assure the prompt trial and disposition of criminal cases, not to effect dismissals by . . . a technical application.” State v. Flores, 1982-NMSC-132 , ¶ 6, 99 N.M. 44 , 653 P.2d 875 .

2014See 4 State v. Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, ¶ 14 , 122 N.M. 831 , 932 P.2d 1075 (stating that if 5 a defendant claims the state has filed a nolle prosequi and reinstated charges in order 6 to circumvent the six-month rule, then the burden is on the state to demonstrate its 7 good faith), abrogated on other grounds by Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025 . 8 {7} As to the second issue, we are not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that “this 9 procedural maneuvering” violated his right to be free from double jeopardy. 10 Defendant’s right to be free of double jeopardy is protected by the United States and 11 New Me

2014See 4 State v. Bolton, 1997-NMCA-007, ¶ 14 , 122 N.M. 831 , 932 P.2d 1075 (stating that if 5 a defendant claims the state has filed a nolle prosequi and reinstated charges in order 6 to circumvent the six-month rule, then the burden is on the state to demonstrate its 7 good faith), abrogated on other grounds by Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025 . 8 {7} As to the second issue, we are not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that “this 9 procedural maneuvering” violated his right to be free from double jeopardy. 10 Defendant’s right to be free of double jeopardy is protected by the United States and 11 New Me

2024See Heinsen 2 1 II, 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 27 (“If the [s]tate can establish that it has acted in order to 2 preserve its right to appeal an order suppressing evidence, which is substantial proof 3 of a material fact in the proceeding, and that it is not doing so for the purpose of 4 delay, . . . the six-month rule should commence six months after the date of 5 arraignment, or waiver of arraignment, on the indictment or information or under 6 any other applicable provision of Rule 5-604[(B) NMRA (2005)] (former version of 7 rule governing commencement of trial in refiled concurrent jurisdiction case

2024See 2005-NMSC-035, ¶ 1 (“We . . . hold the practical finality 4 exception to the final judgment rule is not applicable, because the State may obtain 5 judicial review of such a suppression order by filing a nolle prosequi to dismiss some 6 or all of the charges in the magistrate court after the suppression order is entered and 7 refiling in the district court for a trial de novo.” (emphasis added)); id. ¶ 27 (“[W]e 8 hold that a new six-month rule period should begin to run when the [s]tate files a 9 nolle prosequi following a suppression order by a magistrate court and refiles in 10 district

2011Defendant asserts that his situation is governed by the holding and rationale of State v. Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145 , 140 N.M. 779 , 149 P.3d 95 , abrogated by State v. Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025 , 148 N.M. 301 , 236 P.3d 20 and State v. Yates, 2008-NMCA-129 , 144 N.M. 859 , 192 P.3d 1236 (both holding in essence that dismissal of a magistrate court case does not stop the running of the magistrate court’s six-month rule when the matter is refiled, unless the State overcomes the presumption that the refiled case is a continuation of the original prosecution).

2011Defendant asserts that his situation is governed by the holding and rationale of State v. Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145 , 140 N.M. 779 , 149 P.3d 95 , abrogated by State v. Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025 , 148 N.M. 301 , 236 P.3d 20 and State v. Yates, 2008-NMCA-129 , 144 N.M. 859 , 192 P.3d 1236 (both holding in essence that dismissal of a magistrate court case does not stop the running of the magistrate court’s six-month rule when the matter is refiled, unless the State overcomes the presumption that the refiled case is a continuation of the original prosecution).

2010Our Supreme Court has held, 4 however, that the six-month rule is to be read with a “common sense approach.” State 5 v. Mendoza, 108 N.M. 446, 448-49 , 774 P.2d 440, 442-43 (1989); State v. Flores, 99 6 N.M. 44, 46 , 653 P.2d 875, 877 (1982) (stating that the six-month rule “is to be read 7 with common sense”).

2010See Mendoza, 108 N.M. at 449 , 774 P.2d at 443 (discussing circumstances 11 under which the proceedings are suspended). 12 Defendant cites to—and attempts to distinguish—three cases in which we held 13 there was no violation of the six-month rule.

2010Cf. State v. Lucero, 108 N.M. 7 548, 550, 775 P.2d 750, 752 (Ct. App. 1989) (noting in a six-month rule case that if 8 a new complaint, though charging the same offenses, is “based on new facts or 9 evidence” presented by the state, then the previous indictment is superseded).

2006The purpose of a six-month rule, such as Rule 6-506 “is to encourage the orderly and prompt disposition of criminal cases.” State v. Lucero, 108 N.M. 548, 551 , 775 P.2d 750, 753 (Ct.App.1989).

2011Defendant asserts that his situation is governed by the holding and rationale of State v. Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145 , 140 N.M. 779 , 149 P.3d 95 , abrogated by State v. Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025 , 148 N.M. 301 , 236 P.3d 20 and State v. Yates, 2008-NMCA-129 , 144 N.M. 859 , 192 P.3d 1236 (both holding in essence that dismissal of a magistrate court case does not stop the running of the magistrate court’s six-month rule when the matter is refiled, unless the State overcomes the presumption that the refiled case is a continuation of the original prosecution).

2010See Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145, ¶ 7 , 140 N.M. 779 , 149 P.3d 95 (reiterating that “the State cannot escape the effect of the six-month rule if the dismissal and re-filing are done for a bad reason, including doing so for the purpose of circumventing the six-month rule”); accord State ex rel.

2008See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 109 N.M. 313, 316 , 785 P.2d 224, 227 (1989) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule if a plea agreement is not approved); State v. Coburn, 120 N.M. 214, 217 , 900 P.2d 963, 966 (Ct.App.1995) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule when an event extending pre-trial activity is to the mutual benefit of parties); State v. Altherr, 117 N.M. 403, 406 , 872 P.2d 376, 379 (Ct.App.1994) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule when a defendant is participating in a pre-prosecution diversion program). {12} However, la

2008See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 109 N.M. 313, 316 , 785 P.2d 224, 227 (1989) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule if a plea agreement is not approved); State v. Coburn, 120 N.M. 214, 217 , 900 P.2d 963, 966 (Ct.App.1995) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule when an event extending pre-trial activity is to the mutual benefit of parties); State v. Altherr, 117 N.M. 403, 406 , 872 P.2d 376, 379 (Ct.App.1994) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule when a defendant is participating in a pre-prosecution diversion program). {12} However, la

2024See Duran, 2009-NMSC-030, ¶ 11 ; see also State v. Cardenas, 14 2003-NMCA-051, ¶ 12 , 133 N.M. 516 , 64 P.3d 543 (noting that the six-month rule 15 “is a bright-line rule, designed to assure prompt disposition of criminal cases” 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2012See Duran v. Eichwald, 2009-NMSC-030, ¶ 15 , 146 N.M. 341 , 210 P.3d 238 (stating that all versions of the six-month rule, including Rule 6-506, were amended by a Supreme Court order to give courts discretion to decide whether the failure to timely commence trial should result in dismissal of the charges or whether some other sanction would be more appropriate). {7} In the district court hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Defendant’s counsel advised the court that dismissal was mandatory, stating that “the fact remains that under the rule ... if the . . . time is not extended then the c

2008See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 109 N.M. 313, 316 , 785 P.2d 224, 227 (1989) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule if a plea agreement is not approved); State v. Coburn, 120 N.M. 214, 217 , 900 P.2d 963, 966 (Ct.App.1995) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule when an event extending pre-trial activity is to the mutual benefit of parties); State v. Altherr, 117 N.M. 403, 406 , 872 P.2d 376, 379 (Ct.App.1994) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule when a defendant is participating in a pre-prosecution diversion program). {12} However, la

2008See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 109 N.M. 313, 316 , 785 P.2d 224, 227 (1989) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule if a plea agreement is not approved); State v. Coburn, 120 N.M. 214, 217 , 900 P.2d 963, 966 (Ct.App.1995) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule when an event extending pre-trial activity is to the mutual benefit of parties); State v. Altherr, 117 N.M. 403, 406 , 872 P.2d 376, 379 (Ct.App.1994) (setting aside a literal application of the six-month rule when a defendant is participating in a pre-prosecution diversion program). {12} However, la

2020The State responds: (1) Defendant’s case was brought to trial within the permissive time frame for simple cases established in State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 47-48 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 , and therefore a speedy trial analysis was not triggered; and (2) even if the six-month rule applies to district court proceedings, a new six-month period began once the complaint was refiled in district court. {13} “The right of the accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution.” State

2020The State responds: (1) Defendant’s case was brought to trial within the permissive time frame for simple cases established in State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 47-48 , 146 N.M. 499 , 212 P.3d 387 , and therefore a speedy trial analysis was not triggered; and (2) even if the six-month rule applies to district court proceedings, a new six-month period began once the complaint was refiled in district court. {13} “The right of the accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed by both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution.” State

2024See Duran, 2009-NMSC-030, ¶ 11 ; see also State v. Cardenas, 14 2003-NMCA-051, ¶ 12 , 133 N.M. 516 , 64 P.3d 543 (noting that the six-month rule 15 “is a bright-line rule, designed to assure prompt disposition of criminal cases” 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2024See Duran, 2009-NMSC-030, ¶ 11 ; see also State v. Cardenas, 14 2003-NMCA-051, ¶ 12 , 133 N.M. 516 , 64 P.3d 543 (noting that the six-month rule 15 “is a bright-line rule, designed to assure prompt disposition of criminal cases” 16 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

2022Unpersuaded, we affirm. {2} “[T]he six-month rule [is] to be construed in a common-sense and untechnical manner.” State v. Littlefield, 2008-NMCA-109, ¶ 11 , 144 N.M. 655 , 190 P.3d 1150 . “[W]e avoid technical dismissals where the equities and a common sense approach advise against a dismissal.” State v. Candelario, 2008-NMCA-119, ¶ 7 , 144 N.M. 794 , 192 P.3d 789 ; see also State v. Martinez, 2011-NMSC-010, ¶ 9 , 149 N.M. 370 , 249 P.3d 82 (“[W]e have previously expressed our dissatisfaction with the number of highly technical dismissals under the six-month rule.

2022Unpersuaded, we affirm. {2} “[T]he six-month rule [is] to be construed in a common-sense and untechnical manner.” State v. Littlefield, 2008-NMCA-109, ¶ 11 , 144 N.M. 655 , 190 P.3d 1150 . “[W]e avoid technical dismissals where the equities and a common sense approach advise against a dismissal.” State v. Candelario, 2008-NMCA-119, ¶ 7 , 144 N.M. 794 , 192 P.3d 789 ; see also State v. Martinez, 2011-NMSC-010, ¶ 9 , 149 N.M. 370 , 249 P.3d 82 (“[W]e have previously expressed our dissatisfaction with the number of highly technical dismissals under the six-month rule.

2025Had the Court intended a speedy trial 6 inquiry to completely replace the protections afforded a criminal defendant by Rule 7 6-506(B), it would have amended Rule 6-506(B) to eliminate the six-month rule in 8 magistrate court, supplanting it with a speedy trial inquiry, as it did with the district 9 court six-month rule. 10 {20} “The purpose of [Rule 6-506(B)] is to encourage the orderly and prompt 11 disposition of criminal cases, and to guard against lack of preparedness on the part 12 of the state.” State v. Rayburns, 2008-NMCA-050, ¶ 8 , 143 N.M. 803 , 182 P.3d 786 13 (internal quotation m

2010Compare State v. Rayburns, 19 2008-NMCA-050, ¶ 10 , 143 N.M. 803 , 182 P.3d 786 (noting the state bears the 4 1 burden of demonstrating its actions were legitimate where it refiles a case in district 2 court and fails to bring the case to trial within the six-month period that began in 3 magistrate court and explaining the state must demonstrate its actions were not done 4 for bad reasons or an improper purpose); with State v. Yates, 2008-NMCA-129, ¶ 5 , 5 144 N.M. 859 , 192 P.3d 1236 aff’d by Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025 (holding a 6 defendant’s decision to go to trial that might affect prosecutori

2025Had the Court intended a speedy trial 6 inquiry to completely replace the protections afforded a criminal defendant by Rule 7 6-506(B), it would have amended Rule 6-506(B) to eliminate the six-month rule in 8 magistrate court, supplanting it with a speedy trial inquiry, as it did with the district 9 court six-month rule. 10 {20} “The purpose of [Rule 6-506(B)] is to encourage the orderly and prompt 11 disposition of criminal cases, and to guard against lack of preparedness on the part 12 of the state.” State v. Rayburns, 2008-NMCA-050, ¶ 8 , 143 N.M. 803 , 182 P.3d 786 13 (internal quotation m

2025Had the Court intended a speedy trial 6 inquiry to completely replace the protections afforded a criminal defendant by Rule 7 6-506(B), it would have amended Rule 6-506(B) to eliminate the six-month rule in 8 magistrate court, supplanting it with a speedy trial inquiry, as it did with the district 9 court six-month rule. 10 {20} “The purpose of [Rule 6-506(B)] is to encourage the orderly and prompt 11 disposition of criminal cases, and to guard against lack of preparedness on the part 12 of the state.” State v. Rayburns, 2008-NMCA-050, ¶ 8 , 143 N.M. 803 , 182 P.3d 786 13 (internal quotation m

2011See, e.g., State v. Manzanares, 1996-NMSC-028 , ¶ 6, 121 N.M. 798 , 918 P.2d 714 (“[Ojnly incidentally may [the six-month rule’s] implementation turn on factors determinative of constitutional rights.”).

2011See, e.g., State v. Manzanares, 1996-NMSC-028 , ¶ 6, 121 N.M. 798 , 918 P.2d 714 (“[Ojnly incidentally may [the six-month rule’s] implementation turn on factors determinative of constitutional rights.”).

2011Defendant asserts that his situation is governed by the holding and rationale of State v. Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145 , 140 N.M. 779 , 149 P.3d 95 , abrogated by State v. Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025 , 148 N.M. 301 , 236 P.3d 20 and State v. Yates, 2008-NMCA-129 , 144 N.M. 859 , 192 P.3d 1236 (both holding in essence that dismissal of a magistrate court case does not stop the running of the magistrate court’s six-month rule when the matter is refiled, unless the State overcomes the presumption that the refiled case is a continuation of the original prosecution).

2011Defendant asserts that his situation is governed by the holding and rationale of State v. Carreon, 2006-NMCA-145 , 140 N.M. 779 , 149 P.3d 95 , abrogated by State v. Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025 , 148 N.M. 301 , 236 P.3d 20 and State v. Yates, 2008-NMCA-129 , 144 N.M. 859 , 192 P.3d 1236 (both holding in essence that dismissal of a magistrate court case does not stop the running of the magistrate court’s six-month rule when the matter is refiled, unless the State overcomes the presumption that the refiled case is a continuation of the original prosecution).

2010See Dominguez, 2007-NMCA-132, ¶¶ 1, 10, 7 (analogizing exceptional circumstances under the six-month rule to exceptional 8 circumstances under the timely appeal rule in a case of first impression).

2010A defendant’s right to a speedy trial 19 under the six-month rule is not contingent; it “is a criminal defendant’s right, not that 4 1 of the State, the courts, or any other party[.]” State v. Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025 , ¶ 2 8, ___ N.M. ___, 236 P.3d 20 , cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-___, ___ N.M. ___, ___ 3 P.3d __ (No. 31,288, June 24, 2010).1 Our courts have described the six-month rule 4 as a bright-line rule, meant to insure the timely disposition of criminal cases. 5 Dominguez, 2007-NMCA-132, ¶ 6 .

2010Our Supreme Court has held, 4 however, that the six-month rule is to be read with a “common sense approach.” State 5 v. Mendoza, 108 N.M. 446, 448-49 , 774 P.2d 440, 442-43 (1989); State v. Flores, 99 6 N.M. 44, 46 , 653 P.2d 875, 877 (1982) (stating that the six-month rule “is to be read 7 with common sense”).

2010See Mendoza, 108 N.M. at 449 , 774 P.2d at 443 (discussing circumstances 11 under which the proceedings are suspended). 12 Defendant cites to—and attempts to distinguish—three cases in which we held 13 there was no violation of the six-month rule.

2024The victims’ testimony received at trial was sufficient to support the verdicts reached below. {5} Defendant next asserts that his right to a speedy trial was violated and proceeds to argue the four-factor test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). [BIC 19- 25] Defendant did file a motion to dismiss below, relying on the six-month rule from Rule 6-506 NMRA, Rule 7-506 NMRA, and Rule 8-506 NMRA. [1 RP 180] Defendant did not, however, proffer any argument regarding the Barker factors and, instead, his motion to dismiss “was couched in a belief that the six-month rule . . . applied t

2012The six-month rule originally was implemented in response to the United 16 States Supreme Court’s decision in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

2010In State v. Lobato, 2006-NMCA-051 , 14 ¶ 22, 139 N.M. 431 , 134 P.3d 122 , the defendant argued that because the trial court’s 15 ruling declaring a mistrial was erroneous, the six-month rule was not restarted.

2010In State v. Lobato, 2006-NMCA-051 , 14 ¶ 22, 139 N.M. 431 , 134 P.3d 122 , the defendant argued that because the trial court’s 15 ruling declaring a mistrial was erroneous, the six-month rule was not restarted.

2022Most importantly, it is “not designed to allow a defendant to sleep upon rights under the rule while the state continues prosecution of a case which is subject to being dismissed upon motion.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {17} This Court and our Supreme Court have both held that the six-month rule is not self-executing: “A defendant must file a motion to dismiss to trigger a dismissal.” Id.; see also State v. Smallwood, 2007-NMSC-005, ¶ 22 , 141 N.M. 178 , 152 P.3d 821 (“[T]o trigger a dismissal, a defendant must file a motion to dismiss.”).

2010Id. ¶ 29. 5 1 Similarly, in State v. Jaramillo, 2004-NMCA-041, ¶¶ 3-5 , 135 N.M. 322 , 88 2 P.3d 264 , we took a common sense approach to the rule and held that there was no 3 violation where the defendant acquiesced in the delay by assuming that his co- 4 defendant’s appeal was dispositive of his case, where he participated in numerous 5 hearings and conferences, and where he only alleged a violation of the rule seven 6 months after it expired. 7 Finally, in State v. Guzman, 2004-NMCA-097, ¶ 2 , 136 N.M. 253 , 96 P.3d 8 1173, the district court granted an unopposed continuance for trial, and

2022Unpersuaded, we affirm. {2} “[T]he six-month rule [is] to be construed in a common-sense and untechnical manner.” State v. Littlefield, 2008-NMCA-109, ¶ 11 , 144 N.M. 655 , 190 P.3d 1150 . “[W]e avoid technical dismissals where the equities and a common sense approach advise against a dismissal.” State v. Candelario, 2008-NMCA-119, ¶ 7 , 144 N.M. 794 , 192 P.3d 789 ; see also State v. Martinez, 2011-NMSC-010, ¶ 9 , 149 N.M. 370 , 249 P.3d 82 (“[W]e have previously expressed our dissatisfaction with the number of highly technical dismissals under the six-month rule.

2022Unpersuaded, we affirm. {2} “[T]he six-month rule [is] to be construed in a common-sense and untechnical manner.” State v. Littlefield, 2008-NMCA-109, ¶ 11 , 144 N.M. 655 , 190 P.3d 1150 . “[W]e avoid technical dismissals where the equities and a common sense approach advise against a dismissal.” State v. Candelario, 2008-NMCA-119, ¶ 7 , 144 N.M. 794 , 192 P.3d 789 ; see also State v. Martinez, 2011-NMSC-010, ¶ 9 , 149 N.M. 370 , 249 P.3d 82 (“[W]e have previously expressed our dissatisfaction with the number of highly technical dismissals under the six-month rule.

2011See State v. Stefani, 15 2006-NMCA-073, ¶ 18 , 139 N.M. 719 , 137 P.3d 659 (noting that a six-month rule 16 issue is analytically separate from a constitutional speedy trial issue, and the 17 procedural rule and the constitutional rule are distinct in their operation and reach). 18 If a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial were based on the time for trial 19 set by the rules of procedure, as Defendant suggests, a defendant in the district court 2 1 would have no right to a speedy trial, as the six-month rule that Garza relied upon for 2 its constitutional rule has been withdrawn

2011See State v. Stefani, 15 2006-NMCA-073, ¶ 18 , 139 N.M. 719 , 137 P.3d 659 (noting that a six-month rule 16 issue is analytically separate from a constitutional speedy trial issue, and the 17 procedural rule and the constitutional rule are distinct in their operation and reach). 18 If a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial were based on the time for trial 19 set by the rules of procedure, as Defendant suggests, a defendant in the district court 2 1 would have no right to a speedy trial, as the six-month rule that Garza relied upon for 2 its constitutional rule has been withdrawn